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Abstract 
Corporate Governance has been a focus of attention in many countries around the 
world. A renaissance in governance issues has led global convergence to codes of good 
governance and practices. This study examines the adoption of a relatively new 
corporate governance code for KSA listed companies and its adaptation in an 
institutional setting where family and government ownership prevails. The study 
focuses on the governance mechanisms adopted by companies and the influences on 
such practices, and identifies those that are not being practiced and the reasons behind 
such resistance using both interviews and a questionnaire survey. The results indicate 
that coercive pressures has resulted in the diffusion of some governance practices, but 
normative isomorphic tendencies arising from sociocultural factors have prevented 
governance practices from being adopted effectively leading companies to decouple 
material practice for merely ceremonial practices. The prevailing institutional logics 
within government and family owned companies leads to heterogeneity among listed 
companies regarding their governance structures and practices. The findings of this 
thesis show that policy makers should consider the network of actors that determine 
practice in order to improve the governance framework.  
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter one: Introduction 
  
  
2 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
The series of global corporate collapses of the last two decades that were attributed to 
failures in corporate governance,1 along with the financial crisis of 2008, led to a 
renaissance in corporate governance issues in general, but particularly on the role of 
the board of directors (Adams et al., 2008). Specifically, ‘Good’ corporate governance 
has been suggested as leading directly to greater efficiency as a result of stronger 
relationships with stakeholders, (World Bank, 2009). The renewed worldwide interest 
in corporate governance has led a number of world organisations, including the OECD, 
IMF and World Bank to provide guidelines on corporate governance principles 
(OECD, 2004) that supplement the many national governance codes and guidelines 
that have also emerged (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Dahya et al., 2002).  
 
 
The global convergence of corporate governance codes and practices has led to neglect 
of the need for national and regional context to be considered. Institutional 
environments vary significantly both across developing countries in particular, and 
from those in developed nations (Judge, 2009). Researchers have recently started to 
recognise that corporate governance is influenced by the embedded institutional 
environments within a country’s context, and that such institutional influences differ 
because of differing national and global institutional pressures (Turnbull 1997; Aoki, 
2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Adams et al., 2010; Wanyama et al., 2009).  Thus, 
the institutional setting may matter, but the question of how they influence specific 
governance systems and practices remains an underdeveloped research area 
(Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). 
                                                          
1
 Enron and WorldCom in the United States and Parmelant and Maxwell in Europe are examples of such 
collapses 
  
3 
 
In this context, the present thesis is concerned with corporate governance practices in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), particularly those related to the boards of 
directors of KSA-listed companies. The organisational field of Saudi-listed companies 
has been targeted for the current study as KSA is regarded as hugely influential within 
the Middle East and around the world, being one of the largest oil producers in the 
world with vast influence on the global pricing of oil and oil products (Niblock, 2013). 
The Saudi market is the largest in Arabia and promoting better governance will help 
develop further the capital market (World Bank, 2009). In fact, an assessment of 
governance practices carried out by the World Bank in 2008 concluded that 
governance practices of Saudi listed companies were weak and the introduction of the 
Saudi corporate governance code in 2006 was a measure designed to increase 
investors’ confidence after the market crashed in February of that year (Falgi, 2009). 
By focusing on Saudi Arabia, an Arab and Middle Eastern country, where the culture 
is very different from Western nations, the study intended to contribute to our 
understanding of corporate governance in a rarely-examined context2.  
1.2 Research Objective  
 
Previous calls within the governance literature encourage research addressing the issue 
of environment norms and institutional influences on corporate practices (Filatotchev 
and Boyd, 2009; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  From this perspective, the main 
objective of this thesis is to examine the factors that influence the corporate 
governance practices of KSA-listed companies.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Interested parties in Saudi companies such as foreign investors may also find that their communication 
and engagement with Saudi companies are facilitated if there is an understanding regarding the current 
issues and challenges facing the implementation of corporate governance. 
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Underpinning this broad motivation is the specific research question of the extent to 
which institutions factors influence the corporate governance practices of KSA listed 
companies. 
  
In order to achieve this aim, the perspectives of regulators and board members have 
been sought in order to understand the practices of Saudi boards and the factors 
influencing such practices to emerge. Forty-three interviews were conducted with such 
individuals, and a questionnaire survey distributed amongst a sample of executives of 
KSA-listed companies. These research methods allow the study’s institutional theory 
perspective to inform the enquiry directly. 
 
1.3 Motivation and significance 
 
Most of the focus of corporate governance literature has been on developed countries, 
although more attention has been placed on developing countries in recent years 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Wanyama et al. 2009; Solomon, 2010). A review of the 
literature raises the issue of the scarcity of research on corporate governance in 
developing countries, in Gulf countries and especially in Saudi Arabia, despite calls for 
more work in this area (Al-Harkan, 2005; Al-Huseen, 2009; Falgi, 2009). Research on 
corporate governance has been predominantly influenced by the work of Berle and 
Means (1932) which emphasises the conflicts of interest arising from the separation of 
ownership and control; this has led to various governance mechanisms (i.e. boards of 
directors, executive compensation, board committees etc.) being introduced in order to 
ensure that corporate managers pursue shareholder’s best interests. This pattern has led 
corporate governance research in a direction dictated by agency theory, although its 
applicability to corporate governance research in non-Anglo Saxon contexts has been 
  
5 
 
called into question (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Heracleous 
and Lan, 2012). Examining corporate governance from a different institutional 
perspective in the context of an emerging economy such as Saudi Arabia is a novel 
research avenue, but given the growth of the developing world economy, an important 
one.  
 
This study contributes to reducing this gap by investigating corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia and the factors influencing its practice, using an institutional theory 
perspective. A key stimulus for the research was a desire to determine the nature of 
corporate governance practices in modern-day KSA and how the introduction of the 
Saudi corporate governance code in 2006 influenced board practices. A further 
motivation for the study is investigation of whether governmental policy on corporate 
governance can be informed in a meaningful way by studying practice in the Middle 
East in a context specific manner; the previous literature has questioned how the 
region’s countries adopt corporate governance practices based on Anglo-Saxon 
governance models (Robertson et al., 2001; Mellahi et al., 2011). 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The reminder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two highlights the 
historical background of the Arabian Peninsula leading up to the establishment of the 
KSA in 1932. The chapter describes the nation’s corporate culture including the legal 
and market structure, as well as discussing the recent corporate governance code in an 
effort to inform the reader about the framework of corporate governance in which 
KSA companies operate.   
  
6 
 
The relevant literature is reviewed in Chapter Three. The chapter discusses the 
importance of corporate governance by first looking at its diffusion worldwide, with 
emphasis on the UKs experience as the first country to introduce a corporate 
governance code. The chapter also considers the main characteristics of governance 
models and reviews previous studies in developed- and developing-countries, before 
focusing more specifically on boards of directors regarding their roles, responsibilities 
and structures. The final section of the chapter discusses previous corporate 
governance studies within the Saudi context.     
 
Chapter Four discusses the theoretical frameworks typically adopted in corporate 
governance studies before describing the institutional theory which provides the 
framework of this research. The various levels of analyses that institutional theory 
offers is outlined. The chapter then explains why institutional theory was adopted in 
the current study.  
 
The specific methodology and methods underpinning this study are outlined in Chapter 
Five. Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of 
science and the nature of society are presented in this chapter, and the four paradigms 
envisioned by Burrell and Morgan are discussed. After viewing alternatives to Burrell 
and Morgan’s framework, the chapter then justifies the adopted philosophical stance 
which led the researcher to select the interpretive paradigm. The chapter then discusses 
in detail the two research methods used in collecting the empirical data in order to be 
able to answer the research questions that form the basis of this thesis. The use of both 
semi-structured interviews and questionnaires form a desirable mix whereby the 
limitations of one method overcome the strengths of another. 
 
  
7 
 
The findings from the interviews are reported and analysed in Chapter Six. The 
purpose of the interviews is to gain insight and perspective on the views of regulators, 
board members, executive directors and board secretaries on corporate governance 
practices among KSA-listed companies in the aftermath of the issuing of the nation’s 
first governance code. Chapter Seven then provides the questionnaire results, in an 
attempt to complement the interview findings via a larger sample and formal statistical 
analysis. 
 
Finally, Chapter Eight provides an overall summary of the thesis, and draws out the 
key conclusions, main findings and contributions of the study. The limitations of the 
work are highlighted as are policy implications, suggestions on ways to improve 
corporate governance in KSA, and avenues for future research in the area.  
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Chapter Two: Saudi Background 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter gave an introduction to this thesis. The main purpose of the 
present chapter is to provide an overview on Saudi Arabia as a background to the 
present study. The chapter starts with a general historical background to the Arabian 
region in Section 2.2, before Section 2.3 gives an overview of the development of 
modern-day Saudi Arabia. Section 2.4 then discusses the main legal characteristics in 
the country, including the 2006 corporate governance code, before Section 2.5 
summarises and concludes.   
 
2.2 History Background of the Arabian Region (the Birth of Islam) 
 
Saudi Arabia is the heart of the Islamic world as all Muslims travel to the holy mosque 
in the city of Makkah Almukarramah to perform their pilgrimage (El Mallakh, 1982). 
Thus it is important to provide some background about the Arabian Peninsula and touch 
upon some of the historical features that helped to shape the institutional environment in 
the region.  
 
The pre-Islamic era was called Jahiliyah (the time of ignorance) when wars arose 
between tribes for often insignificant reasons
3
, the infanticide of females was common 
and paganism, the worshiping of idols occurred. In the year 613 the prophet Mohammed 
(PBUH)
4
 started to preach to his people in Makkah about Islam, introducing the concept 
that “there is only one God and that only God is to be worshiped”. The idea faced 
rejection by many of his relatives and clan because Mohammed’s preaching condemned 
                                                          
3
  A war named ‘Albasoos’ lasted 40 years between two rival tribes over a camel dispute in the year 
495ad. 
4
 Muslims are encouraged to say the phrase ‘Peace be upon him’ when the Prophet Mohammed is 
mentioned. 
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the pagan rituals that brought pilgrims to Makkah to worship the idols of that time along 
with economic resources.  
 
Islam therefore threatened the economic interests of the leaders in Makkah (Wynbrandt, 
2010). Mohammed’s preaching did not attract many followers at the beginning, with 
only his wife and a few of his family members following his teachings, but soon more 
started to join, most of whom were very poor and/or were slaves at the time. 
Mohammed also attracted a few of the leading figures in society (Wynbrandt, 2010), but 
became a threat to Makkah’s leaders who ordered his assassination. Mohammed was 
unable to stay in Makkah, and in the year 622 he travelled (hijjrah
5
) to Medinah and 
formed the first Islamic state. The spread of Islam began to expand beyond the Arab 
world as Islam preached equality, recommended hard work, recognised that there was 
only one God and emphasised honesty, loyalty and solidarity (Ali, 1995). The Arabic 
culture has two key embedded values: Islam and Bedouin tribalism (Al-Ghathami, 
2009). Islamic teachings ruled out the habits of tribalism which discriminated people on 
the basis of clan and race, replacing them with the notions of equality among people and 
differentiation on the basis of ‘good’ virtues (Al-Ghathami, 2009). As the Holy Quran 
states: 
“O mankind, indeed we have created you from male and female and 
made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, 
the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. 
Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted” ( Alhujurat, verse13) 
 
After the death of the prophet in 632, the Arab people selected among them a successor 
(Calipha) to be their leader (Sharifa, 2011). The first successor was ‘Abu baker’ who 
ruled for two years, and after his death three others succeeded him; Omar, Ottoman and 
                                                          
5
 The travel of the phrophet from Makkah to Medinah is recognized as the hijjrah which is recognised as 
the start of the Muslim calendar.  
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Ali. The time of these four is called the era of Al-Rashideen (The Rightly Guided 
Caliphs). The Philosopher Bin Khaldoon notes in his memos how Islam raised the 
Arabs:  
“Consider the moment when religion dominated Al-Rashideen’s policies 
and led them to observe a religious law designed to promote the moral 
and material interest of civilization. Under a series of successors to the 
Prophet, how vast their empire became and how strong it was 
established.” (Translation in Mansfield, 1985, p. 37, emphasis added) 
 
The dynasty lines started then with the Ommayah dynasty (661-750) ruling from 
Damascus and changing the capital of the Islamic world as a sign of their power. The 
tribal leaders of Ommayah were located in Damascus at that time, and this is an 
example of one of the struggles that Islam preached against as the ruling power became 
a descendent right rather than being based on “the most righteous” (Al-Ghathami, 
2009). The Abbasiyyah dynasty followed from 750 to 1258, and then the Ottomans 
(1299-1923). 
 
By the time of the last phase of the Ottoman Empire, the people of Arabia practiced 
Jahiliyah rituals again; several Islamic teachings had been abolished and many pre-
Islamic idolatry rituals re-emerged. People quickly became attached to tribalism, and 
wars arose between tribes leading to a harsh environment and ‘survival of the fittest’ 
(Okashah, 2001).  
 
2.3 The Social System in Arabia   
 
The social system in the Arabian Peninsula thus became based on clans and tribes as 
these provided the only protection for individuals; the rules of social conduct were set 
down by a small number of families, as the protectors and providers to clan members 
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(Al-Naqeeb, 1996)
6
, and each tribe had a Sheikh who acted as the tribal leader 
(Wynbrandt, 2010). The tribe became the source of legal and regulatory rules for 
individuals led to alliances being made solely at tribe level; as a result tribe’s were best 
placed to preserve peace and resolve conflicts (El Mallakh, 1982). The assurance of 
survival in harsh living conditions strengthened peoples’ loyalty to the tribal system, 
making it the main political force in the Arabian Peninsula (Peterson, 1977; Malaika, 
1993; Okashah, 2001). Individualism had no part in tribal mentality unless it served the 
tribe’s interests, leading individuals to act in accordance with tribal and family 
expectations (Malaika, 1993). These relationships between individuals, family 
friendship and the tribe- and hence society- allowed people to commit strongly to tribal 
and family obligations, obligations which are very distinctive from those found in 
Western societies (Berger, 1957) This historical context explains the modern system of 
ruling families in Arabia, as Arab leaders have their roots in tribal society (Muna, 
1979). Most political and economic power is in the hands of the ruling family and those 
who are close to the centre, such as government officials, those with high social status 
and prestige within society (Berger, 1957). Thus, strong kinship is one of the main 
institutional characteristics of Arab society (Muna, 1979).   
 
Cultural and social values are important within tribes and values such as kinship and 
nepotism remain a distinctive part of relationships in Saudi Arabia today (Muna, 1979; 
Malaika, 1993). In this context, Muna (1979) noted that:  
“Small groups in Arab society are formed on the basis of primordial ties 
such as family, school or neighbourhood friendship, religious and regional 
affiliation as well as other competing ties and loyalties such as political 
party, trade, or profession. However, the strength of such ties, and the types 
of them that are important, differ from person to person and from society to 
society; it will be argued that it is the former primordial ties which are 
generally the more pervasive and more important.”. (p.73) 
                                                          
6
 Individual would relate themselves to tribes rather than an  area or a city, however most tribes would be 
associated with particular cities or areas (Okashah, 2001). 
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Thus, these values and norms of Arabs influence behaviour and expectations within 
society in which family and relationship ties dominate (Muna.1979). This framework is 
equally important when looking at organizational structures where Arab managers and 
owners rely primarily on family and friends for ‘getting things done’ (Muna, 1979). 
 
2.4 Saudi Arabia 
 
In 1744 an Islamic scholar called Mohammad bin Abdulwahhab returned from Makkah 
where he had been taught Islam and started preaching to his people within the Najd 
province
7
 about the wrong doings of idolatry rituals and the true teachings of the 
prophet Mohammed. However, bin Abdulwahhab was weak and did not have the 
protection needed to fulfil this task; he therefore made an alliance with the Sheikh of 
Dariyah,
8
 Mohammed bin Saud,
9
 with the new government being based on the teachings 
of Islam; this was the start of the country of Saudi Arabia (Ibn-Bishr, 1982).
10
 
 
The Al- Saud family increased its rule over the Arabian Peninsula and, with the help of 
the English, were able to seize most of the Ottomans’ land. By 1932 King Abdul-Aziz 
had united most of the Arabian Peninsula under one flag, the point now regarded as the 
birth of modern Saudi Arabia (AL-Turaiqi, 2008). The country was founded on the 
teachings of Islam, with the legal system
11
 based on the two Islamic sources: the Holy 
Quran; and the Sunnah (teachings of the prophet Mohammed, PBUH) (El Mallakh, 
1982; Al-Harkan, 2005). The beliefs and values of Islamic teaching have now been 
embedded in Saudi society and underpin social norms and practices. Islamic teachings 
                                                          
7
 The middle region of Saudi Arabia 
8
 A small village within the region of central of current Saudi Arabia 
9
 The great grandfarther of King Abdul-Aziz the founder of current Saudi Arabia 
10
 The name of the country came from the family name of the founder Mohammed bin Saud.  
11
 The civil law is also adopted in regulating companies and entities; this is touched upon later in this chapter. 
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have also influenced the regulatory environment in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the King was 
criticised by religious scholars when he allowed the telephone, motorcycles and radio in 
the country as they were regarded as “tools of the devil” (Yergin, 1991). This happened 
because Arabs felt the need to protect themselves from western modes of life, and are 
typically sceptical about western technologies that might influence their cultural values 
and religious beliefs (Martyr, 1985).  Here, Mansfield (1977) noted that: 
“No one can tell what political and social institutions the Arab 
people will have developed by the end of the momentous century. 
All that can be said with certainty is that, however much they 
derive from foreign movements and ideas, they will have a 
specifically Arab and Islamic character” (p.552) 
 
 
2.4.1 Geography of The Country 
 
To most Muslims, Saudi Arabia is the most religious place on earth. The two holy 
mosques
12
 are located in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom covers most of the Arabian 
Peninsula (around 2.3 million square kilometres) with most of the land being desert 
with scarce water resources (El Mallakh, 1982). Figure 2.1 shows a map of Saudi 
Arabia as it is today.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 The two holy mosques are located in the cities of Makkah and Al-madeenah  
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Figure 2.1 Map of Saudi Arabia 
 
 
Saudi Arabia is a unique setting with its own institutional factors that are likely to 
impact on the corporate governance framework. The country has only been in existence 
for 90 years, and before then many tribes struggled to survive. It is an emerging 
economy that has only just started to gain access to the world economy since it became 
a member of the World Trade Organization as late as 2005 (WTO, 2012; Habib, 
2008)
13
.  Saudi Arabia maintains its own values and cultures that govern most social 
conduct, yet the development of a traditional country such as Saudi needs to maintain an 
institutional structure that absorbs change (Eisenstadt, 1989).  
 
 
                                                          
13
  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/saudi_arabia_e.htm accessed on 18.12.2012 
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2.4.2 Revolutionary Oil 
 
Before oil was discovered Saudi Arabia was regarded as one of the poorest countries in 
the world; 80% of the country is covered in desert and it lacked natural resources. The 
search for oil started in Saudi Arabia in 1933
14
, and when oil was found in 1938 
petrodollars began flooding the kingdom. Today, no country in the world has as much 
influence as Saudi Arabia on the production and pricing of crude oil and other 
petrochemicals (Niblock, 2013). It is one of the leading countries in oil and 
petrochemical production, (See Figure 2.2), by far the largest in the Middle East. The 
discovery of oil changed the landscape of the country over a short period of time, 
shifting the landscape from having the king, Abdul Aziz, carry the country’s national 
treasury on a back of a camel with 95% of its inhabitants illiterate, to driving cars, 
building sky scrapers and witnessing progressive change and development (Butler, 
2008; Yergin, 1991). In order to embark on the modernization of the country there was 
a heavy reliance on the experience of qualified foreign workers in various industries 
(Ali, 1995). Although, with the country having one fifth of the world’s proven oil 
reserves, nearly 75% of the kingdom’s revenue comes from the sale of oil (CIA, 2011), 
there have been many efforts to diversify the Saudi economy in order to reduce the 
country’s dependency on a single industry and to encourage foreign investment (MEP, 
2009; Chazi et al., 2010).  
 
Saudi Arabia is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, as Table 2.1 
demonstrates, is ranked as one of the most competitive of GCC countries; however, the 
table also shows that it is regarded as one of the most corrupt countries in the Gulf 
region (Transparency International, 2012). The Saudi government has maintained a 
                                                          
14
 An agreement was signed in 1933 between Saudi Arabia and California’s Standard Oil for the latter to 
explore oil wells in Saudi Arabia (Yergin, 1991). 
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series of five-year plans to achieve goals in various socio- economic levels, with plans 
in education, healthcare, human resources, infrastructure and energy; according to the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning (2009) the strategy focuses on improving living 
standards, developing human resources, employability and increasing the production of 
local Saudi goods  for sale on the national and international market (MEP, 2009). 
Table 2.1 Rank of Gulf countries (competitiveness/ corruption) 
Competitiveness Rank* Corruption Rank** 
Qatar KSA 
KSA Kuwait 
UAE Oman 
Oman Bahrain 
Kuwait UAE 
Bahrain Qatar 
Note: the table lists gulf countries ranked in terms of their competitiveness (Competitiveness is 
developed by the world economic forum and the OECD based on a set of institutions and policies 
which determine the level of countries productivity) and corruption. Source:* (Scheab, 2012) **/ 
(Transparency international, 2012) 
Figure 2.2  
 
  
18 
 
The development strategy is geared towards innovation, but is also, intends to take into 
account social and cultural perceptions and attitudes towards development; therefore, an 
important element of each of the five-year plans is maintaining the social and cultural 
values and beliefs underpinning Saudi society. Such an approach led to the acceptance 
by Saudi Sheikhs and rulers of the modernisation of the country experienced after the 
discovery of oil.  
 
The importance of the previous discussion to the present study lies in the tendency for 
executive managers and board members from Saudi society to carry with them these 
social and cultural values (Muna, 1979; Malaika, 1993). Thus, it is important to note 
that some aspects of laws and regulations, including corporate governance codes, based 
and derived within a western context, might not be applicable within the context of an 
Arab country such as Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.5 Legal and Regulatory System  
 
The legal system that governs corporations in Saudi Arabia is based on French civil law 
(Koraytem, 2000; Sourial, 2004). According to La Porta et al. (1997, 2000) a country’s 
legal system, particular the extent of enforcement of laws, is fundamental to corporate 
governance practices and economic development. This section of the chapter therefore 
gives an overview of the legal structure pertaining within Saudi Arabia to provide an 
understanding of the regulatory environment in which its listed companies operate. To 
this end, the next section discusses the regulatory bodies currently in place in Saudi 
Arabia and the ownership structure of the kingdom’s listed companies.    
 
 
  
19 
 
2.5.1 Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was established in 1953. Its main role related 
to the oversight of commercial activities within the KSA. The Ministry is responsible 
for initiating and implementing trade policies, issuing and implementing new 
regulations, encouraging local trade, developing and maintaining foreign trade relations 
and also helping expand production and export of non-oil products
15
. However, one of 
the Ministry’s key responsibilities is to oversee company law, an issue which is 
discussed later in detail.  More generally, the Ministry is concerned with developing 
plans for improving the skills and qualifications of Saudi citizens in order for them to 
offer more to the economy and replace foreign workers.    
 
2.5.2 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
 
SAMA was established as the central bank of Saudi Arabia16 to regulate and monitor 
economic affairs in the financial sector. Its main functions are to: (i) issue the national 
currency, the Saudi Riyal; (ii) act as a banker for the government; (iii) supervise 
commercial banks; (iv) manage the Kingdom’s foreign exchange reserves; (v) conduct 
monetary policy aimed at promoting price and exchange rate stability; and (vi) promote 
growth and ensure the soundness of the financial system.  
 
In 1984 SAMA took over as the regulator of the Saudi stock market. It oversees 
development of the financial system and all matters related to trading, introducing an 
Electronic Share and Information System (ESIS) in 1990. Recently, SAMA introduced 
a corporate governance code (Appendix B) specific to the financial sector, in line with 
                                                          
15
 http://www.mci.gov.sa/AboutMinistry/Pages/MinistryFunctions.aspx 
16 By Royal decree on 20/4/1952 
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the recommendations of the Basel committee on banking supervision and the OECD 
principles on corporate governance (SAMA, 2011).  
 
2.5.3 The Capital Market Authority  
 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established in 2003 with financial and 
administrative independence; it acts as the developer and regulator of the Saudi Arabian 
capital market. 17  Its stated objective is to establish and maintain an ‘appropriate’ 
investment environment. In achieving these aims the role of CMA comprises: (i) 
organising and developing the Saudi capital market (TADAWUL) and developing the 
methodologies of trading in securities; (ii) ensuring protection for investors against 
unethical practices such as fraud, manipulation or trading based on insider information; 
(iii) achieving justice, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions; (iv) 
developing rules and regulations that reduce risk bearings when dealing with securities 
investments; (v) developing, regulating and monitoring the issuing and trading of 
securities; (vi) regulating and monitoring the activities of the entities which are under its 
jurisdiction; and (vii) regulating and monitoring the disclosure of information regarding 
securities and their issuers.  In 2006, the CMA issued the first KSA corporate 
governance code, arguably as a means to restore investor confidence after the market 
crashed in February of that year (Falgi, 2009). The CMA continues to issue regulations 
and communications through announcements on its web site and holds ‘awareness 
seminars’ in order to increase investors understanding of issues such as corporate 
governance (CMA, 2011).  
 
                                                          
17
 Established by Royal Decree No (M/30) dated 2/6/1424H. 
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2.5.4 Saudi Stock Market (TADAWUL) 
 
The Saudi stock market was first established, unofficially, in 1935 (Al-Jaser, 2002). 
However, only five companies were listed by 1954, and it remained unregulated, and 
informal (Al-Barrak, 2005). SAMA was ordered by a royal decree to regulate and 
monitor all securities activities in 1984 (SAMA, 2013), with the role passing to CMA 
when it was established in 2003. The stock market became a joint stock company after a 
Royal decree issued by the King in 2007 (TADAWUL).
18
 
 
Only 81 companies were listed on the stock exchange in 2005, but today the stock 
market is one of the largest in the Middle East
19
 with, as Table 2.2 shows, nearly 160 
companies listed by the end of 2012 (Tadawul, 2013).
20
  
 
The Saudi stock market is also regarded as one of the largest in the region in terms of 
market capitalization (Piesse et al. 2012) with a value at the end of 2012 of 1400bn SR. 
TADAWUL’s role is therefore important; these comprise: (i) operating the market 
effectively and efficiently; (ii) ensuring market integrity and fairness (iii) supporting 
investor education and awareness efforts; (iv) developing service excellence for 
customers (Brokers, issuers, investors,); and (v) developing the exchange’s capabilities 
and competencies.  
 
 
 
                                                          
18
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
ewIE8TIwODYFMDA08Tn7AQZx93YwN3I_3gxCL9gmxHRQCI_lsB/ 
19
 According to world bank Saudi Arabia market capitalization is 373 billion by the end of 2012 
20
 One of the reasons for the increase in the number of listed companies is the privatisation process that 
the government has embarked on in a variety of its economic sectors (Al-Ghamedi, 2012). 
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Table 2.2 Saudi Stock Market Exchange 2007-2012 
Year No. Listed 
Companies 
No shares 
traded 
(Million SR) 
Value of shares 
traded (Billion 
SR) 
Market Cap for 
issued shares 
(Billion SR) 
Share 
price 
index 
2007 111 57829 2557.7 1946.4 11038.7 
2008 117 58726 1962.9 924.5 4803 
2009 144 56685 1264 1195.5 6121.8 
2010 147 33255 759.2 1325.4 6620.8 
2011 150 48544 1098.8 1270.8 6417.7 
2012 158 82540 1929.3 1400.34 6801.2 
Note: The table illustrates the growth of the Saudi stock exchange in recent years in terms of the number of 
companies listed and shares traded SR= Saudi Riyals. Source: Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) 
 
The Saudi stock exchange had 158 companies in 2012, spread across fifteen sectors; 
Table 2.3 details the number and percentage of companies in each sector.  
Table 2.3 Saudi Listed Companies Classification  
Sectors No. Of 
Firms 
Percentage 
Banks & Financial Services 11 7.0% 
Petrochemical Industries 13 8.2% 
Cement 12 7.6% 
Retail 12 7.6% 
Energy & Utilities 2 1.3% 
Agriculture & Food Industries 16 10.1% 
Telecommunication & Information Technology 5 3.2% 
Insurance 33 20.9% 
Multi-Investment 7 4.4% 
Industrial Investment 14 8.9% 
Building & Construction 15 9.5% 
Real Estate Development 8 5.1% 
Transport 4 2.5% 
Media and Publishing 3 1.9% 
Hotel & Tourism 3 1.9% 
Total 158 100 % 
Note: The table indicates the number and percentage of companies in each sector in the Saudi stock market as of 
2012. Source: (Tadawul). 
 
 
2.5.5 Ownership Structure 
 
The corporate governance model in Saudi Arabia can be classified as an ‘insider model’ 
with many of the companies in the stock market owned by families and government 
shareholders (Solomon, 2010). Figure 2.3 shows that more than 50 companies in the 
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stock market (33%) are primarily controlled by family shareholders; this is in line with 
the ‘family and founder’ ideology playing a major role in the corporate sector in Saudi 
Arabia (Robertson et al., 2013). In addition, the government has explicit control over 12 
companies in the stock market. In fact, previous studies have argued that 75 percent of 
the companies in the stock market are family-controlled while the remaining 25 percent 
are in the control of the government (Toonsi, 2003); the current, more recent, study 
suggests a different pattern, reflecting new companies listing on the Saudi Stock Market 
over the past ten years with different types of ownership structure often foreign and/or 
dispersed. Figure 2.3 also shows that fifteen percent of companies in the stock market 
are controlled by both family and the government, representing the second highest 
amount of control of the stock market.  
Figure 2.3 Ownership Structures of Saudi Listed Companies 
 
Note: The figure shows the number of companies controlled by each group of shareholders for all listed 
companies. The information used in developing this figure was obtained from the disclosed ownership 
information on the Saudi Stock Exchange web site (Tadawul) as of 6 June 2013. 
 
2.5.6 Islamic Companies 
 
In KSA, the term ‘Islamic company’ is used to identify a firm that adheres to Islamic 
teaching in its activities, financing and investments. Thus companies that deal with 
pork, alcohol, gambling or speculation are prohibited in Islam and therefore are 
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regarded as non-Islamic. Even if a company’s main activities do not include any other 
‘non-halal’ activity, it still might be regarded as a non-Islamic company if it has 
interest-based loans as interest is regarded as an impure activity within Islam (Uusmani, 
2002)
 21
. Islamic companies comply with Sharia law, and many of the companies listed 
in the stock exchange strive to be Islamic, because Muslims will often prefer to invest in 
Sharia-compliant companies (Uusmani, 2002). These religious influences have led 
companies to make changes to ensure that their loans are interest free; currently around 
half the companies on the Saudi stock market are regarded as Islamic companies (Al-
Fouzan, 2012).
22
  
 
2.6 Companies Act  
 
In the conduct of business, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry introduced a new 
regulation, approved by the council of ministers, in the form of the Companies Act 
1965. The law represented a first attempt to regulate companies and their affairs in 
Saudi Arabia, covering regulations regarding company structures and corporate 
governance issues such as the number of directors on the board, CEO duality, board 
composition, remuneration, internal control and shareholder’s rights. The act was 
updated in 2007, and is currently undergoing discussion in the Consultative council
23
 
(Majlis Alshura) regarding reforms of many sections to be recommended to the council 
of ministers to adopt these amendments.
24
 
 
                                                          
21
 The teachings of Hinduism, Christianity and Judaism also prohibit interest (usury) (Hassan and Lewis, 
2007) 
22
 http://main.islammessage.com/newspage.aspx?id=9663 
23 Is an advisory body to the council of ministers, it roles comprises of giving opinions to the council. 
24 According to a member of the Consultative council, they have reached a draft of a new company act 
that will be introduced to the Ministry of councils for approval.   
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2.7 Saudi Corporate Governance Code  
 
The Gulf region hosts many countries that have adopted corporate governance codes. 
The first such country to adopt a code was Oman, in 2002, possibly due to the influence 
of foreign investors, since Oman has offered an open market to these parties  since 1998 
(Sourial, 2004). Before 2006 there was no unified corporate governance regulation in 
KSA (Sharif, 2006), resulting in very limited disclosure and transparency. The corporate 
governance code in Saudi Arabia was introduced at the end of 2006 by the CMA25, and 
marked the first attempt by an official body to formalise corporate governance practices 
in Saudi Arabia. The CMA argues that the code was introduced in an attempt to reduce 
the extent of rumours within the market and fraudulent practices, particularly insider 
trading (CMA, 2011).  
 
The Saudi corporate governance code has three main sections. The first relating to the 
rights of shareholders and the AGM; the second is in regard to issues of disclosure and 
transparency, while the final section discusses the role and responsibilities of the board 
of directors as well as board composition. The code mostly adopts a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach, but  the CMA board has mandated some sections of the code such as Article 9 
which points to: (i) disclosure in the board’s report on other directorships of the board 
members; (ii) composition of the board, identifying executive and non-executive board 
members; (iii) details on the compensation of the board members; and (iv) disclosing 
the compensation of the five highest executives, including the CEO and CFO; and (v) 
noting in the director’s report the sections of the code that the company has complied 
with and justifying cases of non-compliance (comply or explain). The CMA also 
mandates section I and J of Article Five whereby the company must make available to 
                                                          
25
 An English translation of the code is provided in Appendix A 
  
26 
 
all shareholders the minutes of AGMs and inform the stock exchange of decisions made 
in AGMs (CMA, 2006). Recently, in December 2012, the CMA board mandated that all 
listed companies should develop an internal corporate governance code that is 
consistent with the Saudi corporate governance code, and also develop explicit policies 
and procedures for board membership (CMA, 2012). 
 
2.7.1 The Board of Directors 
 
The Saudi corporate governance code emphasizes the important role of the board of 
directors, stating that there should be a majority of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) on 
the board, while also outlining a number of specific roles that the board is expected to 
carry out. The code states that the main functions of the board are: (i) to approve the 
strategic plans and main objectives of the company and supervise their implementation; 
(ii) to lay down a comprehensive strategy for the company; (iii) to determine the most 
appropriate capital structure for the company, its strategies and financial objectives and 
approve its annual budgets; (iv) to decide the performance objectives to be achieved and 
supervise the implementation of these and the overall performance of the company; (v) 
to review and approve the organisational and functional structures of the company on a 
periodic basis. 
 
The code states that boards should have between three and eleven members comprising 
executive and non-executive directors with a majority being non-executive, while 
emphasising that there should be at least three of the latter who are independent.  
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2.7.2 Board Sub Committees 
 
The only board committees that were adopted in Saudi companies before the 
introduction of the 2006 code were the audit committee (Al-Motaz, 2003) and in the 
banking sector, the sharia and executive committee (Al-Ajlan, 2005). The Saudi 
corporate governance code has recommended the adoption the audit committee, which 
the board is required to have by law as well as the remuneration and nomination 
committee. The code allows companies to establish any other committees they require.  
 
2.7.3 The Audit Committee in KSA 
 
The establishment of audit committees in Saudi Arabia became mandatory after the 
Ministry of Commerce issued a resolution in 1994 requesting all public listed 
companies to do so (Al-Twaijry et al, 2002; Al-Moataz, 2003; Al-Lehaidan, 2006). The 
number of companies that had established such committees in the past was very low. 
Before 1994, no company had established any board committees (Piesse et al., 2012), 
indeed, by 2001, only 5 companies had an audit committee (Al-Qarni, 2004.). Even 
where audit committees were established, they were composed of executive directors 
(Al-Moataz, 2003). The corporate governance code emphasises the importance of the 
audit committee and, as a listing requirement, the CMA now mandates that listed 
companies should have an audit committee.  
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2.7.4 The Remuneration and Nomination Committee26  
 
At the initial introduction of the corporate governance code, the setting up of 
remuneration and nomination committee was a voluntary provision of the code, but later 
in 2010 the CMA regulatory body mandated that all listed companies should establish a 
remuneration and nomination committee by 2011 (CMA, 2010). The main duties of this 
committee are: (i) recommend the nomination of individuals onto the board; (ii) the 
annual evaluation of the experience and qualifications needed for board membership, 
including the time which a board member should allocate to performing board tasks; 
(iii) evaluating board structure and recommending any changes to the board; (iv) 
establishing the strengths and weaknesses of the board and recommending to the board 
ways to resolve them; (v) ensuring the independency of INED and that there are no 
conflict of interests when board members have other directorships; and (vi) developing 
a clear policy for the remuneration of board members and the executive team.  
 
Table 2.4 gives an illustration of the institutions and organisations that have an 
influence on companies’ structures in Saudi Arabia. The establishment of different 
institutions to deal with more specific regulations and tasks such as SAMA, CMA, and 
SOCPA has paved the way for better efficiency and wider adoption of regulations, 
including the establishment of corporate governance departments within the Saudi stock 
market (OECD, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 In the KSA corporate governance code the Remuneration and Nomination Committee is referes to as 
one committee and not as two separate committees as that in codes in other counties.  
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Table 2.4 Laws and Organizations Influencing Saudi Companies 
Regulation/Organisation Year Description/ Purpose  
 
The Income Tax and Zakat Law 
 
1950 First regulation that mandated companies to 
hold  accounts in order to calculate the Zakat 
(Islamic tax) 
The Companies Act 
 
1965 Over 200 articles govern the legal framework 
of entities 
Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA) 
 
1992 Regulator and issuer of accounting and 
auditing standards 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
 
2003 Regulate and develop the capital market 
the Saudi Corporate Governance Code  
 
2006 Regulate the corporate governance practices of 
listed companies 
SAMA Corporate Governance Code for 
the Banking Sector 2012  
 
2012 Regulate the corporate governance practices of 
banks whether listed or non-listed 
Note: the table shows the regulations and regulatory bodies that influence Saudi companies.  
 
In 2008, the World Bank assessed the implementation of corporate governance  
practices in KSA listed companies, benchmarked on the OECD principles of corporate 
governance, and found that although the Saudi corporate governance code had 
mandatory disclosure requirements regarding corporate governance issues such as board 
and committee composition, related party transactions and remuneration of directors, 
the level of corporate governance disclosure by listed companies was still very weak, 
with no laws protecting whistle-blowers. They also noted that there were no succession 
or performance evaluation frameworks for board members or executives and that very 
few companies had established remuneration and nomination committees (World Bank, 
2009).  
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2.8 Summary 
 
This chapter first provided an overview on the political, cultural and social context of 
the Arabian Peninsula, including setting out how tribal and social values arose and 
became embedded within the Arab culture.  
The chapter then looked at the establishment of the KSA, focusing on the country’s 
legal system and the main institutions and regulations that govern businesses in Saudi 
Arabia, including the establishment of the Saudi stock market. Finally, the chapter 
discussed the main sections of the Saudi corporate governance code issued in 2006 and 
in force at the time of this study.  
 
This chapter sets out the context of the current study in order to be able to better provide 
meaningful explanation on the factors that influence corporate governance practices 
among the organisational field of KSA-listed companies. The next chapter will examine 
the relevant corporate governance literature.  
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Chapter three: Literature review 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter gave a background to the Saudi context. This chapter reviews the 
academic literature on corporate governance by discussing the main themes. The 
remaining of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 gives different views on 
the definitions of corporate governance and defines corporate governance in the context 
of this thesis. Section 3.3 outlines the diffusion of corporate governance codes starting 
with the UK experience.  Section 3.4 outlines the current corporate governance models, 
before Section 3.5 discusses corporate governance in emerging markets. Then Section 
3.6 outlines the main corporate governance mechanisms, before section 3.7 that reviews 
corporate governance studies in the Saudi context, finally Section3.8 gives a summary 
of the chapter.  
 
3.2 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance has been approached from a variety of disciplines such as 
economics, management, law, politics, culture, and sociology, contributing to different 
definitions from different angles, resulting in no one agreed upon definition of corporate 
governance ( Mallin, 2007). For example, the Cadbury code (1992, p.13) notes that it is 
“the systems by which companies are directed and controlled”. Letza et al. (2004) offer 
a stakeholder’s perspective on corporate governance, stating:  
Corporate governance is about the understanding and institutional 
arrangements for relationships among various economic actors and corporate 
participants who may have direct or indirect interests in a corporation, such 
as shareholders, directors/managers, employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, local communities, government, and the general public (p. 242). 
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Corporate governance is defined by Zingales (1997) from an economic perspective as: 
‘The complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the 
quasi-rents generated in the course of a relationship’ (p.496) 
 
The International financial corporation (IFC) also defines Corporate Governance as: 
“The structures and processes for the direction and control of companies. 
Corporate governance concerns the relationships among the management, 
the Board of Directors, the controlling shareholders, minority shareholders 
and other stakeholders”. 
 
The OECD (1999) also gave a definition for corporate governance that: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined” (p. 11). 
 
La Porta et al. (2000, p. 4) also define corporate governance as ‘a set of mechanisms 
through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders’. 
Tricker (1984) gives another definition from an accountability perspective, stating that: 
 
“Corporate governance is concerned with the process by which corporate 
entities, particularly limited liability companies, are governed: that is with 
the exercise of power over the direction of the enterprise, the supervisory 
and control of executive actions, the concern for the effect of the entity on 
other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and the regulation 
of the corporation within the jurisdiction of the states in which it operates” 
(p.8).  
 
Definitions of corporate governance share the concern of companies for their 
shareholders, their internal control systems, engagement with stakeholder groups and 
external aspects of their roles in society (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cadbury, 1992; 
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OECD, 1999). Mallin (2007) states that an important aspect of corporate governance 
lies in ensuring that an effective internal control system is adopted, and also that no one 
person or group has too much power over the decision making of the board. Blair (1995, 
p. 3) gives a broader view of corporate governance as:  
“The whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, 
how that control is exercised and how the risks and returns from the 
activities they undertake are allocated”.    
 
The previous definitions identify corporate governance from the paradigm and 
perspective of each subject’s view on corporate governance issues, whether from legal, 
social or economic perspectives. The latter definition of corporate governance by Blair 
identifies with many of the dilemmas surrounding businesses and their environment, 
and is in line with the pattern of the current research and is used here for this research.  
 
Corporate governance was introduced as a measure to prevent corporate failures 
globally (Dunne et al., 2003; Mallin, 2007). The importance of corporate governance 
rose with the financial collapses and scandals that were a result of failures in 
governance structures, such as the Asian financial crisis 1997-1999, the collapses of 
Enron and WorldCom in the US, also in  Europe, Royal Ahold, Parmalat Maxwell and 
Polly Peck (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Melis, 2005). The case of Enron is regarded 
as one of the most significant collapses attributed to failures in corporate governance 
mechanisms over internal control systems and the weak functioning of non-executive 
directors (Solomon, 2007). An example of bad corporate governance is that of Royal 
Ahold, a Dutch company, which had a dominating chief executive officer (CEO) whose 
decisions led the company to suffer a £500 million loss and the role of institutional 
investors was also oppressed by having such a dominating CEO (Mallin, 2007). 
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A lack of independence in the board room is also a main corporate governance 
weakness that may lead to a company’s failure (Mallin, 2007). Parmalat had 13 
directors, only 3 of whom were regarded as independent. This is a possible example of 
the important role of independent non-executive directors. These aspects of the board of 
directors will be discussed in more detail in an upcoming section. 
 
The importance of corporate governance is not only as means to reduce corporate 
scandals but also to promote growth, accountability, gaining access to external finance,  
lowering the cost of debt and  reducing the probability of financial crisis (McGee, 2009 
; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Having defined the term corporate governance and its 
importance the chapter now turns to the diffusion of codes of governance, starting with 
the UK’s experience because the first corporate governance code was established in the 
UK. 
 
 
3.3 The Diffusion of Corporate Governance Codes 
 
In the last two decades, many codes and regulatory reports have been adopted around 
the world and have been developed to introduce greater transparency, accountability and 
to gain investors’ confidence in the markets in order to attract investments (Mallin, 
2007; Burton et al., 2004). Further, many countries have industries that have been state-
owned, the privatization process of these industries has led to a need for better corporate 
governance (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Mallin, 2007).  
 
The Cadbury Report was the first code to establish the foundations for corporate 
governance, driven by many company collapses, such as the Maxwell affair in 1991, 
which was regarded at that time as the greatest fraud of the 20
th
 century (Solomon, 
2007; Tricker, 2009). Sir Adrian Cadbury chaired the committee and the published 
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report is known by his name, although its official title is “The Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance”. The code focused on the board of directors as the most 
important and fundamental corporate governance mechanism. 
 
The Cadbury code focused on three main issues relating to corporate governance: the 
role and responsibilities of the board of directors; auditing; and the role of shareholders. 
Cadbury (1992) describes the role of the board of directors as leading the company by 
providing effective leadership and overseeing the management of the company, and also 
suggests that the role of the chairman should be separate from that of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). Cadbury (1992) also considers the role of non-executive 
directors (NEDs) on the board to bring knowledge, experience and independent 
judgment, emphasising the importance of the NED’s independence. One of the 
recommendations of Cadbury (1992) was for a new committee to be established to 
review the level of implementation and compliance of the not hitherto mandatory 
Cadbury Report. The Greenbury Committee (1995) was thus established in January 
1995 focusing on director remuneration because of the concern of shareholders and the 
public about the high salaries of “Fat Cat” directors at that time (Greenbury, 1995). 
 
The Hampel committee was established to review both the Cadbury Report and the 
Greenbury Report, issuing its recommendations in 1998 (Mallin 2007; Solomon 2007). 
By 1998, the Combined Code was published, considering the recommendations of 
Cadbury, Greenbury and the Hampel Reports (Keasey et al. 2005; Mallin 2007; 
Solomon, 2007). Shortly afterwards, the Turnbull committee was established to give 
guidelines for companies to follow in order to implement effective internal control 
systems (Keasey et al. 2005; Mallin, 2007). A few years later, in 2001, the Myners 
Review focused on the role of institutional investors.  
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After the Enron scandal in the US, many countries updated their corporate governance 
systems. One of the causes of the failure of Enron and other companies at that time was 
due to the ineffectiveness of the non-executive directors (Solomon, 2007). This might 
be why in the UK the Higgs committee (2003) reviewed the role of non-executive 
directors to enhance their effectiveness and independence by improving the Cadbury 
recommendations in ensuring the independence of outside directors (Keasey et al. 2005; 
Solomon, 2007). The forty page document emphasised more regulation, although 
voluntary, to enhance the independence of board of directors, and it is regarded as the 
UK’s equivalent to Sarbane-Oxley due to its time of publication after the aftermath of 
Enron.  
The Smith Report was also published in 2003. The report gave guidance on the 
relationship between companies and external auditors and on the role of the audit 
committee. Attention to the role of audit committees came about as a result of the 
scandals at that time, which were also attributed to weak audit committees (Solomon, 
2007). The second draft of the UK Combined Code was published in late 2003 
incorporating the recommendations of all previous reports. However, the new code did 
not take into account some of the recommendations of the Higgs Report, which raised 
some concerns, for example it did not suggest that the chairman of the board should not 
be  the chairman of the nomination committee (Higgs et al. 2003). In January 2006 the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) released the revised Combined Code (2006), 
making changes to the 2003 code. For example,  it allowed the Chairman of the board to 
be a candidate for the chair of the remuneration committee (Solomon, 2007). The FRC 
introduced a newer version of the Combined Code in 2008; the main changes were 
related to the chairman of a company being unable to be a chairman of another company 
from the FTSE 100, and removing the restriction of the chairman for being a member of 
the audit committee.  
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After the recent financial crisis, the Walker review was established in 2009 and gave its 
final review to the FRC on the state of corporate governance in financial institutions.  
This lead to the revised 2010 combined code which emphasized the strategic and 
stewardship role of the board. In 2011 Lord Davies was requested by the UK coalition 
government to commence a review of the barriers of board diversity and the weak 
representation of women directors in boardrooms (Mallin, 2013). The FRC issued a new 
code in 2012 that requests the nomination committees to include in the annual report the 
recruitment policy on board room diversity, the revised code also required that audit 
committees inform shareholders on how they carried out their roles, and to fully explain 
to shareholders cases of non-compliance with the codes guidelines (FRC, 2012; Mallin, 
2013). 
The corporate governance framework in the UK was not achieved over night, on the 
contrary, it has been over two decades since the publication of the first corporate 
governance report in the UK, yet many governance reforms and regulation still take 
place. Thus, it can be learnt from the UK experience that codes are not meant to be solid 
rules that have no room for flexibility, but need to develop in the context of the 
economic and social affairs in which a country strives to achieve. Such an experience 
may shed some light to other countries such as Saudi Arabia on how a country’s 
approach to corporate governance may be enhanced and developed. 
 
In the US, many financial scandals, such as Enron, led to regulatory reform. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was issued in 2002 focusing on financial reporting and 
internal control systems. A major requirement of SOX is that the CEO and CFO (Chief 
Financial Officer) of US listed companies must certify that the annual and quarterly 
financial statements truly represent the financial aspects of the company, thus making 
them accountable for the accuracy of the financial statements (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 
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2007). Auditors of US companies are obliged to audit the internal controls of the 
company and check and report on the effectiveness of the internal control system 
(Solomon, 2007). Although the legislation had been a draft several years prior to its 
issuing, the US congress was lobbying against more regulation at that time, However 
the financial scandals showed a coercive influence on the congress to change their 
opinion regarding SOX which resulted in the issuing of the act. This also shows that 
events such as financial scandals and failures make opportunities to criticize current 
regulatory practice which paves the way for new governance reforms. The need of 
efficiency and attracting external capital has also resulted in the convergence to 
corporate governance codes all around the world (Maher and Andersson, 2000).  
 
 
3.3.1 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance was published in 1999, giving 
guidelines to many countries around the world to use the principles as a benchmark for 
developing their own codes, especially OECD countries and emerging economies 
(Enrione et al,. 2006; OECD 1999). The World Bank and other international bodies like 
the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) have also recommended the 
development of corporate governance on a global scale.  
 
In 2002, a review by the OECD corporate governance group was carried out, looking at 
the challenges that countries faced when adopting the OECD principles while also 
taking into account the scandals at that time, which led to a new version of the corporate 
governance principles in 2004. The OECD principles of corporate governance are 
classified into six specific areas: (i) ensuring the basis for an effective corporate 
governance framework; (ii) the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; (iii) 
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the equitable treatment of shareholders; (iv) the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance; (v) disclosure and transparency; and (vi) the responsibilities of the board. 
These principles were published to take into account the fact that countries differ in 
regard to their culture and their stage of market development. 
 
The OECD principals of corporate governance have had an influence on the codes of 
many developing Arab countries, and UK and US corporate governance have also 
influenced other developing countries to develop their codes. India, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore have all developed a corporate governance 
code (Allen, 2000); however, the practices of developing countries in regards to their 
corporate governance codes are still limited (Harabi, 2007). 
 
The commonly accepted principles have been driven mainly from Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The efforts of the OECD in governance reform seem to be in line with the 
notion of a global convergence to a national system of corporate governance (Mallin, 
2002). The adoption of laws and legislations from developed countries to developing 
countries has proven to be unsuccessful (Black and Kraakman, 1996). Kapardis and 
Psaros (2006) suggest four requirements in order for an Anglo Saxon model to be 
effective in other developing countries around the world: (i) a low concentration of 
ownership; (ii) accurate, reliable, timely information flow to the market; (iii) a highly 
liquid and sophisticated security market; and (iv) a well-developed legal infrastructure 
to protect against wealth transfer and insider dealing. An Anglo Saxon model that is 
adopted in emerging countries should have the criterion of that model in order to 
produce an effective outcome. The next section will illustrate more on corporate 
governance models. 
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3.3.2 Convergence of Corporate Governance codes 
 
The Cadbury Report inspired other countries around the world to start developing their 
own corporate governance codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Triker, 2009) 
and formed the starting point of an institutionalized process of corporate governance 
code adoption (Enrione et al, 2006). France developed the Vienot Report (1995), the 
Cromme Code in Germany (2002), where there is a two-tier (dual) board
27
. Denmark 
also introduced its Norby Report in 2001 that was voluntary for companies to adopt. By 
2008, sixty eight countries, including transition and developing countries, had 
established a code of corporate governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), while 
the efforts of other organizations, such as the World Bank and the OECD have also been 
important in encouraging countries to adopt governance principles. 
 
3.3.3 Mandatory Vs Voluntary 
 
Corporate governance reform in the US has chosen the mandatory implementation of 
corporate governance, this implementation approach has been influenced by the 
financial scandals in the US and that mandating governance reform may reduce such 
scandals (MacNeil and Li, 2006) whereas in the UK, a voluntary approach has been 
established, by either complying with the code or explaining the non-compliance 
(Solomon, 2007; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Such an approach is argued to be 
effective under three assumptions; (i) the flexibility of firms to adjust to governance 
mechanisms more suitable to them; (ii) financial markets are able to assess the adequacy 
of corporate governance practices; and ( iii) the ability of the legal framework to serve 
the corporate governance agenda (MacNeil and Li, 2006). It should be noted that the 
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 A dual board is where there exist two boards: the supervisory board (supervising) and an executive 
board, and the German CG code requires companies to have employee representatives on the former 
(Donnelly, Gamble, Jackson, & Parkinson, 2001). However this board tends to be dominated by 
representatives of the larger shareholders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2008).  
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approach to corporate governance reform in the UK and US has focused on the relevant 
issues in each country, noting that each country has different approaches that serves the 
interests of the corporate governance agenda. In this context, a developing country such 
as Saudi Arabia with many cultural and social differences from western countries, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, should take into account these differences when 
enacting corporate governance regulations. The next section discusses the different 
corporate governance models. 
 
3.4 Corporate Governance Models 
 
The legal system of a country and the ownership structure of the firm have been argued 
to be the main factors to influence corporate governance models (La Porta et al., 1997 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Solomon, 2007; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). This section 
will discuss these two factors. 
 
3.4.1 Legal Framework  
 
According to La Porta et al. (1997) the level of the country’s legal system and 
enforcement of laws are fundamental to the corporate governance practices and 
economic development. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discuss the influence of the legal 
system on investor protection, noting: 
 
“The extent of legal protection of investors varies enormously around 
the world. In some countries, such as the United States, Japan, and 
Germany, the law protects the rights of at least some investors and the 
courts are relatively willing to enforce these laws. But even in these 
countries, the legal system leaves managers with considerable 
discretion. In most of the rest of the world, the laws are less protective 
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of investors and courts function less well and stop only the clearest 
violations of investor rights. As a result, legal protection alone 
becomes insufficient to ensure that investors get their money back” (p. 
753). 
In this context, the legal system of a country and its ownership structure are two main 
factors that influence a country’s corporate governance framework. However, it is 
important to note that the classification to insider and outsider models is an 
oversimplification of governance models which may also be influenced by other factors 
such as the legal environment, labour market, the capital market structure and the 
financial systems within a country (Maher and Andersson, 2000; Solomon, 2007).
 28
 
 
Berle and Means (1932) argue that in developed economies ownership has become 
more dispersed in such economies, such as the USA and UK, the common law ensures 
the rights of minority shareholders (Mallin, 2007), this encourages investors to 
participate in markets with investor protection mandates, whereas investors are 
discouraged in investing in markets characterised by weak protection of minority 
shareholders which is the case in many developing markets (La Porta, 2000). Thus, the 
kind of laws adopted within a country influences the level of investor protection which 
either encourages investors to invest and as a result a more dispersed ownership be 
established, or on the other hand the laws adopted by a country have a low level of 
investor protection, such as the French civil law, discouraging investors from investing 
and therefore have higher concentration of ownership with family or controlling 
shareholders. La Porta et al. (1997) found that there is a relationship between the legal 
system of a country and the level of investor protection. The authors found that the legal 
system adopted in a country determined the level of investor protection; French civil 
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 Many have criticized La Porta et al., (1998)  framework as it only partially explains the influence on the 
corporate governance systems, the influence of colonialism, democracy, judicial practices and 
sociocultural factors are all part in reflecting the level of investor protection (Shleifer, 2002; Roe, 2003; 
Beck et al., 2003; Licht et al., 2005 )  
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law was the weakest in terms of investor protection, the common law countries adopted 
mostly in the US and UK, offered stronger protection for investors; German and 
Scandinavian law countries are situated between the two. Saudi Arabia has adopted 
French civil law (Koraytem, 2000; Sourial, 2004). Thus, it would be expected to have 
weak form of investor protection. Companies in countries with weak legal forms try to 
compensate for the weak legal environment by adopting strong corporate governance 
practices (Klapper and Love, 2004).  
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) study the adoption of corporate governance codes 
worldwide. The authors found that most countries that adopt common law as their legal 
framework have issued corporate governance codes and were earlier adopters of 
corporate governance codes contrary to other countries that have a civil law framework. 
They also indicate that countries that have more developed markets have issued more 
corporate governance regulations, arguing that capital market maturity stage is an 
important element in influencing the number of corporate governance codes developed.  
 
Zattoni and Cuoma (2008) investigate the corporate governance codes of sixty 
countries, classifying them according to their legal system (common law/civil law). The 
authors found that corporate governance codes in countries that are classified as civil 
law countries have weaker recommendations than common law countries. They also 
differ in scope, coverage and the strictness of the recommendations, while civil law 
countries adopted corporate governance codes later than common law countries, and 
offer more lenient recommendations. Common law countries’ corporate governance 
codes focus on board structure and evaluation of board members, while codes in 
countries with a civil law focused on shareholder rights, employee role and conflicts of 
interest, concluding that civil law countries issue corporate governance codes for 
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legitimacy reasons rather than to improve governance practices. The next section 
discusses ownership structure. 
 
 
3.4.2 Ownership Structure 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the concentration of ownership plays a major role 
in shaping corporate governance. There are two types of corporate governance model 
based on the type of ownership, the insider model and the outsider model (Short et al., 
1998). The outsider model is when the ownership of listed companies is dispersed 
through many investors (Mallin, 2007), such as in the US and UK (Short et al., 1998) 
with a wide separation between ownership and management (Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Solomon et al., 2002). In such a system, institutional investors, mutual funds and 
banks play an important role (Maher and Andersson, 2000). The insider model is where 
ownership and voting power in listed companies are concentrated within the hands of 
major shareholders, as families and controlling shareholders who are bounded by a 
close relationship with the firm (Maher and Andersson, 2000; Solomon, 2007). A small 
role is played by institutional investors, mutual funds and banks in the insider model 
(Maher and Andersson, 2000). Many mainland European countries and various Asian 
and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries are regarded as having an insider 
model (Bhasa, 2004; Claessens et al., 2000; Sourial, 2004); this type of ownership is 
predominant in most countries around the world (La Porta et al., 1998, Maher and 
Andersson, 2000).  
 
Within the insider model of governance there is less separation between ownership and 
control, but a problem arises with the possible abuse of power by controlling 
shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (Berglof and Pajuste, 2003; Young 
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et al., 2008). Capital markets of countries with an insider model are usually less 
developed than those of the outsider model (Maher and Andersson, 2000; Coffee, 
2002). Advantages of the insider model are that it is not driven by the short-term 
demands of the market, and the concentration of ownership encourages long-term 
investment
29
 (Maher and Andersson, 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Solomon, 2007; 
Mallin 2007). The chapter now focuses on the context of emerging markets which 
reflects the insider model. 
 
 
3.5 Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets  
Corporate governance codes have been widely adopted in both developed and 
developing countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Triker, 2009; Enrione et al, 
2006; Wright et al., 2005; Aoki, 2001). Many developing countries have established 
codes of corporate governance for economic development as means to attract and 
retain investments from other countries, or as discussed earlier to compensate on the 
weak level of investor protections, reducing the probability of financial scandals and 
increase legitimacy (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 2009). However, corporate 
governance codes remains at an earlier stage in developing countries, as the level of 
transparency in some developing countries, such as Asia, is relatively low (Claessens 
et al. 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002). Corporate governance reform started to take 
place within emerging economies after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 to retain and 
attract foreign investment, recognizing the importance of ‘good’ corporate governance 
(Solomon et al., 2003). The Asian financial crisis has contributed to the liberalization 
of markets but with weak level of economic and legal institutions and corporate 
governance systems (Millar et al., 2005). This raised many questions regarding the 
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 A more detailed disruption on the characteristics of companies within the insider model is discussed in 
Kester (1992). 
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adequacy of the corporate governance frameworks in Asia which resulted in 
governance reform in the region. Although the impact of the crisis was less on 
companies with ‘good’ governance structures (Bae et al., 2012). 
 
Other developing countries have issued corporate governance codes or are in the stage 
of issuing these because of; internally driven reforms; in response to international 
demands; and to attract foreign investment (Aguilera, 2005; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 
2007; Young et al. 2008). Japan issued a code in 1997, India and Korea issued their 
corporate governance codes in 1999, and Malaysia in 2000, while Indonesia followed 
in 2001 (Maassen et al., 2004). However, the functioning of the corporate governance 
mechanisms in developing countries may be less effective than in developed countries 
(Young et al. 2008). In the developing stage of a country, the legal framework and 
ownership structure have an effect on the corporate governance system that the country 
adopts. For example, in the case of ownership structure, La Porta et al. (1999), in their 
study of 27 countries, including 14 emerging countries, conclude that most of these 
countries have a concentrated ownership structure. This concentration of ownership is 
often in the hands of the state, financial institutions and families. Claessens et al. 
(2000) conclude that the ownership structure in East Asian countries is mostly 
concentrated in family pyramidal structures. They present evidence of single families 
owning nearly 16-17% of the value of all listed companies assets in Indonesia and the 
Philippines respectively. In addition, there is a relationship between the legal 
framework of a country and its ability to attract finance (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Solomon et al., 2003), although the concentration of ownership within families and 
large shareholders may result in the poor protection of the minority shareholders. Peng 
and Jiang (2010) empirically investigated how ownership concentration influences 
shareholders’ protection within family controlled companies in seven Asian countries. 
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The authors conclude that the institutional context of emerging economies in Asia 
offers weak protection for minority shareholders and that a strong legal and regulatory 
institutional framework in Asian countries contributes to a better protection of 
minority shareholders’, this may result in reducing the ability of family controlled 
companies to expropriate minority shareholders. Table 3.1 gives a comparison between 
emerging countries that adopt civil and common laws. The table shows that emerging 
countries which have adopted common law as their legal origin have better legal right, 
credit rights and protection of minority shareholders compared to emerging countries 
that adopt the civil law as their legal origin.  
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of Emerging Countries Civil and Common Laws 
Legal origin Number of 
emerging 
countries 
Legal rights 
strength index 
(avg) 
Creditor rights 
index (avg) 
Legal protection 
of minority 
shareholders 
index (avg) 
Civil Law 22 3.7  1.5 37.3 
Common Law 15 7.6 2.5 62.1 
Note: the table shows a comparison between emerging countries that adopt civil versus common law in 
terms of how common law countries outperform emerging countries with regards to their legal rights, 
creditor rights and legal protection of minority shareholders. (Adopted from Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013, table1b).  
 
Solomon et al. (2003) describe the environment of corporate governance in Taiwan as 
similar to that of the German model, with a dual board structure and a balance between 
the number of outside and inside directors. They find that corporate governance in 
Taiwan is influenced by: (i) company law; and (ii) the listing requirements of the 
Taiwanese stock exchange. 
South Korea`s Corporate governance model can also be characterized as having an 
insider model (Claessens et al., 2000), with no separation between ownership and 
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management. Some might argue the advantages of the insider model, such as the 
absence of the agency problem; and a lack of short-termism (Solomon et al., 2002). 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are emerging 
economies that have implemented corporate governance systems. Before the 
privatization act in Poland in 1990, Poland had a system of supervision for state owned 
enterprises. After privatization, Poland introduced reforms that had some attributes of 
the German model, such as the supervisory boards and the legal right to employee 
representation on the supervisory board (Koladkiewicz, 2001). The change to a German 
model of corporate governance in Poland might be because of the political view of the 
supervision system that Poland held prior to the privatization (Koladkiewicz, 2001).  
However, these three countries have chosen different methods of privatization, Mallin 
(2000) argues that this may lead to different distributions of share ownership, and to 
different kinds of corporate governance. The author also takes into account the role of 
banks and financial institutions in this process, and the fact that the policy makers’ 
concerns in the post-privatization of these countries lies in assessing the long term 
feasibility of two alternatives: a bank based financial system; and a stock market based 
financial system.  
 
Wanyama et al. (2009) conducted a study to examine the corporate governance 
framework in Uganda, a developing country. They find that corporate governance 
mechanisms are in place in Uganda, but that these are far from effective. They explain 
that the role of institutions in the Ugandan context, is one of the drivers that holds back 
the way in which corporate governance mechanisms are implemented. They conclude 
that Ugandan institutions are not yet able to support a framework for ‘good’ 
governance.  
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Siddiqui (2010) investigates the adoption of corporate governance in another developing 
country, Bangladesh. The author found that corporate governance in Bangladesh has 
adopted an Anglo-Saxon model to the local context as a result of the need for 
legitimacy, although the present institutional context of Bangladesh does not support the 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance approach adopted in the country, while the author 
concludes that other factors suggest that an adoption of a stakeholder model would be 
more suitable. The next section will discuss corporate governance in the MENA region 
 
3.5.1 Corporate Governance in the MENA Region 
Some MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries are heavily dependent on oil 
production, such as in the Gulf countries (Sourial, 2004).
30
 Many countries in the 
MENA region showed little interest and little adoption of corporate governance 
(McGee, 2009) with only two countries in the region having corporate governance 
codes issued prior to 2006, Oman in 2002 and Egypt in 2005 (Koldertsova, 2010). After 
market crashes in 2006 many countries in the region issued corporate governance code 
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis as that adopted in the UK (OECD, 2012). Issuing 
corporate governance codes was a step in governance reform in the region; governance 
codes had been issued specifically for the banking sectors, state owned enterprises and 
family owned firms (OECD, 2012; Koldertsova, 2010; SAMA, 2009). Countries in the 
region have also embarked on developing corporate governance institutions such as the 
institute of directors in Egypt and Hawkamah institute in United Arab Emirates (OECD, 
2010; Sourial, 2004). 
 
                                                          
30
 The World Bank classifies MENA countries as: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Israel. 
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El mahdi (2007) examines corporate governance in Tunis, finding that two factors 
influence Tunisian corporate governance: company law and the listing requirements 
with which all listed firms must comply. The author found that ownership concentration 
is high in Tunisian firms, stating that families and the state own nearly 25% and 23% of 
the listed firms respectively. He concludes that companies’ adoption of corporate 
governance in Tunisia is weak, attributing this weakness to the association found 
between concentrated ownership and performance, and the limited role of law and 
regulations (El Mahdi, 2007). 
 
Filatotchev et al. (2012) highlight the need to understand how institutions vary in 
different countries and their influence on the corporate governance framework within 
these countries. The authors point out the importance of understanding the factors that 
influence board effectiveness within different institutional contexts, arguing that the 
effectiveness of governance practices does not emerge from adopting similar practices 
to other countries but is a result of institutional factors that can improve (or damage) the 
internal governance practices of organisations.  
 
Hussain and Mallin (2003) investigate corporate governance in Bahrain, a Gulf country 
in the Middle East. While Bahrain at that time had not developed a corporate 
governance code,
 31
 listed companies have a certain number of corporate governance 
rules in the country’s company law, such as: the board of directors; separation between 
the role of CEO and chairman; and adopting an audit committee. Hussain and Mallin 
(2003) also found that companies have not established a nomination committee, while 
directors are elected by the major shareholders. They also found that non-executive 
                                                          
31
 Bahrain developed a corporate governance code in 2010 
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directors (NED) form the majority on the boards of listed companies, which is regarded 
as ‘best practice’ in corporate governance internationally.   
 
Piesse et al. (2012) investigate ownership structure and its influence on corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Their findings indicate that, in both countries’ 
foreign investors, the state and large families are dominant shareholders of listed 
companies, having the most influence over the nomination and election of board 
members. The authors point out the low level of governance disclosure, arguing that 
such weak disclosure is due to the weak attitude towards transparency and the general 
cultural norm of corporate secrecy which will be examined further in this thesis. 
 
After discussing a variety of corporate governance issues in both developed and 
developing countries, the chapter now will discuss the relevant literature on some of the 
main corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
3.6 Corporate governance Mechanisms  
3.6.1 The Board of Directors: 
 
The board of directors is one of the main corporate governance mechanisms that is the 
focus of this thesis (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Garratt, 1997). Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that corporations are run by managers that have no ownership in the 
company. Thus, the board should make sure that management are pursuing the 
company’s interests rather than their own. Mintzberg (1983) notes that the board role 
consists of seven main roles: selecting the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which is 
regarded as the most important role (Carver, 1990; 1999; Cadbury, 2002); exercising 
control during a crisis; reviewing the managerial decisions and performance; obtaining 
external influences; establishing contacts for the organization; enhancing the 
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organization’s reputation; and giving advice to the organization. Cadbury (2002) also 
includes these aspects as the board’s role but adds that the board should assess its own 
performance which would result in strengthening its role in future decisions. Mallin 
(2007) argues:  
“The board of directors leads and controls the company and hence an 
effective board is fundamental for success of the company. The board is the 
link between managers and investors and is essential to good corporate 
governance and investor relations” (Mallin, 2007, p.124) 
 
Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue that the legal context only allows the board of directors 
to review and monitor the strategy of the firm and they have no role in formulating 
strategy. On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) offer an agency theory view of 
the role of boards, arguing that its role is to reduce the agency costs resulting from the 
delegation of the strategic decision making to the top executives by exercising decision 
controls which involve monitoring the managerial decision making and performance. 
 
Previous research on the board of directors has focused on board structure and board 
characteristics, such as the presence of NED’s, CEO duality and directors’ 
shareholding (Stiles and Taylor 2001). Pettigrew (1992, p.177) states:  
‘The study of boards and their directors has not been helped by over ambitious 
attempts to link independent variables such as board composition to outcome 
variables such as board and firm performance…. The task is … to provide some 
basic descriptive findings about boards and their directors’. 
 
Research on board characteristics is important; however, a condition of board 
effectiveness is the behaviour of board members determines board effectiveness 
(Roberts et al. 2005) as the success or failure of a company relies on the individuals on 
the board of directors, as noted in the French Bouton report  
  
54 
 
 ‘Although procedural rules and recommendations concerning the 
operation of the board and its committees are essential corporate 
governance standards, any procedure will only be as good as the 
people implementing it’. (Bouton, 2002. p.6) 
 
The board of directors usually focuses on three main objectives: the strategic role, such 
as the formulation of goals and the allocation of resources; the control role, such as 
monitoring the management and their performance; and the service role of giving advice 
to the top management team (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Jonson et al., 1996; Forbs and 
Milliken, 1999). 
 
3.6.2 Board Structure 
 
There are two kinds of structure for boards of directors: the unitary board, which is 
popular in the USA, UK and most of the Middle East and North African countries 
(MENA) including KSA (Falgi, 2009); and the dual board, which is popular in 
Germany, Austria, Denmark, Japan and other EU countries (Mallin, 2007; World Bank, 
2009). The unitary board is composed of both executive and part-time, non-executive 
directors (NEDs). On these boards, there is often a close relationship between the 
executives and NEDs that can be of benefit regarding the flow of information between 
them (Mallin, 2007).
32
 
3.6.3 Board Composition 
 
Corporate governance codes emphasise having a balance between executive directors 
(EDs) and NEDs or having a majority of NEDs on the board, as this composition 
                                                          
32
 The dual system is composed of an executive board which is in charge of running a company’s day to 
day business, while the supervisory board is composed of non-executive directors whose role is to keeps 
an eye on the executive board. Mallin (2007) argues that an advantage of the dual system is that the 
separation between management and non-executive directors produces a distinct and formal relationship. 
Most European Countries that adopt a dual board structure have employee representatives on their 
supervisory board, as required by the legal regulations.  
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suggests the better functioning of the role of the board of directors as a governing body 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Cadbury, 1992; SOA, 2002; 
OECD, 2004; CMA, 2006; FRC, 2010). Having a board which is diverse enhances 
board performance through their objectivity, ability to give independent judgment and 
asking questions that executive directors might not consider asking (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Ahmed et al., 2006). This results in generating a range of different perceptions 
that could benefit the board in the decision making process (Minichilli et al., 2009). 
However, there should also be a level of understanding between NEDs and executive 
directors on the board (Roberts et al, 2005). Research on board composition has been 
shown to be equivocal (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Dalton et al,. 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999). One of the reasons for this equivocality 
might be because researchers have focused on the use of quantitative methods when 
examining boards of directors, a result in them being far from actual board practices 
because of the difficulties in obtaining access to board members (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Roberts, 2002). Thus, board composition may vary from firm to firm, depending on the 
circumstances of the firm, as each individual firm, within its context, should gain over 
time the optimum composition of its board structure. This study fills this gap by 
obtaining access to board members.  
 
3.6.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs)  
 
The presence of INEDs on the board is one of the main corporate governance 
mechanisms as boards that are more independent from management are less influenced 
by management in the decision making and resulting in better monitoring (Cadbury, 
1992; Bhaget and Bolton, 2008). Indeed, some boards recruit NEDs to increase the 
firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of the stakeholders (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and 
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Pearce, 1989). In the UK, the Cadbury Report (1992) emphasizes having NEDs on the 
board and on board committees. The Tyson Report (2003) gives insights about selecting 
NEDs from a broad range of people in society. The report states that NEDs should 
provide advice to company management; and monitor management; monitor the 
company’s ethical and legal performance and; assume responsibility for appointing and 
removing the senior management (Tyson, 2003). 
 
The function of independent directors has been the focus of ongoing empirical work in 
developed -and developing- countries (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Dalton et al., 1998 
Staikouras et al., 2007; Lefort and Urzúa, 2008; Chen and Nowland, 2010; Ramdani and 
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Lappalainen and Niskanen, 2012). A high percentage of 
independent directors on boards results in better board monitoring and transparency 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Gul and Leung, 2004). INEDs function may be reduced when 
boards are larger and the literature recommends a board size of between seven and nine 
board members (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) this is because, on large 
boards, outside directors might face difficulties in expressing their opinions, which 
might affect the decisions made at board level (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
Although the influence of independent directors presence on company boards is 
inconsistent and continually debated in the governance literature. This indicates that 
there is no casual relation between independent directors and performance. Any 
relationship that appears within the governance variables and company performance are 
bonded by the specific context and given time in which such a relation occurs (Bhagat 
et al., 2008). The next section will discuss board committees. 
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3.6.5 Board Committees 
 
In order for the governance structure of a board to be effective some board 
responsibilities are delegated to board committees (Vafeas, 1999; Solomon, 2007; 
2010;). The main board committees suggested in the governance literature are the audit 
committee; nomination committee; and remuneration committee (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989; Brown et al,. 2011). The importance of board committees in governance is that 
they help to enhance board accountability and maintain independent oversight over 
board activities (Harrison, 1987). In regards to the audit committee’s role, the Smith 
review (2003) states that audit committees should ensure that financial reports and 
internal control are functioning properly, while also reviewing the external auditors’ 
work on a company’s financial position by ensuring the independence of the external 
auditors (Mallin, 2007). The Smith review also suggests that all members of the audit 
committee should be INEDs (Smith, 2003). The remuneration committee should also be 
composed of INEDs. The Greenbury Report (1995) focused on executive remuneration, 
stating that remuneration committees need to:   
“Determine pay packages needed to attract, retain and motivate 
directors of the quality required but should avoid paying more than is 
necessary for this purpose” (p.201). 
 
Although the existence of board sub committees varies across countries. Carson (2002) 
studies the factors that influence the adoption of board committees in Australia, finding 
that the big six audit firms and directors with multiple directorships influence the 
adoption of audit and remuneration committees when these committees are voluntary, 
although she finds no relationship between board composition and the existence of 
board committees. 
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Many corporate governance codes highlight the importance of the role of NEDs on 
board committees, as executive board members might not be able to give independent 
judgment that would put at risk the role of these committees. The next section discusses 
the audit committee.  
 
 
3.6.6 The Audit Committee 
 
The importance of establishing an audit committee was driven by corporate collapses 
worldwide (Spira, 1999) and is an important board subcommittee for its role in giving 
oversight and monitoring of a company (Mallin, 2007). The Treedway commission in 
the US was the first to publish the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee, in 
1987, while the Blue Ribbon report followed in 1999, which was a result of an 
evaluation of the audit committee practices in the US at that time, to improve audit 
committee practices as a main corporate governance mechanism (Millstein, 1999; 
Reinstein and Luecke, 2001). The Smith Report, published in 2003 in the UK, focused 
on audit committee effectiveness, giving attention to its role in internal control and the 
relationship with the external auditor. More recently the UK’s Corporate Governance 
Code 2012 requires that audit committees should inform shareholders on how they carry 
out their roles.    
 
Collier (1993. p.26) found that a number of factors have influenced listed companies in 
the UK to adopt audit committees, these being: good corporate practice; strengthening 
the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors; assisting directors in discharging 
their statutory responsibilities with regard to financial reporting; preserving and 
enhancing the independence of internal and external auditors; improving 
communications between the board and internal auditors; assisting auditors in the 
  
59 
 
reporting serious deficiencies in the control environment; and improving 
communications between the board and the external auditors. 
  
Studies in other countries have identified factors associated with the formation of audit 
committees, such as Willekens et al (2004) who found the proportion of INEDs on the 
board correlated with the formation of audit committees in Belgian companies. 
 
The effectiveness of audit committees has been argued to be related to the financial 
literacy of their members. Buckby et al. (1994) investigate the relationship between 
audit committee composition and its effectiveness, concluding that the presence of 
independent directors; their financial literacy; and the provision of training to members 
are important factors in determining their effectiveness. 
 
Other studies also emphasize audit committee independence and effectiveness. Beasley 
and Salterio (2001) conclude that companies in Canada that have voluntarily established 
audit committees have more outside directors on their boards who have accounting and 
financial reporting knowledge and experience. Abbott and Parker (2000) investigate 
whether audit committee composition is related to the choice of external auditor. The 
results indicate that companies that have active and independent audit committees as 
measured by the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee are more 
likely to have an industry specialist external auditor. 
 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) investigate the relationship between the independence of 
audit committees and their relationship with the internal auditors, concluding that audit 
committees that are composed solely of independent directors are more likely to be 
engaged with the internal audit department and its activities.  
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All of the previous studies illustrate the importance of having independent board 
members on audit committees and how it reflects on other important governance issues 
within these companies. However, studies on the institutional context in which audit 
committees operate and what environmental factors may influences audit committees 
have been neglected (Turley and Zaman, 2004). This study will try to answer this call 
and fill the gap in the literature on the institutional factors that influence audit 
committees. The next section will discuss the nomination committee. 
 
3.6.7 Nomination Committees and the Selection of Board Members 
 
Corporate governance codes have stressed the establishment of nomination committees 
by boards in order to select and recommend directors to the board. Eminet and Guedri 
(2010) show that the role of this committee is to “define the profiles of directors needed 
on the board and to suggest future director candidates” (p. 558) but few studies within 
the academic literature have given attention to nomination committees (Vafeas, 1999; 
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Eminet and Guedri, 2010; Kaczmarek et al., 2012), possibly 
because of the many financial scandals that have lead research in corporate governance 
to focus on other areas and little is actually known about how directors are nominated 
(Pettigrew, 1992). The establishment of a nomination committee may be used as a way 
to reduce the influence of CEOs and chairman on board member selection. The 
literature indicates that the nomination of directors is influenced by the CEO in the west 
(Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Jensen, 1993; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; 
Monks and Minow, 2004), therefore having a separate committee to deal with board 
nominations may reduce the influence of CEOs on the nomination process, especially 
when such committee is composed of outside directors (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Vafeas, 1999).  
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The importance of nomination committees for corporate governance is to ensure that 
qualified candidates are elected to the board with diversified backgrounds to improve 
board quality (Vafeas, 1999). Vafeas (1999) concludes that for US firms, firms that 
have established nomination committees have of a majority of outside directors who 
hold other directorships 
 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) study nomination committees in Swiss listed companies, and 
conclude that an increase in the number of INEDs on the board increases the likelihood 
of having a nomination committee, as well as having foreign directors on the board. 
They also conclude that when companies have a concentration of ownership it is 
unlikely that a company will establish a nomination committee, as it may decrease large 
shareholders’ influence on the selection process of board members. 
 
From the above discussion a nomination committee is a complement as a governance 
tool when ownership is dispersed and is a substitute when large family shareholders are 
present on the board  (Bhagat et al., 2008) therefore, such committees may be less 
relevant in the context of companies with controlling owners on the board such as in the 
context of family or government controlled companies, such as that in KSA, while it 
would be more effective in dispersed owned companies as governance mechanism 
would help to ensure that management are less involved in the selection of directors. 
The next section discusses the separation of the roles of CEO and chairmen as another 
corporate governance mechanism. 
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3.6.8 CEO Duality 
 
CEO duality refers to the leadership structure of a firm whereby the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board. Separating these two roles increase board independence 
especially when monitoring the role of managers, while also having independent 
judgment (Rechner and Dalton, 1991), although CEO duality maintains clear leadership 
and unity of command for decision making (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Many 
corporate governance codes state that the role of the chairman should be separate from 
that of the CEO (Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 1999; KSA, 2006; Kings 2009) as an 
independent chairman can add more balance and independence to the decision making 
of the board of directors (Stile and Taylor, 1993; Solomon, 2007). A chairman should 
bring valuable knowledge and experience and prevent any one individual from having 
too much power and allowing responsibility to be shared, and enhancing the board’s 
corporate strategy (Lawler and Finegold, 2005).  The empirical evidence shows a 
positive reaction of share price when the two roles are separated while reacting 
negatively when the two roles are combined (Dahya et al., 1996). CEO duality might 
affect the board’s judgment in supervising and evaluating the top management (Carver, 
1990; Cadbury, 2002) and has been viewed as a factor in corporate collapses in the UK 
(Argenti and Argenti, 1976). In the US, these two roles tend to be combined, and in 
2002, 66 percent of the top listed US firms had a CEO who was also the chairman 
(Roberts, 2002). For example, Herzel and Shepro (1990) illustrate CEO duality in the 
US by stating that: 
“The CEO would probably be the chairman of the meeting and 
completely in charge. Generally, he controls both the agenda and the 
flow of information to the directors. He dominates the meeting and the 
board plays a quite secondary role”. 
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Although CEO duality tends to be the case in the US, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) point 
out that when boards have CEO duality, the CEO/Chairman should consult the leading 
outside director on issues concerning: the selection of board committee members and 
chairpersons; the board’s meeting agendas; the adequacy of the information that the 
directors receive; and the effectiveness of the board meeting process (p.70).  As such, in 
the case of CEO duality, many codes emphasise establishing the role of a senior 
independent director to whom the other board members can address any issues relating 
to the CEO/chairman (Cadbury, 2002; OECD, 2004; Combined code, 2008,) or other 
issues  related to the chairman when no CEO duality occurs (Cadbury, 2002).  
 
Although the literature on the relationship between separating the role of CEO and 
chairmen remains inconclusive, corporate governance codes issuers regard splitting the 
two roles as a sign of good governance, achieving independent leadership from 
management, and allowing the board to exercise its monitoring role.  
 
An important contribution of this thesis is to investigate the factors that take part in 
shaping the governance structure within the organisational field of KSA listed 
companies. Having discussed the main corporate governance issues related to board 
structure, the chapter will now turn to other governance mechanisms. 
3.6.9 Cumulative Voting 
 
Corporate governance codes worldwide give emphasis to the use of cumulative voting 
when voting on the selection of directors at AGMs (Campbell, 1955) whereby 
cumulative voting gives each share one vote, multiplied by the number of directors 
elected. If a shareholder has one share and there are seven directorships positions to 
vote on, this share gets seven votes, the shareholder is then free to either cast all votes to 
  
64 
 
a single candidate to increase the chances of the candidate’s nomination or divide them 
between two or more candidates (Bhagat and Brickley, 1984). 
 
The US SEC (Secretary and Exchange Commission) illustrates the use of cumulative 
voting in contrast to the regular voting method: 
 ‘For example, if the election is for four directors and you hold 500 
shares (with one vote per share), under the regular method you 
could vote a maximum of 500 shares for any one candidate (giving 
you 2,000 votes total - 500 votes per each of the four candidates). 
With cumulative voting, you could choose to vote all 2,000 votes 
for one candidate, 1,000 each to two candidates, or otherwise 
divide your votes whichever way you wanted.’ 
 
The use of cumulative voting is a helpful governance mechanism, as this may help to 
reduce the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders especially 
in emerging countries with highly concentrated ownership (Berglof and Pajuste, 
2003).Cumulative voting is argued to enhance company performance. This is achieved 
as minority representation on the board will help in increasing the number of outside 
directors on to the board and result in better managed firms (Bhagat and Brickley, 
1984). 
 
Companies may reduce the possibility of having minority representation on the board by 
amending the company’s charter to not include cumulative voting. Another method that 
might be used is by reducing the numbers of directors elected through classification of 
the type of directorships, and only one type of directorship is elected each year (Bhagat 
and Brickley, 1984). 
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3.6.10 Board Directorship 
 
The literature indicates that people join boards of directors for many reasons, such as 
utilizing their competence, seeking status and engaging in actor networks, as an 
opportunity to learn, or to seek personal benefits (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989). Joining a board might be time consuming which makes individuals think about 
whether they have the time to serve as a board member
33
. Mace (1971) argued that in 
order for directors to devote enough time and effort companies should make sure that 
they compensate directors in an appropriate manner; if directors are under paid this may 
result in them doing very little. 
 
A consideration to be taken when accepting board membership is any conflict of interest 
with other directorships. The compensation of a board directorship might give 
individuals more incentive to gain more directorships, and this may result in weakening 
the performance and monitoring ability of such directors (Maher and Andersson, 2000) 
Table 3.3 gives a brief description of some of the reasons for joining and refusing to 
join boards of directors. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Reasons for Joining or Refusing Board Memberships 
Joining a board Refusing board memberships 
Quality of top management 
Learning opportunity 
Prestige of the firm 
Personal prestige 
Compensation  
Lack of time 
Meeting conflicts 
Conflict of interest  
Not having a useful role 
 
Source: adapted from Mace (1971) and Lorsch and MacIver (1989) tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
                                                          
33
 The average time devoted for a board membership is half a month per year per board (Lorsch and 
Maclver, 1989)  
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3.6.11 The Concept of Whistle Blowing 
 
The rise of corporate scandals, such as Enron, across the world raised the issue of the 
role of employees when wrongdoing occurs and the protection of whistle blowers 
(Lewis, 2008). The literature on whistle blowing shows that the attitudes and behaviour 
towards whistle blowing are influenced by culture and society (Ahmed et al., 2003; 
Trongmateerut and Sweeney, 2013). 
 
Seifert et al. (2010) study whistle blowing among a sample of 447 internal auditors and 
management accountants in the US, concluding that, when organizations introduce clear 
policies and procedures for whistle blowing, more employees are likely to exercise this 
right, although they point out that having policies and procedures in place for whistle 
blowing does not ensure that actual practice will change. 
 
Park et al. (2008) explore whistle blowing in three different nations: South Korea, 
Turkey and the UK. They conclude that different nations perceive whistle blowing 
differently, which influences them with regard to practicing this governance 
mechanism. They find that, in South Korea, anonymity towards whistle-blowers is 
strong, while relatively weak in the UK and Turkey, arguing that in a setting such as 
South Korea, a more anonymous channel of communication is a more effective method 
of implementation.  
 
Trongmeteerut and Sweeny (2012) compare whistle blowing in the US and Thailand. 
They argue that, in both countries, individuals have different attitudes towards whistle 
blowing, suggesting that introducing whistle blowing in a non-western culture should 
take into account the social norms and attitudes towards whistle blowing, and conclude 
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that the social norms and attitudes related to this activity should be considered before 
such regulations are implemented. Thus, an understanding of the social and cultural 
context of a country, such as KSA where  there is a high emphasis on tribal and cultural 
values (Muna, 1979; El Mallakh, 1982; Al-Ghathami, 2009) is necessary in order to 
know how to implement whistle blowing effectively.  
 
3.7 Corporate Governance in KSA 
 
A review of the literature shows that few studies have been carried out on corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. One of the earliest attempts to investigate the nature of 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia was done by Al-Harkan (2005). At the time of the 
study no corporate governance code existed, and he found that large Saudi Arabian 
complains, especially banks, had adopted some corporate governance practices, such as 
separating the role of the CEO and the Chairman and having at least three NEDs who 
are independent of the management on the board. His results also showed that the two 
most important factors in nominating NEDs were relevant business skills and 
professional qualifications, concluding that the introduction of a corporate governance 
code would enhance the disclosure and transparency of companies with regard to 
corporate governance issues. While the study also found two main factors that hindered 
the development of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia were; the lack of systems and 
procedures that governs companies; and the lack of emphasis on values and principles. 
 
Al-Ajlan (2005) investigated the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in 
the banking sector. In 2005, only 10 banks operated in Saudi Arabia, one of which was 
government-owned. The author conducted interviews with directors and board members 
in order to understand the strategic and monitoring role that boards play in the banking 
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sector. The researcher found that boards in the banking sector have a significant role to 
play in setting the strategic aims of the company but that large shareholders influenced 
the setting of the strategies. He concludes that there are differences among board 
members in terms of how they view the strategic role of the board, although the general 
perception is that boards are involved in strategy formulation with the help of the top 
management team, even though different banks had different ownership structures. 
Hence concentrated ownership and the ownership structure is an important feature with 
KSA firms. 
 
Falgi (2009) is the first study to examine corporate governance after the introduction of 
the corporate governance code in Saudi Arabia, looking at the perceptions of different 
stakeholder groups and their evaluation of corporate governance practices by using 
semi-structured interviews and questionnaires.  
 
The author found that there is a lack of awareness about corporate governance within 
Saudi society even at board level, and such a finding is worrying when attempts are 
being made to implement a governance code when board members know nothing about 
it. He found that  stakeholders view corporate governance from a very narrow agency 
perspective, and that such a narrow view reduces the amount of accountability exercised 
by companies towards society and other stakeholders; he posits that the only recognised 
accountability relationship that exists is that between management and the board of 
directors. 
 
Falgi also indicated that there is no real independence of directors due to the weak 
requirements for an independent board member and the cultural influences within the 
nomination process. He also indicates to several factors in the governance framework 
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such as: weak regulation and monitoring; lack of experienced members; inadequate time 
that members contribute; poor compliance by companies to the corporate governance 
requirements; and the lack of independence. Although the CMA (Capital Market 
Authority) issued the code in 2006 on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, the author suggested 
that the code should be mandatory. 
 
 
Al-Motaz and Al-Husseny (2012) also investigate the relationship between company 
characteristics and the level of corporate governance disclosure by Saudi listed 
companies during the period 2006 and 2007. The authors conclude that there is a 
negative association between board independence and corporate governance disclosure, 
while also finding a significant positive association between audit committee size, 
liquidity and gearing with the level of corporate governance disclosure. They also find 
an association between firm size and corporate governance disclosure; however this 
relationship was not statistically significant.  Al-Motaz and Al-Husseny also found a 
negative association between the number of INEDs and corporate governance disclosure 
practices, indicating that Independent directors might not actually be Independent.  
 
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance in general and in emerging 
markets in particular, while also pointing to a country’s movement to adopt corporate 
governance codes. This chapter also examined corporate governance models, the board 
of directors’ roles and responsibilities, board structure, directors’ independence and the 
role and structure of board committees. 
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A different approach to understand corporate governance and the board of directors is 
taken in this thesis that uses different theoretical assumptions from those that have been 
used in most previous studies which look upon governance narrowly rather than from 
the social and cultural framework of a country’s context, which this study undertakes, 
leading to an understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in relation to the 
external environment.
34
 The next chapter will discuss the theoretical framework adopted 
in this thesis.  
 
  
                                                          
34
 Hofstede's cultural dimension has also been used in examining business and cultures but the focus here 
is on the Organisational field of Saudi listed companies. Other theoretical frameworks, such as agency 
theory, have also been used in the governance literature; these will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter four: Theoretical Framework 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This study aims to investigate the factors that influence corporate governance practices 
among the organisational field of KSA-listed companies. The previous chapter 
discussed the relevant literature on corporate governance, including issues relating to 
the board of directors, and argued that more research of a qualitative nature is needed.  
The current chapter discusses the theoretical framework adopted to interpret the 
research findings. New institutional sociology is shown to be the theoretical framework 
adopted in order to answer the questions such as: which institutional factors influence 
corporate governance practices of KSA-listed companies? The next section gives a brief 
outline of the notion on theoretical framework and illustrates the different theoretical 
frameworks that researchers have used in corporate governance. Section 4.3 then 
discusses in detail the theoretical framework selected for this study and outlines why 
this theory is considered to be the most appropriate research lens. Section 4.4 
summarises and concludes.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Frameworks within Corporate Governance 
There is no single agreed upon definition of theory. Sutherland (1975) defines a theory 
as:  
“An ordered set of assertions about a generic behaviour or 
structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad 
range of specific instances.” (p.9). 
Also Chambers (1992) defines theory as: 
“a theory is a well ordered set of statements about classes of 
things and classes of events which are in some way connected 
in our experience of them.” (p. 138).  
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From these and other definitions of theory, it is evident that the main roles of a theory 
are; (i) to provide a framework of analyses and reference; (ii) to provide a clear 
explanation of the way we see the world; and (iii) to provide an effective basis for 
developing understanding and expanding knowledge of observed phenomenal. 
 
A theory is a way to look at a certain phenomenon from a particular point of view with 
specific boundaries that are set and justified, these boundaries are important if 
meaningful answers to research questions are to be derived from empirical  observations 
(Hall and Lindzey, 1978). One of the main functions of a theory is to prevent the 
observer from being removed from the inherent complexity of the natural world; a 
theory as a set of lenses, guides an observer to avoid having to focus on all observed 
events (Hall and Lindzey, 1978).  
 
Corporate governance has recently been a subject of academic debate in several 
disciplines, including, law, economics, finance, accounting, management and 
organisational behaviour, and these have helped with the development of a theoretical 
underpinning (Mallin, 2007). Within these disciplines, corporate governance has been 
examined using a range of different theoretical lenses in order to explain and analyse 
various corporate governance issues (Solomon, 2010). However, one of the theories 
which have had the strongest impact on the development of corporate governance 
thinking is agency theory (Clarke, 2004; Solomon, 2007; 2010; Tricker, 2009; Mallin, 
2010). A significant amount of the literature on corporate governance has incorporated 
agency theory by looking at corporate governance mechanisms and their relationships to 
performance, an approach that seems to be influenced by the Anglo-Saxon approach to 
corporate governance (Clarke, 2004; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). This line of research 
started with the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) with 
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the problems which arise from the separation between ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932). Agency theory argues that the “agent” (i.e. managers) who work on 
behalf of the “principal” (i.e. the owner) are opportunistic and may not act in the best 
interest of the latter, as the principal cannot monitor all decisions made by the agent on 
his/her behalf. Therefore monitoring and control costs need to be introduced in order to 
align the interests of the agent and principles together, while ensuring that agents do not 
misuses the principal’s assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
However, researchers using agency theory have often looked at corporate governance in 
very narrow terms, focusing on the relationship between governance structure and 
financial performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Rubach and Sebora, 1998). This 
trend has led many governance studies to overlook socio-cultural influences on 
corporate governance by focusing only on the relationship between management and 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). A separate strand of the 
governance literature examines companies’ contributions to social and economic 
development (Clarke, 2004,) but agency theory- as other theories such as transaction 
cost economics, stakeholder theory, class hegemony theory, managerial hegemony 
theory and stewardship theory which have also been used in corporate governance 
research (Blair, 1995; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007)- by definition views corporate 
governance from the boundaries specified by that theory and cannot capture all aspects 
of the notion (Cadbury, 2002).  
 
Research that uses positivist theories such as agency theory to study corporate 
governance is dominated by studies in Anglo-Saxon countries, mainly the US and UK, 
but it is now becoming recognised that researchers in other countries need to use 
alternative frameworks (Turnbull,1997; Davis, 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009).  
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Applying theoretical models in different contexts where cultural, legal, political and 
economic systems differ from the Anglo-Saxon world may generate conclusions of 
limited value unless the adopted frameworks are built on assessments of specific 
environmental factors (Wanyama et al., 2009).  
 
Although theoretical frameworks have focused in the past on the Anglo-Saxon context, 
some of the resent research on corporate governance has broadened the theoretical 
scope of the extant literature. For example a stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance analyses may be appropriate in nations where communities rather than 
individuals are emphasised in cultural traditions (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). In light 
of these considerations the next section discusses the theoretical lens used in this thesis. 
 
4.3 Institutional Theory  
 
New institutional sociology (NIS) is the theoretical framework used in this thesis to 
interpret the findings of this research
35
. Given the dominance of institutions in all 
aspects of Saudi life, this perspective was thought appropriate for the present study. In 
addition the framework fits well with the study’s focus on the board as an institutional 
governance mechanism. This perspective is adopted in order to explain the institutional 
factors that influence corporate governance practices of Saudi listed companies by  
answering the research question: What are the factors influencing the corporate 
governance practices of KSA-listed companies?  
 
                                                          
35
 Hofstede's  cultural dimensions is also used in identifying how values influence practice, However its 
limitations regarding the five cultural dimensions overlooks other environmental influences that might 
emerge within a particular context. 
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The definition of the term “institution” varies amongst scholars as some definitions are 
specific and clear, whereas others are less clear in their conceptualisation (Scott, 1987).  
Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007) argue that institutions are not only structures specific to 
one organisation, but also to other organisations combined together in a given context in 
order to achieve the same objectives such as in an organisational field. Zucker (1977; 
1991) argues that institutionalisation is a process whereby individuals agree on what is 
real and define it as a taken for granted part of reality where the observer is exterior and 
objective. Meyers and Rowan (1977) concept of institutionalisation is a practice where 
social processes, obligations, or actualities come to be taken for granted in social 
thought and action. Hasselbladh and Kallinkos (2000) address the scope of 
institutionalisation as follows: 
“Institutionalization does not end with the diffusion of rationalized 
beliefs and practices. [Rather it] is sustained and given meaning and 
direction through its capacity to constitute distinctive forms of 
actorhood.” (p. 701). 
  
Scott (1995) gives a conceptualised definition stating that:  
“Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures 
and activities that provide meaning to social behaviour. Institutions 
are transported by various carriers - cultures, structures and routines - 
and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction ... institutions are 
multifaceted systems incorporating symbolic systems - cognitive 
constructions and normative rules and regulative processes carried 
out through and shaping social behaviour.”(p. 33).  
 
Friedland and Alford (1991) argue that institutions conceive of: 
“Both supraorganizational patterns of activity through which humans 
conduct their material life in time and space, and symbolic systems 
through which they categorize that activity and infuse it with 
meaning.” (p. 232). 
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These definitions have in common the notion that institutionalisation is a process where 
individuals agree on what constitutes social reality, and that social behaviour is guided 
by cultural and social premise. The conceptualisation of Scott (1995) combines three 
elements, cognitive, regulative and normative aspects of institutions; these elements 
have some similarities with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) early rise of isomorphism 
classifications discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Institutional theory has been used in disciplines such as sociology, economics and 
accounting to try and help understand different socio-economic phenomena in societies 
and organisations (Meyers and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) this 
diversity might be one of the reasons why there is as yet no agreed upon definition of 
the term institution. Institutional theory has, though, developed rapidly over the decades 
and this evolution has led to three branches of related thinking to being widely 
recognised: Old Institutional Theory (OIT); New Institutional Economics (NIE); and 
New Institutional Sociology (NIS). While these three perspectives on institutional 
theory have different assumptions, they share a common concern about institutional 
change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) and have been used in different disciplines’ such as 
management, accounting and more recently in corporate governance, to understand 
observed organisation changes (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; 1988; Collier and 
Robberts, 2001; Scapens, 2006; Zagoub, 2011).  
 
Advocates of NIE argue that large corporation hierarchies emerge because of 
difficulties in establishing efficient exchange mechanisms where transaction costs are 
high (Williamson, 1975). By adopting a micro-analytical economic approach, assuming 
rational behaviour and equilibria in explaining why transactions are organised in certain 
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ways. NIE is used to explain the emergence and existence (or absence) of particular 
institutions, (Hodgson, 1993).  
 
Old institutional economics (OIE) looks at the actions of individuals in terms of rules, 
routines and institutions (Burns and Scapens, 2000). The theory focuses on rules, habit, 
customs and routines that are taken for granted as ways of explaining how things 
become what they are, and on understanding why and how structures emerge (or 
change) over time by examining them from a macro-economic level  (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005). OIE rejects the assumption of rational 
optimistic individual adopted by NIE thinking (Hodgson, 1994).  
 
There are some similarities between the OIE and NIS theories. For example they both 
reject the rational economic approach adopted by NIE, and emphasise on the 
relationship between the organisation and its environment and stress the role of 
culture.
36
 Both paradigms also stress that institutions in the environment have an effect 
on organisational rationality (although the perceived nature of these effects are 
different) and they both view institutions “as a state-dependent process which makes 
organisations less instrumentally rational by limiting the options they can pursue” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p12).  
 
However, there are also some significant differences between the two theories. For 
example NIS tries to explain why organisations tend to become more similar over time 
by outlining the pressures that shape them in the context of the socially structured world 
where organisations exist, and focusing on the social rules and rituals that drive 
irrationality in formal structure themselves. In context, the OIE prioritises the questions 
                                                          
36
 Culture is defined here by North (1990) as: “transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching 
and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behaviour.’’ 
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of how and why informal arrangements deviate from the formal structure within an 
organisation but neglecting the influence of the external social environment (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Orru et al., 1991; Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
 
4.3.1 Institutions and Environments  
 
Earlier literature argues that organisations have become more affected and judged by the 
environment in their context. In this context, Selznick (1966) explains that while 
organisations are evaluated on technicalities they also have a natural dimension that 
affects them as “they are products of interaction and adaptation” (p. 22). 
 
Writers on new institutionalism have argued that in order to understand change, the 
historical context of environments needs to be considered in order to understand 
existing practices; institutionalisation directly reflects the history of the organisation the 
groups of people within it and how it has adapted to its environment (Perrow, 1977; 
Selznick, 1966; North, 1990). Here, North (1990, p. vii) states that: 
“History matters, it matters not just because we can learn from the 
past, but because the present and the future are connected to the 
past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. Today`s and 
tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the past. And the past can only 
be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution.”  
In this regards, Perrow (1986) emphasises the need for an institutional perspective: 
“For institutional analysis, the injunction is to analyze the whole 
organisation. To see it as a whole is to do justice to its organic 
character. Specific processes are, of course, analyzed in detail, but it 
is the nesting of these processes into the whole that gives them 
meaning”. (p. 158). 
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Although Selznick (1966) argues that organisations have values that are infused from 
the environment, he did not touch upon how these values and norms37 emerge (Scott, 
1987). Other scholars have since argued that organisational structures are influenced/ 
shaped according to the institutional environment in which they are located in, and not 
by organisational requirements (Meyers and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
Friedland and Alford, 1991). External forces within environments such as norms, 
culture, political and religion play a part in influencing the adoption of certain structures 
that take the form of rules or institutional practices supported by public opinion and/or 
enforced by law (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powel and DiMaggio, 1991). Scott 
(1987) argues: 
“Organisations do not necessarily conform to a set of 
institutionalized beliefs because they “constitute reality” or are 
taken for granted, but often because they are rewarded for doing so 
through increased legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities.” 
(p. 498). 
Organisations can therefore be pressured by institutions in their environment, making 
them conform to certain norms, rules and structures in order to achieve legitimacy and 
secure the resources needed in order to survive. Organisations that establish institutional 
structures and processes are then rewarded (Scott and Meyers, 1983). This tendency, 
however, does not imply that these “myths and ceremonials” would necessarily increase 
efficiency (Meyers and Rowan, 1977). In reality therefore organisations are made up of 
cultural norms and materials from their environments which play a part in the 
decoupling between the policies and structures of organisations (Meyers and Rowan, 
1977; 1978; Meyer, 2008; Bromley and Powell, 2012). 
                                                          
37 According to Scott (1995,. p.37) “Norms specify how things should be done, they define legitimate 
means to pursue valued ends”  
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NIS perceives systems and cultures as being objective in nature, and external to the 
individuals involved, with individual actions within an environment guided by the pre-
existing cultural rules that constrain choices (Scott, 1995). Thomas et al. (1987) explain 
these rules by stating that:  
“Institutionalized cultural rules define the meaning and 
identity of the individual and the patterns of appropriate 
economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by 
those individuals.” (p. 12).  
Therefore choices
38
 are guided and driven by rules, social and cultural norms and legal 
requirements. Choices are structured and guided by the way in which social rules and 
values have made them look acceptable. Individual choices are therefore made 
according to obligations to, and not because of, individual interests; the set of 
assumptions that pre-exist and are embedded through the environment according to 
social and cultural norms and legal and religious beliefs act as guides. Organisations, 
therefore, adopt particular structures not because they are the best choice, but because of 
institutional forces and not for the effectiveness of these choices. Power and legitimacy 
forces are stronger that the need for efficiency in new institutionalist thinking 
(Carruthers, 1995). 
 
Institutional norms vary in two key respects: (1) their effect over time, as some norms 
have an indefinite effect and others decrease or increase over time; and (2) their impact 
on different organisations, as sectors within organisations require alternative 
institutional practices (Scott and Meyer, 1991). Searing (1991) argues that these 
institutions become different in different contexts, while Scott (1987a, p.508) suggests 
that:  
                                                          
38
 The term choices here illustrates a set of choices within a certain boundary of the alternatives choices 
that are available to choose from (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
  
82 
 
“Institutional frameworks define the ends and shape the means 
by which interests are determined and pursued. Institutional 
factors determine that actors in one type of setting, called firms, 
pursue profit; that actors in another setting, called agencies, seek 
larger budgets; that actors in a third setting, called political 
parties, seek votes; and that actors in an even stranger setting, 
research universities, pursue publications”. 
 
The theory also assumes that as well as the institutional environments that organisations 
face, (i.e. the given rules and requirements which organisation conform with in order to 
be recognized as legitimate
39
) they also face (technical) environments, i.e. those where 
product or service provision leads to organisations becoming more efficient and 
effective. The effect of technical or institutional environments depend upon the life 
cycle of an organisation (Powell, 1991); the early years of an organisation`s life cycle 
would be strongly affected by technical environments while at the mature stage of the 
life cycle institutional environments become more significant (Powell, 1991). However, 
it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between technical and institutional rules; many 
institutional norms and rules are designed to look like technical ones (Scott and Meyers, 
1991). This tendency is because those who formulate institutional rules strive to make 
them appear technical in nature. As other technical rules become institutionalised, they 
may, over time, lose their technical advantage and remain in use because of becoming 
institutionalised (Powell, 1991) and becoming an institutional logic (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; 2008). 
 
Thus, the technical and institutional pressures on organisations may vary according to 
the underlying business activity or sector; for example, banks may face a high level of 
technical and institutional pressures, whereas health clubs may face low levels of both 
(Scott, 1987b). Figure 4.1 illustrates these differences: 
Figure 4.1 The Institutional Pressures 
                                                          
39
 Scott and Meyers, 1983; Scott, 1991 
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  Institutional Environment 
 
 
 
                            Stronger                              
Technical environment 
                            Weaker 
Stronger Weaker  
Banks, Insurance Manufacture 
 
Clinics, Schools Health clubs, 
restaurants 
 
Source: Table 6.1 in Scott (1987b, p126) 
Thus, organisations within different sectors may be affected differently by both 
institutional and technical environments (Scott and Meyer, 1991). 
 
4.3.2 Institutional Isomorphism 
 
As discussed above, organisations often adopt institutionalized practices to enhance 
external legitimacy to validate their activities and increase survival probability (Meyers 
and Rowan 1977; Covaledki and Dirsmith; 1983; Zucker, 1987; 1991). In this context, a 
number of scholars have attempted to understand how and why organisations conform 
to environmental institutional norms (Scott, 1987a).  
 
The most prominent studies of this type is that of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who 
argue that organisations within the same environment will tend to become more 
homogeneous over time and that this homogenisation is explained, by institutional 
theory, through two types of “isomorphism”: ‘competitive’; and (2) ‘institutional’. 
Competitive isomorphism relates to situations where market competition drives 
organisations to adopt cost effective structures and practices. For example organisations 
would all tend to adopt the ‘best’ and cheapest product. In context, Institutional 
isomorphism involves political power and institutional legitimacy being pursued. The 
latter isomorphism is relevant to this thesis. Institutional isomorphism is sub-
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categorized by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) into three categories: coercive; mimetic; 
and normative. 
 
Coercive isomorphism arises from external forces which pressurise organisations to 
adopt mandates or conform to regulations, such as political and governmental mandates 
and laws (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Moll et al., 2006) which influence organisations 
to adopt a certain set of rules including new laws or codes which are followed up with 
monitoring and result in either sanctions or rewards in order to influence future actions 
(Scott, 1995).  
 
Mimetic isomorphism relates to organisations imitating others’ structures and 
procedures ((DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in an attempt to be viewed in the same way 
as leaders in the same field. This pressure to mimic others is driven by uncertainty and a 
lack of clarity regarding solutions which makes the copying of structures of successful 
organisations the easiest way to gain the perceived benefits (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996; Greenwood et al., 2002) this tendency suggests that smaller or less successful 
organisations model themselves on others, and organisations with ambiguous goals are 
also more likely to mimic others to legitimate their activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). For example, and in the context of the present study, adoption of certain board 
structures by large successful companies would make other companies desire imitation 
of the structures involved. This imitation propend can be an effective means for 
organisations with poorly focused goals to imitate other successful ones. 
 
The third type of institutional isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 is 
“normative”. This version arises when professional bodies or consultants advocate an 
institutional form which is consistent with their aims, and organisations then apply these 
  
85 
 
institutionally-favoured characteristics in an effort to be seen as legitimate. Professional 
bodies often play in shaping and redefining practices as well as encouraging 
organisations to interact with each other (Greenwood et al., 2002). Normative 
isomorphism is different from coercive or mimetic isomorphism, as the obligation to 
comply stems from how things should be done without the pressure of laws and 
regulations (Scott, 1995). A relevant example here is the OECD; Principles of Corporate 
Governance which have been widely adopted as guidelines for corporate governance 
best practice (Wanyama et al., 2009) across the globe. Isomorphism thus explains why 
organisations adopt structures or rules (i.e. in order to avoid punishment or because of 
moral obligation) (Scott, 1995). Some scholars have focused more on regulatory 
elements (Scott, 1995) and other focus on socio-cultural norms DiMaggio (1988).  
 
These institutional isomorphic pressures would lead to similarities in organisations 
practices within the same environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus forming a 
community of practice (Marquis et al., 2007).This has led to broadening the views 
within institutional theory (Lounsbury, 2008), with the stands taking an institutional 
logic (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 2008; Spicer and 
Sewell, 2010) versus an institutional work root (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Thus, 
there are multiple institutional constraints within society in an organisational field, each 
with their own material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes the 
relations between different aspects of society (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Seo and 
Creed, 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2011). Hence symbolic 
carriers are the rules, beliefs and norms defining acceptable practices; and material 
carriers comprise artificial laws and routines which are continually reproducing the 
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institutional logics of the actors involved within the organisational field 
40
(Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; 2008). Institutions may thus have a variety of 
isomorphic pressures from different institutional logics, which determine how they 
respond to institutional pressures (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Oliver, 1991; 
Greenwood et al., 2011) resulting in different community of practices (Helms et al., 
2012; Lepoutre and Valente, 2012) that may overlap (Hyvonen et al., 2012). 
Governments issue laws and regulations to guide human activities, and such “social 
systems” all have different material and symbolic carriers that produce and reproduce 
their institutional logics (Helms et al., 2012). For example, when non-Western countries 
adopt Western technologies and regulations they may face cultural problems as 
symbolic carriers (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Thus, an important part of the 
institutional logics affecting an organisational field are those arising from the societal 
level (Greenwood et al., 2011). In this context, it is important when looking at corporate 
governance practices in Saudi Arabia, to take into consideration the social and cultural 
aspects of society as discussed in chapter two. The next section will now turn to prior 
governance research using institutional theory.  
 
4.4 Institutional Theory for the Present Study  
 
Although there are some limitations to New Institutional Sociology, it has been chosen 
as the theoretical framework for the current study, this is because, as mentioned in 
chapter two, Saudi Arabia, as with many other Arab countries, has a tribal and 
authoritarian culture (; Al-Ghathami, 2009; Krebat et al., 2013). The main concern of 
this thesis is to understand the factors influencing governance practices, the use of the 
                                                          
40
 Friedland and Alford (1991) argue that within each organizational field- such as for this thesis Saudi 
listed companies- there are institutional logics, and the interplay between these logics take part in 
confining individual behaviour.  
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new institutional sociology seems to be an insightful framework to embrace when 
examining such phenomena especially when taking into account the differences 
between developed and developing countries institutions.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for this thesis, presenting an 
overview on theories used in corporate governance research and a discussion on 
institutional theory in general and with particular insights on new institutional 
sociology. The chapter defines institutions and how they become part of the taken for 
granted rules and norms in a social context. The chapter also examines coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphism to which organisations may conform to result in 
dominant institutional logics and a community of practice. 
 
The theoretical framework used in this study contributes to pervious research on 
corporate governance that has mainly used agency and resource dependence theories 
and extends the limited theoretical development of corporate governance issues 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The new institutionalism approach examines the 
institutional factors that shape corporate governance practices that often tend to be 
different across countries, contributing to the emerging attempt to incorporate 
institutional theory within the corporate governance research (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Aguilera et al., 2008) and therefore will help in informing the aim of this research 
to find out what are the institutional factors that influence corporate governance practice 
among KSA-listed companies. The next chapter will discuss the methodology and 
methods adopted in this thesis.  
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Chapter Five: Methodology and Methods 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Two of this thesis presented a review of the literature on corporate governance with a 
particular focus on the practices of the boards of directors. Chapter three then provides 
background on the Saudi environment. Chapter Four discussed the theoretical 
framework which the researcher intends to use for this study. This chapter completes the 
contextual part of this thesis by discussing the methodology and methods adopted in this 
thesis. Section 5.2 briefly discusses the definition of research while section 5.3 outlines 
the philosophical assumptions adopted by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Section 5.4 
provides alternatives to Burrell and Morgan’s framework. Section 5.5 describes the 
methodology and method employed in this thesis. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter by 
summarizing the key points. 
  
5.2 Research methodology 
5.2.1 Context 
 
Research is an important context in all fields of study. It is a method of investigation 
which considered a scientifically valid approach to academic enquiry. In a business and 
management context, research has been defined by Lewis and Thornhill (2003) as: 
 
“...something that people undertake in order to find out things in a 
systematic way, thereby increasing their knowledge.”(p.3) 
     
According to this definition, a meaningful research project one should combine two 
main elements, the first, being the desire to add to knowledge and the second relating to 
a robust and systematic research plan (Saunders et al., 2009). Research combines 
multiple stages, which may vary depending on the discipline concerned, but any 
researcher is likely to go through the processes of reviewing the literature, collecting 
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and analysing data using appropriate methods and then presenting the results (Saunders 
et al., 2009). This chapter discusses the details of these processes in so far as they are 
relevant to the present study. The next section therefore outlines the philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society that underpin 
the thesis.  
 
5.2.2 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science   
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that views of social science are either subjective or 
objective in nature, based on four underpinning set of assumptions. These are 
categorised as: ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. The authors 
argue that each category has two extremes ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ and this 
categorisation is applied to four sets of assumptions made by social science researchers. 
The subjectivist position regards reality as being constructed by people’s perception 
whereas objectivism is based on the notion that reality exists external to individuals and 
can therefore be measured by ‘objective’ methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).    
 
The first of the four sets of assumptions is related to ontology, which is concerned with 
the question of ‘reality’, i.e. how the researcher views the world and whether 
observations are external to the individual or part of an individual’s consciousness. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the two possible ontological positions 
‘nominalist’ at the (subjectivist) end of the continuum or ‘realist’ (aligned to 
positivism). Nominalism regards the world as being made up of names, concepts and 
labels for describing reality in a world where no real structure exists. On the other hand, 
realists regard the world as being made of hard, tangible objects that are external and 
independent, with humans being born into a pre-existing socially-structured world.  
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Epistemological assumptions relate to the nature of knowledge and how it is 
communicated with others, questions such as ‘what is knowledge’ and ‘how is it learnt’ 
are central here (Bryman, 2004). Cooper et al. (1999) states: 
“Many people have the impression that epistemology is the most 
central area of philosophy, or even that philosophy should really 
be identified with epistemology. Certainly there is a popular 
image of philosophers as people obsessively and almost solely 
concerned with determining whether we really know the things 
we ordinarily think we do.” (p. 3).   
 
Thus, knowledge is viewed as being either “hard, real” and able to be conveyed in a 
tangible form or, subjectively as soft, based on experience and insight (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The two extremes are termed positivist and anti-positivist; ‘positivists’ 
are those who see knowledge as hard and real, independent of individuals and 
discovered by searching for relationships between different observed elements. In 
context, anti-positivists reject the idea that knowledge exists independently from 
individuals and argue that knowledge can only be obtained from those who are involved 
directly in the phenomena under investigation. 
 
The third set of assumptions in Burrell and Morgan’s analysis relates to human nature, 
and how humans see their relationship with the environment in which they live.  Burrell 
and Morgan argue in their context that human behaviour is either: (i) determined by the 
environment in which humans live and is a product there of -the ‘deterministic’ view; or 
(ii) is based on the notion “completely autonomous and free willed” (p.6) in creating 
their own environment- the ‘voluntarist’ view.   
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue those researchers’ assumptions about ontology; 
epistemology and human nature lead them to adopt either an ideographic or nomothetic 
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methodology. An ideographic methodology assumes that one can only understand the 
social world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the phenomena under investigation, 
while a nomothetic methodology is objective in nature, allowing for knowledge to be 
developed from a distance. In this context, Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.3) state that: 
“The methodological issues of importance are thus the concepts 
themselves, their measurement and the identification of underlying 
themes. This perspective expresses itself most forcefully in a search for 
universal laws which explain and govern the reality which is being 
observed.” (p. 3). 
Researchers with a nomothetic methodology normally use methods such as quantitative 
techniques to analyse these realities under investigation. On the other hand researchers 
using an ideographic methodology would use methods such as interviews and case or 
felid studies. Questionnaire surveys as a method are used by both methodological 
strands to obtain empirical data. By reflecting on the subjective and objective view of 
reality, Figure 5.1 illustrates the subjective and objective dimensions of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) based on these four assumptions.  
Figure 5.1 The Subjective –Objective Dimension 
The subjectivist 
 approach  
to social science 
The objectivist  
approach to  
sociel science  
                      Nominalism                                  ontology                                Realism 
                      Anti-positivism                         epistemology                         Positivism 
                     Voluntarism                              human nature                         Determinism  
                      Ideographic                              methodology                          Nomothetic 
 
Note: This figure summarises the assumptions about the nature of social 
science outlined in Burrell and Morgan (1979). Source: Burrell and Morgan 
(1979, p.3). 
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5.2.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Society  
 
The second set of assumptions outlined by Burrell and Morgan (1979) are those related 
to the nature of society. Here they build on the work of Dahrendorf (1959) concerning 
the nature of society and focus on two concerns: the nature of social order and problems 
of change and conflict. The order-conflict debate is illustrated in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 Theories of Societies “The Order” and “conflict” Views of Society 
The ‘order’ or ‘integrationist’ view The ‘conflict’ or ‘coercion’ view 
Stability 
Integration 
 Functional co-ordination  
Consensus 
Change 
Conflict 
Disintegration 
Coercion 
Note: This table outlines the different notions underpinning the ‘order’ and ‘conflict’ view of society. 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 13). 
  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that Dahrendorf`s social structure model is simplistic 
and could lead to misunderstandings amongst researchers. Different labels are therefore 
needed and Burrell and Morgan suggest replacing the term “order” with “regulation” 
and “conflict” with “radical change” (p.16). The sociology of regulation views society 
as developing in a cohesive manner, whereas researchers from the sociology of radical 
change school are concerned more with explanations of modern society that adopt a 
‘critical’ or ‘change’ based perspective. 
 
These two assumptions regarding the nature of society have two extreme points, similar 
to the previous subjective objective framework. The Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
representation of the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical change is 
reproduced in Table 5.2  
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Table 5.2 The Regulation- Radical Change Dimensions 
 
The sociology of REGULATION  
 
The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE  
 
(a) The status quo  
(b) Social order  
(c) Consensus 
(d) Social integration and cohesion 
(e) Solidarity 
(f) Need satisfaction  
(g) Actuality  
(a) Radical change  
(b) Structure conflict  
(c) Modes of domination 
(d) Contradiction 
(e) Emancipation 
(f) Deprivation 
(g) Potentiality 
Note: The table outlines the characteristics associated with the Regulation and Radical change sociologies 
outlined by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 18). 
 
5.2.4 Research Paradigms 
 
A research paradigm represents a particular way that guides an individual’s belief 
system (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Kuhn (1962) argues that paradigms are “universally 
recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners” (p.viii). Collis and Hussey (2003. p. 47) 
define paradigms as: 
“The progress of scientific practice based on peoples’ philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge … offering a 
framework comprising an accepted set of theories, methods and ways of 
defining data.”  
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 23) expand these definitions by viewing paradigms as: 
“Basic meta-theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame 
of reference, mode of theorising and modus operandi of the social 
theorists who operate within them. It is a term which is intended to 
emphasise the commonality of perspective which binds the work 
of a group of theorists together in such a way that they can be 
usefully regarded as approaching social theory within the bounds 
of the same problematic” (p. 23).  
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) classify paradigms according to the assumptions made 
regarding the nature of social science and the nature of society. As a result the way 
individuals see the world is classified into four paradigms, each with its own boundaries 
that do not overlap. Burrell and Morgan argue that two sets of assumptions adopted by 
researchers determine which paradigm they will operate within. The first set of 
assumptions concerns the nature of social science, or how researchers understand the 
world, while the second set relates to the nature of society. Burrell and Morgan argue 
that these paradigms are mutually exclusive and that a researcher cannot be in more than 
one paradigm at a single point in time. However, this view has been criticised, for 
example by Chua (1986) who argues that this mutual exclusivity is not valid as it does 
not take account of theoretical perspectives that view society as being situated on a 
continuum of human interaction. 
 
Figure 5.2 outlines the four paradigm scheme set out by Burrell and Morgan based on 
assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society, they term them: 
radical humanist; radical structuralist; interpretive; and functionalist  
Figure 5.2 Paradigms Classifying Social Sciences 
       The Sociology of Radical Change  
 
Subjective 
 
Radical humanist 
 
Radical structuralist 
 
Objective 
Interpretive Functionalist 
  
The sociology of regulation 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the four paradigms classifying social science research outlined by 
Burrell and Morgan. Source:  Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22). 
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Each paradigm is viewed as attached to but separate from each of its neighbours, as they 
share similar characteristics but are fundamentally different as regards to viewing the 
world and the use of particular research methods. Thus, a researcher’s choice of 
paradigm affects both the way a researcher approaches the phenomena under 
investigation, and the manner in which results are analysed.   
 
The functionalist paradigm involves the sociology of regulation and seeks to explain 
phenomena in an objective manner. Researchers located in this paradigm try to explain 
the status quo and social order by embracing a realist standpoint (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979) that sees the world as real and practical solutions emerging from observation of 
real-world phenomena. Functionalism, which adopts a positivist, deterministic and 
nomothetic approach, is summarized by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as: 
“…a perspective which is highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned to 
understand society in a way which generates knowledge which can be 
put to use” (p. 26). 
 
Burrell and Morgan argue further that this pragmatism is partly responsible for 
functionalisms’ predominance in the academic literature. Whilst the functionalist and 
interpretive paradigms both share the assumption of the ‘sociology of regulation’ 
standpoint, interpretiveists take a subjective rather than an objective standpoint regarding 
the investigation of society, seeing the world as an evolving social process which is 
created by those concerned (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Researchers located in the 
interpretive paradigm try to understand the world as it is, which cannot be achieved by 
external observation, and instead requires direct interaction with those individuals who 
are involved on the ground. Methods used by researchers located in this paradigm adopt 
a nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntaristic and ideographic approach.   
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The radical humanist paradigm combines a subjective and radical change perspective, 
viewing the world in a similar way to interpretivists in terms of individuals creating the 
world in which they live. However, radical humanists criticise the status quo which is 
seen as a barrier to human development, and are interested instead in emancipation, 
deprivation and potentiality. Finally, the radical structuralist paradigm shares the concern 
with emancipation and changing society, but takes an objective view of the world and 
focuses on conflict within organisational structures which can be measured more 
scientifically (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).   
 
5.3 Alternatives to the Burrell and Morgan framework 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that a researcher can only be in one paradigm at any 
given point in time and this dichotomous view has been criticised by other theorists. For 
example, Chua (1986) argues that Burrell and Morgan’s classification of paradigms does 
not take into account other assumptions in regards to their paradigm classification, in this 
context she states that: 
“All the assumptions are presented as strict dichotomies: for example 
one either assumes that human beings are determined by their societal 
environment or they are completely autonomous and free-wiled”  
 
Bhaskar (1998) argues that humans are continuously engaged with their society in 
“socio-psychological” activities which leads to collective sharing of the reproduction of 
their realities. Bhaskar states that: 
“Society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices 
and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but 
which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist 
independently of human activity, but it is not the product of it” (p. 
39). 
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The subjective and objective extremes presented by Burrell and Morgan are often 
criticised on the basis that many intermediary stand points may exist; other researchers 
argue that several intermediary stages exist between the two ontological and 
epistemological extremes. For example, Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that six 
categories exist depending on ontological stance as illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.3 The Morgan and Smircich Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core  
ontological  
stance 
Subjectivist 
approach to Social 
Science 
 
    Objectivist 
approach to 
social science 
 
Reality as a project of 
human imagination 
Reality as a 
social 
construction 
Reality as a realm 
of symbolic 
discourse 
Reality as a 
contextual field 
of information 
Reality as a 
concrete 
process 
Reality as a 
concrete 
structure 
epistemological 
stance 
To obtain 
phenomological insight, 
revelation 
To understand 
how social 
reality is 
created 
To understand 
patterns of 
symbolic 
discourse 
To map context To study 
systems 
process, 
change 
To construct a 
positivist 
science 
 Source: Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 492) 
 
Another criticism of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) analyses is that the choice and 
evaluation of paradigms cannot be justified on any rational grounds. Chua (1986) argues 
that advocating irrationality is a misrepresentation of Kuhn’s (1962) notion that no 
acceptable framework of what constitutes ‘scientific rational choice’ exists. Chua also 
suggests that the distinction between radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms 
is not clear within the sociology literature itself. Other researchers have combined the 
two radical paradigms together (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
 
Chua (1986) outlines three sets of beliefs underpinning social science research: 
knowledge; the empirical phenomena under investigation; and the relationship between 
theory and practice. She believes that knowledge is “produced by people, for people, and 
is about people and their social and physical environment” (Chua, 1986, p. 603). 
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Knowledge includes methodological and epistemological assumptions; the latter are 
concerned with understanding the criteria for assessing a truthful claim, while 
methodology requires the methods used by the researchers to be ‘valid’.  The second set 
of beliefs relate to physical and social reality and the relationship between ontology, 
human purpose and society. The relationship between theory and practice concerns the 
issue of how society can benefit from empirical research investigation. The next section 
will discuss the methodology and method adopted in this thesis.  
 
5.4 Research Methodology and Paradigm 
  
The objective of this research is to investigate and provide a general understanding of the 
factors that influence corporate governance practices in KSA listed firms. An 
institutional theory perspective is used to investigate this phenomenon and to examine in 
particular whether isomorphic pressures exist in shaping board processes, practices and 
structures. The ontological position of this research is nominalist, as reality is treated as 
being constructed through the perceptions of those directly involved in KSA boards, with 
interviews and questionnaire survey the methods used to try and achieve this aim. 
 
An anti- positivist epistemology is adopted as this research assumes that knowledge is 
based on personal experiences; boardroom processes and practices in Saudi Arabia are 
investigated by gaining insights directly from the individuals involved. Therefore this 
research does not examine, or try to predict relationships between different variables to 
understand  the social phenomena, but attempts instead to gain first-hand knowledge 
from board members and other individuals who are directly involved with boards of 
directors of KSA-listed companies. This leads to the adoption of an ideographic 
methodology that employs qualitative tool such as interviewing relevant participants. 
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However, there is a degree of nomothetism in the approach, as questionnaires are also 
used in order to obtain and analyse data from a larger sample of board members and 
stakeholders that can in turn be used to interpret any similarities or differences in 
practices that emerge. The use of mixed methods such as interviews and questionnaires 
should help in reducing potential bias and enhance the reliability and validity of the 
results (Denzin, 2009; Patton, 1990). 
 
As regards human nature, this study investigates the practices of boards of directors 
composed of real people in organisations, and these structures are viewed as being part of 
the environment and therefore influenced by it.  However, the research assumes that 
these pressures are created and sustained by human interaction, as individuals themselves 
take part in shaping these environmental pressures, and are not, therefore, completely 
influenced and deterministic, autonomous or free-willed. The current research uses the 
theoretical underpinning of new institutional sociology which argues that individuals’ 
actions within an environment are guided by pre-existing cultural and social rules which 
constrain their choices; organisations also play a part by virtue of having an inter-
changing relationship with their environment (Meyers and Scott, 1983; Scott, 1995). 
Board members are therefore affected by external environmental pressures, created and 
sustained by human interaction which determines their actions; the extent to which these 
pressures continue will depend on humans continuing to make these choices. However, 
corporate governance practices, especially those related to the board of directors are 
mostly voluntary in Saudi Arabia (Faligi, 2009) therefore an element of choice exists in 
terms of shaping boards. An intermediary standpoint is thus adopted in order to allow for 
the influence in practice of both voluntaristic and deterministic assumptions.    
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Finally, the research adopts regulatory assumptions regarding the nature of society as this 
thesis does not attempt to challenge or change the status quo, but is concerned instead 
with understanding extant board practices in order to provide explanations of the forces 
that shape current corporate governance practices. Having outlined the methodological 
positioning of this study, the chapter continues by discussing the specific research 
methods adopted.  
 
5.5 Research Method 
 
Several research methods are available to researcher adopting a qualitative approach. In 
order to meet the objectives of this research, the thesis adopts two methods- semi-
structured interviews and a questionnaire survey- as the main tools for generating 
empirical data. The next section discusses these methods and their use here. 
 
5.5.1 Interviews  
5.5.1.1 Interviews Types 
 
Interviews are the most commonly-used method in qualitative research (Burgess, 1997) 
and are used to obtain insights from individuals that are contextualised in their own 
terms, perceptions, attitudes, values and experiences (May, 2001). In practice, interviews 
usually take the form of face-to-face discussions with individuals, but groups of people 
can also take part (Kahn and Cannell, 1957, cited in Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Interview approaches tend to be one of three types: structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured. Unstructured (in-depth) interviews allows for questions that were not 
developed in advance, but which become relevant during the context of discussions. This 
flexibility has to be weighed up against the researcher having no control over the range 
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of topics that different interviewees may talk about (Collis and Hussey, 2009) although 
the latter can also have benefits in terms of novel insights (Robson, 2002). 
 
Semi-structured interviews have less flexibility than unstructured interviews, but more 
than structured interviews. Bryman (2001) describes the process of semi-structured 
interviews as: 
“The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be 
covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a 
great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions may not follow on 
exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. Questions that are not 
included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things 
said by interviewees. But, by and large, all of the questions will be asked 
and a similar wording will be used from interviewee to interviewee.” (p. 
321).  
 
Semi-structured interviews are based on a set of specific theme-related questions that 
may be asked in a different order depending on the direction of the conversation to gain 
insightful information on the phenomenon (Powney and Watts, 1987). During the course 
of the interview the researcher may follow-up with additional questions about certain 
aspects of the research topic that were not envisaged at the outset. However,  even in 
semi-structured interviews, the initial questions asked should be common and consistent, 
as changing the wording may result in different interpretations being placed upon them 
by the interviewees; here, Patton (1990) states: 
 “The way a question is worded is one of the most important elements 
determining how the interviewee will respond” (p. 259). 
 
  
Structured interviews are a set of questions laid out in a standardised order. This 
approach is mainly used in quantitative research (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
disadvantage of this type of interview is that it does not allow the researcher to deviate 
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from the questions being asked to follow-up on relevant issues that might emerge. 
However, structured interviews benefit from reducing the potential for bias to occur from 
inconsistencies in question format and nature (Patton. 1990). In addition, data analysis is 
relatively straight-forward as answers from different participants are located to specific 
questions very easily (Patton, 1990). 
 
While there are different interview methods, the main objective of all three types “is to 
find out what is in and on someone else’s mind… [and] to access the perspective of the 
person being interviewed” (Patton, 1990, p. 278). 
 
 
Interviews are one of the prominent methods in qualitative research (Burgess, 1997; 
May, 2001), but researchers are required to take written notes and audio record (if 
possible) all discussions; (Jankowicz, 2005) not doing so may result in errors and 
misrepresentation of the interviewees’ answers (Bryman, 2001). The use of an audio 
recorder may result in making the interviewee uncomfortable, which may in turn have an 
effect on the answers given. More generally, interviews take time to conduct and analyse; 
they can also be expensive to carry out (Bryman, 2001). In particular, obtaining access to 
senior individuals in industry, academia and government can be very difficult, 
particularly in developing countries (Shikaputo, 2013). Interviewing certain people may 
also be another difficulty which a researcher may face. 
 
5.5.1.2 The interview process 
 
This study adopts semi-structured interviews as one of the methods of gathering 
empirical evidence on the corporate governance practices of Saudi-listed companies. 
This method has been employed in order to understand the perceptions, beliefs, 
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knowledge and experiences of board members related to the role and practices of boards 
in Saudi-listed companies. The use of interviews has been argued to be a useful method 
in gathering reliable and relevant evidence related to the research question (Saunders et 
al., 2009) and in line with the methodological assumptions of this research. Using a 
qualitative tool is argued to be an effective approach in order to understand complex 
phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989) such as corporate governance practices in KSA. 
 
The questions used in the interviews were generated from the literature on corporate 
governance in general - including studies relating directly to developing countries- but in 
the context of the specific Saudi Arabian business environment and the factors that have 
influenced in shaping current governance trends in listed companies. The interview 
questions covered three main topics: (i) the adoption of the Saudi corporate governance 
code; (ii) current practices of listed companies in regard to board composition and board 
committees- including their roles and responsibilities and the factors that have shaped 
these practices; and (iii) factors that have influenced corporate governance and its 
adoption in the KSA more generally. The interview questions (in both English and 
Arabic) are provided in Appendix C.  
 
The interview questions were first written in English, then translated (and back-
translated) in to Arabic to ensure no meanings were lost (Alreck and Settle, 1995). The 
Arabic version was piloted on staff and PhD students at the School of Business in the 
University of Dundee whose first language was Arabic. The researcher then conducted 
face-to-face interviews with 43 interviewees located in four of the main cities in Saudi 
Arabia. Table 5.3 provides descriptive characteristics of these interviewees. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Analyses of the Interviewees 
Code 
Chairmen 
Full time position and other roles 
 
City 
Chairmen   
H 1 Head of government institutional investor agency Riyadh 
 
CH 2 Chairman of Bank 
 
Riyadh 
CH 3 Large shareholder & Chairman  Riyadh 
CH 4 Large shareholder & Chairman of family company  Riyadh 
CH 5  
 
 
Ex-chairman of government controlled company  Riyadh 
Chief Executive Officers  
 
 
 
CEO 1 CEO and INED on other boards Riyadh 
 
CEO 2 Executive board member NED on two other boards Riyadh 
 
CEO 3 Executive director and board secretary Jeddah 
CEO 4 Executive director NED on another board Jeddah 
CEO 5 Executive board member of family company Tel 
Non-Executive Directors  
NED 1 Employee in government institutional investor agency  Riyadh 
NED 2 Employee in government institutional investor agency  Riyadh 
NED 3 Employee in government institutional investor agency  Riyadh 
NED 4 Employee in government institutional investor agency  Riyadh 
NED 5  Employee in Ministry of Finance Riyadh 
NED 6 Employee in government institutional investor agency  Riyadh 
NED 7 Employee in government institutional investor agency  Riyadh 
NED 8 Executive director in government listed company Riyadh 
NED 9 Large shareholder Riyadh 
NED 10 Large shareholder Riyadh 
NED 11 Executive director in government listed company Riyadh 
Independent Non-Executive Directors  
INED 1 Academic & private consultant  Riyadh 
INED 2 Executive director of private management fund  
INED 3 Academic & private consultant  Jeddah 
INED 4 Private consultant  Riyadh 
INED 5 Private consultant  Riyadh 
INED 6 Academic Riyadh 
Board Secretary   
BS 1 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 2 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 3 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 4 Board Secretary  Jeddah 
BS 5 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 6 Board Secretary  Jeddah 
BS 7 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 8 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 9 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 10 Board Secretary  Riyadh 
BS 11 Board Secretary  and executive director Dammam 
Other    
ACM 1 Academic, CEO of SOCPA, Audit committee member Riyadh 
ACM 2 Academic, Audit committee member Makah 
Almoukarramah  
FA Private consultant & Financial analyst Riyadh 
SA 1 Official  of Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Riyadh 
CM 1  Official at the capital market authority Riyadh 
   
Note: The table outlines the interviewees’ board roles and the city in which the interviews took 
place.  
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Twenty-three interviews were conducted during the months of December 2009 and 
January 2010 while the rest were conducted between October 2011 and January 2012
41
. 
The interviews took place in; Riyadh, Jeddah, Makkah Almokarramah and Dammam. 
The researcher conducted all the interviews face-to-face with one exception, with CEO 5, 
which was undertaken by phone. The average duration of the interviews was one hour. 
At the beginning of each interview, the nature of the research was explained and 
confidentiality guaranteed. The researcher then transcribed all interviews in the Arabic 
language
42
. For the twelve interviewees who refused to be recorded, detailed notes were 
taken during the course of the discussions. All of the questions were then transferred to a 
table with each interviewee’s answers summarised and ordered by the questions asked. 
This method allowed the researcher to get an overall view of the differences and 
similarities between board members’ answers on the various issues discussed. The results 
of the interviews are presented and discussed in Chapter six of this thesis.  
 
5.5.2 Questionnaires 
5.5.2.1 The Role of Questionnaires   
 
A questionnaire is a form of data collection technique whereby each participant is asked 
to answer to a similar set of questions (Oppenheim, 1992) and it is used here as the 
second method of collecting data regarding corporate boards practices in Saudi listed 
companies. The questionnaire is regarded as one of the standard data collection methods 
in social science (Oppenheim, 1992).  
There are many advantages to the use of questionnaires, for example, they are regarded 
as cheaper, less time consuming than other research tools and easier to distribute among 
                                                          
41
 Due to time constraints the researcher had to do the interview process in to two stages. 
42
 One interview (CH2) was transcribed in English as the original interview took place in this language. 
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different locations. Questionnaires give respondents more anonymity than does an 
interview which might encourage the free expression of opinions (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). Notwithstanding these points, there are a number of well-documented 
disadvantages with questionnaires such as the misinterpretation of questions, the low 
response rate and the danger of completion by someone other than the targeted individual 
(Bryman, 2001).  
 
Questionnaires can include both: open-ended and closed- ended questions. An open-
ended question allows the respondent to use his or her own words when answering, while 
a close-ended format requires the respondent to choose from a given set of answers. The 
advantages of closed ended questionnaires are that they are easier for the participants to 
answer, are easier to administrate, to code and to analyse, whilst it does not capture other 
possibly interesting discoveries that participants may indicate which can be captured 
with open ended questionnaires (Gillham, 2000). The disadvantages of open ended 
questionnaires are that they might be more difficult to answer and analyse and they are 
more time consuming (Oppenheim, 1992; Collis and Hussey, 2003). This study therefore 
employs a closed-ended questionnaire given the advantages discussed above. However, 
the final section at the end of the questionnaire included some open ended questions for 
the participants to share their thoughts regarding corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
After analysing the interview results in the context of the research question and the 
relevant literature, a set of closed-ended questions were developed. These all used a five 
point Likert scale
43
 asking for selection of the most relevant response. Four open-ended 
                                                          
43
 Likert scaling is an ordinal method used to measure people’s attitudes regarding a question (Nachimas 
and Nachimas, 1996). 
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behaviour questions were also included in order that the respondents could elaborate 
their opinions and add relevant information regarding the issues concerned. 
 
The first section of the questionnaire asked for demographic information regarding the 
role of the respondent on boards and other background information such as the number 
of years of experience as a board member and other full time roles they might have. The 
second section aimed to attain respondents’ opinions regarding the factors that influence 
the practices of boards of directors in KSA. The final section was designed to elicit the 
respondents’ views about the factors that influence the roles and responsibilities of 
boards and board committees. This section was designed to indicate clearly the factors 
that influence board processes and behaviour in KSA in practice.  
 
The questionnaire was designed in English before being translated into Arabic, the 
primary language in Saudi Arabia. In order to avoid potential problems relating to the 
translation process, several steps were considered which was broken into three stages: 
first, each statement in the questionnaire was translated into Arabic and discussed with 
several staff and PhD students at the University of Dundee whose native language was 
Arabic. Second, the Arabic version of the questionnaire was given to PhD students at the 
University of Dundee whose native language was Arabic to assess whether it 
corresponded to the English version. Finally, the Arabic version of the questionnaire was 
pilot-tested
44
 with two board members in Saudi Arabia to make sure that the translation 
process did not lead to any misunderstanding of the questions. As a result of this process 
several changes were made and the final Arabic version was then ready to be distributed 
among board members of Saudi listed companies. The final English and Arabic versions 
are provided in Appendix D. 
                                                          
44
 Oppenheim (1992) argues that questionnaires require pilot in order for the document to serve its 
purpose.   
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5.5.2.2 Questionnaire Sample 
 
The questionnaire was targeted at all CEOs and other board members and in Saudi listed 
companies. The process of distributing the questionnaire started in October 2011. A 
total of 880 questionnaires were distributed by post to the board members of all (158) 
listed companies. The information regarding the names of board members was accessed 
via the Tadawul website on the 5
th
 of October 2011 in order to ensure that those with 
multiple directorships were not sent more than one questionnaire. The initial number of 
directors identified was 1052 but the number was reduced to 880 when the input of 
multiple directorships was dealt with. Table 5.4 details the number of questionnaires 
sent out across industrial sectors and the respective response rates and numbers for the 
sample as a whole, the 82 responses represented a rate of 9.3%. The highest response 
rate was generated by board secretaries (37.8%) while the lowest occurred for chairmen 
and CEO at 3% and 9% respectively. A similar response rate emerged from NEDs and 
INEDs of around 21% and 26% respectively. 
Table 5.4 Number of Questionnaire respondents from each sector 
     Sector Respondents/ 
(Respondents 
rate) 
CH NED INED CEO BS 
1 Financial 16/19% 0 4 2 1 9 
2 cement & petrochemicals 15/19% 2 5 2 2 3 
3 communication & media 5/6.1% 0 1 1 1 2 
4 agriculture & food 8/9.6% 0 0 3 0 5 
5 Multi & Industrial Investments  14/17.1% 0 2 7 2 3 
6 Building, Construction & Real Estate  12/14.6% 
 
1 2 5 1 3 
7 Hotel , Tourism  transport 4/4.9% 0 0 0 1 3 
8 Other 8/9.7% 0 4 1 1 3 
 Total sent  /Responses   
percentage   % 
880 / 82 
100 / 9.3 
3             19          20            9           31 
3.6         21.9       25.6         10.9       37.8 
Note: The table reports the number of questionnaires sent, response numbers and rates categorised by 
sector and respondents position. 
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5.5.2.3 Reliability and Validity of Questionnaire Responses  
 
The notion of “reliability” relates to the extent to which any research tool produces 
consistent results when used repeatedly (Carminer and Zeller, 1979). There are three 
ways to measure reliability: the test-retest method; inter-coder reliability; and the 
internal consistency method (Carminer and Zeller, 1979).  Two tests are typically used 
with the internal consistency method: the split half and Cronbach’s alpha. According to 
Field (2009), Cronbach’s alpha is the best measure of the reliability of questionnaire 
responses.  Carmines and Zeller (1991, p. 48) define Cronbach’s alpha as: 
“An estimate of the expected correlation between one test and a 
hypothetical alternative form containing the same number of items”  
 
Cronbach’s alpha shows how well items complement each other when measuring 
different aspects of the same variable (Litwin, 1995. p. 24). The alpha test takes a value 
from zero to one. The closer the value is to one the more reliable the results. Field 
(2009) argues that a value of 0.7 should be regarded as the minimum accepted value. In 
the present study Cronbach’s alpha was used to measure the reliability of the 
questionnaire responses, and the resulting score of 0.77 suggests reliability in the 
questionnaire responses. 
 
Validity assessment relates to whether, or not, a research tool actually measures what it 
is intended to measure (Carmines and Zeller, 1979, p. 17). The common validity tests 
take one of three forms: criterion validity; content validity; and constructed validity. 
Content validity was used for the questionnaire survey amongst the academics and PhD 
students who took part in the pilot test as discussed previously in this chapter. 
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5.5.2.4 Statistical Test of the Questionnaire 
 
After coding the responses from the questionnaire data, the data were transferred to the 
SPSS statistical package. A normality test
45
 showed that the data was not normally 
distributed therefore non- parametric analyses of the responses was used. In particular, 
Kruskal Wallis and Mann- Whitney tests were used to measure the significance of 
differences in sub-sample respondents.    
 
Factor analysis is also used in order to reduce the data to a set of components or 
‘factors’ extracted on the basis of accounting for a significant proportion of the overall 
variability in the data (Dunteman, 1989). This method has been used in order to be able 
to reduce the factors in pursuing the most common factors influencing governance 
practices. 
 
5.6 Summary   
This chapter has outlined the main methodological issues relevant to a study of this 
type, including a detailed outlining of the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework. 
Although this framework has its limitations, it reviews a common basis for setting out 
the framework for empirical research in the social sciences. In this context, the 
discussion in the chapter explained the choice of an interpretive paradigm for the 
present study. The chapter also discussed the two main research methods: (i) interviews; 
and (ii) questionnaires which are used to gather the empirical data and details how these 
methods are suitable in the context of the researcher’s methodological view and in 
answering the research question regarding the factors that influence corporate 
governance practices of KSA-listed companies. Having presented the context of the 
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 The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality indicated a significant result rejecting the null hypothesis for the 
data being normally distributed.  
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study in terms of extant literature, theory and methodology, the empirical work is now 
presented, beginning in the next chapter with the interview findings, followed by the 
questionnaire results in chapter seven 
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Chapter six: Semi-structured interviews 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the methodology and methods used in this thesis. The 
present chapter details and discusses the interviewees’ perceptions regarding corporate 
governance practices in Saudi-listed companies, by focusing on the factors that 
influence these practices, especially those related to the board of directors. The chapter 
starts with a description of the interview process and interviewees. Section 6.2 discusses 
the adoption of the corporate governance code in KSA. Section 6.3 then discusses the 
factors influencing board composition and the selection process, while Section 6.4 
focuses on the factors influencing board committees’ composition and selection 
processes. Section 6.5 focuses on the factors influencing the role of independent non-
executive directors (INEDs), while Section 6.6 highlights factors that influence other 
governance practices. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.  
 
6.2 Adopting the Saudi Corporate Governance Code  
 
The introduction of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code emanated from the Saudi 
stock exchange regulator, the capital market authority (CMA). This move was widely 
seen as a response to the market crash in February 2006 (Falgi, 2009), when the Saudi 
AMF price index which had reached 878 in 2005 dropped to 404 in 2006, a loss of more 
than 50% (Zaher, 2007). According to interviewee CM 1, an official at the CMA, the 
main motivation for the code was a desire to restore investor confidence by adopting the 
corporate governance practices of other developed countries as a normative isomorphic 
process. Saudi Arabia is classified as a civil law country (Koraytem, 2000) and in such 
environments investor protection laws are relatively weak (La Porta et al., 1999). In this 
context interviewee CM 1 noted:    
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“We could not propose a code that is very specific and detailed; we 
have indeed developed the code from other countries and 
organisations such as Cadbury, SOX and OECD, and with the help 
of international consultants, and applied the comply or explain 
approach because one size does not fit all. Companies differ in 
their financial and technical ability to comply. We needed a 
broader comply or explain view that would give companies more 
flexibility in adopting the CMA framework, while allowing for the 
development of firms own internal corporate governance rules.” 
Another official (interviewee SA 1) gave his view as a regulator for the financial sector:  
It was very important to look at the corporate governance practices 
in developed countries before issuing our own corporate 
governance code into issuing new regulations 
 
The “comply or explain” approach adopted is evidence of the influence of the UK 
approach to corporate governance, thus mimetic isomorphism my be evident at the 
national level, as the regulatory body needed to add legitimacy to its governance 
structure after the financial crisis in 2006. Uncertainty may have caused the CMA 
official to model directly a corporate governance regime that follows the UK “comply 
or explain” approach. 
 
After the KSA corporate governance code was issued in 2006, the CMA began to 
mandate particular sections of the code, but many remain voluntary. The interviewees in 
the present study argued that this voluntary approach was not appropriate in the Saudi 
culture and severely weakened its impact on corporate governance practices. For 
example, BS 7 noted: 
“In our society people need to be told what to do, you cannot give them 
regulations that requires time and effort and then tell them you may 
apply them on your company or not, of cores they will not fallow such 
regulation.”  
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Interviewee CH 1 also stated: 
“The voluntary approach of the corporate governance code weakened 
its implementation and made companies not take such regulations 
seriously; the code also included some of the voluntary regulations that 
contradict with the company law and this also weekend it.” 
 
Two interviewees indicated that their firms had implemented a corporate governance 
code before the issuance of the CMA corporate governance code. Interviewee BS 1 
noted that his company was going through a privatisation process and having a 
corporate governance code helped the company in this process; he explained: 
“When the company was going through the privatisation process, 
there were many discussions between board and management 
regarding restructuring elements of the company. After extensive 
discussions with a foreign consultant, the answer was to establish 
an internal corporate governance code. This also helped the CMA 
in developing the KSA code.” 
 
The company’s chairman who at the time made the decision to introduce a corporate 
governance code explained that the initiative was taken after looking carefully at 
companies in other countries that had experienced a transition from state-ownership to 
public-listing; with the help of international consultants, the firm reached the conclusion 
that a corporate governance code, based on internationally-recognised best practice, was 
desirable reflecting mimetic influences on practice. 
 
The interviewee further revealed that the adoption of a corporate governance code was 
effectively a result of the technical uncertainties confronting the company during the 
privatisation process; this example is therefore consistent with the institutional theory 
view that companies conform to institutional environments as a result of uncertainty. In 
particular, mimetic isomorphism is evident in this company’s decision to adopt a 
corporate governance code (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell, 1991). The case 
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events are also consistent with previous literature which concludes that when companies 
move toward privatisation they require new governance structures in order to 
successfully accomplish this process (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).  
 
Many of the interviewees stated that their companies had adopted the corporate 
governance code issued by the CMA in 2006, including the mandatory requirements, 
such as the adoption of an audit and remuneration committee. However, companies 
appeared to vary in the extent of their adoption of voluntary provisions; company size, 
sector, ownership structure and technical and financial capabilities were all noted as 
factors that could influence the level of compliance
46
. For example, Interviewee NED 9 
noted: 
“Companies cannot adopt corporate governance equally, some 
companies see the value advantage when adopting corporate 
governance and others do not; some other companies, such as 
family-controlled ones, will never adopt corporate governance until 
it is mandatory.” 
The interviewees also argued that introducing a (western) code would not necessarily 
mean adoption in the same manner as in Western countries themselves as environmental 
and societal factors are relevant and differ markedly in practice. In this context, 
interviewee INED 1 stated: 
“The code, in itself, is not the main pillar of governance, it is the 
society and how they would accept implementing such practices; in 
order for these codes to be effective, the society needs to change 
and adapt, before implementing governance practices. Society still 
has not yet accepted the concepts of corporate governance. ” 
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 The extent of adoption of internal corporate governance code varied; as many large companies had 
introduced these, but small or newly-listed firms tended only to adhere to the CMA code. 
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Interviewee CH 1 noted his dissatisfaction with implementing any western regulations 
as they are not always suitable to the Saudi context, he argued that: 
“We should not jump to implement any regulations that seem to be 
‘best’ practice in western countries, our society is different and 
therefore we should account for this difference by measuring the 
suitability of these imported regulation before implanting them, I 
do not think that they [the CMA] have done a good job to have a 
corporate governance code that suit our society and our needs.” 
 
A number of interviewees indicated that soon after the introduction of the CMA code, it 
became important to follow the code especially the mandatory provisions as the CMA 
had issued sanctions on companies that did not adopt them reflecting coercive 
isomorphism. For example, interviewee BS 3 stated: 
“The CMA mandated that companies should adopt the code or 
sanctions would be applied, it was very important for us not to have 
any sanctions on our records as a listed company.” 
 
Interviewee NED 11 also indicated that his board re-organised the composition of the 
board as part of the codes requirements to have independent directors on the board, he 
explained: ‘after the code was introduced we had to do some changes to our board 
structure including having independent directors’.  
Thus, Saudi listed companies have adopted the corporate governance code as a result of 
coercive isomorphism deriving from pressures from government regulatory body 
(CMA). The CMA regulatory body seemed to be influenced itself by the governance 
model in developed countries such as the UK, and these results are therefore consistent 
with the view that emerging economies seem to adopt an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate 
governance model (Reed, 2002)
47
. Thus, mimetic isomorphism seems to be prevalent in 
                                                          
47
 The relatively late adoption of a corporate governance code in the KSA may suggest that governance 
reform took place primarily for legitimacy reasons rather than the need for economic efficiency (Enrione 
et al., 2006). 
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the way corporate governance has been adopted by the regulator, as stated by 
interviewee CM 1, as the Saudi codes provisions’ are very similar to those in developed 
countries. The CMA then issued the KSA corporate governance code and mandated 
many of its sections gradually, thus reflecting coercive isomorphic pressures on KSA-
listed companies. While on the other hand, a few other companies that have developed 
their own corporate governance code prior to 2006 also reflected a mimetic 
isomorphism as a result of modelling themselves on other organisations that were 
external to the Saudi context
48
. 
 
The findings of this section demonstrate part of a worldwide convergence towards an 
Anglo Saxon corporate governance code through mimetic isomorphic process. Having 
looked at the broad issue of pervasive codes, the analysis now follows on specific 
governance issues starting with the composition of the board of directors.  
 
6.3 Board Composition and Selection 
 
Board composition is defined as the ratio of executive directors (EDs) to non-executive 
directors (NEDs) on the board (Shamsher and Annaur, 1993). Virtually all corporate 
governance codes emphasise the need for a balance between EDs and NEDs, in order to 
ensure ‘better’ functioning of the board (Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 2004; FRC, 2010; 
SOA, 2002; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the 
literature on board composition varies (Hermalin and Wesbach, 1991; 2003; Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1990; Dalton et al., 1998), and so this section examines practices in 
KSA. 
 
                                                          
48
 The results also confirm previous studies that have found evidence of corporate governance codes 
being adopted in an attempt to improve governance at a national level (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004). 
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Two thirds (29) of the interviewees stated that their board is composed of a majority of 
NEDs - in most cases only NEDs; others were mainly from family-listed companies. 
The interviewees argued that having a majority of NEDs has been the norm in the KSA 
for some time, even preceding the publication of the CMA code. However, very few of 
the executives are board members in Saudi Arabia as many of the board members are 
owners acting as NEDs to “keep an eye on their investment” (NED 9) and they do not 
hold executive positions in these companies. Some of the interviewees argued that 
previous regulations restricted executives from becoming board members
49
. However, 
this perception came from board members and executives in government-controlled 
companies. 
 
These practices are obviously different from those found in developed countries’ boards 
such as in the UK and US, where the ownership structure is dispersed (Aguilera, 2003) 
and boards of directors still have large numbers of executive directors (Forbes and 
Watson, 1993). Interviewee CH 1, who represents the government investment by being 
on three listed companies’ boards, stated in this regards that: 
“In all three boards that I am on, we never had CEOs or any other 
executive director on the boards. He [the CEO] only comes and 
gives the presentation and answers our questions and that is it, he 
has no other role on the board.”  
 
Interviewee CH 3, who is a large shareholder, argued that:  
“A CEO is a paid employee who should present results to the board 
on the progress of the company; why should he be on the board? 
Who is he? What percentage of ownership does he represent? 
These things need to be taken into account if he is nominated to the 
board.”  
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 To the best of the researcher’s knowledge no regulations in KSA has stated that executives are 
restricted from taking up board membership. 
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Some interviewees perceived having a CEO on the board as a threat to control, as the 
information advantage would always be in the hands of the executives. Interviewee 
NED 4 noted here that “If a CEO is on the board, he can be more powerful and can 
influence the decision, as he sees himself in competition with other members.” 
Relatedly, the interviewees agreed that ownership structure was the main driver of 
board composition, therefore if a CEO was on the board, it was typically because of his 
level of shareholding; Interviewee INED 5 noted the power that came from this type of 
setup thus: “The people on the board are always the owners and those that they choose 
to have with them.” It is clear that many of the interviewees, especially those from 
government-controlled companies, felt that boards are, and should be, composed totally 
or mostly of NEDs that represent key shareholders. This finding likely reflects these 
interviewees own situations, as previous studies show that board composition in 
government-controlled enterprises generally involves NED majorities (Chizema and 
Kim, 2010). Although some interviewees stated that it was against government 
regulations to have an executive on the board, and that the presence of executives on the 
board would influence the monitoring and evaluation of top management, the findings 
are consistent with existing literature in developed countries (Yermack, 1996; Fleischer 
et al., 2002). However, in the KSA no company law, corporate governance code or any 
other regulations prevent executive directors from being nominated to the board. 
 
It was argued that when trust is established, the CEO can be an important element of the 
board as their knowledge and ownership will be an advantage to the company. 
Interviewee CH 4, who is chairman of a family-listed company, stated in this context: 
“The current CEO is one of the directors on the board and owns a 
stake in the company. He knows everything there is about the 
company; he treats it as one of his children. I trust his intentions 
and his ability. His presence on the board is essential.” 
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While Interviewee INED 4, from a company where the CEO was on the board argued: 
“The board does not choose the CEO to be on the board unless it 
trusts him and is confident about his judgment.”  
Interviewee CEO 1 noted that: 
“I do not hold a substantial share in the company and I am on the 
board. Mr X, who is the controlling shareholder, also selected me 
to be on the board of another listed company in which he has an 
interest. I do not think he would have done that if he did not trust 
me and my ability, having been with him for 25 years.” 
Finally, and although not mentioned explicitly, trust appears to underpin the views of 
Interviewee CEO 2, thus:  
“Most of our board is composed of the owners; I am the youngest 
owner amongst them and have most experience in this industry, 
and therefore they asked me to run the company.”  
 
Thus personal relationships appear to influence the practice of who is invited to be on a 
board. Another interviewee explained how the historical context of Saudi business 
activity influenced board composition: 
 “When Saudi Arabia started to develop, there were not many people 
who were knowledgeable and experienced but they had the capital. 
They would start the main project by bringing professionals to work 
for them and the latter would mostly oversee the business, until it 
became a large corporation; the owners would be on the board, 
overseeing management who worked for them.” (INED 3) 
From the above evidence, it is clear that the institutional norm has been for owners 
(NEDs) to sit on the board, often on a board with no executive directors, other than 
CEOs (in some family companies) and those who had earned the trust of the controlling 
shareholders from this personal relationship and network of actors. 
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Having a majority of NEDs on the board also seemed rooted in the corporate history of 
the Saudi context. Thus, the historical, social and legal context of the business 
environment in Saudi has embedded the organisational logic of a board composed of a 
majority of NEDs, and this tendency is consistent with institutional theory view that 
board composition is likely to be influenced in practice by the historical and 
environmental institutions within its social context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lynall 
et al., 2003).  
 
 
6.3.1 Selection of NEDs and INEDs 
 
The nomination process at AGMs is mainly driven by the ownership structure of the 
company (Falgi, 2009). There are three main types of controlling owners of Saudi-listed 
companies, these being: government; family and other large controlling shareholders
50
; 
and other companies with dispersed ownership. This is consistent with other evidence 
that ownership is concentrated in the hands of family or governments in most 
developing countries (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) including more recent evidence on the 
KSA (Falgi, 2009). Many of the interviewees agreed that in government-controlled 
companies, NEDs and INEDs are nominated and selected by the government. The main 
government bodies that are involved in the selection process are: the General 
Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI); The Public Pension Agency (PPA); and the 
Public Investment Fund (PIF). All three government bodies nominate board 
representatives in most of their investee companies. According to the interviewees, 
there is an implicit agreement that each government agency representative at an AGM 
votes for the other’s nominated representative when they have shares in that company, 
with the result that the board concerned becomes controlled by the government. 
                                                          
50
 A company may be controlled by one, two or three of the main controlling shareholders or others such 
as foreign shareholders and other companies as described in Figure 2.3 in Chapter two. 
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Interviewee CH 2, who is a chairman of a financial institution in which all three 
government agencies have substantial shares, stated in this context that: 
“The institutional investors that are on my board communicate 
with each other… “Vote for my guy, I will vote for yours”, then 
they are on the board.” 
 
Most of the government representatives nominated are officials working within the 
government’s institutional investor agencies. Interviewee CH 1 explained why they 
elect representatives in this way: 
“We always try to have our people, those we trust, on the board to 
know what is going on in these companies and they come back to 
us before and after board meetings, to discuss some of the 
decisions. We do not try to go out of the way and nominate 
someone not from the agency, as he might get carried away and we 
have no control over them.” 
 
However, many of the board members interviewed who did not represent government 
agencies argued that government representatives nominated to boards are often 
inadequate
51
. In some cases, where government agencies own shares in companies 
controlled by families or other large shareholders they nominate a representative to look 
after their interests, but in other cases, their voting power is not enough to secure a 
board seat -usually when other family and large shareholders’ voting power would 
exceed that of the government-. Family and large shareholder ownership may be more 
substantial, giving them an advantage in gaining control over all board seats by forming 
a coalition from their network of actors that results in the government agencies not 
gaining any board seats. In terms of joint action, interviewee FA noted: 
                                                          
51
 This issue is returned to later in this chapter. 
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“It’s all about groups that lobby with each other; when I own 20 % 
of shares and my friend also owns 20% of a company’s shares, I 
vote for him and he votes for me, so we can control four board 
seats.” 
 
Interviewee NED 9, who is a large shareholder, made the same point but explained that 
NEDs and INEDs are selected based on trust and mutual understanding arising from 
their network of actors: 
“Most of the boards want to work with people they know and trust; 
if you and I do not get along with each other, we cannot work 
together, therefore, when people have trust and rely on one another, 
they are able to create a coalition, not to assume bad faith in the 
intention of their coalition.” 
 
However, eight of the interviewees argued that if the intentions of the individuals were 
honest and pure it made no difference if they were family and friends or not. Here, 
interviewee BS 7 noted that: 
“When the company went through an IPO one of the new 
controlling shareholders’ requirements was for the current 
controlling members to stay on the board; if you want to make a 
judgment on boards that have coalitions you need to look at the 
history of the company and that will show you if their intentions 
are pure or not.” 
Interviewee CEO 2 commented from experience on the issue of trusting those from the 
same network, noting that: 
“On our board we have a large shareholder who controls two other 
listed companies and he asked me to join him on his other boards. 
Once trust has been established, that is the one criterion that you 
can count on.” 
As did Interviewee BS 7: 
  
“We announce in the newspapers the opening of a board seat as it 
is a regulatory requirement. But the board of our company is 
composed of the owners and they choose who they want because it 
is their company, and they are always selected based on trust.”  
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While interviewee CH 4 spoke in terms of the principles involved thus: 
“It is trust that comes first when you have to nominate someone to 
the board; you do not want someone to share decision- making 
with you unless you trust them; it’s not that you disregard their 
qualifications but you first base your decision on trust, then 
qualification.” 
 
From this perspective, it is clear that many board members happily bring friends 
and relatives onto their boards, with trust arising from their social networks being 
regarded as an important social norm and value in the Kingdom. From an 
institutional perspective, the key factors that influence the selection process of 
board members are ownership and alliances arising from trusted networks. As 
interviewee INED 6 noted: 
“Bringing those who are in your circle of trust is part of our 
history and practiced to the highest political level. In the council 
of ministers, the new formation that was announced this year 
was composed of members who are from the leading political 
ruling families’ circle of trust. I know one of the new ministers, 
he is an academic and has nothing to do with the ministry that he 
has been appointed to, but he is there because he is from their 
circle.” 
Interviewee INED 1 explained how these values were promoted in Saudi Arabia, 
emphasizing that they were often more important than experience and 
qualification: 
“Arabia was a desert and we were forgotten and isolated for 
hundreds of years before oil was discovered, as Western countries 
were not interested in empty deserts. In this period of isolation, 
resources were scars in the environment and people became 
focused on survival; from that point, values were demolished, 
people became focused around what protected them and fed them. 
They grouped around the tribe and clan and religion; this has 
influenced how we have become as a society today and board 
members are groups from the same society.”  
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6.3.2 Selection of the Chairman 
 
The interviewees all understood that at the first board meeting after their nomination at 
an AGM, the directors selected a chairman from amongst them
52
. The interviews 
revealed arguments that the factors that influence the chairmen’s selection relate 
primarily to the ownership structure of the company and social and cultural factors from 
networks of actors; these are now discussed. 
 
When ownership of a Saudi company is heavily represented by government agencies, 
the chairman is appointed by the government, with rubber-stamping of the nomination. 
Interviewee NED 5, who sits on the board of a bank, stated in this context that: 
“We [the government representatives] were told by our 
government agencies that the chairman of our board would be Mr 
“X”. We did not vote, nor did we nominate him, we went and just 
agreed as did the other government agencies that are on the board 
with us.” 
Interviewee INED 2 noted that:  
“In the banking sector especially, the government nomination goes 
to the highest official, “the ministry of finance”, and he makes the 
decision.” 
 
An insider perspective was given by Interviewee CH 5, the former Chairman of a listed 
company, who revealed that:   
“The board nominated me as chairman due to government 
influence; the government owns more than 50 per cent of the 
company and they recommended me to be the chairmen and the 
board agreed.” 
 
It is clear that the three government agencies mentioned earlier (the GOSI, the PPA and 
the PIF) have a significant influence on the selection of both the members and the 
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 None of the directors are elected to the role of chairmen at the AGM itself.  
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chairman of the board. However, even in situations where the government is not a 
controlling shareholder, but as representation are on the board, ex-ministers and high 
ranking government officials would regularly be elected to the position of chairmen. As 
Interviewee CEO 2 argued: 
“There is a cultural influence on the board; our society still has 
embedded in it the tribal essence of having the leader of the tribe, 
which is still embedded in our culture, so when a person that has 
these characteristics is on the board, he would be the chairman.”  
 
Interviewee NED 3 rationalised this tendency from an external perspective, thus: 
“We have an ex-minister as the chairmen of our board and his 
high position gives more legitimacy to the board; it would be 
difficult to have someone else as chairman, as it would not look 
good for him personally or for our board.”  
 
The negative impact of this behaviour was touched on by interviewee INED 2, who 
argued that: 
“The values that have been seen to be important for the chairman’s 
role are different in our culture, the criteria that we expect in a 
chairman is more related to who he is and his external position in 
society and not his experience or qualifications; it is more 
political.”  
 
While interviewee NED 10 commented as follows: 
“Unfortunately, our culture still implies that you need someone 
who has power and is well known in order to run things; that’s why 
we have a prince as our chairmen. We understand that our culture 
respects them. It’s not only our company but many companies do 
the same thing.” 
 
Interviewee CEO 1 also indicated that it is most likely that a company would extend an 
invitation to a highly regarded member of the province in which the company is located 
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such as the prince of the province to join their board as the chairmen out of courtesy to 
him and also that the company may need his power in office.  
 
Another chairman of a listed company is a member of the royal family and, as the board 
secretary of this company, BS 4 stated: 
“The board of directors in our company is composed of many 
individuals, one of whom is a member of the royal family, who 
would be better to nominate as the chairman? We need someone to 
add to the company’s image and to represent us positively in the 
eyes of the public.” 
 
Thus, the influence of social status and those with networks in high society influence 
chairman. Having an individual with a high social position as the leader of a group has 
been evident in the tribal values of the Arab culture and one of its main characteristics 
with every tribe having a leader (Shakh) that other members of the tribe seek his 
guidance and protection (Al-Ghuthami, 2009). The level of conformity of board 
members to cultural symbolic logics has led to selecting high status and prestigious 
individuals among them to be the chairman. This evidence is consistent with the 
institutional view that organisations conform to the institutionalised process in order to 
increase their legitimacy and their ability to survive in a highly institutionalised setting 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1991; 1995).  
In the case of family-controlled companies, the chairman is usually the founding-owner 
of the company, even when the firm is listed. Interviewee INED 1 argued that the first 
generation would always regard the company as their own, even after becoming 
publicly-listed and, whether they adopt the corporate governance code or not, the 
decisions are always made though the founder who is, in practice, usually the chairman. 
Interviewee CEO 5 who is a CEO of a family-controlled firm noted in this regard that: 
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“The chairmen is our uncle, he does have a large share in the 
company but he is the chairman because he is regarded as a father 
to all of us who are younger than him; also he will be heard in the 
boardroom and no other family members can go against him, 
therefore his presence as chairman gives balance and structure to 
the boardroom.”  
  
From an institutional theory perspective, the firms make choices that are shaped 
according to the social context; organisational arrangements would thus be based on 
social and cultural norms and values. This tendency may have influenced the high 
regard for older family members and people of ‘high status’, whether from the royal 
family or government, such as ex-ministers and the elite of society that impact on 
chairmen selection in the KSA. As a result, board members feel obligated to appoint 
people of high status to the position of chairman as this has been the accepted norm in 
Saudi society, in order to enhance the appearance of an organisation in a traditional-
based social context, and thereby reflecting a community of practice of having a high 
profile chairman. The interview evidence more broadly indicates that institutions have 
formed a community of practice in the selection process and composition of board of 
directors in Saudi listed companies. 
 
6.4 Board Committee Composition 
 
The international community has given much attention to the role of board committees 
and the presence of independent directors on them (Turley and Zaman, 2004). This 
section discusses the issue of board committees that have been in Saudi listed 
companies. 
 
The interviewees noted that board committees typically established by boards of listed 
companies in the KSA, are audit, executive, and remuneration and nomination 
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committees. Both audit and remuneration committees are recommended in many 
countries’ corporate governance codes (Pierce and Waring, 2004). Surprisingly 
however, some interviewees indicated that they had also established committees with 
titles such as ‘governance and social responsibility’. The main factor that influenced 
boards in establishing such committees was the views of board members themselves; 
the companies that had these voluntary committees in place often had common board 
members, who were typically also members of these committees. It seems that 
individual board members who serve on different boards have influenced the latter to 
adopt voluntary board committees, while multiple directorships seem to result in boards 
imitating the structure of others, in line with the notion of mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Homogeneity in board structures results, consistent with 
the evidence of multiple directorships influencing companies to adopt audit and 
remuneration committees (Carson, 2002). Furthermore, board members who were 
interviewed within specific sectors, such as the financial sector, seemed to have 
common board committees such as Sharia, investment and risk committees, while 
several other factors identified in the literature did not seem to influence listed 
companies to adopt board committees such as in developed countries (Collier, 1993). 
 
Only three of the interviewees () could point to any special procedures that were 
followed in allocating board members to any of the committees. In practice, the process 
is instead mainly reliant on the opinions of the chairmen and, more recently, the 
remuneration and nomination committee
53. Interviewee INED 5 noted: “The chairman 
would give suggestions regarding who would be on which committee and most of us 
would agree.” CEO 1 cited his personal experience as an INED on another board: 
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 Selection of board members to board committees has been stated in the corporate governance code as a 
role to be practiced by the remuneration and nomination committee (Article 15 CG code). 
  
132 
 
“When the board noticed that I criticised too much, the chairman asked me to be on the 
audit committee.” 
 
The interviewees also expressed the opinion that no individuals would like to put 
themselves forward or promote themselves for a board committee position as culturally 
that was not accorded practice. Interviewee NED 9 stated in this context that: “In our 
society, no one would put himself forward to be on a board committee, as it is regarded 
as impolite.” Similarly, interviewee NED 3 commented: “We like to be nominated by 
others, it is seen as unpleasant if done otherwise.” 
 
[The interviewees also argued that government agencies, when represented on boards, 
are typically also members of committees, regardless of their background or 
qualifications. As part of unofficial agreements, government agencies on boards would 
also be on each of the key committees. Interviewee INED 2 explained that:  
“When different government agencies invest in a company and 
have a representative on the board, it is already part of the 
understanding of the board that they should be on board 
committees, not because of their qualifications but in a monitoring 
role for their government agency, to ensure that procedures are 
followed, regardless of whether these procedures are processed 
correctly or not.” 
[ 
 Interviewee NED 1, who is a newly appointed government official, stated that: 
“The chairman nominated me to the audit committee; I then 
indicated to the chairman that my experience and knowledge is not 
in accounting but in law; he then argued that he would like all board 
members to be part of board committees.” 
 
It seems that government agencies in the KSA have institutionalised the practice 
that government representation should be included on board committees, regardless 
of the qualifications or background of their representatives. This is not surprising, 
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perhaps, given their percentage of ownership, and the fact that they represent 
government investments. As such, this appears to suggest a degree of coercive 
isomorphism certainly in so far as the spread of representation is concerned.  
 
While the selection process for the chairmanship of board committees is not subject 
to any specific requirements or procedures for listed companies, some of the 
interviewees stated that the oldest member of the committee is often nominated to 
be chairman of the committee. Interviewee NED 9 explained as follows: 
“You always respect those who are older than you; it’s part of our 
culture, therefore when we selected the chair of the audit 
committee, it was based on respect for him and not on his 
experience or qualifications; I cannot be the chair of the committee 
while there is someone who is older than me on the committee; it is 
something that we have as habitual in our society.” 
 
 
Interviewee I NED 11 noted similarly that: 
“Selecting a chairman of the committee is like giving more regard 
to those who are elder to sit down before others when you enter a 
room together, and also at dinner they would always be put 
forward to dine first, the chairman of a committee is the same, it is 
a matter of respect to them.”  
 
From an institutional theory perspective, it seems that cultural values influence the way 
directors are elected to board committees, with interviewees citing the rarity of 
someone nominating himself to a board committee. The selection of the committee 
chair is also clearly influenced by cultural values given more regard to people who are 
older and more senior as noted above. However, this tendency contradicts the very 
essence of corporate governance, especially relevant in relation to audit committees, 
where the most experienced and qualified individuals should act as chair (Aldamen et 
al., 2012). Thus, cultural norms in Saudi society are critically important in influencing 
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committee members to nominate a chairman. These findings offer new insights into the 
factors -within an institutional context- that influence the practice of board committees 
in developing countries, with social and cultural symbolic carriers playing a significant 
role in the process. The following section now discusses other committees the audit 
committee followed by a section on remuneration and nomination committee. 
 
6.4.1 Audit Committees 
 
The establishment of audit committees in Saudi Arabia has been mandatory since the 
Ministry of Commerce issued a resolution in 1994 requesting all public listed 
companies to establish one (Al-Twagiry et al., 2002; Al-Moataz, 2003; Al-Lehaidan, 
2006). The proportion of companies that had established such committees up until 1994 
was low; in fact before 1994, no Saudi company had established any board committees 
(Piesse et al., 2012). By 2001, five companies had an audit committee (Al-Qarni, 2004.) 
but the composition included executive directors (Al-Moataz, 2003). The interviewees 
argued that the law have not been enforced since 1994 and the monitoring role of the 
regulator was weak therefore companies have effectively been free to ignore it. For 
example, Interviewee ACM 2 noted that when he joined a company’s audit committee, 
they had just established the committee, and no internal audit department existed; he 
claimed that the regulatory and monitoring of listed companies was weak, and this was 
perceived because no enforcement mechanisms were in place to ensure that such 
committees were established, and hence there was no coercive isomorphism.   
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6.4.1.1 Establishing the Audit Committee  
 
The interviewees were thus asked why they had established audit committees. Nearly 
64% of the board members (twenty-seven interviewees) stated that the reason was to 
comply with the regulations, although this in itself raises many concerns, as boards may 
have only established audit committees as a symbolic ritual, conforming to recent 
mandatory requirements in 2006 and not for the governance benefits that they offer 
(Spangler and Braiotta, 1990). Other interviewees argued that some of the board’s roles 
and responsibilities were allocated to the audit committees because the board only met 
four times a year, which was not enough to exercise board responsibilities. Surprisingly, 
only board members who were academics and experienced in accounting and auditing 
argued that the audit committee played an important part in ensuring the well-being of 
the company, by exercising roles such as recommending the external auditor and 
evaluating both the internal control system and the reliability of the financial statements. 
 
The KSA corporate governance code stated the roles expected from the audit 
committee
54; this includes a member of this committee having “accounting knowledge.” 
Some of the interviewees argued that the term “accounting knowledge” is too broad and 
not adequately defined in the code; as a member of an audit committee, ACM 2, who is 
also a qualified auditor, stated that: 
“The CMA code states that an audit committee should be 
composed of at least three members, at least one member having 
accounting knowledge; this is a broad definition and anyone can 
define it differently; someone could have only an elementary 
school degree and say “I have ‘accounting knowledge’” …every 
company is saying they have in their committee someone with 
“accounting knowledge” and they don’t.” 
 
                                                          
54
 Via Article 14 of the code. 
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This interviewee also noted that the board of the company contacted him in order to 
establish the audit committee and he commented in this regard that: “When I joined the 
audit committee there were no charters or mandates or anything. I then had to establish 
everything from scratch, to set out the role of the audit committee.” 
 
From an institutional theory perspective, it seems that KSA boards have been coerced 
by the formal requirements to establish an audit committee, but this implies coercive 
isomorphism, as many of the interviewees argued, the board adopted these structures as 
they were mandated by the regulatory authorities decoupling them from policy.   
 
The interviewees’ comments suggest that some boards have formed audit committees 
composed of a majority of external members
55
, with fewer members from the board. 
There is no specific requirement in the KSA corporate governance code for members of 
board committees to be members of the board of directors, as is the case in many other 
countries (e.g. in the US via SOX, 2002).  Nine of the interviewees noted that a more 
specific corporate governance code issued by the financial sector regulatory body 
SAMA states that audit committees within the financial sector should be composed 
mainly by those who are not members of the board of directors, as well as stipulating 
that the ratio of external audit committee members should be greater than the ratio of 
NEDs on this committee in order to ensure the independence of the audit committee.  
The interviewees agreed that having an audit committee composed of external members 
might help in ensuring the independence of the committee, although some suggested 
that these individuals’ independence might be compromised by the presence of large 
shareholders. This loss could be critical, as the audit committee’s ability to monitor 
management relies on the independence of its members (Sommer, 1991; Daily and 
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Dalton, 1992; Beasley and Salterio, 2001). Interviewee INED 1, who is a member of an 
audit committee of a bank, noted in this context that: 
“I was asked by the CEO, who is also the controlling shareholder, 
to give him information regarding an issue on the committee’s 
agenda; I requested for him to join the meeting and stay with us 
until we finished the meeting, as our board recommendations 
should be announced first to all shareholders. The next year, I 
was asked to resign, with the reason given that they had five 
members and they intended to reduce to four. I know, however, it 
was for trying to stay independent. The large shareholders have 
everything in their hands and it is hard for someone to stay on the 
board and still be independent.” 
[ 
It is clear that an active desire on the part of some NEDs to stay independent may create 
the risk that controlling shareholders would replace them through challenging those 
with whom they have personal relationships. Contrary to the findings of Bronson et al. 
(2009), who argue that the presence of independent directors is sufficient for audit 
committees to be effective, the evidence here suggests that, in the context of 
concentrated ownership firms, the non-involvement of large shareholders is also 
necessary. 
 
Another interviewee who served on an audit committee insisted that his committee 
should be completely independent from the board, setting out the following reasoning: 
“My condition in accepting audit committee membership was to 
ensure it was composed of independent members from out of the 
board, with no exception. This is because boards are filled with 
affiliated directors, there are no independent members on the board 
and I do not trust having such members with me on the audit 
committee; they might influence decisions made, therefore, I have 
more trust when the audit committee is composed of external 
members.” (ACM 1) 
Interviewee INED 4 outlined his frustration about the lack of power of audit committees 
when large shareholders are present: 
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“It is difficult to argue with them, even although you are regarded 
as an independent director; you know that they make all the 
decisions so what would be the point, you just give them your 
advice, and it’s their choice to take it or leave it.” 
 
It seems that even though most corporate governance codes recommend having an 
independent audit committee (SOX, 2002; CMA, 2006; Kings, 2009; FRC, 2012), the 
interviewees expressed the opinion that, in the Saudi context, the ability of 
‘independent’ directors to act in such a way is heavily compromised, especially when 
large controlling shareholders are present on the board. Thus, in the context of Saudi 
Arabia large shareholders prevent the independence of audit committee members; 
thereby hamper the effectiveness of the audit committee as control is paramount. 
 
From an institutional theory perspective, these findings suggest that the adoption of 
audit committees and independent directors by Saudi firms may provide legitimacy but 
not necessarily improve effectiveness (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
The interviewees argued that the presence of (unqualified) board members -who in 
some cases are also large shareholders and government officials- harms the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. Interviewee CEO 5 noted here that:  
“The government representative in our board is a government 
official who is inadequate for the required role. The role they play 
on the board is to report back to their government agency; the 
problem is that they are also on board committees. They think they 
have the right to be on them because they represent the 
government; if they were qualified to be on the audit committee, I 
wouldn’t mind, but the problem is that they are not. How can this 
committee be effective in its roles?” 
 
Interviewee NED 9 was unequivocal in arguing that: 
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“The government officials who are on our board only seem to 
contribute silence; I have never heard them talk or discuss 
anything of value; they are only on the board in name but 
contribute little.” 
 
However, two of the interviewees argued that the government officials on their audit 
committees had sound financial knowledge and were very effective. Interviewee CEO 2 
explained the involvement of a government official on his board as follows: “Mr. X is 
highly qualified, as his background is in auditing and he is very effective in his role in 
the audit committee”. Thus it seems that the level of engagement of government 
officials, who are on board committees, reflect the qualification levels of these 
individuals. As was argued in the previous section, government agencies have 
effectively coerced firms to appoint their representatives as members of board 
committees, and has resulted in some companies having government representatives 
who are unqualified for the audit committee role; as interviewee NED 1 explained, he 
was unqualified to be on the audit committee but the chairman selected him to be on this 
committee. 
 
One a more positive note, the interviewees suggested that some audit committee had 
representatives of the Saudi Arabian Organization for Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA) as a member; hence reflecting a different institutional logic. Interviewee NED 
4 explained in this context that:  
“Usually we do not meet with the external auditor on a regular 
basis; after noticing the recommendations of the corporate 
governance code and looking at other companies’ practices, we 
asked a member of SOCPA to join the audit committee; we were 
engaged with many issues, although mostly I did not understand 
because my background is not in accounting.” 
 
SOCPA has played a normative role in influencing Saudi companies’ audit committee 
practices; some large, listed organisations have invited SOCPA members onto their 
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audit committee and this practice seems to be spreading with a competing institutional 
logic to the dominant logic. Interviewee ACM 1, who is the head of SOCPA and an 
audit committee member, explained the role of SOCPA and audit committees as 
follows:  
“We have conducted several workshops in three major cities in 
Saudi Arabia in the past year, to promote guidelines and 
understanding of audit committee’s roles and responsibilities, as 
previous regulations, including the corporate governance code, 
have been too broad on this matter.” 
 
Some of the audit committee members interviewed noted that their firms had 
approached SOCPA as an authoritative body with the potential to help with organising 
audit committee operations in the future; interviewee ACM 1 indicated here that:  
“Companies approach SOCPA as it is regarded as the umbrella 
organisation for the accounting and auditing profession in KSA. 
the efforts we do in educating audit committee members has made 
companies approaches us. Therefore, I have recommended some of 
our members to these companies.” 
 
From an institutional theory perspective, coercive isomorphism is evident in audit 
committees practice, via the legal and regulatory influences of the corporate governance 
code. Coercive isomorphism is also evident in audit committees within specific 
industries, such as the financial sector where the committees seem to be more 
homogenous, as a result of institutional pressure of the regulatory authority, SAMA 
resulting in a different community of practice in the financial sector. Normative 
isomorphism is also evident in audit committee practices with the influence of 
professional bodies such as SOCPA leading some audit committees to approach it in 
order to get SOCPA members to join audit committees resulting in a new institutional 
logic. The findings also indicate that adopting audit committees practices are decoupled 
from their material carriers. Therefore the broader social and cultural environment is 
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important for the audit committee practice (Aguliera et al., 2008). The findings thus 
contribute to the corporate governance and audit committee literature, by identifying the 
environmental and institutional influences that affect the practice of audit committees 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004) especially the impact in the Saudi context (Al-Lehedan, 
2006).  
 
6.4.2 Remuneration and Nomination Committee 
 
One of the recommendations of the Saudi corporate governance code is for company 
boards to establish a remuneration and nomination committee with sufficient 
independence to provide important checks on concentration of power at the top of the 
firm
56
. This type of recommendation is included in codes elsewhere (Cadbury, 1992; 
SOX, 2002; FRC, 2012), but in developed countries the recommendation is typically to 
establish two separate committees on remuneration and nomination (SOX, 2002), 
whereas the Saudi code suggests combining the two in to just one committee. Thus it 
seems that the Saudi regulator has adopted a normative governance code to suit its own 
environment. 
 
At the first interview stage, in early 2010, seven of the interviewees noted that their 
boards had established a remuneration and nomination committee, while the remaining 
interviewees indicated that their boards had not; these findings are consistent within 
previous studies that few Saudi listed companies had established remuneration and 
nomination committees by 2009 (Piesse et al., 2012). While the interviewees in 
companies that had not established such committees noted that the relevant tasks were 
performed by the executive committee. Interviewee CH 1 explained that this occurred 
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because executive committee members were closer to management and, thus, more 
aware of how to evaluate them. This practice had a number of implications, with some 
companies running executive committees composed of executive directors. Interviewee 
BS 2 noted that the chairman of the executive committee was also the CEO; clearly this 
situation might influence the committee in exercising its role in evaluating and 
nominating directors to side with management. 
 
The interviewees had strong opinions about the evaluation of board members, indicating 
discomfort, because the mere suggestion of evaluation is regarded as an insult in the 
KSA context, implying incompetence, and is thus very difficult to implement. As 
clearly noted, directors in Saudi Arabia often include large shareholders, founders of the 
company and other individuals who have high social status, such as members of the 
royal family, ministers and other senior government officials, thus the process of 
evaluation is potentially fraught. Numerous quotes relevant to this point were made. For 
example, Interviewee INED 6 stated in this regard that: 
“Directors think that evaluation is an insult because it is saying 
they are incompetent; I see no problem with the evaluation itself 
but how they should be evaluated is very sensitive.” 
 
 
 Interviewee ACM1 pointed to the practical difficulties as follows: 
“How would someone evaluate board members, especially when 
they think they are superior to others; no one would like anyone to 
monitor or evaluate him. A board member’s reply would be: “Who 
does he think he is to evaluate me?” 
 
 
Interviewee FA argued that: 
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“When you have a prince or a highly regarded member of society, 
it is regarded as an insult if you try to evaluate them or even 
mention board evaluation.” 
 
 
While Interviewee INED 5 pointed to calls involving large shareholders:  
“Whatever the structure of this committee, it would be difficult for 
it to play its role effectively, especially when the board has large 
shareholders. We are selected by those people, so how should we 
evaluate them? It’s a matter of conflict of interest.” 
 
Interviewee BS 7 made a point regarding the lack of accountability this type of set up 
can cause: 
“The committee is composed of the owners and they make the 
decisions of whom to bring on the board and who to fire; that’s as 
far as board evaluation goes, they are the owners and therefore they 
do not need evaluation, you can’t tell someone who built the 
company for thirty years that you need evaluation, it is his 
decision.” 
While Interviewee CEO 2 gave a specific example thus: 
“Our first board meeting was in Caen, every board member came 
in his private jet; one of them landed in another city because his jet 
was too big for Caen’s airport. You have people who represent 
royalty and the elite of the society on the board, so who would 
evaluate them?”  
 
More generally, many of the interviewees argued that evaluation of directors in the 
Saudi context is simply not useful and, in some cases, impossible. When conducting the 
first interviews stage in January 2010 it became evident from all the interviewees that 
no meaningful evaluations are carried out in the KSA. Furthermore, committee 
members who are nominally ‘independent’ are in fact not truly independent. Thus 
cultural and social values seem to prevent the role of the committee in evaluating board 
members in practice, especially those of high social status. Indeed, board members 
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seem to feel socially obligated not to undertake such evaluations thus reflecting an 
embedded dominant organisational logic.  
 
As the CMA had mandated the formation of ‘remuneration and nomination’ committees 
by listed companies in January 2011, many of the second stage interviews conducted in 
October 2011 revealed that this committee had now been set up since the first stage 
discussions took place. 
 
It was evident that coercive pressure from the regulatory body was the main driver of 
this behaviour. During the second round of interviews however, the interviewees noted 
continuing concerns regarding the ability of their board members to remain independent 
and evaluate directors representing large shareholders particularly those with ‘high’ 
social status. As interviewee NED 5, a member of a remuneration and nomination 
committee, noted:  
“You come and take members from the board and tell them to 
evaluate the board; who evaluates whom?; where is the 
independence? Even after they evaluate the board, what is the 
assurance of a member of this committee performing this role 
effectively?; what if he [the committee member] noticed 
something wrong with one of the board members and came out 
and said this is wrong?; what is his assurance regarding remaining 
on the board?”  
 
The interviewees emphasised specific elements missing from the evaluation process in 
Saudi culture and reflecting ownership structure, indicating that the entrenchment of 
family companies and block owners remains significant. CMA officials acknowledged 
the impact of culture on the evaluation process at board level, but that they were trying 
to overcome the problem as interviewee CM noted here that: 
“It is a matter of culture; if you would say to a board member that 
he needs to be evaluated he would regard this as an insult, but after 
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making presentations and workshops on this topic, he would come 
and discuss it with you more openly.” 
 
It is clear from the discussion that when regulators mandated Saudi companies to form 
remuneration and nomination committees, boards complied only in a symbolic way and 
did not change actual practice. Some interviewees however revealed that they are in the 
process of introducing a questionnaire to be filled out by board members themselves as 
a method of evaluation. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that any such methods of evaluation 
will prove to have much impact because of the cultural impediment to the broad notion 
of ‘evaluation’ that remains. Thus the new institutional logic of the regulator has been 
avoided /defied.    
 
6.5 Factors Influencing the role of NEDs and INEDs 
 
The importance of NEDs and INEDs has been emphasised regularly in the context of 
‘good’ corporate governance (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Stills and Taylor, 2001; Higgs, 
2003), and so the role of INEDs was explored specifically here.  
 
Few of the interviewees (only five) distinguished between the role of NEDs and INEDs, 
instead regarding the difference as simply a classification needed in the annual report, 
with no impact on their board roles. Interviewee INED 4 noted: 
“I don’t understand what the difference between an NED and an 
independent NED is; they are all the same and have the same role 
to play on the board and it is only classifying the member in the 
board’s annual report that has changed.” 
The interviewees argued that the term “independent director” was relatively new in the 
KSA context, only emerging after the introduction of the national corporate governance 
code in 2006. It was also argued, however, that the definition of an independent NED 
therein was not clear, making it difficult in practice to classify directors as independent. 
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It was pointed out that government officials on boards were formally regarded as 
independent directors in some cases, even though they represented government 
ownership. Interviewee INED 6 stated in this context that:  
“The term independent is new to us. I have been classified as an 
independent director on my board but there is no difference in the 
role I play on the board; we drink, tea make sure that everything is 
going ok and leave.” 
Similarly, interviewee INED 5 stated that:  
“The “independent director” is a new term in the Saudi corporate 
environment – what is independent? It is not to have shares. I don’t 
have any, therefore I am independent, but my role on the board is 
just to give advice as a consultant to the chairmen, who are the 
controlling shareholders.”  
 
The interviewees claimed that board members are largely unaware of the legal 
obligations faced by independent directors because the CMA regulations only define 
independence as “having no relationship with the company or being a relative of the 
executive employees”57 and do not take into account the boundaries at which the ability 
to give independent judgments end. Worryingly, Interviewee BS 3 noted here that: 
“I have contacted the regulatory body CMA to clarify what they 
meant by “independent” in order to class our board members, as 
the definition was not clear for us. I did not get any reply.” 
 
Roberts and Scapens (1985) argue that the way practice is defined will depend on how 
past events have also defined. In the Saudi context, independent NED have not existed 
on the boards of Saudi companies until only recently and, as noted earlier, the term has 
only been used to any meaningful extent since the Saudi corporate governance code 
was issued in 2006. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that institutional change 
cannot occur until organisations have an understanding of new concepts; thus, an 
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important influence on INEDs’ appointments is an understanding of the role at board 
level, as the role of the INED is limited to the definition of the CMA and is still not 
understood. Diffusion of practice is slow in spreading and the critical need for giving 
independent judgment is currently missing. Thus coercive pressure may be needed to 
institutionalise this new logic.  
 
Thus, companies seem to have appointed nominally independent directors simply as a 
symbolic response to the corporate governance code and the legal environment has yet 
to maternally influence board composition (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999).  
 
The interviewees argued that the level of board members’ understanding of their role 
varies and suggested that INEDs who hold CEO positions in other companies will have 
a better understanding of their roles as INEDs. Interviewee BS 11 explained that: 
“An executive director is more aware of his responsibilities in his 
position as an executive, therefore when he becomes a non-
executive elsewhere he is more aware of the boundaries of his role 
and that he is not an executive in that company.” 
 
Although in this case the example relates to NEDs generally, it has obvious implications 
for the specific independence function.  
  
6.5.1 Government and Family Representation 
 
As noted earlier, in KSA companies with significant government ownership, a 
representative from within government organisations is elected to the board, either from 
the Ministry of Finance or a similar agency. Many interviewees showed concern about 
government NEDs on the board, suggesting that most of them are inadequate, without 
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the relevant knowledge or experience to provide meaningful independent input to 
boards. The interviewees in fact suggested that government representatives’ interests are 
generally limited only to making sure that the outline of procedures is in place as 
Interviewee BS 6 stated that: 
“The role of government officials on boards is very inactive; they 
act as if they have a checklist to make sure everything is in order 
but if there are any discussions about the business plan or strategic 
issues, they are mostly quiet about it. They lack the business 
experience that is crucial to the board.” 
 
Interviewee NED 9 was particularly scathing when noting that:  
“The government officials who are on our board contribute 
little; I have never heard them talk or discuss anything of value; 
they are only on the board to represent silence and not to 
represent their investors.” 
An executive and board secretary (interviewee BS 9) shared this concern: 
“People on the board are silent as the wind; these are mostly 
government officials who are on the board with us; I really don’t 
know why they are on the board.”58 
While even one of the government officials interviewed (NED 5) acknowledged that: 
“Board members, including myself, came on the board to 
represent government investment and lack banking experience. I 
think within time we will learn and have more experience.” 
 
At a more general level, it was suggested by the participants that when board members 
do not have a clear understanding of their role and/or lack the necessary experience and 
background they are simply not in a position to exercise their role effectively. This issue 
may also lead in turn to the emergence of practices that are not relevant to their role as 
                                                          
58 Some of the interviewees argued that the main reason why government officials are on the board is 
simply financial compensation for being on the board.  
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board members, such as micro-managing. Interviewee CEO 1, who is an executive 
director and a NED on another board, explained here that: 
“Boards should not micro-manage and should focus mainly on 
relevant roles. Some board members do not have a clear 
understanding of their role. This leads them to get involved in 
micro-managing, but how management carries out its role is not the 
board’s business.”  
 
In family companies, INEDs are not actually family members, but their role is limited to 
being consultant to the controlling group and hence not INEDs. The interviewees 
explained in this regard that family members who are NEDs are more involved with the 
company and, are therefore more aware of the business decisions that are needed to be 
made at board level. Interviewee CEO 4 argued here that: 
“NEDs who are members of the family are more aware of the 
industry and business and are closer to management; their 
discussions at board level lead to more effective decisions. Other 
NEDs are not so involved with board decisions.” 
 
Several interviewees from family-controlled companies stated that the board meeting 
was just the final step in the decision making process. Discussions took place prior to 
board meetings with the family members, and the proposed decision would then reach 
the board in its completed form; interviewee CEO 5 explained that: 
“Before the board meetings I would sometimes go and meet non-
family board members in person in order to explain to them the 
direction of the proposal and for them to have a clear 
understanding of our [the family] direction before the board 
meeting.” 
Interviewee CEO 2 also noted that:  
“Whether it’s a corporate governance code or a company law, 
family-controlled companies will always do what they see as 
right for themselves; appointing an audit committee or 
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independent directors would not change anything, as they 
control what goes on.” 
 
 
Clearly, family members have a major influence on the decision- making of their 
firms’ boards, whether or not independent NEDs are present. The influence of 
family and large shareholders is vast on KSA boards, which results in INEDs’ 
opinions being largely irrelevant, as interviewee CEO 1, an INED on another board, 
noted: 
 “I tried to get involved in board issues…however, these were never 
followed up and were even carried out just because the chairman, 
who is the controlling shareholder, wanted another approach and so 
I left the board.” 
 
The same interviewee went on to explain that:  
“He [the chairman] would ignore our views and suggestions, going 
on to do whatever he wanted, just because he had control over the 
board and was not interested in what anyone else had to say. I was 
the only one who was at least trying, but others were agreeing with 
him, just to stay on the board or for other benefits that they were 
gaining from their directorships.” 
Interviewee INED 6, who is on a board controlled by a large shareholder, summed up 
the problem: 
“We go to the board and find everything already put in place by 
the chairman, who is the controlling shareholder; would discuss 
the agenda items with us and we would give him our opinion; 
when a decision is made, it is his choice to take our advice or not 
because it is his company.” 
Large shareholders are thus barriers to INEDs’ involvement, as even when INEDs try to 
exercise their independence in good faith they are in a weak position relative to large 
shareholders who dominate boards. The interviewees also argued that the relationships 
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between individual board members through their networks tend to result in agreement 
between them in all board issues all the time. As Interviewee NED 10 noted: 
“Our businesses is still influenced by our culture; when you have a 
relationship with someone on the board, you compromise the 
business in order to maintain this relationship, what is called in our 
culture “courtesy”, “Mojamalah.” Because of this courtesy, you do 
not want to lose this relationship with this person, so you 
compromise by losing the business.” 
However another interviewee, BS 1, argued that: 
“We are a society filled with hypocrisy with our “courtesy”; our 
understanding of business is that, ‘I will do what I can but will not 
take it to the level of jeopardising the relationship I have with 
someone else,” 
Interviewee, CEO 2 gave a specific example regarding this issue, stating that: 
 “One of the board members, who is a large shareholder, paid six 
million for another non-profit organisation in order to show his 
generosity. Six million is nothing to him, as he will write it off the 
next day. It’s not about generosity, it is about maintaining a 
relationship with the prince of that province where the non-profit 
company is located.” 
 
Cultural influences, such as “courtesy to others” and personal relationships have clearly 
impacted on the level of KSA board members' practical engagement. These social 
influences from their network of relationships are firmly embedded in the business 
environment and are difficult to overcome. The discussion now turns to the factors 
influencing other governance mechanisms. 
 
6.6 Other Factors Influencing Other Governance Practices  
 
Most interviewees agreed that culture has a significant impact on corporate governance 
practice; evaluation of board members and whistle-blowing are amongst those that are 
alien to the Saudi context. Cultural values such as courtesy to others, one’s position in 
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society, and the employment of friends and family all impact on the make-up and 
practice of the nations’ boards. Many of the interviewees argued that introducing a 
‘Western’ code did not necessarily mean that it would have to be adopted in the same 
manner as in the countries of origin, where the cultural, political and economic 
environments were different. Interviewee INED 5 stated in this context that: 
“The code, in itself, is not the main pillar of governance; it is the 
society and how it would accept implementing such practices. In 
order for these codes to be effective, society needs to change and 
adapt before implementing governance practices. Society still has 
not yet accepted the concepts of corporate governance.” 
 
Some practices mentioned were whistle-blowing, CEO duality and cumulative voting. 
The concept of ‘whistle-blowing’ was regarded as particularly helpful but difficult, 
maybe impossible, to adopt in the Saudi environment. Interviewee ACM 1 pointed to 
the practical danger this might have for those involved: 
“We suffer in Saudi Arabia, where if someone speaks out 
against another, that means he has condemned himself in the 
company and is no longer trust worthy, and will always be 
looked down upon… what are the rights and assurances for the 
whistle blower?” 
 
The interviewees consistently pointed out that in Saudi culture, whistle-blowing is 
perceived differently from the way it is perceived in Western countries. It was argued 
that in the KSA, employees will tend to avoid whistle-blowing against their superiors or 
other employees, simply because it is regarded as immoral and not an act of nobility. In 
addition, no assurances or rights are given to potential whistle-blowers, as even the term 
‘employee rights’ is alien in Saudi culture (Piesse et al., 2012). Perhaps not surprisingly 
given this context, the way in which cultural and social norms are embedded in Saudi 
society, based on collectivism, family relations and tribalism influences views over the 
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reporting of wrong doing. This finding is in line with previous studies in countries with 
dictatorial monarchies that have very little whistle-blowing as it is likely in practice to 
damage the career of those who do so (Aguilera, 2005).  
 
The role of shareholder activism was also limited, as more education was needed about 
shareholders rights to take a more active role. Interviewee INED 1 argued that: 
“What has made boards and corporate governance better in other 
countries is that shareholders take action and take companies to 
court; the governance practices will not be improved by only 
issuing regulations but when shareholders themselves take these 
companies to court and sanctions are issued on board members; 
then you will see that only the fittest will nominate themselves to 
the board and not only to fill their pockets.” 
 
 Interviewee INED 5 also noted that:  
“Regulators introduced the corporate governance codes as formal 
laws and procedures that need to be followed. This is mainly 
because the regulator presented the code as regulations and laws 
and did not present the codes as a way to promote justice and 
equality for all shareholders, which is in the Islamic teachings.” 
 
Interviewee NED 8 also pointed to the economic development of Saudi Arabia over the 
last 50 years as an important element; the interviewee explained: 
“Until the late 1950s, we were still using camels as a means of 
travel. … the point is that we have shifted dramatically in the last 
50 years, from having only deserts and camels as means of 
transport to building skyscrapers, which is amazing; we still need 
time and education in order to gain a better understanding of 
governance practices and how to apply them in our society.” 
Another cultural effect on corporate governance suggested by the interviewees was the 
Arabic notion of “Mojamalah or “excessive courtesy”. In practice this involves 
disregarding certain protocols or rules, at another’s request in order to please him or her. 
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In the context of this study, it could involve board members being nominated as 
chairman or CEO simply because of their social status. As interviewee BS 1 stated:   
“Our problem is that we, as a culture, are permissive, which does not 
only affect companies but the country as a whole; it’s all about, “I 
don’t want to lose you, so I will do what you want me to.”  
 
Thus, the introduction of some western-style corporate governance practices collide 
directly with the cultural and social norms and institutions that are embedded in the 
Saudi context, although this is not the key factor in the next issue examined, that of 
CEO duality.  
 
6.6.1 CEO Duality 
 
Most Corporate governance codes suggest that the roles of chairman and CEO should 
be separated, arguing that many benefits will arise from separating the two (Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991; Cadbury, 1992; Dahya et al., 1996; Stile and Taylor, 2001; Solomon, 
2007). Some previous literature has, however, pointed to the benefits of CEO duality, 
such as providing the firm with a clear focus on its objectives and operations (Anderson 
and Anthony, 1986) while also increasing the firms’ ability to secure resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) while other find no benefits of the separation (Elsayed, 2007; 
Dahya et al., 2009). The current practices of boards of directors in Saudi-listed 
companies with regard to splitting or combining the role of CEO and chairman were 
discussed with the interviewees, while taking into account that this practice of CEO 
separation is recommended by the code but is regarded as one of the voluntary sections 
of the extant code.  
 
  
155 
 
The interviewees noted that before the KSA’s corporate governance code was 
introduced, most companies, including family-controlled entities had CEO duality. 
However, some had separated the two roles often those that were government-
controlled
59
, reflecting a different community of practice. After the introduction of the 
corporate governance code, all interviewees, without exception, indicated that their 
firms had separated the role of chairman and CEO on their boards. Interviewee INED 3 
explained why most companies had combined the two roles before the corporate 
governance code’s recommendations to split them: 
“The first initiative to establish companies in Saudi Arabia did not 
come from people with knowledge and experience in the business 
but from people who had capital and, therefore, establishing 
companies started with owners of capital overseeing executives 
that they employed; the latter merely running the day-to-day 
operations of the company.” 
 
In general, the interviewees made clear that the separation between the roles of CEO 
and chairmen had been in response to the introduction of the corporate governance code 
as a coercive isomorphism.   
 
6.6.2 Cumulative Voting60 
 
The KSA’s corporate governance code recommends, but does not mandate, that 
companies adopt cumulative voting when selecting board members at the AGM (CMA, 
2006). The KSA code defines cumulative voting as:  
‘a method of voting for electing directors, which gives each 
shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares 
he/she holds. He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee 
                                                          
59
 Although the interviewees suggested that, although not entirely clear, dual CEOs were not technically 
permitted even prior to the code’s emergence.  
60
 As of 2012,  23% of KSA listed companies adopted this practice 
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or to divide them between his/her selected nominees without any 
duplication of these votes’.  
The interviewees differed in their opinions regarding the benefits of adopting 
cumulative voting; those representing the government seemed to be broadly in favour 
and their boards typically had introduced cumulative voting or were in the process of 
approving such a system. Interviewee CH 1 argued that cumulative voting gives 
minority shareholders a chance to nominate independent directors to boards, whereas 
current voting practices give large shareholders control of board nomination; as noted 
earlier, for cultural reasons often they bring their network of friends and family 
members onto the board and the absence of cumulative voting helps facilitate this. 
Interviewee BS 1 also noted that:  
“In our company, more than 50 per cent of the shareholding is 
controlled by the government and we try to adopt all aspects of 
governance, even cumulative voting, although this reduces the 
board seats that we control. We tried to give minority shareholders 
a chance to be on the board, even before the introduction of 
cumulative voting. ”61 
 
Large and family shareholders interviewed argued against adopting cumulative voting, 
arguing that not only is it a voluntary part of the code but it might also reduce their 
voting power. As Interviewee CEO 2 explained: 
“I am against cumulative voting. If I chose this method, I would 
lose control of board seats. However, even that is not the problem; 
the problem lies when new members want to take the company in 
another direction- that is what I have a problem with.” 
 
                                                          
61
 Although the promotion by government agencies of cumulative voting may also be motivated by a 
wish to have the former secure a seats on boards as outlined earlier in this chapter, in some cases 
government agencies cannot nominate a state officials to be NEDs because of other large shareholders 
controlling voting outcomes at AGMs.  
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These findings are consistent with the results of research elsewhere that has found a low 
level of implementation of government mechanisms in family-controlled firms and 
firms with concentrated ownership (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2009; Chizema and Kim, 2010). 
Some companies that initially hesitated to adopt cumulative voting changed their views 
when they saw others move in this direction as a mimetic perspective. Interviewee NED 
10, a controlling shareholder, rationalised this behaviour thus: 
“You are always careful when you adopt something new; it can be 
risky, especially for a new company like us. When we saw some of 
the other companies in our sector adopt cumulative voting, we also 
started to adopt it, while it was at the voluntary stage.” 
 
Effectively, such companies appear to try and model themselves on other existing 
organisations, as a reaction to environmental uncertainties in line with the notion of 
mimetic isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
However, the firms represented several communities of practice and were influenced 
differently as regards adopting cumulative voting since the NED quoted earlier is a 
large shareholder of a firm that has recently been listed on the stock exchange for the 
first time, indicating that not all institutions feel isomorphic pressures equally in the 
same way (Oliver, 1991). This variation may also reflect the stage in the firm’s life 
cycle (Powell, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). 
 
An interviewee from the financial sector, CEO 3, noted that a foreign company that 
owns a controlling stake of the company issued an internal corporate governance code 
for his firm to adopt and this stated that they needed to adopt cumulative voting. 
Interviewee BS 2, from the financial sector, whose company is controlled by foreign 
ownership, also indicated adopting cumulative voting for similar reasons. Thus, it 
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seems that foreign owners influence the listed Saudi companies that they control to 
adopt corporate governance practices that would be common in the home country. This 
finding, which is consistent with previous evidence of foreign ownership improving 
corporate governance practices in developing countries (Claessens and Djankov, 1999; 
Claessens et al., 1999), suggests another way in which normative isomorphism impacts 
on KSA firms.  
 
The interviewees believed that cultural issues discourage companies from adopting 
cumulative voting, it was suggested that many small shareholders are simply not 
interested in voting, even when online voting is introduced, as the shareholders are only 
interested in short-term investment. Interviewee BS 9 explained here that: 
“The reality of the stock market is that there are large controlling 
shareholders and small short-term investors. These small investors 
are interested in the company’s short-term share price. We know 
this as a fact, so even if you have cumulative voting and also 
implement online voting, in the end, it is a waste of time and 
money because these shareholders do not care to vote; the culture 
of voting in society is misunderstood.” 
 
Interviewee NED 9 was more blunt:  
“Why implement a method that you know is useless; people don’t 
vote and don’t care what is happening on the board, all they care 
about is short-term profits on the stock market” 
 
 
Interviewee BS 7 argued that:  
 
“There is no point in introducing cumulative voting because when 
looking at actual practice the people in control will have to divide 
their shares among the individuals they want, and agree on this 
division before the AGM so they will still be in control. Nothing 
has changed; the culture of voting needs to be changed before 
implementing this method.”  
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 The discussions indicated that institutional investor agencies in Saudi Arabia try to 
promote the adoption of cumulative voting on behalf of the government, while 
regulatory bodies
62
 and foreign investors also seem to have had an influence of this 
type. Only family and large shareholders seem not to be supportive of adopting 
cumulative voting systems representing two communities of practice and competing 
institutional logics. 
 
From an institutional perspective, it seems that some KSA companies have adopted 
cumulative voting as a symbolic scene to conform with the regulatory environment. For 
example, companies with government representation and/or significant foreign 
ownership seem to be influenced by the governance practices of these stakeholders, 
although companies controlled by family and other large shareholders seem to resist 
this pressure in an attempt to protect their power and control over the company 
consistent with previous literature (Klapper et al., 2005). Thus, ownership structure is of 
importance in the adoption of these governance practices. It is equally clear that 
coercive and mimetic isomorphism have influenced companies to adopted cumulative 
voting but a number of social barriers, such as the presence of family ownership and the 
culture of voting at AGMs work in the opposite direction. Interestingly, the evidence on 
cumulative voting systems shows that while some aspects of the Saudi governance code 
have been adopted, some, such as cumulative voting, are not found in all firms; this 
supports Friedland and Alford (1991) assertion that the level of adoption of institutional 
practices depends on different institutional logics that are embedded within 
organisations which determine how they respond to institutional pressures. The 
                                                          
62
 In 2012, the Ministry of Commerce issued a statement encouraging all listed companies to work on 
adopting cumulative voting. (Source http://www.mci.gov.sa/news/displaynews.asp?id=1739) 
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discussion of the research now concludes by examining the issue of director motivation 
and incentivising board membership.  
 
6.6.3 Board Membership Incentives 
 
The interviewees were asked for their opinions regarding the motives underpinning 
board directorships in Saudi Arabia. Many interviewees suggested social status as the 
most important reason for individuals seeking out and accepting board positions. The 
findings are therefore consistent with studies that find that board directorship 
acceptance is associated with high social status (e.g. Aguilera, 2005) indicating that the 
evidence is not exclusive to the KSA setting. However, several of the interviewees 
(17%) argued that they were on the boards of directors primarily to educate and gain 
experience. This view was mainly expressed by CEOs and academics. The results are 
consistent with the literature, in that board membership gives symbolic power to its 
members (McGregor, 2000) and satisfies a desire to learn from the experience of others 
(Mattis, 1993; Burke, 2000). The view of Interviewee CH 1, who is a government 
official, noted that in his case, although there was a specific purpose, he had little 
choice in taking up a directorship:  
“I joined boards of listed companies because I have to; part of my 
job is to look after our government investments; however, many 
others that I have seen only use it as means of gaining fame and to 
be noticed and to say, “look at me, I am a board member”, 
especially in the banking sector.”  
 
However, in some circumstances cultural factors from social networks may influence 
individuals “not to say no” to a board membership interviewee CEO 2 explained that: 
“A Large shareholder Mr.X whom I know wanted to acquire 
another listed company and asked me to join him on the board. 
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“I nominated myself but then Mr.X pulled out of the 
acquisition, I then forfeited my directorship, the current 
controlling shareholders asked me to not forfeit my nomination 
and stay as a INED. I agreed because I couldn’t say no to them 
because whom they were [people with high status], although I 
didn’t have any interest in staying as a board member”  
 
The interviewees argued that many individuals want to be on boards for reasons that 
are mainly economic. The specific incentives mentioned fell into two categories: the 
amount of compensation; and information that board members may gain to use for 
illegal insider trading. Interviewee CEO 2 provided some context here thus: 
“I hold a few other board memberships other than my position here 
as a CEO therefore some of the people I know have contacted me 
to recommend them to some of the companies’ boards; they admit 
to me that their motives is the remuneration as they are 
experiencing hardship.”  
 
When the issue was explored in more detail, the interviewees indicated that as well as 
direct personal benefits, the awarding of commercial contracts was also important. 
Interviewee BS 7 noted that, very much contrary to any notion of ‘best practice’ that: 
“Most of the board members are there to gain business contracts 
for their business and try to get the most benefit; they should be 
there to monitor management but in fact in one of the companies, 
not our board, the chairman made his board agree to buy land with 
more than its market value because he [the chairman] owned that 
land… Board membership is a matter of honesty to God before 
anything else, even if all the governance mechanisms in the world 
were in place and you had bad intentions, you would find a way to 
do what you wanted.” 
 
Insider trading was regarded by many of the interviewees as being acceptable to society. 
This is contrary to attitudes in Western countries, where sanctions are applied to insider 
trading and it is regarded as a crime (OECD, 2004). Interviewee NED 9 explained that:  
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“Saudi society does not regard trading with insider information as 
illegal; even those who are regarded as religious think it’s natural 
that, if you gain information, you have the right to take advantage 
of it.” 
 
 
 
Similarly, Interviewee FA 1 noted that: 
“It is all about information and insider dealing; why do you think 
there are board members on many different boards? They trade in 
stock and want to make fortunes from the information they get 
access to.” 
 
 Interviewee INED 1 provided some important context here:  
“When people are at a dinner party, some board members talk 
about the information that they have got with pride, and gain 
pleasure because others around them are looking up to them as if 
they are helping them by giving them this information; they are 
doing this because they think they are helping those who are close 
to them. Society looks at insider trading as if it is acceptable, not 
only that but also as a sign of “nobility” because that person is 
helping his people. The way we value it is different from in the 
West; they see it as wrong and punish it.”  
 
Although some of the interviewees argued that the incidence of insider dealing has 
reduced as laws have been put in place and sanctions issued on board members
63
. Thus, 
coercive pressures from the regulator are taking place in order to reduce the prevailing 
logic of insider dealing in KSA. Notwithstanding the issue specific to insider trading, 
cultural, social and economic motives are the most important factors that influence 
individuals to become board members in KSA. 
 
 
                                                          
63
 In 2011, nearly 25 individuals were accused and charged with insider trading, which resulted in them 
being banned from the boards of companies and from investing in the stock market. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
 
The Saudi context is highly institutionalised with social and cultural norms and values 
influencing many aspects of national life. The results presented here indicate that 
prevailing institutional norms arising from the KSA’s historical and environmental 
context as set out in an earlier chapter, influence practice relating to boards of directors 
in a range of different ways.  
 
The findings indicate that the main driver for recognition of corporate governance 
practices at the national level is a perceived need to restore investors’ confidence 
following the market crash in late 2005; as a result, the CMA issued the first Saudi 
corporate governance code in 2006, which most companies adopted to provide 
institutional legitimacy, but with some of the mandatory sections having only 
ceremonial impact decoupled from policy. Companies, however, vary in their adoption 
in practice of the voluntary sections of the code, influenced primarily by ownership 
structure, and personal relationships from social networks. 
 
The introduction of the corporate governance code has established the need for 
independent NEDs on the board, although this practice to date has only been 
ceremonial. More generally, the findings show that board composition is driven by 
several factors that are not in line with established notions of best practice, resulting 
from ownership and the trust and personal relationships, resulting from network of 
actors important in a tribal society such as KSA. 
 
The findings of the chapter suggest that normative isomorphism plays a role in the KSA 
as similar board committees have been established among companies within industrial 
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sectors; board members with multiple directorships have influence over companies to 
adopt analogous board committees. Saudi companies have generally established audit 
remuneration and nomination committees as mandated by the code, but primarily as a 
‘ceremonial practice’, conforming to the coercive institutional pressures that are 
influenced by regulatory bodies.  
 
However, and possibly as a result, it does not appear that remuneration and nomination 
committees are actually effective, especially regarding the practice of evaluating board 
members, with cultural barriers inhibiting the ability to do so, with the cultural 
disapproval of ‘evaluation’ of high status people such as large shareholders, company 
founders, members of the royal family and the elite of society. Relatedly, the 
independent NEDs who should play an important role on these committees are either 
absent or unable to function effectively without assurances that they will not be 
dismissed from the board for any contentious decisions. Thus, in KSA one community 
of practice has arisen with the inability to implement evaluation processes. In this 
context, the CMA should urgently consider the practice of board committees, and find a 
way to improve matters that takes into account the nations’ societal and cultural context.  
 
From an institutional theory perspective, a particularly noteworthy finding in the chapter 
is the interviewees’ perception that the practical level of involvement of INEDs is 
influenced by networks of large and family shareholders, reflecting cultural and social 
norms such as “courtesy to others”. The main manifestation of this tendency appears to 
be that board members value their relationships with other directors more than the 
business itself. The presence of large shareholders and controlling family members on 
boards means INEDs perceive major shareholders as in full control with the INEDs’ 
effectively acting only as external consultants embedding this institutional logic.  
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The findings as a whole suggest that board members in the KSA have a wide range of 
motives for joining boards, with some regarding board membership as an educational 
opportunity while, more worryingly, others believing it will be a way to improve their 
social status and networks or to access valuable information. It is not surprising 
therefore that many of these governance mechanisms nominally in place in the kingdom 
have very little effect with a decoupling of policy. In addition to the issues referred to 
above, the ability of INEDs to become and remain independent, exercise whistle-
blowing and support cumulative voting, are all heavily compromised in practice. The 
weak coercive monitoring of the regulatory bodies is also a contributing factor. 
 
The findings presented in this chapter contribute to the governance literature by 
investigating specific board-related issues in a developing nation from an institutional 
perspective. As a whole, the evidence indicates that cultural and social norms influence 
corporate governance practice and that analyses of corporate governance issues should 
take into explicit account the organisational and environmental institutions within their 
context. This contextual issue is therefore taken account of in the next chapter which 
discusses the results obtained from the questionnaire survey.   
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Table 6.1 Summary of the interviews findings 
Corporate Governance practice  Type of 
provision 
Family companies Government companies 
Board composition   KSA companies had the norm of having the owners or their representatives on the board as NED minimising the 
presence of executive board members, the code emphasised current practice  
Selection of the Chairman NA Cultural and social factors influence the selection process 
 
Large and family shareholders influence the  selection  Government officials and government bodies influence the 
selection  
Selection of  Non-Executive 
Directors 
Mandatory regulations influence board to be composed of NED and Cultural and social factors and ownership structure play an 
important role in the selection process 
effectiveness Family NEDs are more aware of the business and 
therefore are more effective  
NEDs who are government employees are inadequate as they 
do not have the relevant experience and qualifications 
Selection of  Independent Non-
Executive Directors 
Mandatory  The corporate governance code influences boards to have  independent directors 
effectiveness This mechanism has been decoupled as the institutional logic within the Saudi culture  unaided INEDs to act 
independently with controlling shareholders predominant their effectiveness 
Large and family shareholders influence selection of 
these so-called independent directors   
Government officials influence the selection of these directors 
Selection of  Audit committee 
members  
Mandatory corporate governance code coercively influenced companies to adopt this committee however ownership remains a 
powerful tool in the composition of this committee 
controlling family shareholders appoint them the government appoint them 
Selection of  Remuneration and 
Nomination committee members 
Mandatory corporate governance code coercively influenced companies to adopt this committee 
 controlling family shareholders appoint them the government appoint them 
effectiveness Cultural and social factors hinder the roles of these committees 
CEO / Chairman separation   Voluntary the corporate governance code normatively influenced companies to separate CEO and Chairmen roles although it still 
remains a voluntary part of the code 
Cumulative voting Voluntary The corporate governance  code with government initiatives have normatively influences companies to adoption 
cumulative voting 
 some family companies do not adopt this practice as it 
contradict with family logics 
Government firms adopt this practice normatively 
Number  of Directorships  Voluntary corporate governance code normatively influenced directors to have a maximum of five directorships 
 
Directorships incentive  Individuals sought that social statues, financial incentives and experience were main derivers in obtaining a board 
membership 
Note: The table shows the main findings of the interviews regarding factors influencing governance practices; it also shows more specifically, in some instances, the different influences within 
family and government controlled companies.   
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Chapter Seven: Questionnaire Analyses 
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7.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter focused on the findings from the semi-structured interviews that 
were conducted in KSA. The present chapter presents and discusses the results from the 
questionnaire survey, which was conducted to allow a larger number of opinions to be 
gathered and the extent to which the opinions of the interviewees pervade in the KSA 
determined (Gillham, 2000). The questionnaire
64
 was distributed amongst boards of 
directors of KSA listed companies and was designed to elicit the respondents’ opinions 
on the factors that may influence corporate governance practices, particularly those 
related to board issues. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 outlines the 
questionnaire headings and identifies the respondent groups, before the analyses of 
respondents’ perceptions regarding the factors influencing the nomination of board and 
committee members are discussed in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 investigates the 
respondents’ perceptions on the factors influencing other corporate governance 
practices while Section 7.5 addresses the influences on board of directors’ roles and 
decision making process. Section 7.6 concludes this chapter. 
 
7.2 Respondents’ Background  
 
As discussed in Chapter four of this thesis, the questionnaire covered four main areas, 
the first section of the questionnaire covered background information on the 
respondents and their role on the board. The second then focused on the factors 
influencing the selection of board member and committee members. The third part was 
designed to elicit the respondents’ opinion on factors influencing the adoption of some 
                                                          
64
 Copies of the questionnaire in both English and Arabic are provided in Appendix D. 
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broader corporate governance practices, while the final section aimed to obtain views 
regarding influences of directors’ behaviours and board meeting practices.  
 
7.2.1 Respondent Demographics  
 
For the analysis of the questionnaires, the respondents were requested to identify 
themselves as either: Chairmen (CH), Chief Executives Officers (CEOs), Non-executive 
directors (NEDs), Independent Non-executive directors (INEDs) or board secretaries 
(BS).  
 
The participants were then asked to indicate from which sector their organisations were 
from. Most respondents were from the financial sector and multi investment sector 
representing 23.2% and 17.2% of the respondents respectively. Fifteen percent of the 
respondents were from the petrochemical and cement sector and 14% were from the 
building construction and real estate sector. 10% were from the tourism, communication 
and media sector with 8% coming from agriculture and food. The remaining nine 
percent were spread over a number of other areas. The respondents were also asked to 
disclose the ownership category that applied to their companies. Table 7.1 illustrates the 
respondents’ demographics.  
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Table 7.1 Background Information about the Respondents 
 Categories Number % 
Board Role 
Chairmen  3 3.7% 
CEO 9 11.0% 
NED 19 23.2% 
INED 20 24.4% 
BS 31 37.8% 
Total 82 100% 
    
Serving on 
board 
committees 
Audit  23 NA 
Remuneration and nomination 26 NA 
Executive 13 NA 
Sharia
65
 0 NA 
    
Ownership type 
Dispersed  19 23.2% 
Government 24 29.3% 
Family 26 31.7% 
Foreign  9 11.0% 
other 4 4.9% 
Total 82 100% 
    
Years’ 
experience as a 
board member 
Less than 5 years 6 7.3% 
From 6 to 10 years 8 9.8% 
From 11 to 15 years
66
 36 43.9% 
More than 15 years 32 39.0% 
Total 82 100% 
    
Sectors 
  % from each sector 
Financial  16 3% 23.2 
Cement and Petrochemical 
Cement  
15 5.7% 15 
Communication and tourism 9 15% 10 
Agriculture and food 8 5% 9 
Multi investments 14 7.6% 17.2 
Building and real estate 12 5% 14 
Other  8 NA 8 
 Total 82  100% 
Note: This table details the respondent demographics regarding board role, years of experience, ownership 
category and board committee membership.  The table also indicates the percentage of respondents in relation 
to the total of each sector.  
 
After receiving the questionnaire responses, the documents were coded and analysed 
using SPSS. It was clear from inspection that the data were not normally distributed, 
therefore non-parametric tests were used to analyse the questionnaire responses, in 
particular, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests were use. Factor analysis was also 
used in order to establish the extent of any commonality amongst respondents in related 
                                                          
65
 No respondents served on the Sharia committee; this might be due to the questionnaire being focused 
on board members and the Sharia committee board members are arguably independent even from the 
board. 
66
  Another interesting observation from the table is that most respondents were board members for more 
than 10 years which might indicate to the length of time an individual may serve as board members and 
their views might be entrenched.  
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areas indicating the most relevant factors from the pool of factors under consideration 
(Dunteman, 1989). 
 
7.3 Selection of Board Members 
 
In order to investigate the extent to which factors suggested by the literature and in the 
interviews influenced the selection of board and board committees, the second part of 
the questionnaire addressed issues with respect to:  Chairmen; NEDs; INEDs and board 
committees.  
7.3.1 Selection of the Chairmen 
 
The respondents were first asked to indicate their level of agreement about whether or 
not specific factors influenced the selection of the chairmen. Table 7.2 shows that on the 
basis of a 1 to 5 point Likert scale were 1= strongly agree, and 5= strongly disagree. 
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Table 7.2 Factors Influencing the Selection of Chairmen 
Factors R M SD Group Means K-W 
 
M-W  
Chairmen & CEO  & NED & INED& 
BS 
Sig 
Diff CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate governance 
code 
12 4.07 1.08 4.00 4.56 3.63 4.60 3.87 0.04* 0.11 0.88 0.06 0.77 0.10 0.83 0.10 0.02* 0.61 0.02* 2 
Gov & regulatory bodies  5 2.55 1.32 3.67 3.33 1.63 3.05 2.45 0.00** 0.74 0.00** 0.45 0.16 0.00** 0.60 0.08 0.00** 0.09 0.10 3 
Members of royal family 10 3.95 0.97 2.67 3.11 4.28 4.10 4.03 0.01** 0.43 0.01** 0.02* 0.02* 0.01** 0.02 0.01** 0.56 0.38 0.81 6 
Islamic principles  12 4.07 0.91 3.33 4.00 3.89 4.10 4.26 0.27 0.01** 0.23 0.15 0.04* 0.63 0.64 0.09 0.88 0.44 0.45 2 
Personal relationships 1 1.70 0.70 2.67 1.89 1.53 1.80 1.58 0.03* 0.08 0.01** 0.04* 0.01** 0.13 0.70 0.10 0.17 0.86 0.11 3 
Courtesy to others  2 1.82 0.89 3.33 1.89 1.47 1.75 1.90 0.06 0.05 0.01** 0.02* 0.05* 0.09 0.55 0.54 0.16 0.15 0.97 4 
Position in society 3 1.93 0.94 2.00 1.89 1.89 1.80 2.03 0.89 0.72 0.44 0.51 0.69 0.53 0.70 0.94 0.65 0.44 0.72 0 
Family ownership 8 3.02 1.44 2.67 3.11 2.89 3.05 3.10 0.96 0.60 0.96 0.58 0.68 0.94 0.88 0.74 0.74 0.46 0.84 0 
Government ownership 7 3.00 1.35 3.33 3.33 2.68 3.11 3.00 0.75 1.00 0.49 0.75 0.75 0.28 0.61 0.61 0.28 0.39 0.80 0 
Top Management  13 4.12 0.77 4.00 4.22 4.05 4.11 4.16 0.96 0.39 0.88 0.46 0.63 0.61 1.00 0.99 0.59 0.62 0.95 0 
Company size 11 4.05 0.90 2.67 4.22 4.21 4.30 3.87 0.09 0.03* 0.04* 0.03 0.07 0.65 0.60 0.29 0.98 0.17 0.09 4 
Company sector 9 3.82 1.20 2.00 4.22 4.00 4.00 3.65 0.23 0.03* 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.83 0.51 0.38 0.57 0.27 0.53 4 
Experience and 
Qualification of nominee 4 
2.36 1.31 2.67 2.89 1.56 3.70 1.77 0.00** 0.84 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.01** 0.09 0.03* 0.00** 0.38 0.00** 5 
Nominee being on other 
company boards 6 2.77 1.42 3.33 4.33 2.11 3.55 2.13 0.00** 0.03* 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.00** 0.24 0.00** 0.00** 0.92 0.00** 7 
          5 8 5 7 4 1 3 4 0 3  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance.  The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. Responses 
are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively.  
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The respondents regarded “Personal relationships” as the most important, with a mean of 
1.70, followed by “courtesy to others” (1.82) and “position in society” (1.93). This 
finding suggests that Arabian social and cultural networks are important factors in 
selecting the chairmen of the board and is also consistent with both previous literature 
that argues that Arab tribal and social values still influence modern organizational 
structures (Faligi, 2009) and the interviews finding in the previous chapter. However, 
family and government ownership did not seem to influence the selection of the 
chairmen, with means of close to the mid-point of 3 which was not expected and does not 
accord with the findings of the interviews. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate wither there are any significant differences between the respondent groups in 
general and between any two groups regarding their opinions regarding the influence of 
these factors. The results revealed that the groups had different opinions in several cases 
with significant results for the former. The NEDs and BSs indicated that government and 
regulatory bodies influenced chairmen’s selection, while all the other groups disagreed. 
This might be because most of the NEDs and BSs responses came from government-
controlled boards (34% and 30% of each group respectively) and might be more likely to 
observe the influence of regulatory influence on chairmen’s selection in companies that 
are state-controlled an issue raised by the interviewees and discussed in Chapter Six. 
When analysing the results by type of ownership, respondents from family- and 
government- controlled boards agreed that government and regulatory bodies influenced 
the chairmen’s selection, while respondents from companies that had dispersed 
ownership disagreed. This finding suggests that where the government does not hold 
significant interests (i.e. in dispersely-owned companies) they do not influence the 
selection of its chairman in any direct way.  
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The respondents also had different opinions regarding the influence of ownership. 
Respondents from family-and government-owned companies agreed that family 
ownership is an important factor (means 1.62 and 2.56 respectively) while respondents 
from both dispersed-and foreign -owned companies were broadly neutral. Thus, the type 
of ownership is regarded as an important factor in the selection of chairmen in the KSA. 
 
Inspection of the table above reveals that CEOs and INEDs had similar views with the 
least significant Mann-Whitney results
67
despite their different roles on Saudi boards as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The NED and BS also had similar views in regards to 
the factors that influenced the chairmen’s selection. All the groups agreed that experience 
and qualifications are important factors that influence the selection of the chairmen, 
while INEDs disagreed with this factor, one possible interpretation is because some 
INEDs might see themselves, or others in the board room, to be more experienced than 
the selected chairman and therefore view the selection process of the chairman as based 
on social status and prestige arising from their networks.  
 
The factor analysis reported in Table 7.3 suggested that six factors influence the selection 
of the chairmen. The first column in the table shows that the factor with the highest 
eigenvalues had high loadings for experience and qualifications and presence on other 
company boards; this factor is therefore labelled “Personal traits”. The second factor is 
labelled as “cultural influences” as variables such as personal relationships, courtesy to 
others and position in society has high loadings; these findings concur with the evidence 
from the interviews which suggested that cultural norms influence the selection of board 
members. Although cultural influences and personal traits have very similar eigenvalues, 
                                                          
67
 The table shows that CEOs and INEDs had only one significant deference regarding the factor Members 
of the royal family   
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the cultural factors came second in the degree of importance in the factor analysis; this 
pattern is likely to reflect the two largest groups, NEDs and BS, who might have given 
more emphasis to the importance of personal traits as shown in Table 7.2.  
 
The third column in the table is labelled “family ownership”, representing 11% of the 
total variance. When analysing responses by ownership type, respondents from family- 
controlled firms agreed that family ownership influenced the selection of the chairman 
with a mean of 1.62, while responses from all the other types of ownership had a mean 
close to three. Thus, within family firms, family owners appear to strongly influence the 
selection of the chairmen. These findings are consistent with evidence from the 
interviews where large shareholders, especially in family companies, were found to 
influence the selection of the chairman. The result is also consistent with DeMott (2008) 
who found strong influence of the controlling family on the selection process of the 
chairman.  
 
The fourth column shows that Islamic principles and membership of the royal family 
have high loadings, this is relevant to the Saudi culture, discussed in Chapter six, where 
the Arab culture gives high regard to people with important social status such as those 
from the royal family and with senior government roles; therefore this column is labelled 
as “Political influence”. The previous literature has also shown the influence of social 
and cultural values in the Arab culture (Faligi, 2009).  
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Table 7.3 Factor Analysis - Selection of Chairmen 
Factors Personal 
traits  
Cultural  
influences 
Family 
Ownership 
Political 
influences 
Islamic 
values 
Social 
status 
Corporate governance code  0.590 -0.062 -0.189 0.311 -0.360 -0.329 
Gov and Regulatory bodies  0.517 0.385 0.029 0.387 0.088  0.203 
Members of the royal family -0.367 0.359 0.036 0.436 0.392 -0.380 
Islamic Principles  0.204 -0.027 0.242 0.531 0.579 -0.088 
Personal relationships 0.405 0.529 -0.290 -0.154 0.044  0.184 
Courtesy to others  0.349 0.471 -0.483 0.145 0.084  0.413 
Position in society -0.144 0.593 -0.021 -0.265 0.022 -0.435 
Family ownership -0.423 0.276 0.679 0.014 -0.166  0.235 
Government ownership -0.133 0.668 0.337 0.129 -0.372  0.200 
Top Management  0.283 -0.388 0.096 -0.359 0.399  0.252 
Company size 0.321 -0.428 0.047 0.428 -0.460 -0.095 
Company sector 0.152 -0.268 0.449 0.266 0.047  0.292 
Experience and Qualification of nominee 0.638 0.240 0.500 -0.284 0.024 -0.237 
Nominee being on other company boards 0.778 0.029 0.316 -0.295 0.053 -0.157 
Eigen values 2.514 
 
2.121 
 
1.552 
 
1.401 
 
1.178  1.029 
Proportion of variance 17.95 15.15 11.08 10.01 8.41 7.34 
Cumulative variance 17.95 33.10 44.19 54.20 62.62  69.97 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the variables of each 
column the factors with high correlation in each column are highlighted in Bold. The bottom part of the table highlights the 
importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and cumulative percentage. The Kaiser 
criterion was used to decide on the principal components which should be presented in the results. Kaiser (1960) recommends 
that principal components with latent roots greater than one should be retained
68
. 
 
 
The results from Tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate that a community of practice exists when 
selecting the chairmen of a company, and this reflects the social and cultural influences 
that form the basis for this logic in the Saudi context. Both tables indicate how associates 
and friends nominate chairmen as a result of the position individuals hold within the 
society, while not undermining the influence of controlling shareholders in the 
nomination process. Thus, normative isomorphic tendencies are at work in making 
companies adopt similar institutionalising practices.  
 
 
                                                          
68
 Other methods in determining the number of principle components to retain have also been discussed in 
the literature such as the Scree test or on the basis of the total percentage of variance more than 70% 
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7.3.2 Selection of NEDs and Independent NEDs 
 
Respondents were asked to express their views regarding the factors that influence the 
selection of NEDs and INEDs. Table 7.4 and 7.5 show that personal relationships (means 
of 1.77 and 1.70 respectively) courtesy to others, position in society and experience and 
qualifications of nominees were the most important factors. These results show that 
although individual levels of proficiency are considered when selecting board members, 
the influence of social and cultural factors are more important in the selection process for 
both NEDs and INEDs.  
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Table 7.4 Factors Influencing The Selection of NED 
Factors M SD R 
Group M K-W  
 
M -W    
Chairmen &  CEO & NED & INED  
CH CEO NED INED BS  CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS BS  
Corporate governance code 3.83 1.29 8 2.67 4.56 3.63 4.60 3.35 0.00** 0.02* 0.21 0.01** 0.40 0.10 0.01** 0.02* 0.02* 0.50 0.00** 6 
Gov and Regulatory bodies 2.30 1.22 5a 2.67 3.33 1.63 3.05 1.90 0.00** 0.23 0.02* 0.67 0.09 0.00** 0.67 0.00** 0.00** 0.71 0.00** 5 
Members of the royal family 4.08 0.87 11 3.33 3.11 4.28 4.10 4.30 0.01** 0.77 0.08 0.14 0.03* 0.01** 0.14 0.00** 0.56 0.92 0.54 3 
Islamic values  4.10 0.91 13 3.33 4.00 3.89 4.10 4.32 0.20 0.01** 0.23 0.15 0.04* 0.63 0.15 0.07 0.88 0.32 0.33 2 
Personal relationships 1.77 0.74 1 2.67 2.11 1.53 1.85 1.68 0.03* 0.17 0.01** 0.06 0.03* 0.02* 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.79 0.21 3 
Courtesy to others 1.82 0.89 2 3.33 1.89 1.47 1.75 1.90 0.06 0.05 0.01** 0.02* 0.05 0.09 0.02* 0.54 0.16 0.15 0.97 4 
Position in society 1.93 0.94 4 2.00 1.89 1.89 1.80 2.03 0.89 0.72 0.44 0.51 0.69 0.53 0.51 0.94 0.65 0.44 0.72 0 
Family ownership 2.99 1.43 7 2.67 3.11 2.89 3.05 3.00 0.99 0.60 0.96 0.58 0.77 0.94 0.58 0.91 0.74 0.58 0.93 0 
Government ownership 2.98 1.38 6 3.00 3.33 2.68 3.11 2.97 0.80 0.74 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.28 0.87 0.58 0.28 0.45 0.73 0 
Top Management 4.09 0.78 12 3.67 4.22 4.05 4.11 4.10 0.80 0.11 0.41 0.15 0.37 0.61 0.15 0.77 0.59 0.83 0.79 0 
Company size 4.07 0.86 10 3.33 4.22 4.21 4.30 3.87 0.16 0.03* 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.65 0.05 0.29 0.98 0.17 0.09 1 
Company sector 3.84 1.15 9 2.67 4.22 4.00 4.00 3.65 0.31 0.03* 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.83 0.06 0.38 0.57 0.27 0.53 1 
Experience and Qualification of 
nominee 
1.84 0.86 3 2.67 1.78 1.89 1.80 1.77 0.46 0.11 0.23 0.12 0.11 0.77 0.12 0.61 0.39 0.43 0.79 0 
No inee being on other boards 2.14 1.12 5b 3.33 1.56 2.26 2.10 2.13 0.08 0.01** 0.04* 0.07 0.05 0.04* 0.07 0.18 0.25 0.53 0.63 3 
          5 4 2 3 4 2 3 2 0 2  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups. Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= 
agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively.  
  
  
179 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.5 Factors Influencing the Selection of INED 
Factors M SD R 
Group M K-W M- W  
Chairmen & CEO & NED & INED 
& 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS  CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS BS  
Corporate governance code 2.73 1.44 7 1.67 1.78 3.05 3.25 2.58 0.06 0.71 0.12 0.09 0.38 0.03* 0.01** 0.25 0.69 0.22 0.10 2 
Gov and Regulatory bodies 2.33 1.21 6 2.33 3.33 1.74 3.05 1.94 0.00** 0.14 0.22 0.40 0.40 0.00** 0.60 0.00** 0.00** 0.98 0.00** 4 
Members of the royal family 4.03 0.89 12 3.31 3.12 4.28 4.10 4.17 0.02* 0.77 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.01** 0.02* 0.01** 0.56 0.57 0.92 3 
Islamic values  4.02 0.93 11 3.30 4.00 3.89 4.10 4.13 0.51 0.01** 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.63 0.64 0.33 0.88 0.73 0.82 1 
Personal relationships 1.70 0.70 1 2.67 1.89 1.53 1.80 1.58 0.03* 0.08 0.01** 0.04 0.01** 0.13 0.70 0.10 0.17 0.86 0.11 2 
Courtesy to others 1.82 0.89 3 3.33 1.89 1.47 1.75 1.90 0.06 0.05 0.01** 0.02* 0.05 0.09 0.55 0.54 0.16 0.15 0.97 2 
Position in society 1.93 0.94 4 2.00 1.89 1.89 1.80 2.03 0.89 0.72 0.44 0.51 0.69 0.53 0.70 0.94 0.65 0.44 0.72 0 
Family ownership 3.01 1.45 9 2.67 3.11 3.11 3.05 2.94 0.99 0.60 0.73 0.58 0.88 0.74 0.88 0.99 0.83 0.91 0.79 0 
Government ownership 2.94 1.43 8 3.33 3.33 2.74 3.11 2.81 0.76 1.00 0.58 0.75 0.57 0.39 0.61 0.37 0.36 0.68 0.42 0 
Top Management 4.05 0.86 13 3.33 4.22 4.05 4.11 4.03 0.74 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.26 0.61 1.00 0.77 0.59 0.87 0.78 0 
Company size 4.07 0.86 14 3.33 4.22 4.21 4.30 3.87 0.16 0.03* 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.65 0.60 0.29 0.98 0.17 0.09 1 
Company sector 3.87 1.12 10 3.33 4.22 4.00 4.00 3.65 0.47 0.03* 0.16 0.21 0.39 0.83 0.51 0.38 0.57 0.27 0.53 1 
Experience and Qualification 
of Nominee 
1.74 0.87 2 2.67 1.56 1.56 1.80 1.77 0.39 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.82 0.81 0.61 0.56 0.38 0.79 1 
Nominee being on other 
boards 
2.10 1.15 5 3.33 1.56 2.11 2.10 2.13 0.17 0.01** 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.26 0.47 0.18 0.77 0.92 0.63 3 
          4 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 0 1  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups the final row and column show the number of significant differences. 
Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively.  
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This evidence is similar to the results relating to chairmen selection in Table 7.2 above, 
and are also consistent with the interview findings and with previous literature of 
personal relationships as an influential factors in the selection process within Arab 
countries (Zagoub, 2011; Falgi, 2009). The results indicate neutral views concerning 
family and government ownership influence on the selection of NEDs (means of 2.99 
and 2.98 respectively) and INEDs (means of 3.01 and 2.94 respectively) despite most 
Saudi listed companies being family and/or government owned. This result might be 
because the respondents have various types of controlling shareholders within their 
company such as foreign investors, large shareholders or dispersed ownership. 
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 also illustrate that government and regulatory bodies influence the 
selection process of NEDs and INED (means of 2.30 and 2.33 respectively); in context 
the corporate governance code only influenced the selection of INEDs (mean of 2.73), 
reflecting the code being the first attempt to introduce the concept of INEDs to Saudi-
listed companies and initiated the presence of INEDs on KSA boards. This evidence is 
consistent with previous literature that finds the importance of regulatory influences on 
corporate governance practices in several emerging countries (Black et al., 2006; Klapper 
et al., 2005).  
 
Comparison of the results from individual respondent groups indicates some differences 
in their opinions. NEDs, INEDs and BS all strongly indicated that personal relationships 
and courtesy to others were the two main influences on the selection of NEDs and 
INEDs; in this context, CEOs thought that experience and qualification and having other 
directorships were most important.  
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The groups’ responses also differed regarding the influence of the KSA corporate 
governance code on the selection of NEDs. Group CH agreed that the code influenced 
the selection process while all others disagreed. Interestingly, INEDs had mixed views 
regarding the influence of the code on their own selection as reflected in the mean 
response of 3.25. This evidence might be because not many KSA board members 
differentiate between NEDs and INEDs; as discussed in Chapter Six, as the concept of 
independence is not well understood within boards of directors of KSA listed companies 
given that it is a relatively new concept and this may even be the case amongst INEDs 
themselves. 
 
To examine further the impact of type of ownership of respondent’s companies, Table 
7.6 highlights the particularly relevant finding and shows that respondents from family 
controlled boards strongly agreed that family ownership influences the selection of both 
NED and INEDs, while respondents from government-controlled boards agreed that 
government ownership influences the selection of both NEDs and INEDs on their boards.  
Respondents from dispersely-owned companies did not seem to think that government 
and regulatory bodies influenced the selection of NEDs or INED, similar to their 
response regarding chairman selection. Respondents from both family-and dispersed-
owned companies did not think that the code or the regulatory bodies influenced the 
selection of NEDs while respondents from government-controlled companies agreed; this 
might be because government bodies are only able to influence the nomination of NEDs 
on to boards in companies in which they have an interest. Respondents with dispersed-
and foreign - ownership agreed that the corporate governance code influenced the 
nomination of INEDs, while respondents from-family controlled companies disagreed, 
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suggesting, as was apparent from Chapter Six, that INEDs in family companies are not 
actually independent and that they are selected in practice on the basis of social networks. 
  
Table 7.6 Influence of Family and Government Ownership on the Selection of NED 
and INEDs, 
 Selection of NED Selection of INED 
 Family 
ownership 
Government 
ownership 
Family 
ownership 
Government 
ownership Family Respondents 1.62 2.96 1.73 2.72 
Government Respondents  4.29 2.33 4.21 2.79 
Note: The table shows the responses of from family-and government-controlled firms on the influence of such 
ownership on the selection of NEDs and INEDs. 
 
The results shown in Tables 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 together indicate that cultural factors are 
important in the selection of board members in the KSA, as reflected in the importance of 
the cultural factors within all tables.  
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Table 7.7 Factor Influencing the Selection of NEDs and INEDs 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the variables of each column the factors with high correlation in each column are highlighted in 
Bold. The bottom part of the table highlights the importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and cumulative percentage. The Kaiser criterion was used to decide 
on the principal components which should be presented in the results. Kaiser (1960) recommends that principal components with latent roots greater than one should be retained. 
Factors 
NEDs INEDs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regulation Social 
status    
Personal 
traits Vs 
Governmen
t influence 
 
Company 
sector 
Islamic 
values 
Family 
influence 
Cultural   and 
regulatory 
influences  
Ownership 
 
Personal 
traits V 
government 
influence 
  
Social 
status  
Compa
ny 
sector 
  
Company 
characteri
stics  
Corporate governance code 0.778 -0.149 -0.165 0.299 -0.247 -0.069 -0.145 -0.481 0.152 0.156 -0.566 0.140 
Gov and Regulatory bodies 0.644 0.366 -0.195 -0.020 0.344 -0.051 0.598 -0.130 0.457 0.289 -0.143 -0.012 
Members of the royal family -0.157 0.477 -0.452 0.378 0.213 -0.358 0.271 0.344 -0.195 0.665 -0.171 0.183 
Islamic principles   -0.006 0.186 0.092 0.435 0.656 -0.223 0.299 -0.102 0.076 0.608 0.288 0.446 
Personal relationships 0.375 0.185 0.229 -0.491 0.219 0.317 0.583 0.100 0.379 -0.351 -0.022 0.089 
Courtesy to others 0.500 0.370 0.212 -0.390 0.295 0.085 0.634 -0.049 0.433 -0.282 -0.032 -0.038 
Position in society -0.185 0.662 0.126 -0.186 -0.293 -0.023 0.421 0.437 -0.389 -0.279 -0.274 0.044 
Family ownership -0.570 0.158 -0.294 0.137 0.112 0.576 -0.195 0.721 0.053 0.149 0.052 -0.044 
Government ownership 0.258 0.315 -0.675 -0.142 -0.108 0.199 0.132 0.586 0.448 0.067 -0.107 -0.224 
Top Management -0.008 -0.332 0.537 -0.031 0.256 -0.141 -0.113 -0.148 0.249 -0.305 0.458 0.568 
Company size 0.599 -0.368 -0.107 0.363 -0.268 0.182 -0.120 -0.577 0.264 0.169 -0.229 -0.312 
Company sector 0.040 -0.170 0.092 0.416 0.389 0.574 0.105 -0.091 0.146 0.249 0.637 -0.546 
Experience and Qualification of 
nominee 
-0.033 -0.589 0.440 0.363 -0.310 0.148 0.527 -0.110 -0.631 -0.025 0.047 -0.140 
Nominee being on other boards 0.201 0.387 0.505 0.391 -0.235 0.060 0.509 -0.435 -0.442 -0.035 0.134 -0.047 
Eigen  values 2.262 1.923 1.690 1.479 1.340 1.072 2.090 2.008 1.709 1.413 1.232 1.055 
Proportion of variance 16.160 13.732 12.071 10.566 9.568 7.657 14.931 14.346 12.210 10.095 8.802 7.535 
Cumulative variance 16.160 29.892 41.963 52.529 62.097 69.754 14.931 29.278 41.488 51.583 60.384 67.920 
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Factor analysis was applied to the responses to the fourteen questions to identify the main 
influences on the selection of NEDs and INEDs. The first column in Table 7.7 shows that 
the corporate governance code, and government and regulatory bodies have the highest 
loadings, indicating the importance of the regulatory environment in influencing board 
selection of NEDs and INEDs; this finding is consistent with the requirements of the 
Saudi corporate governance code which mandates that boards should be composed of a 
majority of NEDs and have INEDs on them also. 
 
The second column shows a high loading for membership of the royal family and 
position in society, suggesting that these factors are important in influencing the selection 
of NEDs, this evidence is again in line with the interview findings, suggesting a strong 
underlying trend in opinions. The Saudi culture gives more regard to individuals who 
have high social status and this would give in turn more power and legitimacy to the 
company and its board of directors. This column also shows a contrast between the role 
of these factors and ‘experience and qualification’ which has a high negative loading; one 
possible explanation for this pattern is that within the Saudi context the importance of 
social status in the nomination process exceeds the importance of experience and 
qualifications of an individual when appointed as a NED. 
 
The third column indicates a high loading for experience and qualifications but it also 
shows a high (negative) loading for government ownership. This evidence might indicate 
that within government-controlled companies there is a different community of practice 
when selecting NEDs; an explanation of this finding may lie in the interview results 
where government-controlled companies were perceived as having a tendency to 
nominate government employees on to boards, even though such representatives were 
described by the interviewees as having very little input, precisely because they do not 
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have the experience and qualifications necessary to serve as a director. Hence, there 
appears to be an institutional element within board structure in government-controlled 
companies, where government employees are nominated even though they are 
unqualified to serve as board members. This column is therefore labelled as ‘Personal 
traits vs. government influence’.   
 
The fourth column in Table 7.7 shows a high loading for the factors ‘Islamic principles’, 
‘company sector’ and ‘personal relationships’. According to the interview findings, close 
personal relationships are the norm when selecting board members, the negative loading 
for this factor suggests a more complex picture, with committees such as the adoption of 
Sharia committees and a need therefore for Sharia-oriented scholars (AAOIFI, 2004) 
being relevant. Sharia committees tend to be in sectors which mostly deal with Islamic 
products such as the financial sector (AAOIFI, 2004) and personal relationships might be 
less likely to be an influence in banking and related organisations. As the highest 
columns are likely to be related in this way, the column is labelled as ‘Company sector’. 
 
The interview findings suggested that within family companies, family shareholders 
influence the selection of individuals on to the board; this is also reflected in column six 
which shows that family ownership is an important factor. This column is therefore 
labelled ‘family influence’. This evidence is consistent with other research which 
concludes that family-controlled companies influence the nomination of board members 
(Anderson and Reed, 2004). Company sector is also shown here to be important and, as 
previously shown in Figure 2.2 in Chapter Two, that family shareholders control many of 
the companies in the Saudi stock market, suggesting that the influence of family 
ownership is in companies within different sectors of the Saudi stock market. 
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The remainder of Table 7.7 shows six factors to be important for INEDs selection. The 
first column shows a high loading for: government and regulatory bodies; courtesy to 
others; position in society; and personal relationships. This might be because, on one 
hand, the requirements of having INEDs on listed companies boards initially appeared as 
regulations in the corporate governance code therefore influencing companies to have 
INEDs on their boards. On the other hand cultural factors are also important, which 
suggest that even though regulation requires companies to have INEDs they are still 
selected based on the social networks, this column reflects their importance, hence this 
column is labelled as ‘cultural and regulatory influence’.    
 
The second column shows a high loading for the factors family and government 
ownership which indicates a high influence of these factors in the selection process of 
INEDs. The column also shows the factor corporate governance code as important, this 
may elicit that although the corporate governance code has initiated that boards should 
have independent directors, INEDs, when on family or government controlled boards, are 
appointed through the influence of these controlling shareholders, This column is 
therefore labelled as ‘Ownership’. These independent directors might be, as discussed in 
Chapter Six, friends of controlling shareholders and therefore are only labelled as 
independent, as previous literature has found that less independent (more affiliated) 
directors are appointed on boards in family firms (Anderson and Reed, 2004).  
 
Interestingly, similar to the NEDs section of this table, the third column for INEDs also 
shows a high loading for the similar factors which are experience, qualifications and 
government ownership. This column is therefore also labelled as ‘Personal traits vs. 
government influence’.  
 
  
187 
 
The fourth column shows the factors Islamic principles and members of the royal family 
as important. As discussed previously, these factors are relevant within the Saudi context 
which gives more regards and respect to people with social status such as those from the 
royal family and have high influential roles in Saudi society, whether in government or in 
public, and companies may benefit from having such individuals as INEDs on their 
boards. This factor is labelled as ‘social status’.  
 
The fifth column in labelled as ‘Company sector’ as it shows a high loading for this 
factor. This might be explained, as discussed earlier, that some sectors are more regulated 
in applying corporate governance practices. For example, the financial sector regulatory 
authority SAMA has issued a corporate governance code specifically for the financial 
sector, these regulations influence companies within the financial sector to adhere to 
more governance standards which include having more independent directors on the 
board and board committees. Thus, it seems that some sectors are applying more 
corporate governance practices than others due to more regulatory influence on such 
sectors. This seems to be a result of coercive isomorphic tendency’s on specific sectors in 
adopting more governance. This is consistent with institutional theory that argues that 
pressures may vary across different sectors (Scott and Myers, 1991; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). 
 
The final column shows a high loading for factors ‘top management’ ‘company sector’. 
This may suggest that top management have an influence on the selection of INEDs. 
However, this influence may vary across sectors. Such practices may be encountered in 
less regulated sectors. On the other hand, the interview findings indicated that in some 
companies, especially those with dispersed ownership, management are able to influence 
the selection of board members. This column is labelled as company characteristics.   
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The previous results shown in Tables 7.4 through 7.7 signify that the selection of NEDs 
and INEDs is influenced by the social and cultural norms that are present in the Saudi 
context, thus, influencing corporate governance structure. This confirms the institutional 
view that organizations are influenced by informal network of actors that are embedded 
within any given context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991; Scott, 1995). It is also 
likely such influences may vary according to companies’ sectors as it has been argued 
that due to the high regulatory role within some sectors, such as the financial sector, 
some of the cultural factors are less present within these sectors. Executives from 
companies within this sector may network together bringing their own community of 
practice. The results also highlight that the presence of INEDs has also been due to the 
influence by regulations imposed by the corporate governance code and the SAMA 
corporate governance code for the financial sector, although family controlled companies 
seem to be less affected by this factor. Also, it seems that there is still some ambiguity 
over the term independent which was highlighted from the neutral responses of INEDs 
themselves in the questionnaire to the influence of government and regulatory bodies. 
The next section will cover the responses from the questionnaires regarding the selection 
of committee members.  
 
7.3.3 Selection of Board Committee Members  
 
The questionnaire then asked which factors influenced the selection of board members to 
the audit, remuneration nomination and executive committees. The respondents all 
indicated that their boards had established both audit and remuneration and nomination 
committees, which is expected since these committees are mandatory requirements of the 
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corporate governance code.
69
 70% of the respondents had executive committees in their 
companies. 27% and 30% of the respondents served on the audit and remuneration and 
nomination committees respectively while 15% of the respondents served on the 
executive committee. Only eight percent of the respondents had a Sharia committee but 
none of the respondents served on this committee.
70
 
                                                          
69
 The audit committee has been part of the mandatory requirement of the corporate governance code for all 
listed companies since 2008 while the adoption of a remuneration and nomination committee only became 
mandatory in 2011. 
70
 It is surprising that only eight present of the respondents had Sharia committees; a higher percentage 
would be expected given that 23% of the respondents are from the financial sector. Further investigation of 
this area might be a possible avenue for future research. 
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Table 7.8 Factors Influencing Board Committee’s Selection 
Factors 
 
Audit Remuneration Executive 
R 
 
M SD R M SD R M SD 
CG code 3 2.11 0.981 2 2.23 1.05 13 3.33 1.774 
Government and Regulatory bodies  5 2.88 1.400 5 2.99 1.31 7 2.87 1.936 
Islamic values  14 4.24 0.854 12 4.26 0.66 12 3.27 1.988 
Favouritism  12 3.91 1.259 13 4.28 0.79 8b 2.94 1.971 
Personal relationships 4 2.85 1.467 6 3.06 1.34 4 2.37 1.781 
Courtesy to others  11 3.74 1.265 8 3.78 1.31 9 2.96 2.003 
Position in society 8 3.65 1.391 9 3.79 1.26 6 2.79 2.017 
Family ownership 6 2.91 1.354 4 2.52 1.28 3 2.13 1.691 
Government ownership 7 3.04 1.444 7 3.37 1.44 5 2.65 1.895 
Top Management  9 3.68 1.216 11 4.04 1.05 11 3.17 1.961 
Company size 10 3.71 1.262 10 3.95 1.04 8a 2.94 1.901 
Company sector 13 3.95 1.065 14 4.21 0.75 10 3.10 1.960 
Experience and Qualification of BM  2 1.46 0.613 3 2.43 1.11 1 1.16 0.895 
BM being on similar committees  1 1.44 0.611 1 1.59 0.54 2 1.17 0.900 
Note: this table shows the mean and standard deviation. R= factor ranks in the order of importance. M= means. SD = standard deviation. Responses are based on a five point 
Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree 
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Table 7.9 Factors Influencing the Selection of Audit Committee Members 
Factors 
Means K-W 
 
 
M-W  
Chairmen and  CEO NED INED V 
BS 
No 
Diff CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
CG code 1.67 2.56 1.79 1.95 2.32 0.29 0.21 0.92 0.37 0.32 0.08 0.22 0.59 0.37 0.11 0.36 0 
Government and Regulatory bodies  2.00 2.00 3.37 1.90 3.55 0.00** 1.00 0.13 0.91 0.07 0.02* 0.90 0.00** 0.00** 0.69 0.00** 4 
Islamic values  2.67 3.89 4.47 4.10 4.45 0.02* 0.10 0.01** 0.03* 0.01** 0.05 0.22 0.04* 0.19 0.92 0.18 4 
Favouritism  3.67 4.00 2.53 4.20 4.58 0.00** 0.47 0.17 0.10 0.02* 0.01** 0.21 0.02* 0.00** 0.00** 0.09 5 
Personal relationships 2.67 2.00 2.63 1.85 3.90 0.00** 0.32 0.88 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.85 0.00** 0.07 0.00** 0.00** 3 
Courtesy to others  4.00 3.89 3.26 4.05 3.77 0.50 0.72 0.55 0.55 0.85 0.44 0.28 0.72 0.10 0.23 0.52 0 
Position in society 2.00 4.22 3.63 3.40 3.81 0.22 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.32 0.14 0.84 0.61 0.41 0.21 0 
Family ownership 2.00 3.56 3.37 2.15 3.03 0.02* 0.04* 0.09 0.85 0.31 0.75 0.00** 0.39 0.00** 0.45 0.06 3 
Government ownership 2.67 3.33 2.47 2.55 3.65 0.02* 0.33 0.52 0.61 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.30 0.52 0.02* 0.01** 2 
Top Management  4.00 3.89 3.95 2.25 4.35 0.00** 0.72 0.65 0.01** 0.26 0.48 0.00** 0.06 0.00** 0.37 0.00** 4 
Company size 2.67 3.44 3.63 3.35 4.16 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.35 0.04* 0.76 0.92 0.10 0.60 0.16 0.05 1 
Company sector 2.67 3.67 4.05 3.50 4.39 0.01** 0.14 0.05 0.20 0.01** 0.09 0.86 0.01** 0.09 0.36 0.01** 3 
Experience and Qualification of BM  1.67 1.33 1.32 1.55 1.52 0.66 0.47 0.40 0.87 0.62 0.94 0.36 0.52 0.21 0.33 0.56 0 
BM being on similar committees on 
other boards 
1.33 1.44 1.32 1.55 1.45 0.79 0.75 0.92 0.43 0.70 0.79 0.46 0.97 0.28 0.67 0.33 0 
       1 1 2 4 2 2 5 4 3 5  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant 
differences across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant 
differences. Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% 
level respectively.  
  
192 
 
Table 7.8 indicates that the respondents believed that experience and qualifications of 
board were the most important in influencing the selection of audit, remuneration and 
nomination and executive committee members (means of 1.46 2.43, and 1.16 
respectively), while they also thought that being on other similar committees in other 
companies was also an influential factor, this might be expected since board committee 
membership requires more specific knowledge and therefore needs a focus more on 
qualifications and experience.  
 
The respondents were in agreement that the KSA corporate governance code influenced 
the selection of audit committee and remuneration and nomination  committee members 
(means of 2.11 and 2.23 respectively), although they did not think the code had any 
influence on the selection process of the executive committee (mean 3.33); this might be 
expected as the code does not refer to the executive committee in any of its sections, 
whereas it has mandatory sections on both the audit and remuneration and nomination 
committees for listed companies.  
 
Inspection of the table above reveals that the respondents had mixed opinions regarding 
the influence of some of the factors on the selection process of board committees. CH 
and INEDs agreed that family ownership (means of 2.00 and 2.15 respectively) and 
government ownership (means of 2.67 and 2.55 respectively) influenced the selection 
onto the audit committee, whereas the executives (groups CEOs and BSs) had different 
views, this might be because executives want to demonstrate that the selection process of 
board members is more objective than being influenced by large shareholders to show 
that they are applying normative governance practices. Group CH and INEDs were also 
in agreement that government and regulatory bodies influenced the selection of audit 
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committee members as well as CEOs, whereas groups BS and NED disagreed. When 
looking at the results from the type of ownership of respondents companies, respondents 
from both family and foreign controlled boards disagreed with the influence of 
government and regulatory bodies, whereas those from government controlled boards 
and companies with dispersed ownership agreed; this is consistent with the results in 
chapter six where the interviews within government and dispersed owned firms had audit 
committee members from SOCPA.  
 
Only the respondents from government controlled firms indicated that government 
ownership influenced the selection of audit committee members (mean 2.04), while the 
respondents from family – and dispersed- ownership indicated that family ownership 
influenced the selection of audit committee members (means of 1.88 and 2.63 
respectively), these findings suggest that ownership is an important factor in influencing 
the selection of audit committee members. It would be expected that family ownership 
does not influence companies with dispersed shareholders, an explanation of this finding 
might be that such companies before becoming listed on the KSA stock exchange had 
family ownership, however, the amount of ownership decreased allowing for the 
company to be classified on the market as dispersely owned, although the influence of 
the controlling family might still be present. No respondents thought that top 
management influenced the selection of audit committee members except for INEDs. 
This is consistent with the INEDs views in the interviews that companies with dispersed 
ownership and where large shareholders are absent, management have more control over 
the nomination of board committee members. However, when analysing the respondents 
based on the type of ownership, respondent from all types of companies disagreed that 
  
194 
 
top management influenced the selection of audit committee members; future research 
might investigate the influence of management on the adoption of governance practices.  
 
Inspection of the table above revealed that CEOs and INEDs had similar views, which 
shows from having the least significant differences in the Mann- Whitney results; this 
might be because of the level of involvement between management and board 
committees, while groups BS and INEDs had the most differences of opinions; this might 
be because INEDs take on the role of committee members while BS do not take part in 
committee memberships. 
 
Table 7.10 shows that most respondent groups indicated that government, regulatory 
bodies and family ownership influenced the selection of board members onto the 
remuneration and nomination committee, but group BS disagreed, this might be because 
BS do not have any voting power or take part in nominating board members onto 
committees, and hence are less knowledgeable about this process. 
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Table 7.10 Factors Influencing the Selection of Remuneration and Nomination Committee Members 
Factors 
MEANS K-W 
 
 
M-W   
CH and CEO and NED and INED& 
BS 
Sig  
M CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
CG code 2.33 2.33 1.95 2.10 2.45 0.74 0.92 0.65 1.00 0.83 0.43 0.70 0.87 0.55 0.19 0.41 0 
Government and regulatory bodies  2.67 2.33 2.32 2.15 3.55 0.00** 0.47 0.28 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.28 0.01** 0.01** 0.67 0.00** 3 
Islamic values  3.33 3.56 4.42 4.30 4.42 0.00** 0.67 0.02 0.01** 0.02* 0.01* 0.01** 0.00** 0.40 0.98 0.34 5 
Favouritism  4.67 3.22 4.11 4.40 4.58 0.00** 0.02* 0.17 0.40 0.91 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.28 0.01** 0.12 5 
Personal relationships 4.00 1.89 2.21 2.95 3.90 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.08 0.56 0.48 0.01* 0.00** 0.02* 0.00** 0.00** 7 
Courtesy to others  3.67 4.22 3.21 4.45 3.77 0.01** 0.01** 0.17 0.00** 0.02* 0.17 0.39 0.57 0.02* 0.21 0.12 4 
Position in society 3.33 4.22 3.84 3.65 3.77 0.70 0.18 0.33 0.60 0.35 0.79 0.24 0.73 0.45 0.94 0.44 0 
Family ownership 2.33 2.44 2.63 2.15 3.87 0.00** 0.77 0.10 1.00 0.29 0.05 0.45 0.34 0.01** 0.00** 0.01** 3 
Government ownership 3.00 3.22 3.58 2.85 3.65 0.19 0.70 0.37 0.84 0.25 0.37 0.49 0.25 0.09 0.94 0.03* 1 
Top Management  3.67 1.67 4.32 4.40 4.35 0.00** 0.01** 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.90 0.93 0.97 4 
Company size 2.67 3.44 3.84 4.15 4.16 0.14 0.32 0.12 0.04 0.04* 0.35 0.14 0.08 0.64 0.46 0.76 1 
Company sector 2.67 4.00 4.32 4.15 4.39 0.06 0.05 0.02* 0.04 0.01* 0.18 0.53 0.08 0.49 0.69 0.26 2 
Experience and Qualification of BM  2.00 2.56 2.26 2.65 2.39 0.75 0.57 1.00 0.19 0.64 0.61 0.90 0.73 0.24 0.69 0.39 0 
BM being on similar committees  
on other boards 
2.67 1.44 1.53 1.75 1.45 0.02* 0.02* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.69 0.12 0.97 0.15 0.61 0.04* 5 
Number of Significant M       5 3 3 5 3 4 5 4 3 5  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant 
differences across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant 
differences. Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 
5%/1% level respectively. 
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Inspection of the table above reveals that most of the significant differences of the Mann-
Whitney results were regarding the factor personal relationships. CEOs and NEDs 
thought that personal relationships influenced the selection of board members to the 
remuneration and nomination committee; this might be because NEDs represent large 
shareholders and like to have those whom are from their same networks on this 
committee with them, and NEDs are usually on this committee because of its influence 
on the nomination process onto the board. Groups CH and BS disagreed regarding the 
influence of personal relationships which might be because of them being less involved 
with this committee, while INEDs had mixed views represented in the neutral mean, this 
might be because the questionnaire caught the views of both truly independent and 
affiliated INEDs and therefore had mixed views.  
 
The respondent groups had different views regarding whether management influenced 
the selection of board members onto the remuneration and nomination committee. CEOs 
agreed that management had an influence while all other groups disagreed, this is not 
surprising, as the evidence from the interviews showed that companies had different 
approaches when composing board committees, considering managements’ 
recommendations might indicate that CEOs themselves have influence in this process.  
The corporate governance code states that the role of allocating board members to board 
committees is part of the roles of the remuneration and nomination committee, which is a 
mandatory requirement since 2011, the evidence shows that within some companies this 
role has not yet been practiced by the remuneration and nomination committee. Thus, 
there seems to be an influence over the selection of remuneration and nomination 
committee members depending on the controlling shareholder, in government controlled 
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boards the government has a control over committee nomination, while in family 
companies it is the controlling family.  
 
It seems that there are some similarities regarding some of the factors between the 
groups. NEDs and BSs had similar views, while groups CEOs and INEDs had similar 
views. One explanation might be that CEOs are, as discussed in chapter 6, paid 
employees while INEDs are board members that are invited to join the board, and both 
are beholden to large shareholders, who employ/nominate them, as large shareholders, 
who are NEDs in most cases, control board decisions, including committees’ 
composition.  
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Table 7.11 Factor Analysis - Selection of Audit and Remuneration and Nomination committees 
Factors Audit committee Remuneration & Nomination committee 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social & 
cultural 
Sector Personal 
traits 
 
Regulation Social & 
cultural 
Sector Family 
Ownership 
Personal 
traits 
Committee 
experience 
Regulation 
CG code 0.484 -0.033 0.012 0.477 0.302 0.047 -0.485 0.029 -0.366 0.550 
Gov and Regulatory bodies  0.589 -0.075 -0.458 -0.132 0.550 -0.330 0.322 0.059 0.162 -0.302 
Islamic values  0.585 0.433 0.363 -0.364 0.390 0.638 0.152 -0.033 0.194 -0.024 
Favouritism  0.599 -0.176 0.253 -0.023 0.493 0.343 -0.294 0.082 0.365 -0.116 
Personal relationships 0.725 -0.219 -0.312 -0.158 0.724 -0.115 -0.354 -0.149 0.053 0.106 
Courtesy to others  0.595 -0.445 0.201 -0.239 0.639 -0.294 -0.086 0.197 -0.168 -0.085 
Position in society 0.573 -0.258 -0.026 0.201 0.474 -0.489 0.313 0.229 -0.032 0.139 
Family ownership 0.081 0.698 -0.212 0.451 -0.198 0.107 0.475 0.450 0.279 0.154 
Government ownership 0.621 -0.396 -0.157 0.158 0.630 -0.294 0.330 -0.205 -0.161 0.116 
Top Management  0.579 0.255 -0.465 0.093 0.445 0.477 -0.100 -0.223 0.342 -0.282 
Company size 0.372 0.640 -0.054 -0.090 0.075 0.670 -0.042 0.368 -0.353 0.021 
Company sector 0.548 0.512 0.161 -0.105 0.379 0.518 0.406 0.202 -0.451 0.049 
Experience and Qualification of 
BM  
0.229 -0.163 0.493 0.556 0.026 -0.265 -0.447 0.711 0.236 -0.156 
BM being on other similar 
committees  0.310 0.145 0.723 -0.031 0.069 0.086 0.141 -0.005 0.641 0.656 
Eigenvalues 3.805 1.968 1.626 1.067 2.735 2.095 1.411 1.379 1.102 1.020 
Proportion of variance 27.177 14.055 11.615 7.619 19.533 14.962 10.078 9.852 7.868 7.284 
Cumulative variance 27.177 41.232 52.847 60.465 19.533 34.494 44.572 54.423 62.292 69.576 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the variables of each column the factors with high correlation in each 
column are highlighted in Bold. The bottom part of the table highlights the importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and cumulative 
percentage. The Kaiser criterion was used to decide on the principal components which should be presented in the results. Kaiser (1960) recommends that principal components 
with latent roots greater than one should be retained. 
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The factor analysis reported in Table 7.11 narrowed down the most important factors that 
influence the selection of audit and remuneration and nomination committee members 
into four and six factors respectively. The first factor for the audit committees is labelled 
as “social and cultural” as the column shows a high loading for favouritism, personal 
relationships, courtesy to others and position in society this is also consistent with the 
findings in chapter six. This elicits how social and culture factors are important in the 
selection process of this committee, suggesting an underlying trend regards the influence 
of socio-cultural factors on governance practice and confirms that organizational 
structures are influenced by the prevailing institutional norms within society (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1991; Scott, 1995).  
 
‘Sector’ is the label for the second column. Characteristics such as firm sector and size 
show a high correlation, this might be because within some sectors there are more 
coercive influences on companies to adopt more governance within different sectors, for 
example the regulatory body of the financial sector SAMA has coercively 
institutionalised financial institutions to have audit committees composed of a majority of 
external members who are not part of the board, thus, ensuring the independence of this 
committee. Institutional theory argues that the pace of institutional influence may vary 
across sectors because of the differences in the structures of each sector which allows for 
organisations to be heterogeneous (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). As a result of such 
pressures, there is a different community of practice between companies in the financial 
sector and non-financial sector. This is because financial sector companies have an 
embedded institutional logic that may arise from the coercive pressure of the regulator 
which has resulted in having a community of practice that is different from other sectors. 
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The third column in the table is labelled “Personal traits”. This column shows a contrast 
between the personal traits factor and “Top management”. According to the interview 
findings management, in some companies, have an influence over the nomination of 
directors to board committees, this may have led top management to influence audit 
committee selection; having members that are selected by management to serve on the 
audit committee may reduce the number of experienced and qualified independent 
members resulting in a reduction in the monitoring role. These findings are consistent 
with the literature that argues that top management influence board committee selection 
processes and leads to less independent directors serving on such committees, and 
reduces their effectiveness and independence (Klein, 1998; Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999; Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Carcello et al., 2011).  
 
The fourth factor for audit committees is termed ‘Regulation’, the corporate governance 
code stresses having experienced and qualified individuals on the audit committee; this 
indicates that regulations are important in influencing governance structures which is also 
the result of the corporate governance code obligating companies to establish audit 
committees. This is consistent with prior literature that pointed to the importance of 
regulatory factors for adopting governance practises in emerging economies (Black and 
Jang, 2006).  
 
In the remuneration and nomination committee section of Table 7.11, the first and second 
column are identical to those of the audit committee section therefore are also labelled as 
‘Social and cultural’ and ‘Sector’ respectively. 
 
The third factor indicates a high loading for ‘family ownership’ while it also shows a 
negative loading for the corporate governance code and experience and qualification, this 
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is because, as discussed in Chapter Six, in family controlled companies family members 
choose the committee members despite the recommendations of the corporate 
governance code and the experience of the candidate.  
 
The final factor for the remuneration and nomination committee is termed ‘Regulation’ 
where it stresses the importance of the factors ‘corporate governance code’ and board 
member being on similar committees on other boards’, one possible interpretation is that 
the code does not specify the qualifications needed for the remuneration and nomination  
committee members. Since the only experience that could be considered when selecting a 
board member onto this committee is for this individual to have previously served on 
other remuneration and nomination committees in other companies, having members on 
the committee that are on the same committee in other companies would show some 
level of experience and being a normative isomorphic influence on to practice. This also 
elicits that the remuneration and nomination committee concept is new for Saudi listed 
companies. 
 
In the context of the previous results, it seems that similar factors influence the selection 
process of the members of both audit and remuneration and nomination committees, but 
varies across sectors; and maybe the result of the regulatory bodies having greater 
influence on companies in the financial sector. This has led board committees in the 
financial sector to have more independent members, indicating a community of practice 
within this sector that is differ from others regarding board committees. 
 
Having discussed the factors that influence board and committee composition, the 
analysis now follows on specific governance issues starting with the practices of board 
committees. 
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7.3.4 Factors Influencing Board Committee’s Practice  
  
Respondents were asked to indicate the factors that influenced the practice of board 
committees. The questionnaire focused on the audit and remuneration and nomination 
committees as all listed companies are required to have them. Unlike previous questions, 
the Likert scale was designed to capture whether the set of factors either contributed or 
prevented board committees in practicing their roles.
71
 
  
                                                          
71
 The five point Likert scale on this particular question in the questionnaire ranged as: 1=strongly 
contributes, 2= contributes, 3=neutral, 4= prevented, 5=strongly prevented.  
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Table 7.12 Factors Influencing the Practices of the Audit Committees 
Factors M SD Means K-W 
P 
value 
Mann – Whitney   
Chairmen & CEO  & NED & INED 
&BS 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate governance code 1.65 0.66 2.00 1.89 1.67 1.58 1.58 0.49 0.72 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.17 0.76 0.92 0.76 0 
Gov and Regulatory bodies  1.93 0.81 2.33 2.56 1.44 2.11 1.87 0.00** 0.62 0.04* 0.60 0.22 0.00** 0.19 0.02* 0.01** 0.02* 0.22 5 
Economic factors 2.89 0.48 2.67 3.00 3.06 2.95 2.74 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.55 0.67 0.49 0.20 0.32 0.07 0.24 0 
Favouritism 3.96 0.85 3.33 4.00 3.17 4.00 4.45 0.00** 0.16 0.68 0.10 0.02* 0.01** 0.75 0.08 0.00** 0.00** 0.08 4 
Personal relationships 3.96 0.73 3.67 4.00 3.39 4.00 4.29 0.00** 0.47 0.46 0.31 0.12 0.04* 0.87 0.26 0.01** 0.00** 0.20 3 
Courtesy to others  3.88 0.76 3.67 4.00 3.22 3.94 4.23 0.00** 0.47 0.12 0.53 0.20 0.00** 0.83 0.39 0.00** 0.00** 0.19 3 
Position in society 3.91 0.80 3.33 4.11 3.67 3.19 4.42 0.00** 0.08 0.62 0.58 0.01** 0.18 0.00** 0.17 0.12 0.00** 0.00** 4 
Family ownership 2.68 1.08 2.67 3.00 1.67 4.06 2.42 0.00** 0.08 0.05 0.00** 0.70 0.00** 0.00** 0.03* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 7 
Government ownership 3.76 0.67 2.67 3.56 3.72 4.12 3.74 0.01** 0.05 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* 0.40 0.02* 0.52 0.02* 0.92 0.04* 6 
Top Management  2.18 1.18 2.33 1.78 1.61 4.12 1.55 0.00** 0.21 0.07 0.00** 0.04* 0.40 0.00** 0.35 0.00** 0.91 0.00** 5 
Company size 2.99 0.25 3.00 2.89 2.94 3.06 3.00 0.51 0.56 0.68 0.67 1.00 0.61 0.14 0.29 0.16 0.45 0.44 0 
Company sector 2.87 0.47 3.00 2.89 2.89 2.82 2.87 0.97 0.56 0.55 0.67 0.58 1.00 0.68 0.93 0.63 0.91 0.70 0 
Experience of BM 1.72 0.53 2.00 1.67 1.44 1.82 1.81 0.07 0.34 0.09 0.44 0.46 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.02* 0.02* 0.86 2 
Qualification of BM 1.69 0.65 2.00 1.89 1.39 1.59 1.84 0.03* 0.72 0.05 0.22 0.52 0.04* 0.21 0.83 0.53 0.00** 0.08 2 
BM being on similar committees 
on other boards 
1.74 0.57 2.67 1.67 1.67 1.71 1.74 0.15 0.06 0.03* 0.01** 0.01** 0.93 0.73 0.62 0.74 0.59 0.85 3 
         0 3 4 5 6 4 2 8 8 4  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. 
Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly contributes, 2= contributes. 3= neutral, 4= prevents, 5= strongly prevents. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level 
respectively.  
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Table 7.12 shows the respondents’ perceptions regarding the factors that 
contribute/prevent audit committees in their practices. The corporate governance code, 
government and regulatory bodies, experience and qualifications and being on similar 
committees in other companies were ranked as the most important factors to influence 
audit committees practices (means of 1.65, 1.93, 1.72, 1.69 and 1.74 respectively). This 
is consistent with previous literature that has indicated the importance of experience to 
the role of audit committees (Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2003; Klein, 2002; 
Yang and Krishnan, 2005). Top management and family ownership were also perceived 
as influencing the audit committee. However, the Kruskal Wallis and Mann- Whitney 
tests in Table 7.12 indicate that the INEDs thought that both factors hindered the 
committee from practising its roles (means of 4.06 and 4.12 respectively); one possible 
interpretation highlighted in Chapter Six is that, in some cases, INEDs are not able to 
truly act as independent directors on these committees when family owners are present, 
as family controlling shareholders become more involved in the role of the committee 
and therefore obstruct supposed independent directors from practicing their role which 
hinders the committees’ role. 
 
The table above shows that the respondents indicated that position in society, personal 
relationships, courtesy to others and favouritism were all factors that prevented the audit 
committees in carrying out their roles (means of 3.91, 3.96, 3.88 and 3.96 respectively). 
Thus, cultural factors may have a negative influence on this committee in carrying out 
its roles effectively. This finding accords with the literature, which has argued the 
important influence of environmental and institutional factors on the roles of audit 
committees (Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
 
 
  
205 
 
Most of the respondent groups indicated that government ownership hinders the role of 
the audit committee, when controlling for the respondent type of ownership, 
respondents from government controlled boards also agreed to this point. This in 
consistent with the interview findings that pointed out that government employees are 
nominated to board committees through government ownership and are often 
ineffective.  
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Table 7.13 Factors Influencing the Practices of the Remuneration & Nomination Committee 
Factors M SD Means K-W 
 
M-W  
Chairmen & CEO  & NED & INED 
&BS 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate governance code 1.66 0.60 2.00 1.78 1.50 1.65 1.71 0.53 0.58 0.19 0.29 0.41 0.29 0.49 0.82 0.74 0.19 0.42 0 
Government and Regulatory bodies  2.34 1.07 2.50 2.56 1.61 3.59 2.00 0.00** 0.90 0.09 0.12 0.32 0.01** 0.01** 0.07 0.00** 0.05 0.00** 4 
Economic factors 2.94 0.37 2.50 3.11 2.89 3.00 2.90 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.00** 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.69 0.43 0 
Favouritism 4.13 0.80 3.50 4.22 3.61 4.00 4.52 0.00** 0.10 0.71 0.20 0.04* 0.01** 0.92 0.12 0.02* 0.00** 0.07 4 
Personal relationships 3.60 1.04 4.50 3.78 2.44 3.88 4.00 0.00** 0.26 0.01** 0.29 0.35 0.00** 0.35 0.42 0.00** 0.00** 0.86 4 
Courtesy to others  3.87 0.85 4.00 4.22 3.17 3.88 4.16 0.00** 0.48 0.04* 0.88 0.67 0.00** 0.54 0.90 0.00** 0.00** 0.56 4 
Position in society 3.64 1.02 3.50 3.56 3.39 2.94 4.19 0.00** 0.80 0.84 0.19 0.15 0.65 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.01** 0.00** 2 
Family ownership 2.56 1.11 3.50 3.00 1.44 3.94 2.26 0.00** 0.03* 0.01** 0.23 0.05 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 8 
Government ownership 3.83 0.66 3.00 3.67 3.94 3.94 3.81 0.15 0.10 0.02* 0.08 0.06 0.21 0.19 0.57 0.65 0.40 0.28 1 
Top Management  2.26 0.98 2.00 1.89 1.78 3.76 1.84 0.00** 0.79 0.53 0.01** 0.63 0.75 0.00** 0.91 0.00** 0.69 0.00** 4 
Company size 3.00 0.28 2.50 2.89 3.00 3.06 3.03 0.06 0.22 0.00** 0.02* 0.04* 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.65 0.77 0 
Company sector 2.90 0.48 3.00 2.89 2.94 2.82 2.90 0.99 0.64 0.74 0.73 0.79 0.61 0.68 0.76 0.93 0.89 0.98 0 
Experience of BM 1.77 0.58 2.00 1.67 1.56 1.82 1.87 0.30 0.43 0.26 0.53 0.63 0.71 0.37 0.35 0.10 0.07 0.98 0 
Qualification of BM 1.95 0.71 2.00 2.11 1.22 2.82 1.84 0.00** 0.76 0.03* 0.01** 0.60 0.00** 0.00** 0.16 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 7 
BM being on similar committees 
on other boards 
1.65 0.53 2.50 1.56 1.56 1.71 1.65 0.34 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.88 0.45 0.63 0.50 0.71 0.67 0 
         1 5 4 2 6 4 1 7 6 5  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. 
Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly contributes, 2= contributes. 3= neutral, 4= prevents, 5= strongly prevents. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level 
respectively.  
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Table 7.13 shows that, similar to the audit committee, the corporate governance code 
and government and regulatory bodies are perceived as positive factors contributing to 
the role of the remuneration and nomination committee. This is expected given that the 
code cites the roles and responsibilities of this committee and made it mandatory for all 
listed companies.  
 
Inspection of Table 7.13 shows that INEDs indicated that government and regulatory 
bodies contribute to the practices of the remuneration and nomination committee, these 
were also the views of the respondents from the ownership category ‘other’; this might 
be explained by pointing out that government and regulatory bodies and professional 
bodies, such as SOCPA, have considered the role of the audit committee by issuing 
guidelines regarding its role to ensure its independence and practices. However, 
independent directors might believe that government and regulatory bodies are not 
enforcing the independence of members of the remuneration and nomination committee 
and hence INEDs opinions differ from other groups.  
 
The respondent all agreed that cultural factors hinder the role of the remuneration and 
nomination committee. Regarding personal relationships the NEDs indicated that this 
factor was important to the committees practice; this might be because, as in the 
previous section of this chapter and in Chapter Six, that a company’s controlling 
shareholders influence the selection of committee members, and NEDs who are usually 
large shareholders or government representatives choose committee members on the 
basis of trust through personal relationships and their same social network. The 
respondents indicated that family ownership affected the committee’s in its practice. 
However, the Mann-Whitney section of Table 7.13 shows the group’s views on the 
influence of family ownership were different, NEDs and BSs indicated that family 
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ownership contributes to the committee roles, while the CEO group had mixed views 
and CH and INED disagreed, indicating that family ownership prevented the committee 
in practising its roles which might be because, as discussed in the interview chapter, 
family and large shareholders influence board committees. When analysing this result 
by ownership type respondents from all types of ownership agreed that family 
ownership assisted the committees in its roles except those classified as ‘other’. The 
respondents indicated that government ownership hindered the committee in practicing 
its roles. When analysing this result by the type of ownership this view was also 
strongly shared by all the respondents even the respondents who were on government 
controlled boards with means greater than 3.5. This might be because as stated 
previously that the government, through its ownership, appoints government officials to 
board committees who are inadequate resulting in them being ineffective on board 
committees. 
 
INEDs were dissatisfied with the involvement of management; this view was also 
shared with the respondents from companies that were classified as “other” ownership, 
this is also in line with the results in chapter six, where some of the board members in 
dispersed owned companies pointed out the reluctance of top management in engaging 
with the requests of the audit committee.  
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Table 7.14 Factors Analysis - Practices of Board Committees 
Factors Audit Remuneration & Nomination 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Cultural 
influence 
Family 
influence 
Personal 
traits 
Sector Ineffective 
governance’ 
Family 
influence 
Cultural 
influence 
Sector Personal 
traits 
Ineffectiv
e 
governan
ce’ Corporate governance code 0.213 0.018 0.084 0.132 -0.799 0.294 0.307 0.168 0.233 -0.640 
Government and Regulatory bodies  0.133 0.545 -0.082 0.346 0.121 0.603 -0.475 -0.126 -0.129 0.042 
Economic factors -0.055 0.256 -0.036 0.673 0.292 0.264 -0.177 0.462 -0.630 0.258 
Favouritism 0.809 -0.083 -0.072 0.065 0.077 0.515 0.677 -0.092 -0.073 0.194 
Personal relationships 0.899 -0.135 -0.096 -0.088 -0.040 0.761 0.457 -0.070 -0.072 -0.084 
Courtesy to others  0.836 -0.064 -0.062 -0.111 -0.123 0.619 0.593 0.000 -0.150 0.036 
Position in society 0.602 -0.464 0.165 0.142 0.318 0.146 0.748 -0.046 0.064 0.127 
Family ownership 0.253 0.732 -0.430 0.081 -0.049 0.717 -0.457 -0.055 0.001 -0.158 
Government ownership 0.178 0.164 -0.507 -0.067 0.169 0.047 -0.031 -0.444 -0.207 0.405 
Top Management  -0.001 0.646 -0.476 -0.228 -0.200 0.621 -0.464 -0.172 -0.065 -0.109 
Company size 0.089 0.205 -0.239 -0.229 0.383 -0.109 0.022 -0.689 0.056 0.175 
Company sector 0.076 -0.075 -0.035 0.722 -0.196 -0.021 0.046 0.652 -0.272 0.073 
Experience of BM 0.187 0.540 0.594 -0.169 -0.009 0.310 -0.072 0.319 0.520 0.398 
Qualification of BM 0.292 0.392 0.593 -0.055 0.058 0.790 -0.335 -0.061 0.147 0.003 
BM being on similar committees on other boards 0.040 0.472 0.645 0.004 0.084 0.213 -0.101 0.315 0.581 0.348 
Eigen  values 2.822 2.303 1.908 1.303 1.129 3.448 2.486 1.606 1.260 1.057 
Proportion of variance 18.813 15.357 12.72 8.686 7.526 22.985 16.570 10.708 8.401 7.044 
Cumulative variance 18.813 34.169 46.889 55.576 63.101 22.985 39.555 50.263 58.664 65.708 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the variables of each column the factors with high correlation in each column are 
highlighted in Bold. The bottom part of the table highlights the importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and cumulative percentage. The Kaiser 
criterion was used to decide on the principal components which should be presented in the results. Kaiser (1960) recommends that principal components with latent roots greater than one 
should be retained. 
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Factor analysis was applied to the responses of the fifteen factors to identify the main 
influences on board committees. For the audit committee the first column in Table 7.14 
shows the first factor is ‘cultural influence’ consistent with the findings of the interviews. 
The second column is labelled ‘family influence’ as it shows family ownership and top 
management as important, since in many family companies family members also hold 
management positions and family members are involved in the role of audit committees. 
The third column is ‘personal traits’ with experience and qualifications and being a 
member on similar committees in other companies influencing the objectives of the audit 
committee, although government ownership has a negative value, this may indicate, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, that government employees do not hold the relevant experience 
and qualifications to serve on board committees, becoming a burden on the committee in 
exercising its roles.  
 
The fourth factor shows a high loading for sector and the economy, thus the type of 
industry may affect the level of business risks of a company, which is argued by previous 
studies point out that in some sectors there are more risks involved (Goodwin and Kent, 
2006; Carcello et al., 2011) for example the financial sector (Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 
1991). As argued in the interview chapter, audit committees in the banking sector have 
more regulation that influences the composition of these committees. This factor is 
therefore labelled ‘sector’. 
 
The fifth column reflects how the corporate governance code in relation to the role of the 
audit committee has not been achieved, which is a result of not having truly independent 
audit committees which might be why the audit function in KSA companies is inadequate 
(Al-Twaijry et al., 2003). Although the fifth column of Table 7.11 shows that the 
corporate governance code is important when selecting audit committee members, the 
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negative sign in Table 7.14 above might suggests that this is mere a ceremonial practice 
for legitimacy reasons to validate companies’ activities and is decoupled from practice in 
reality (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 1978; Zucker, 1987; Covaledki and Dirsmith, 1988).  
 
For the role of the remuneration and nomination committee, the first factor in Table 7.14 
shows family ownership and qualifications of board members as important factors 
influencing the role of this committee, as are the cultural factors which are labelled as the 
second column.  
 
The third factor shows company size and sector as important. This might show that as 
discussed previously, the adoption of corporate governance structures may vary across 
sectors, a company’s sector may require more involvement of its committees, also, as a 
company’s size increases it demands a greater level of monitoring than smaller 
companies with less complex structures (Subramaniam et al., 2009).  
 
The fourth factor shows experience and board members being on similar committees in 
other boards as important factors, labelled ‘personal traits’. This indicates the importance 
of having experienced directors on board. This finding is consistent with prior literature 
that finds that a board member’s other directorships and experience are important 
attributes to have and contribute to the independence of the nomination committee 
(Vafeas, 1999).  
The table shows that family ownership is an important influence on both committees. 
Thus, even though there are some similarities within companies corporate governance 
practices it varies depending on their size, sector and type of ownership. This highlights 
the importance of the regulatory framework and a need for better policies regarding 
governance practices especially in emerging economies (Black and Jang, 2006), while 
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also, taking into account reframing governance to the Saudi context (Falgi, 2009; Al-
harkan, 2005; Alajlan, 2005).  
 
Further, the final column shows the corporate governance code has not achieved its 
intended objective as the roles expected from the remuneration and nomination 
committee collides with the cultural expectations which result in having possibly 
ineffective remuneration and nomination committee because the coercive isomorphic 
pressure imposed by the regulator has merely resulted in it being a ceremonial 
governance practice with practice decoupled from policy and material carriers (Meyers 
and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Carruthers, 
1995). 
 
The analyses reported in Tables 7.12 to 7.14 indicate that board committees are affected 
by sociocultural factors, it also indicates that audit and remuneration and nomination 
committees practices vary due to company size, sector and the type of ownership as there 
seems to be a variation within family- and government- controlled companies 
representing several community of practices and embedded institutional logics.  
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Table 7.15 Factors Infusing the Adoption of Cumulative Voting 
Factors M SD Group Means 
K-W 
M-W  
CH & CEO & NED & INED 
 & BS 
 
 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS  CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate governance code 1.76 0.81 2.00 1.22 1.61 2.32 1.65 0.00** 0.13 0.48 0.78 0.51 0.15 0.00** 0.08 0.03* 0.82 0.02* 3 
Government and Regulatory bodies 1.95 0.91 2.00 1.78 1.61 2.68 1.74 0.00** 0.71 0.48 0.47 0.64 0.63 0.04* 0.94 0.00** 0.54 0.00** 3 
Members of the royal family 4.05 0.79 4.00 3.56 3.89 4.32 4.13 0.16 0.44 0.85 0.55 0.81 0.37 0.01** 0.07 0.12 0.34 0.51 1 
Islamic values 4.04 0.76 4.00 3.56 4.28 4.00 4.06 0.14 0.44 0.62 1.00 0.91 0.04* 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.34 0.75 1 
Personal relationships 4.18 0.66 4.00 3.78 4.50 4.00 4.23 0.09 0.62 0.35 1.00 0.68 0.01** 0.32 0.07 0.01** 0.19 0.21 2 
Courtesy to others 4.12 0.79 4.00 3.67 4.39 3.95 4.19 0.20 0.57 0.48 1.00 0.72 0.04* 0.34 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.34 1 
Position in society 4.10 0.89 5.00 4.44 4.39 3.89 3.94 0.21 0.52 0.46 0.16 0.20 0.83 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.62 0 
Family ownership 2.54 1.46 2.00 1.67 3.39 1.74 2.81 0.06 0.43 0.56 0.56 0.65 0.02 0.26 0.02* 0.02* 0.19 0.01** 3 
Government ownership 2.97 1.42 2.00 3.11 3.44 2.00 3.30 0.58 0.35 0.49 1.00 0.38 0.52 0.01** 0.64 0.02* 0.36 0.00** 3 
Top Management 3.22 1.34 2.00 1.67 3.50 3.89 3.13 0.00** 0.51 0.19 0.20 0.35 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.26 0.37 0.04* 3 
Company size 4.29 0.64 4.00 4.11 4.63 3.95 4.35 0.28 0.85 0.22 0.92 0.50 0.07 0.54 0.39 0.00** 0.12 0.03* 2 
Company sector 4.11 0.98 2.00 3.89 4.63 3.90 4.06 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.25 0.82 1.00 0.00** 0.03* 0.20 2 
Experience and Qualification of BM 4.05 1.04 2.00 3.00 4.58 3.90 4.19 0.00** 0.37 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.00** 0.07 0.01** 0.05 0.11 0.45 2 
BM being on other company boards 3.96 1.20 2.00 3.00 4.21 4.45 3.84 0.03* 0.43 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.04* 0.01 0.10 0.72 0.14 0.05 1 
         0 0 0 0 6 5 2 7 1 6  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. 
Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively. 
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7.4 Factors Influencing other Governance Practices 
7.4.1 Adoption of Cumulative Voting  
 
The next section of the questionnaire focused on the respondents’ perceptions regarding 
the factors that influence companies to adopt other governance practices such as 
cumulative voting.  
 
The findings in Table 7.15 above elicit that the corporate governance code and 
government and regulatory bodies are the two main influences on companies to adopt 
cumulative voting (means of 1.76 and 1.95 respectively). This might be expected since 
the code has ‘voluntarily’ suggested cumulative voting as one of its recommended 
governance practices, and government regulations encourage companies to adopt such 
practices, as discussed in Chapter Six. This shows that regulations are important to 
promote corporate governance which is consistent with other literature (Black and Jang, 
2006). Respondents agreed that family ownership influenced the adoption of cumulative 
voting. This might be because family controlled boards try to hamper the adoption of 
cumulative voting, as it reduces the amount of control family shareholders have over the 
selection process of board member. When analysing the results through ownership type 
the respondents from family-and dispersed-owned companies indicated that family 
ownership influenced the adopting of this governance provision (means of 1.52 and 2.33 
respectively). The Kruskal Wallis and Mann Whitney tests indicated that NEDs disagreed 
that family ownership influenced the adoption of cumulative voting (mean of 3.39), this 
might be because NEDs are usually large shareholders, and do not want to show they 
have an influence over AGMs to adopt cumulative voting as it requires AGM approval.  
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Inspection of Table 7.15 reveals that the respondents have the most differences regarding 
the influence of top management, CH and CEOs agreed that management influenced the 
adoption of cumulative voting (means of 2.00 and 1.67 respectively), while all other 
respondents disagreed; this might be because chairmen and CEOs would like to appear 
that they are implementing corporate governance practices. When analysing this factor by 
type of ownership, respondents from foreign controlled companies agreed that 
management influenced the adoption of cumulative voting, this might be because, as 
stated in Chapter Six, foreign controlled companies influence their Saudi subsidiaries to 
adopt international corporate governance practice including cumulative voting, therefore 
top management are following the foreign owners’ decisions, thus it seems that a foreign  
owner influences the adoption of governance practices as a normative isomorphic 
process. 
 
The NEDs and CEOs had the most difference of opinion regarding the influence of these 
factors on adopting accumulative voting, this is expected since each group represents a 
different perspective as NEDs are mostly large shareholders and CEOs represent 
management.  
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Table 7.16 Factor Analysis - Adopting Cumulative Voting  
Factors Sector Regulations Ownership Political 
influence 
Government 
influence 
1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate governance code -0.161 0.744 0.479 -0.043 0.035 
Gov and Regulatory bodies -0.271 0.689 0.563 -0.160 0.026 
Members of the royal family 0.062 -0.288 0.351 0.642 -0.166 
Islamic values 0.513 -0.093 0.369 0.290 0.081 
Personal relationships 0.593 0.043 0.180 -0.011 0.161 
Courtesy to others 0.530 -0.277 0.261 0.166 0.320 
Position in society 0.333 -0.300 0.349 -0.190 0.454 
Family ownership 0.403 0.122 -0.491 0.022 0.333 
Government ownership 0.387 -0.274 0.525 -0.072 -0.577 
Top Management 0.274 0.507 -0.313 0.420 0.253 
Company size 0.605 -0.023 -0.098 -0.535 0.003 
Company sector 0.733 0.128 -0.045 -0.339 -0.202 
Experience and Qualification of 
BM 
0.626 0.281 -0.262 0.248 -0.318 
 being on other company 
boards 
0.481 0.529 0.010 0.133 -0.147 
Eigen  values 3.026 2.014 1.723 1.250 1.042 
Proportion of variance 21.611 14.382 12.309 8.931 7.440 
Cumulative variance 21.611 35.993 48.303 57.234 64.673 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the 
variables of each column the factors with high correlation in each column are highlighted in Bold. The bottom part 
of the table highlights the importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and 
cumulative percentage. The Kaiser criterion was used to decide on the principal components which should be 
presented in the results. Kaiser (1960) recommends that principal components with latent roots greater than one 
should be retained. 
 
The factor analysis reported in Table 7.16 suggests that five factors influence companies 
when adopting cumulative voting. The first column shows a high loading for the factor 
‘company sector’ indicating its importance, as some sectors have different institutional 
pressures than others (Scott and Meyer, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) leading 
such companies to adopt cumulative voting. This column is therefore labelled ‘sector’. 
 
The second column is labelled as “Regulations” with the corporate governance code and 
government and regulatory bodies. This may elicit that as a result of regulatory reform, 
companies are being encouraged to adopt cumulative voting.  
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The third column shows government and family ownership as important, this concurs 
with the findings of the interviews that highlight the adoption of governance provisions, 
in particular cumulative voting, by government controlled boards as they are more likely 
to follow government laws and recommendations, while there was a low level of 
adoption by family controlled companies, possibly because family owners fear losing 
control when cumulative voting is adopting, as discussed in Chapter Six. This accords 
with the literature that argues that family owned firms are reluctant to adopt cumulative 
voting (Klapper et al., 2005) and have weaker corporate governance practices (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Chhoachharia and Laeven, 2009; Chizema and Kim, 2010).  
 
The final column shows the factors government ownership and position in society with 
high loadings, this might elicit the influence that derives from government 
representatives whom also hold highly regarded positions in society and may influence 
corporate governance practices in their companies. This might also indicate that 
government officials who represent the government on boards of listed companies, but 
do not hold a high governmental role, do not influence the adoption of governance 
practices. Therefore this column is labelled ‘government influence’. 
 
Thus, companies have different approaches in adopting cumulative voting with a 
different community of practice as a result of the institutional logics embedded within 
both government owned firms that are more likely to obey laws and regulations, and 
family owned firms that are more likely to only adopt mandatory regulations or adopt 
ceremonial compliance. Thus, the type of company ownership seems to be an important 
element in defining this governance practice and its level of adoption. This confirms the 
institutional theory view that different levels of conformity to institutional practices 
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emerge depending on the organisational structures and their pre-existing symbolic and 
material meanings (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
 
7.4.2 Board Membership 
Tables 7.17 and 7.18 show the respondents’ perceptions on the factors that influence 
board members to join company boards and the number of directorships. 
The results indicate that ‘personal relationships’ and ‘position in society’ are important 
factors and are in line with the interview findings and the previous literature which 
indicates the important role that culture has in the Arab world and that board membership 
is perceived as a highly regarded role in the Saudi society as it give individuals access to 
the networks that may enhance their personal relationships (Al-Ghathami, 2009; Falgi, 
2009). 
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Table 7.17 Factors Influencing Individuals Joining Boards of Directors 
Factors M SD 
Means K-W 
 
Mann – Whitney  
Chairmen & CEO  & NED & INED& 
BS 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate governance code 3.73 1.01 3.33 3.89 4.21 3.10 3.84 0.01** 0.37 0.17 0.67 0.50 0.62 0.06 0.49 0.00** 0.13 0.01** 2 
Government and Regulatory bodies 4.00 0.87 3.00 3.56 4.53 3.50 4.23 0.00** 0.36 0.01** 0.37 0.04* 0.00** 0.90 0.02* 0.00** 0.27 0.00** 6 
Economic factors 2.52 1.33 2.33 1.78 2.58 2.05 3.03 0.19 0.21 0.80 0.37 0.59 0.29 0.22 0.04* 0.73 0.35 0.06 1 
Favouritism 3.43 1.37 3.33 4.11 1.58 4.20 3.87 0.00** 0.27 0.02** 0.17 0.37 0.00** 0.76 0.72 0.00** 0.00** 0.39 4 
Personal relationships 1.76 0.79 3.33 1.67 1.58 1.60 1.84 0.12 0.03 0.02** 0.01** 0.03* 0.56 0.74 0.79 0.70 0.32 0.47 3 
Courtesy to others 2.98 1.41 3.33 3.44 3.28 4.35 1.74 0.00** 0.85 0.88 0.09 0.02* 0.61 0.06 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 5 
Position in society 1.99 0.96 2.00 1.78 2.74 1.75 1.74 0.03* 0.39 0.30 0.39 0.31 0.05 0.84 0.53 0.01** 0.01** 0.59 2 
Family ownership 2.88 1.28 2.00 1.89 4.11 2.65 2.63 0.00** 0.75 0.01** 0.16 0.44 0.00** 0.04 0.14 0.00** 0.00** 0.94 4 
Government ownership 3.38 1.21 3.00 4.22 3.95 3.25 2.90 0.01** 0.06 0.13 0.70 0.85 0.71 0.01** 0.01** 0.03* 0.01** 0.30 4 
Top Management 3.74 1.23 3.67 3.67 2.78 4.00 4.16 0.05 0.92 0.50 0.39 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.09 0.03* 0.01** 0.90 2 
Company size 4.12 0.97 3.00 4.00 4.53 4.15 4.00 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.39 0.84 0.22 0.06 0.45 0 
Company sector 3.21 1.38 2.00 3.67 4.53 2.05 3.13 0.00** 0.05 0.00** 0.96 0.20 0.02* 0.00** 0.33 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 6 
Experience of BM 3.73 1.32 1.67 2.00 3.68 4.15 4.19 0.00** 0.33 0.10 0.00** 0.01** 0.03* 0.00** 0.00** 0.83 0.81 0.48 5 
Qualification of BM 3.83 1.12 1.67 2.67 4.11 3.85 4.19 0.00** 0.21 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* 0.00** 0.41 0.58 0.10 6 
Insider dealing by BM 2.65 1.22 4.33 1.78 1.63 2.40 3.52 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.01** 0.20 0.55 0.06 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 6 
         1 7 4 5 6 4 7 10 8 5  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences across 
the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. Responses are 
based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively. 
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Table 7.18 Factors Influencing Number of Directorships  
Factors M SD 
Means K-W 
P 
value 
Mann – Whitney  
Chairmen & CEO  & NED & INED& 
BS 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate 
governance code 
2.48 1.16 1.67 1.22 3.05 2.05 2.84 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.76 0.00** 5 
Gov and 
Regulatory 
bodies 
4.22 0.89 2.67 4.11 4.53 4.30 4.16 0.12 0.10 0.01** 0.04* 0.04* 0.16 0.52 0.60 0.38 0.27 0.85 3 
Economic 
factors 
2.66 1.44 2.67 2.22 3.11 1.60 3.19 0.00 0.57 0.56 0.15 0.49 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.00** 0.88 0.00** 2 
Favouritism 4.11 0.78 4.00 4.11 4.11 4.20 4.07 0.98 0.79 0.80 0.62 0.87 0.98 0.76 0.89 0.76 0.84 0.55 0 
Personal 
relationships 
1.80 0.79 4.00 1.78 1.58 1.85 1.77 0.06 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* 0.30 0.79 0.61 0.15 0.46 0.38 4 
Courtesy to 
others 
2.69 1.42 4.00 4.11 1.58 4.20 1.87 0.00 0.79 0.01** 0.62 0.02* 0.00** 0.76 0.00** 0.00** 0.26 0.00** 6 
Position in 
society 
1.81 0.80 3.50 1.78 1.58 1.95 1.77 0.07 0.01** 0.02* 0.03* 0.02* 0.30 0.58 0.61 0.12 0.46 0.27 4 
Family 
ownership 
3.09 1.26 2.50 4.11 3.28 3.25 2.59 0.02 0.05 0.35 0.37 1.00 0.05 0.05 0.00** 0.94 0.09 0.08 1 
Government 
ownership 
3.23 1.26 3.00 4.11 2.74 3.70 2.97 0.02 0.08 0.80 0.29 0.87 0.01** 0.38 0.02* 0.02* 0.62 0.05 3 
Top 
Management 
4.18 0.76 4.00 4.11 4.21 4.25 4.13 0.96 0.79 0.61 0.54 0.74 0.73 0.63 0.93 0.87 0.73 0.59 0 
Company size 3.99 1.06 2.00 4.11 3.95 4.15 4.00 0.21 0.03 0.05 0.02* 0.03* 0.92 0.58 0.93 0.53 0.97 0.47 2 
Company sector 2.74 1.39 2.00 3.33 2.78 1.80 3.24 0.01 0.19 0.79 0.49 0.21 0.31 0.00** 0.89 0.23 0.29 0.00** 2 
Experience of 
BM 
4.19 0.93 2.00 3.22 4.53 4.40 4.27 0.01 0.22 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* 0.01** 0.02* 0.03* 0.43 0.36 0.86 6 
Qualification of 
BM 
4.34 0.76 2.00 4.56 4.53 4.40 4.27 0.08 0.02* 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* 0.89 0.44 0.40 0.43 0.36 0.86 4 
Insider dealing 
by board 
members 
3.54 1.28 4.00 4.22 3.68 3.10 3.50 0.07 0.30 0.61 0.15 0.56 0.61 0.01 0.04* 0.09 0.22 0.14 1 
         3 6 6 7 4 3 6 4 0 4  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows 
significant differences across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the 
number of significant differences. Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** 
indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively. 
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The respondents also agreed that economic factors such as the financial compensation 
and other benefits influenced both the desire of an individual to become a board member 
and the number of directorships. The results also show that the corporate governance 
code influences the number of directorships, since the code states a maximum of five 
directorships in listed companies that an individual may hold.
72
 Thus, a voluntary 
provision of the code appears to have become institutionalised reflecting one community 
of practice.  
 
Table 7.17 also shows the most important factor to influence board members to join 
company boards was experience and qualifications (mean of 1.67), while CEOs, NEDs 
and INEDs indicated that personal relationships were most important (means of 1.67, 
1.58 and 1.60 respectively), and BS thought it was the position in society reflecting the 
importance of network of actors. NEDs disagreed that family ownership influenced 
individuals becoming board members (mean 4.11) while all other groups agreed. A 
possible interpretation of the difference opinion of NEDs to the other groups might be 
that NEDs are usually family members or represent large shareholders and may not want 
to indicate their influence on individuals becoming board members. 
 
The respondents indicated that insider dealing made individuals become board members; 
as highlighted in Chapter Six, board members may gain access to information that can be 
used to trade in the stock market despite the regulatory body CMA sanctioning those 
charged with insider trading. However, the results may suggest that board members may 
still be involved in such practices. The results of the Mann-Whiney tests in Table 7.17 
show that the respondents had the most different views regarding this factor. CEOs, 
NEDs and INEDs agreed that individuals join boards to gain inside information (means 
                                                          
72
 This provision is voluntary in the Saudi corporate governance code.  
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of 1.75, 1.63 and 2.40 respectively), whereas CH and BS disagreed (means of 4.33 and 
3.52 respectively). These different perceptions might be attributed to board members 
experience within companies that they serve on, and that unethical activity such as 
insider trading is practiced within some companies, but not all. When looking at the 
respondents opinions by ownership type, respondents from dispersed owned companies 
agreed that insider dealing was a motive to gain board directorship (mean 2.42), while 
those from family boards were neutral and those classified as other disagreed (means of 
2.88 and 3.25 respectively). 
 
After analysing the results by sector, the respondent from non-financial sectors agreed 
that insider trading influenced individuals in becoming board members (mean 2.58) 
while the respondents from the financial sector had neutral views (mean 2.94 ) which 
might be due to the amount of regulations and monitoring on the financial sector from the 
financial regulatory authority (SAMA). These findings suggests that insider trading is 
more likely to be in sectors other than the financial sector, as within such companies the 
absence of an ineffective monitoring system gives self-interested board members an 
opportunity to conduct unethical board behaviour.    
 
The results of Kruskal Wallis and Mann-Whitney revealed that groups had different 
perceptions regarding the factors that influenced the number of directorships an 
individual may hold. Most groups agreed that the corporate governance code influenced 
the number of directorships although NEDs had more neutral views, this might be 
because the restriction of the number of directorships to five is stated in the Saudi 
corporate governance code as a voluntary aspect, therefore it might be that not all NEDs 
adhere to this practice.  
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The respondents seemed to have different views regarding the influence of courtesy to 
others on the number of directorships. NEDs and BS perceived that this factor had an 
influence (means of 1.58 and 1.87 respectively) while all other groups disagreed. An 
explanation of this finding may lie in the interviews where some of the NEDs indicated 
that they may be reluctant to gain board membership in another company, due to them 
being busy, but might agree to accept out of courtesy to those who have invited them 
onto the board. The groups had different views regarding the influence of family and 
government ownership on the number of directorships. CH and BS agreed that family 
ownership influenced the number of directorships, while groups CEOs, NEDs and INEDs 
disagreed. NEDs agreed that government ownership influenced the number of 
directorships while INEDs and CEOs disagreed. After analysing the responses by 
ownership type, the respondents from family owned companies and foreign owned 
companies agreed that family ownership influenced the number of directorships, while 
respondents from government and dispersed owned companies disagreed. The difference 
in the groups opinions regarding the influence of family and government ownership 
might be because of the type of company ownership the respondents represented.  
 
The factor analysis reported in Table 7.19 suggests that six factors are important when 
individuals join company boards. The first column shows a high loading for government 
and regulatory bodies which is in line with the recommendations of regulatory body 
CMA in the corporate governance code that recommends the maximum number of 
directorships a person may hold. 
 
 
 
  
224 
 
Table 7.19 Factor Analysis – Why Individuals Join Boards of Directors 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Government 
regulations 
Cultural 
influenc
e 
Personal 
relationship 
Vs the code 
Courtesy 
to others 
vs the 
code 
Economic 
influence 
Political 
influence  
Corporate governance code 0.202 -0.176 -0.667 -0.342 -0.025 0.008 
Government and Regulatory bodies 0.785 0.232 0.075 -0.002 -0.012 0.267 
Economic factors 0.347 0.239 0.429 -0.142 -0.486 -0.013 
Favouritism -0.398 0.599 0.072 0.227 0.147 0.278 
Personal relationships -0.265 -0.263 0.559 -0.216 0.527 0.252 
Courtesy to others -0.263 -0.383 0.335 0.629 -0.089 -0.179 
Position in society 0.268 0.626 0.052 -0.116 0.313 0.458 
Family ownership 0.610 -0.257 0.395 -0.093 0.184 -0.316 
Government ownership 0.029 -0.242 -0.245 0.515 -0.087 0.566 
Top Management -0.202 0.576 -0.066 0.285 0.311 -0.136 
Company size 0.480 0.121 -0.325 0.443 0.394 -0.223 
Company sector 0.588 -0.263 -0.092 0.133 0.336 -0.230 
Experience of BM 0.487 0.553 0.268 0.204 0.021 0.103 
Qualification of BM 0.607 0.410 0.000 -0.047 -0.119 0.237 
Insider dealing by board members -0.228 0.593 -0.044 -0.380 0.425 0.010 
Eigenvalues 2.80 2.47 1.48 1.40 1.24 1.06 
Percentage  of Variance 
18.63 16.50 9.83 9.34 8.29 7.08 
Cumulative Percentage   
18.63 35.13 44.96 54.30 62.59 69.67 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the variables of 
each column the factors with high correlation in each column are highlighted in Bold. The bottom part of the table 
highlights the importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and cumulative 
percentage. The Kaiser criterion was used to decide on the principal components which should be presented in the 
results. Kaiser (1960) recommends that principal components with latent roots greater than one should be retained. 
 
 
The second column is labelled ‘cultural influence’ as it shows position in society and 
favouritism with high loadings. This indicates that cultural factors and networks are 
important for individuals in obtaining board positions. This finding is consistent with the 
interview findings and previous studies that indicate that board membership is considered 
a highly regarded role in Saudi society (Falgi, 2009). 
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The third and fourth columns show a high loading for the factors personal relationships 
and courtesy to others respectively. However, in each column, there is a contrast between 
these two factors with the corporate governance code, this might be because, as discussed 
previously in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, that social and cultural factors play an influential role 
on individuals selection process; these social and cultural criteria contradict with the core 
objectives of corporate governance and decouple practice from policy as the material 
carrier. Thus, board members are gaining board directorships because of their social 
networks and relationships.  
 
The final column shows high loadings for the factors government ownership and position 
in society. As discussed previously, the position an individual holds whether in the 
government office or in other roles in society (i.e. highly regarded people in society and 
influential business men) are means to attract other individuals to join a board with 
people of such calibre.  
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Table 7.20 Factor Analyses -Influences on the Number of Directorships 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
Personal traits Family 
Ownership 
Government 
Ownership 
CG code Sector 
Corporate governance code 0.289 -0.287 -0.019 0.659 0.285 
Government and Regulatory bodies 0.604 0.316 0.047 0.111 0.371 
Economic factors 0.223 -0.623 0.466 0.184 -0.127 
Favouritism 0.420 0.313 0.444 -0.297 0.006 
Personal relationships -0.658 0.394 0.291 0.440 0.121 
Courtesy to others -0.538 0.534 0.332 -0.303 0.188 
Position in society -0.623 0.419 0.301 0.445 0.109 
Family ownership 0.021 0.710 -0.503 -0.142 0.069 
Government ownership -0.151 -0.220 0.764 -0.272 0.088 
Top Management 0.432 0.437 0.353 0.275 -0.253 
Company size 0.403 0.292 0.369 0.091 -0.485 
Company sector 0.249 0.282 -0.194 0.290 -0.695 
Experience of BM 0.709 0.152 0.114 0.174 0.374 
Qualification of BM 0.747 0.207 -0.006 -0.084 0.307 
Insider dealing by board members 0.242 0.084 0.165 -0.399 -0.154 
Eigenvalues 3.337 2.268 1.877 1.511 1.350 
Percentage  of Variance 
22.246 15.119 12.513 10.072 8.998 
Cumulative Percentage   
22.246 37.365 49.878 59.951 68.948 
Note: This table reports the results of Factor analysis. The top part of the table shows the weightings for the variables of 
each column the factors with high correlation in each column are highlighted in Bold. The bottom part of the table 
highlights the importance of each column in showing the eigenvalues, the percentage of variance and cumulative 
percentage. The Kaiser criterion was used to decide on the principal components which should be presented in the results. 
Kaiser (1960) recommends that principal components with latent roots greater than one should be retained. 
 
The factor analysis reported in Table 7.20 reveals five important factors influencing the 
number of directorships. The first column shows a high loading for the factors experience 
and qualifications, suggesting that individuals gain more directorships in order to develop 
their personal traits, this is consistent with the previous literature (Burke, 1997).  
 
The second column shows family ownership as important and the third column shows 
government ownership as important, these two columns might be explained, as discussed 
previously, that board membership is influenced by ownership. The fourth column shows 
a high loading for the corporate governance code; as the code restricts the number of 
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directorships to five. Thus, regulations seem to influence the number of directorships 
individuals may hold. The final column shows sector with a high negative loading, this 
might be because some sectors might be more favoured by board members to join. This 
is in line with the findings in Chapter Six that indicated individuals favoured gaining 
board membership in companies within the financial sector. This is also consistent with 
previous studies that found that the type of sector might be a motive behind individuals in 
joining a board within that sector (Burke, 2000). This column is therefore labelled as 
‘sector’.  
 
7.5 Factors influencing Board of Directors Roles and Decisions 
7.5.1 Board of Directors Practices  
 
This final section of the questionnaire consisted of questions aimed to elicit the 
respondents’ opinions on the factors that influence boards of directors in their Practices 
and decisions, the time of board meetings and the time spent by board members in 
preparation for meetings. The respondents were asked to assess whether they agreed that 
their board carried out the role of ensuring no conflicts of interest occurred within 
company boards and respondents agreed that their boards carried out this role with a 
mean of 1.63. Table 7.21 shows the analysis of the respondents’ answers to whether a set 
of factors either assisted or hindered boards of directors’ role in ensuring no conflicts of 
interest occurred at board level.  
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Table 7.21 Factor Influencing Board of Directors’ Practices  
Factors 
M SD Group -Means K-W 
 
M- W   
Chairmen & CEO  & NED & INED 
&BS 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Corporate governance code 1.91 0.76 2.67 1.67 2.83 1.75 1.48 0.00** 0.03* 0.36 0.04* 0.01** 0.00** 0.81 0.34 0.00** 0.00** 0.15 6 
Government and Regulatory bodies 2.11 0.85 3.00 1.78 3.16 1.85 1.65 0.00** 0.00** 0.57 0.01** 0.01** 0.00** 0.79 0.43 0.00** 0.00** 0.22 6 
Members of the royal family 3.02 0.59 3.00 3.11 2.84 3.05 3.10 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.81 0.74 0.54 0.83 0.72 0.26 0.15 0.87 0 
Economic Factors 3.06 0.51 3.00 3.38 2.89 3.00 3.13 0.11 0.36 0.55 0.81 0.65 0.03* 0.10 0.16 0.62 0.04* 0.21 2 
Favouritism 3.91 0.89 3.00 4.00 2.79 4.25 4.45 0.00** 0.04* 0.56 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.34 0.08 0.00** 0.00** 0.20 6 
Personal relationships 3.83 0.85 3.00 4.22 2.78 4.00 4.29 0.00** 0.00** 0.46 0.01** 0.01** 0.00** 0.39 0.64 0.00** 0.00** 0.13 6 
Courtesy to others 3.70 0.68 3.67 3.44 3.95 4.10 3.37 0.00** 0.46 0.39 0.32 0.30 0.03* 0.03* 0.89 0.44 0.00** 0.00** 4 
Position in society 2.73 0.98 3.67 2.56 1.37 3.50 3.03 0.00** 0.03* 0.00** 0.75 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 9 
Family ownership 2.38 0.94 2.33 3.11 2.00 2.40 2.39 0.07 0.29 0.43 0.96 1.00 0.00** 0.12 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.98 1 
Government ownership 2.63 0.78 1.67 2.78 3.00 2.70 2.42 0.09 0.08 0.02* 0.08 0.19 0.34 0.79 0.38 0.19 0.04* 0.40 2 
Top Management 2.52 0.67 1.33 2.78 2.74 2.80 2.26 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.03* 0.82 0.59 0.02** 0.37 0.01** 0.00** 7 
Company size 3.01 0.48 3.00 2.67 3.21 2.90 3.06 0.03* 0.39 0.39 0.82 0.76 0.02** 0.30 0.01** 0.06 0.05 0.30 2 
Company sector 2.98 0.65 2.33 2.78 3.00 3.05 3.03 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.02* 0.00** 0.39 0.29 0.23 0.98 0.83 0.84 2 
Experience of BM 1.79 0.60 2.00 1.67 1.89 1.65 1.84 0.64 0.27 0.60 0.26 0.58 0.48 0.87 0.45 0.31 0.96 0.26 0 
Qualification of BM 1.85 0.70 3.33 1.67 1.68 1.65 2.00 0.02* 0.03** 0.02* 0.02** 0.01* 0.81 0.87 0.07 0.89 0.06 0.02* 5 
BM  being on other company boards 3.09 0.91 3.00 2.22 3.00 3.25 3.29 0.02* 0.12 1.00 0.29 0.50 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.05 0.17 0.83 3 
         7 4 7 8 10 3 4 5 9 4  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. 
Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1= strongly contributes, 2= contributes, 3= neutral, 4= prevents, 5= strongly prevents. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level 
respectively. 
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The results in the table above show that experience and qualification of board members, 
the corporate governance code and government and regulatory bodies (means of 1.79, 
1.85 1.90, 2.11 respectively) were important in board practices. The respondents also 
indicated that favouritism; courtesy to others and; position in society affected the board 
in carrying out this role. This finding is consistent with Liew (2007) who concluded that 
cultural influenced governance practices in Malaysian companies. Thus, it seems that 
cultural factors can be an obstacle to improve corporate governance practices at board 
level in Saudi listed companies.   
 
The Kruskal Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests shows that the respondents disagreed on the 
influence of government and regulatory bodies; CEOs, INEDs and BS thought that 
government and regulatory bodies contributed to the role of boards in ensuring no 
conflicts of interest occurred (means of 1.78, 1.85 and 1.65 respectively), NEDs indicated 
that government and regulatory bodies prevented boards from ensuring no conflict occurs 
(mean 3.16), this might be because as stated in the interview chapter, government 
representatives on boards lack the relevant experience and qualifications, and that NEDs 
are more aware of this than other groups, because such government representatives are 
present on their boards. 
 
Although favouritism and personal relationships prevented the board in ensuring no 
conflict of interest, the NEDs thought that they contributed in the prevention of conflicts 
of interest. This might be because NEDs are usually controlling shareholders and, as 
discussed in the interview chapter, bring individuals onto the board that they trust from 
their same personal networks and assume their loyalty which is based on their personal 
relationships with them and look out for their interests.  
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Inspection of the table above reveals that respondents had the most different opinions 
regarding the influence of position in society. Group BS had mixed views (mean 3.03), 
while NEDs and CEOs indicated that “position in society” contributes in ensuring no 
conflicts of interest occur (means of 1.37 and 2.56 respectively). This might be because, 
for example, being from the royal family or an ex-minister might help the board when 
dealing with dilemmas that are out of the boards reach to solve. While CH and INEDs 
indicated that position in society prevented the board from ensuring no conflicts of 
interest occur (means of 3.67 and 3.50 respectively), possibly because social status may 
result in them taking advantage of their social influence and imposing on to the board 
their decisions which other board members might disagree with but are not capable to do 
so in practice.  
 
INEDs had mixed views regarding the influence of top management, while the other 
groups indicated that top management is a factor that contributes in ensuring no conflicts 
of interest occur. The reason why INEDs had mixed views might be because they are on 
different boards and that management within some companies may not provide the board 
with timely or complete information. Further examination of the respondents sector and 
type of ownership did not indicate any differences in the respondents’ opinions, this 
might be an avenue for future research.  
 
The results in the table above also show that the views of NEDs and BSs were most 
different and also the views of CEOs and NEDs, this might be because of the role of each 
group on the board; NEDs are usually more involved in board decisions as they take part 
in carrying out boards roles and responsibilities, whereas CEOs and BSs represent 
management. The next section will discuss the factors influencing board decisions. 
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Table 7.22 Factors Influencing Board Decisions 
Factors 
M SD Group Means K-W 
 
M-W   
CH & CEO & NED& INED 
& BS 
 
   CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Gov and Regulatory bodies  3.39 1.39 2.00 3.56 3.50 3.11 3.53 0.62 0.05 0.18 0.43 0.17 0.71 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.80 0.41 1 
Economic Factors 1.90 0.91 2.50 1.67 1.50 2.45 1.80 0.01** 0.16 0.07 0.86 0.14 0.54 0.05 0.84 0.00** 0.28 0.01** 2 
Members of the royal family 4.18 0.99 4.50 4.22 4.17 3.90 4.32 0.77 0.79 0.89 0.50 0.77 0.86 0.48 0.97 0.31 0.79 0.25 0 
Islamic values  3.66 1.02 4.00 4.11 3.50 3.70 3.58 0.70 0.90 0.56 0.72 0.66 0.22 0.30 0.18 0.67 0.88 0.76 0 
Favouritism  3.04 1.12 4.00 3.11 2.39 2.80 3.48 0.01** 0.13 0.04* 0.22 0.42 0.06 0.59 0.25 0.33 0.00** 0.08 2 
Personal relationships 2.15 0.80 2.50 2.33 2.00 2.15 2.16 0.75 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.87 0.16 0.33 0.61 0.31 0.37 0.84 0 
Courtesy to others  2.40 0.96 3.50 2.67 2.06 2.40 2.45 0.39 0.41 0.14 0.32 0.41 0.09 0.56 0.65 0.14 0.16 0.88 0 
Position in society 2.36 1.01 3.50 3.44 2.00 2.35 2.19 0.00** 1.00 0.14 0.35 0.29 0.00** 0.02 0.00** 0.60 0.30 0.97 2 
Family ownership 2.41 1.22 3.00 3.00 2.33 2.35 2.29 0.61 0.90 0.94 0.77 0.72 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.70 0.59 0.87 0 
Government ownership 3.30 1.44 3.50 3.11 3.00 3.25 3.57 0.52 0.69 0.79 1.00 0.65 0.87 0.69 0.23 0.54 0.12 0.31 0 
Top Management  3.61 1.33 2.00 3.56 3.44 3.60 3.84 0.35 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.94 0.96 0.42 0.98 0.30 0.31 0 
Company size 1.80 0.72 2.00 1.67 1.61 2.25 1.65 0.08 0.36 0.29 0.79 0.36 0.78 0.09 0.79 0.02* 0.98 0.01 1 
Company sector 1.83 0.74 2.00 1.67 1.61 2.35 1.65 0.03* 0.36 0.29 0.62 0.36 0.78 0.05 0.79 0.01** 0.98 0.01 1 
Insider dealing by  BM 3.90 1.06 4.50 4.11 3.78 4.00 3.81 0.89 0.61 0.50 0.39 0.35 0.76 0.73 0.51 0.88 0.74 0.76 0 
Experience of the chairmen 2.55 1.26 2.00 3.56 2.11 2.60 2.52 0.09 0.09 0.89 0.63 0.59 0.01** 0.06 0.03* 0.26 0.28 0.92 2 
         0 1 0 0 2 0 2 3 1 2  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney 
p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. Responses are based on a five point Likert scale 
where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively.  
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7.5.2 Factors Influencing Board Decisions   
 
This next question elicited the respondents’ opinions on the factors that they thought 
influenced board decisions. The table above shows that the respondents strongly agreed 
that company size and sector influences board decisions (means of 1.80 and 1.83 
respectively). The respondents also agreed that cultural factors such as personal 
relationships, position in society and courtesy to others also influenced board decisions 
(means of 2.15, 2.36 and 2.40 respectively); the evidence in Chapter Six also suggested 
that cultural factors influenced board members decisions as they might feel obligated to 
vote or agree with the decisions due to personal networks with those who appointed 
them. However, CH disagreed that position in society and courtesy to others influenced 
the decision making process at board level (means of 3.50), one possible interpretation is 
that chairmen are usually those who have the highest social status and are given more 
regard and courtesy from NEDs and INEDs on the board and influence NEDs and INEDs 
to agree with them.  
 
Family ownership also seemed to influence board decisions, this is expected since as 
noted in Figure 2.2 a large number of KSA listed companies are controlled by family 
ownership, and accords with the literature that states that family and founders influence 
company decisions (Robertson, 2013). When analysing the respondents by ownership 
type, those from family -dispersed and foreign- controlled boards agreed with the 
influence of family ownership on board decisions (1.46, 2.78 and 2.44 respectively), 
while those classified as ‘other’ disagreed (mean 3.25). Also the respondents from 
government controlled boards agreed that government ownership was an important factor 
to influence board decisions (mean 1.57) while the respondents from family -dispersed 
and foreign- controlled companies disagreed (means of 4.15, 4.11 and 3.87 respectively). 
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Thus it seems clear that controlling shareholders have an influence on board decisions. 
Surprisingly the respondents did not indicate that Islamic values influenced board 
decisions, it might be expected that Islam and Shariah law would be an important 
influence in decision making in an Islamic country and is possibly an avenue for future 
research.  
 
7.5.3 Factors influencing board Meeting 
 
This section draws out the respondents’ opinions regarding the factors influencing when 
board meetings take place. From the results in Table 7.23 the respondents indicated only 
the experience of the chairmen was influential with a mean of 2.61 and might be because, 
as discussed in Chapter Six, the time of board meetings and agenda items are usually one 
of the roles of the chairmen. 
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Table 7.23 Factors Influencing Time of Board Meetings 
Factors M SD 
Group M 
KW 
 
M-W P VALUE  
CH & CEO & NED & INED 
& BS  CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Gov and Regulatory bodies 3.69 1.28 4.00 3.50 3.82 3.89 3.52 0.66 0.36 0.61 0.76 0.71 0.21 0.25 0.77 0.89 0.35 0.30 0 
Economic Factors 3.20 1.21 3.33 2.25 3.88 4.15 2.45 0.00** 0.02* 0.20 0.34 0.33 0.00** 0.37 0.01** 0.01** 0.53 0.04* 5 
Members of the royal family 4.15 0.76 5.00 3.50 4.18 4.05 4.32 0.03* 0.03* 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.00** 0.67 0.59 0.26 2 
Islamic values 3.00 1.04 3.00 2.67 2.61 4.25 2.52 0.00** 0.30 0.26 0.04* 0.17 0.91 0.00** 0.81 0.00** 0.63 0.00** 4 
Favouritism 4.28 0.69 4.00 4.11 4.44 4.10 4.35 0.50 0.79 0.26 0.81 0.36 0.27 0.98 0.38 0.17 0.67 0.25 0 
Personal relationships 3.94 0.75 4.50 4.22 4.28 4.15 3.48 0.00** 0.60 0.67 0.54 0.06 0.82 0.84 0.01** 0.61 0.00** 0.00** 3 
Courtesy to others 4.09 0.68 4.50 4.44 3.56 4.20 4.20 0.00** 0.89 0.08 0.62 0.46 0.00** 0.47 0.25 0.01** 0.00** 0.86 3 
Position in society 3.96 1.06 4.50 2.78 4.44 4.25 3.81 0.01** 0.09 0.94 0.71 0.42 0.00** 0.00** 0.03* 0.49 0.07 0.21 3 
Family ownership 3.10 1.27 5.00 2.33 3.44 3.35 2.84 0.03* 0.01** 0.08 0.10 0.03* 0.03* 0.06 0.23 0.88 0.11 0.17 2 
Government ownership 3.53 1.02 4.00 2.89 4.06 3.65 3.29 0.03* 0.19 0.95 0.68 0.38 0.03* 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.00** 0.17 2 
Top Management 3.81 1.06 4.00 3.67 3.61 3.15 4.39 0.00** 0.69 0.64 0.34 0.62 0.81 0.23 0.00** 0.23 0.05 0.00** 2 
Company size 3.88 0.89 4.00 4.33 3.94 3.35 4.03 0.10 0.69 0.95 0.48 0.97 0.17 0.02* 0.29 0.10 0.69 0.03* 2 
Company sector 3.09 0.94 4.00 3.56 2.56 2.95 3.29 0.02* 0.60 0.06 0.21 0.38 0.00** 0.09 0.42 0.36 0.01** 0.20 2 
Insider dealing by  BM 3.80 1.02 4.50 3.56 4.28 2.60 4.32 0.00** 0.10 0.61 0.02* 0.74 0.03* 0.01** 0.02** 0.00** 0.73 0.00** 6 
Experience of the chairmen 2.61 0.96 2.00 2.78 2.83 2.50 2.55 0.56 0.37 0.21 0.60 0.23 0.69 0.55 0.97 0.21 0.45 0.36 0 
         3 0 2 1 7 4 6 4 4 6  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences across the groups’ responses. Mann-
Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. Responses are based on a five point 
Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively.  
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From the table above, the Kruskal Wallis and Mann-Whitney results indicate that 
company executives (CEOs and BS) agreed that economic factors influenced the time of 
board meetings (means of 2.25 and 2.45 respectively), this might be influenced by the 
time the empirical data of this study was carried out which was between 2009 and 2011 
after the global financial crisis, which might have made board meetings longer in time 
and more frequent. CH, NEDs and INEDs disagreed with the economic influence (means 
of 3.33, 3.88 and 4.15 respectively). CEOs, NEDs and BSs seemed to agree that Islamic 
values influenced the time of board meetings, one possible interpretation of this result 
might be that Muslims are required to pray at certain times five times a day,
73
 therefore it 
might be that board meetings take place at times that do not overlap with the times of 
prayer. The executives (CEOs and BS) also indicated that family ownership influenced 
the time of board meetings, which might be expected since family ownership has been 
shown to influence many governance practices and board decisions. NEDs indicated that 
company sector influences the time of board meetings; this might be because NEDs 
usually have multiple board memberships, and some sectors board meetings are made at 
certain times in order not to overlap with other board meetings that they may have to 
attend.  
 
7.5.4 Factors Influencing the Time Spent Preparing for Board Meetings 
 
The final section of the questionnaire aimed to find out which factors influenced the time 
that individual board members spent in preparation for board meetings, demonstrating 
their commitment reflecting governance practice (Minichilli, 2009).  
 
                                                          
73
 At dawn, noon, afternoon, sunset and at night.  
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Table 7.24 Factors Influencing Time Board Members Prepare for Board Meetings 
Factors M SD 
Group M KW 
  
M-W   
CH & CEO & NED & INED 
& BS 
 
CH CEO NED INED BS CEO NED INED BS NED INED BS INED BS 
Gov and Regulatory bodies 3.62 1.26 4.00 3.56 3.67 3.68 3.53 0.96 0.48 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.47 0.49 0.63 0.87 0.89 0.72 0 
Economic Factors 2.34 1.02 4.00 2.22 1.94 2.95 2.10 0.00** 0.01** 0.02* 0.15 0.03* 0.31 0.06 0.43 0.00** 0.83 0.01** 5 
Members of the royal family 3.94 0.80 5.00 3.56 3.78 3.90 4.10 0.11 0.02* 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.58 0.23 0.06 0.56 0.18 0.45 1 
Islamic values 3.56 1.05 3.00 3.33 2.78 3.60 4.10 0.00** 0.81 0.50 0.39 0.07 0.23 0.52 0.07 0.01** 0.00** 0.07 2 
Favouritism 4.18 0.82 4.00 4.11 3.89 4.65 4.06 0.03* 0.76 1.00 0.07 0.87 0.67 0.02* 0.92 0.01** 0.63 0.01** 3 
Personal relationships 4.04 0.83 5.00 3.44 4.00 4.05 4.16 0.09 0.04* 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.02* 0.90 0.56 0.67 2 
Courtesy to others 3.89 0.84 5.00 4.33 3.61 3.85 3.87 0.07 0.10 0.03* 0.07 0.07 0.02* 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.34 0.80 2 
Position in society 4.09 0.90 5.00 4.11 3.89 4.05 4.16 0.49 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.64 0.94 0.82 0.53 0.36 0.81 0 
Family ownership 3.44 1.15 5.00 2.63 3.17 3.00 3.97 0.00** 0.02* 0.03* 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.63 0.00** 0.60 0.01** 0.01** 5 
Government ownership 3.59 1.05 3.00 2.56 3.33 3.50 4.13 0.00** 0.26 0.50 0.48 0.07 0.03* 0.04 0.00** 0.55 0.01** 0.07 3 
Top Management 3.73 0.80 3.00 3.00 3.75 3.60 4.06 0.00** 1.00 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.01** 0.02* 0.00** 0.53 0.21 0.05 3 
Company size 2.04 0.80 2.00 2.11 1.72 2.45 1.94 0.10 0.64 0.38 0.54 0.87 0.05 0.40 0.47 0.02* 0.24 0.08 1 
Company sector 2.26 0.88 2.00 2.67 2.06 2.55 2.10 0.26 0.27 0.89 0.45 0.81 0.09 0.72 0.12 0.12 0.63 0.15 0 
Insider dealing by  BM 4.05 0.73 4.00 4.44 4.06 3.95 4.00 0.54 0.26 0.89 0.90 1.00 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.64 0.82 0.83 0 
Experience of the chairmen 3.89 0.83 2.00 4.44 4.06 3.50 4.00 0.00** 0.02* 0.02 0.01** 0.01 0.18 0.00** 0.15 0.02* 0.82 0.03* 5 
         5 3 1 1 3 3 4 5 3 4  
Note: This table shows the means and group means for the respondents. R= factors ranks in the order of importance. The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (K-W) shows significant differences 
across the groups’ responses. Mann-Whitney p values indicate the difference between the responses of total groups, the final row and column show the number of significant differences. 
Responses are based on a five point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree, 2= agree. 3= neutral, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. A */** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level respectively.  
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The results in Table 7.24 indicate that company size and sector influence the time board 
members allocate to prepare for board meetings, possibly as companies that are larger in 
size and more complex might have more information that needs to be read, such as firms 
in the financial sector, that would require more effort and time (Vafeas, 1999).  
 
The respondents also indicated that economic factors influenced the time board members 
devoted in preparation for board meetings; one possible interpretation is that after the 
global financial crisis board members became more involved and alert in board meetings.  
 
The result of Kruskal Wallis and Mann- Whitney test shows some significant differences 
among the responses of the groups. CH indicated that their experience as chairmen 
influenced the preparation spent by other board members, consistent with the literature 
(Roberts, 2002). Thus chairmen think themselves more influential than may actually be 
true in practice. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reports the results of the questionnaire survey regarding the factors that 
influence corporate governance practices in general and board practices in particular. The 
overall findings signify that social, cultural and regulatory factors influence corporate 
governance practices  
 
The views of the groups respondents varied regarding the influence of some of the 
factors on corporate governance practices; the respondents that had the most similarities 
were the chairmen and NEDs which might be because chairmen are usually also NEDs 
within other companies, and hence network together and the most differences were 
between CEOs and NEDs which might be because CEOs represent the views of 
executives from a day to day basis, while NEDs are less involved and more distant and 
have different networks and social circles.  
 
The findings, as summarised in Table 7.25, point to the importance of the regulatory role 
of government bodies in all of the governance issues discussed in the questionnaire 
which seems to be the result of coercive pressures that promote and diffuse corporate 
governance practices among KSA listed companies, consistent with previous studies in 
emerging countries (Falgi, 2009; Zagoub, 2011; Black and Jang, 2006). The issuance of 
the corporate governance code and other regulatory enforcements have led companies to 
adopt analogous governance practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, the level 
of similarity in conformity does not exceed the mandatory provisions of the code, as the 
evidence suggests that there are variations in the level of adoption of the voluntary 
provisions of the code. Indeed, the analysis reveals that government owned companies 
adopt the voluntary provisions as a community of practice possibly because the 
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prevailing institutional logics embedded within these government boards is to adhere to 
government regulations, but companies controlled by foreign ownership have practices 
resulting from the influence of the foreign controlling shareholder. Family owned firms 
also show their own community of practice by being selective about the voluntary 
aspects of the code. Thus, KSA organisations have responded to external institutional 
pressure according to the prevailing logics within their community (Lepoutre and 
Valente, 2012; Helms et al., 2012).  
The findings also show that there are communities of practice in different sectors. The 
financial sector’s practices maybe a result of the coercive influence of the financial 
regulator (SAMA) with more governance provisions being adopted (Scott and Myers, 
1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
 
Finally, the findings indicate that cultural and social factors and personal networks are 
important drivers in influencing corporate governance practices, but many practices are 
decoupled from policy as material carriers. Having now discussed the two empirical 
results, the thesis will now focus on the conclusions that can be drawn from this study. 
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Table 7.25 The Factors Influencing Governance Practices 
 
Governance practice Cultural  
influences 
Social 
status 
Ownership Political 
influences 
Government 
and Regulatory 
bodies 
Corporate 
governance 
code 
Personal 
traits 
Sector Economic 
Selection of :                   
Chairmen  √ √ √ √ - - √ - - 
NED √ √ - - √ - √ √ - 
Independent NED √ √ √ - √ √ √ - - 
Audit committee members √ - - - √ √ √ √ - 
Remuneration and nomination 
committee members 
√ - √ - - √ √ √ - 
Executive committee 
members 
- - √ - - - y - - 
Factors contribute to the 
practices of audit committee  
- - - - √ √ √ - - 
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Factors hindering  the 
practices of audit committee 
√ - √ - - - - - - 
Factors contribute to the 
practices to remuneration and 
nomination committee    
- - - - - - √ - - 
Factors hindering the 
practices of remuneration and 
nomination committee  
√ - √ - - - - - - 
Adoption of Cumulative 
Voting  
- - √ √ √ √ - √ - 
Board membership √ √ - - √ - - - √ 
Number of directorships √ - √ - √ √ √ - - 
Board of directors decisions - - - - - - - √ √ 
Board meeting - - - - - - - √ - 
Time board members spent 
preparing for board meetings  
- - - - - - - √ √ 
Note: The table provides a summary of the main influences on the corporate governance practices from the factor analyses results and descriptive statistics. (√ indicates that the 
factor influences the governance practice, Board member/BM, corporate governance /CG)
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
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8.1 Introduction  
  
The thesis main objective was to examine the corporate governance framework in the 
KSA environment. It has explored views regarding corporate governance practices 
amongst a range of relevant stakeholders including company Chairmen, CEOs, NEDs, 
independent NEDs and regulators in an institutional theory context. This chapter, 
which concludes the thesis, is structured as follows: Section 8.2 provides an overview 
of the thesis, before the research findings and a number of conclusions relating to 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia are presented in Section 8.3. The contribution to 
knowledge and policy implications are discussed in Section 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. 
While the study’s limitations are presented in Sections 8.6. Section 8.7 then discusses 
avenues for future research and the thesis then concludes with some overall thoughts in 
Section 8.8. 
  
8.2 Overview of the Research 
 
 
The thesis began with an introduction outlining the motivation and rationale of the 
study and addressing the need for corporate governance research in emerging markets 
using alternative theoretical frameworks. The main research question was set out: what 
are the institutional factors that influence the corporate governance practices of KSA 
listed companies. Chapter Two gave an overview of the historical background of Saudi 
Arabia, describing the nation’s corporate culture, legal framework and market 
structure, including the Saudi corporate governance code. The aim of chapter two was 
to inform the reader about the environment in which KSA companies operate.   
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Chapter Three discussed the relevant literature on corporate governance in both 
developed and developing countries. The chapter focused specifically on the literature 
regarding board of directors, especially its composition and structure. The final section 
of this chapter discussed the literature on corporate governance in the Saudi context. 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of the thesis were discussed in Chapter Four. The 
chapter discussed theories that have been used in previous corporate governance 
research, and argued that institutional theory is a suitable theoretical framework for the 
current study. 
 
After viewing alternative methodological assumptions, Chapter Five justifies the 
philosophical stance adopted here, indicating that the research is located within the 
interpretive paradigm in explaining corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia. 
The chapter describes in detail the two research methods used in collecting the 
empirical data, i.e. semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey developed in 
an institutional theory framework to identify the factors that influence the modern day 
corporate governance practices of KSA-listed companies. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the findings of the semi-structured interviews. A total of forty-
three interviews were carried out with board members and executives of KSA-listed 
companies as well as government officials from the regulatory authorities that issue 
corporate governance regulations in KSA. To explore the perception of board members 
of listed companies amongst a wider sample and thereby investigating key issues 
emerging from the interviews more broadly, in Chapter Seven questionnaires were 
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used and opinions gathered regarding the factors influencing board practices and 
decisions in KSA-listed companies. The results of this work are presented in the 
previous chapter. The present chapter now discusses the results emerging from the two 
sets of empirical work.   
 
8.3 Research findings  
 
In order to address the key research question it was important to first identify KSA-
listed companies’ adopted governance practices. The evidence from the empirical 
chapters indicated that practices were often adopted to conform with the regulatory 
authority (CMA); corporate governance code which itself is based primarily on a 
‘comply or explain’ approach. The issuance of the code in 2006 has clearly put 
coercive isomorphic pressures on companies to adopt corporate governance practices 
to provide institutional legitimacy. However, there was some variation in the corporate 
governance practices actually adopted as several institutional logics embedded within 
the organisational field of KSA listed companies played an important role. First, 
companies controlled by the government adopted practices in accordance with the 
code, even those requirements which are voluntary, because of the embeddedness of 
the institutional logics of the state. Second, and in context, family-owned companies 
only adopted governance practices that suited their own purposes and interests, 
preventing the new competing logics of the code replacing the dominant logics within 
family-controlled firms, as this would reduce their control and power over their firms. 
These two logics identified dominate KSA as a whole, although other companies have 
adopted their own logics in the context of normative isomorphic influences, such as 
those emanating from foreign-controlled firms. 
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The CMA mandated some practices in the corporate governance code, such as having 
audit and remuneration and nomination committees, disclosing governance-related 
items in the annual report, having an internal governance code and having INEDs on 
the board; the CMA has thus placed some coercive pressure on KSA-listed companies 
to adopt these practices. However, some of these practices remain ceremonial and actor 
material practice has decoupled from the code.  
 
The evidence shows that prevailing tribal and social loyalties within Saudi society 
impact on the governance practices of boards of directors of KSA-listed companies in 
identifiable ways, with social and cultural norms such as social status, prestige, 
kinship, personal relationships and favouritism from personal networks all representing 
symbolic carriers that influence corporate governance practices, board structure and 
board decisions. These symbolic carriers within the Saudi context are reflected in 
boardroom behaviour, such as electing a chairman according to his social status, and 
nominating directors to the board based on trust and loyalty to major shareholders; 
such evidence indicates how prevalent these practices have been institutionalised 
within Saudi society.  
 
The evidence also shows that the corporate governance code has resulted in INEDs 
being present on most company boards, and board committees as the code requires, but 
there are very few independent directors who are truly independent in practice; closed 
actor networks and social and cultural factors have dictated the INEDs role, such that it 
has become a ceremonial practice only. This trend reflects the dominant institutional 
logic within Saudi culture whereby individuals act primarily in accordance with their 
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family or tribe’s interests. Figure 8.1 is developed based on the evidence summarised 
in tables 6.1 and 7.24 in the previous chapters and illustrates the main findings of this 
thesis in relation to the set objective of identifying the factors that influence corporate 
governance practices in KSA-listed companies.  
 
 
Figure 8.1 Factors influencing the corporate governance of KSA listed companies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the figure shows the factors that influence the corporate governance structures and practices 
within the organisational field of KSA-listed companies 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies corporate 
governance structures 
and practices  
Sociocultural 
 influences 
  
 
Political 
influence 
Personal 
attributes  
Company 
ownership 
Regulatory 
bodies 
Corporate 
governance 
code 
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Corporate governance is still in its early stages in KSA. The lack of awareness in 
general in Saudi society- including amongst board members and INEDs- about the 
notion and its implications for board practices emerged regularly during this study. 
This lack of understanding within Saudi culture is an important issue that needs to be 
tackled, as the intended outcome of diffusing a corporate governance code among 
KSA-listed companies has clearly not been achieved, with only decoupling practices 
from policy. 
  
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
There are a number of contributions to our knowledge that emerge from this thesis. 
First the thesis investigates corporate governance in the Saudi environment, adding to 
the governance literature in the context of emerging economies, especially GCC 
countries, where very little is known. Second, this thesis adds new insights by using an 
institutional theory approach, in this case new institutional sociology, whereas the 
existing governance literature is dominated by agency theory, which is arguably of 
limited relevance in emerging economies, where the historical and cultural conditions 
are different from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. 
 
Another contribution of this thesis is that it identifies the institutional factors that 
influence current corporate governance practices within the Saudi context. In this 
regard, corporate governance practices have been shown to be embedded within the 
social and cultural context, which dictates the way that boards and board members 
respond to corporate governance regulations; the importance of these societal norms 
and personal networks are important and need to be considered when implementing 
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what are purportedly ‘western’ regulations or codes in a country such as Saudi Arabia. 
Thus the results of this thesis are important in comparative corporate governance 
research in operationalising the need to account for national specifications. 
 
From this perspective it can be concluded that the current institutional context within 
Saudi society is incompatible with the corporate governance standards introduced by 
western countries. Therefore it is important that KSA authorities acknowledge the 
institutional environment when developing corporate governance rules in the future, if 
they are to have anything other than being decoupled from policy. 
 
Relatedly, this study contributes to advancing our knowledge of the factors that 
influence boards of directors in Saudi-listed companies; thus contributing more broadly 
to efforts to enhance the level of understanding of corporate governance practices in 
Saudi Arabia. It is therefore intended that the findings of this thesis will facilitate a 
greater understanding of board practices in the Saudi culture in particular, and in Arab 
countries in general.  
 
8.5 Policy Implications 
 
The promotion of corporate governance practices in KSA starts with acknowledging 
the institutional logics that drive individuals’ actions in order to establish the manner in 
which embedded corporate governance practices can be changed so as to fit within the 
Saudi environment. The idea of convergence to a single worldwide corporate 
governance model has proven its appeal on a global scale. However such moves has so 
far neglected the need to reflect the cultural, legal and social institutions in the 
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governance frameworks of a country; the present study has shown how relevant the 
latter are in practice. 
 
More specifically, the role played by government representatives on company boards is 
important, but their involvement and their lack of understanding of business may 
impact unfavourably onto governance practices of state owned enterprises. 
 
The KSA government and regulatory bodies need to embark on improving awareness 
of governance; to this end, channels of communication should be made available 
between the regulatory authority and listed companies directors, especially INEDs,  
 
 
 
8.6 Limitations 
 
 [ 
This thesis focuses on corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia, but is subject to 
a number of limitations. One of the major problems that the researcher faced was that 
corporate governance, as a topic, is relatively new and therefore not well known in the 
Saudi context; this led to some challenges for the researcher when explaining terms 
such as ‘corporate governance’, ‘independence’ and ‘cumulative voting’ to the 
participants. Another problem derived from the fact that many board members in Saudi 
Arabia are highly regarded individuals, and it was a challenge to gain access to the 
interviewees, especially when the discussions moved on to discuss the issue of political 
influence and power. On a related note, conducting research on a sample of listed 
companies also proved to be difficult; this was evident from the number of rejections 
given to the researcher from individuals when requesting access to interviews on the 
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basis that sensitivity of information was important, and they wanted to ensure that no 
information be leaked. Further, not all parts of Saudi Arabia were included in the 
sample of interviews, as the nation’s landmass is very large and time and financial 
constraints meant that the researcher was unable to cover all parts of the country. It 
should also be acknowledged that the empirical findings are based on the perception of 
a limited number of participants, 43 interviewees and 82 questionnaire respondents, 
reflecting the difficulty in gaining access to family firms and large shareholders 
 
Another limitation related to the methods used in this thesis. Whilst these were chosen 
carefully on the basis of being the most appropriate given the study’s aims’, the 
participants in this study may have misinterpreted or misunderstand some of the 
questions during the interviews or while filling out the questionnaire survey. The 
closed-ended questions, while offering specific benefits to the research, also made it 
difficult to capture other important related matters that might have been relevant to the 
subject of corporate governance.  
 
8.7 Avenues for Future Research 
 
The lack of academic literature on Saudi Arabia in general and corporate governance 
in particular is a gap that this study has attempted to fill, but future research might 
want to target other GCC and Arab countries where the political, cultural and 
economic environments are different, especially those where the recent “Arab spring” 
may have impacted on a wide range of governance-related issues. Future research 
might therefore want to include such countries in a cross- national study. 
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The current study deliberately focused on corporate governance practices within listed 
companies. Future research may also want to include non-listed companies, and 
examine their corporate governance practice, and whether similar or different factors 
influence their governance practices.  In addition, the current study only looked at the 
role of government institutional investors through their representatives as board 
members. The role of institutional investors, especially of the government, in corporate 
governance in KSA needs to be investigated further. 
  
Future research might also want to investigate corporate governance within different 
levels of management in alternative types of company ownership structures to examine 
further the embedded organisational logics as well as symbolic and material carriers of 
practice. Future studies may also want to examine in more detail the role of NEDs and 
ways to ensure their independence, especially regarding the cultural barriers to such a 
notion in Arab society. The role of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders in 
corporate governance, and their level of activism within listed companies also needs to 
be investigated to evaluate whether improvements therein are feasible given culturally-
embedded practices. 
 
Finally, another fruitful avenue might be to conduct a field study examining the level 
of diffusion of institutional logics within organisations across individual sectors, and 
with different ownership structures, looking in particular at the role of the internal 
actors.  
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8.8 Concluding Thoughts 
 
In conclusion, corporate governance in the KSA is influenced by the country’s social 
and cultural context and regulators need to understand that issuing governance codes 
and regulations is only one requirement for a robust governance framework; active 
involvement is needed and companies, shareholders, stakeholders and regulators need 
to communicate through actor networks in order to encourage involvement in and 
increase awareness of corporate governance issues. The KSA regulatory authorities 
(CMA and SAMA) that have issued governance regulations in Saudi need to interact 
more via personal networks to accomplish this task; their role up until now has focused 
on issuing regulations and monitoring compliance by issuing sanctions concerning 
firms that do not adhere to mandatory governance requirements. More proactive roles 
are essential to overcome the weakness in current Saudi governance practices in by 
using networks that facilitates the diffusion of new practice to become the enabling 
driver of a new institutional logic. 
 
In summary, the current study has highlighted that social and cultural issues are 
important, but this does not imply that cultural values and traditions should be 
relinquished. The actions of individuals in and around boardrooms through actor 
networks often operate not only against regulatory codes but also Islamic teachings. 
Islam preaches that people should be just, trustworthy, love one another and remember 
that God watches every action that an individual makes. This thesis has shown that this 
is not yet practiced in Saudi boardrooms. The moral obligations of people, from 
religious backgrounds or elsewhere, should compel them to work towards an improved 
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society. We should remember that we are only here on earth temporarily and that when 
we leave we hope that it will be a better place.    
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PART 1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS  
 
 
Article 1: Preamble  
 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the  
management of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure 
their compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure 
the protection of shareholders' rights as well as the rights of 
stakeholders.  
 
 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies  
listed in the Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or 
resolutions of the Board of the Authority provide for the binding 
effect of some of the provisions herein contained.  
 
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must  
disclose in the Board of Directors` report, the provisions that have 
been implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented 
as well as the reasons for not implementing them.  
 
 
Article 2: Definitions  
 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear  
in the Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in 
the regulations and the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless 
otherwise stated in these regulations.  
 
 
b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following  
expressions and terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows  
unless the contrary intention appears:  
 
 
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys 
complete independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute  
an infringement of such independence:  
 
1. he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the  
company or any of its group.  
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or  
more of the issued shares of the company or any of its group.  
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3. he/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive of  
the company or of any other company within that company's group.  
4. he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company  
or of any other company within that company's group.  
 
 
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the  
company or of any other company within that company's group.  
 
 
6. he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the  
company which he is nominated to be a member of its board.  
 
 
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with  
an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, 
such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the 
preceding two years, had a controlling interest in any such party.  
 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not 
have a full-time management position at the company, or who does not 
receive monthly or yearly salary.  
 
 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children.  
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as  
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community.  
 
 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which 
gives each shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares 
he/she holds. He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee or to 
divide them between his/her selected nominees without any duplication of 
these votes. This method increases the chances of the minority shareholders 
to appoint their representatives in the board through the right to accumulate 
votes for one nominee.  
 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of  
shareholders that does not control the company and hence they are unable to 
influence the company.  
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PART 2  
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders  
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in  
particular, the right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share 
of the company's assets upon liquidation; the right to attend the General 
Assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the 
right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the Board of 
Directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; 
the right to inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the 
company's interests and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital 
Market Law and the Implementing Rules.  
 
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to  
Information  
 
a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify  
the procedures and precautions that are necessary for the 
shareholders' exercise of all their lawful rights.  
b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their  
rights shall be made available and such information shall be 
comprehensive and accurate; it must be provided and updated 
regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall use the 
most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No 
discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation 
to providing information.  
 
 
Article 51: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly  
 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six  
months following the end of the company's financial year.  
 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of  
Directors. The Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to 
convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of 
shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity 
share capital.  
 
 
1 
 
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H  
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (i) and (j) of Article 5 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G.  
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c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and  
announced by a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting; 
invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange' website, the 
company's website and in two newspapers of voluminous distribution 
in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means shall be used in 
communicating with shareholders.  
 
 
d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively  
participate and vote in the General Assembly; they shall be informed 
about the rules governing the meetings and the voting procedure.  
 
 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the  
greatest number of shareholders in the General Assembly, including 
inter alia determination of the appropriate place and time.  
 
f) In preparing the General Assembly's agenda, the Board of Directors  
shall take into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed 
in that agenda; shareholders holding not less than 5% of the 
company's shares are entitled to add one or more items to the agenda. 
upon its preparation.  
 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of  
the General Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board 
members and to the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the 
external auditor shall answer the questions raised by shareholders in a 
manner that does not prejudice the company's interest.  
 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by  
sufficient information to enable shareholders to make decisions.  
 
 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General  
Assembly; the company shall provide the Authority with a copy of 
those minutes within 10 days of the convening date of any such 
meeting.  
 
 
j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the  
General Assembly.  
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Article 6: Voting Rights  
a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which  
shall not, in any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any 
action which might hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder 
must be afforded all possible assistance as may facilitate the exercise 
of such right.  
 
 
b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board  
members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied.  
 
 
c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is  
not a board member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the General Assembly on his behalf.  
 
 
d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others -  
e.g. investment funds- shall disclose in their annual reports their 
voting policies, actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material 
conflict of interests that may affect the practice of the fundamental 
rights in relation to their investments.  
 
 
 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders  
 
a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding  
dividends, in a manner that may realize the interests of shareholders 
and those of the company; shareholders shall be informed of that 
policy during the General Assembly and reference thereto shall be 
made in the report of the Board of Directors.  
 
 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of  
distribution. These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares 
shall be given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the 
records kept at the Securities Depository Center as they appear at the 
end of trading session on the day on which the General Assembly is 
convened.  
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PART 3  
 
 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY  
 
 
 
Article 8:Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure  
 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and 
supervisory rules related to disclosure, pursuant to law.  
 
 
Article 9 2: Disclosure in the Board of Directors' Report  
 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the 
content of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the 
annual financial statements of the company, such report shall include the  
following:  
 
 
a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the  
provisions which have not been implemented, and the justifications 
for not implementing them.  
 
 
b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the  
company Board of Directors member acts as a member of its Board of 
directors.  
 
 
c)  Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its  
members as follows: executive board member, non-executive board 
member, or independent board member.  
 
 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board's main  
committees such as the Audit Committee, the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their 
chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of their 
respective meetings.  
 
 
 
 
2 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H  
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all  
companies listed on the Exchange effective from the first board report issued by the company following the date of the 
Board of the Capital Market Authority resolution mentioned above.  
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e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the  
following:  
1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors.  
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest  
compensation and remuneration from the company. The CEO and the 
chief finance officer shall be included if they are not within the top 
five.  
 
 
For the purpose of this paragraph, "compensation and remuneration" 
means salaries, allowances, profits and any of the same; annual and 
periodic bonuses related to performance; long or short- term incentive 
schemes; and any other rights in rem.  
 
 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the  
company by the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or judiciary 
body.  
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control  
procedures of the company.  
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PART 4  
 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 
 
Article 103: Main Functions of the Board of Directors  
 
 
Among the main functions of the Board is the fallowing:  
 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and  
supervising their implementation; this includes:  
 
 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the  
main work plans and the policy related to risk management, 
reviewing and updating of such policy.  
 
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the  
company, its strategies and financial objectives and approving 
its annual budgets.  
 
 
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and  
acquisition/disposal of assets.  
 
4. Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and  
supervising the implementation thereof and the overall 
performance of the company.  
 
 
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional  
structures of the company on a periodical basis.  
 
 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this  
includes:  
 
 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of  
interest and remedy any possible cases of conflict by members of 
the Board of Directors, executive management and 
shareholders. This includes misuse of the company's assets  
 
 
3 
 
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-33-2011) Dated 3/12/1432H  
corresponding to 30/10/2011G making paragraph (b) of Article 10 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2012.  
- The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H  
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 10 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 30/6/2013G.  
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and facilities and the arbitrary disposition resulting from  
dealings with the related parties.  
 
2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting  
procedures including procedures related to the preparation of the 
financial reports.  
 
 
3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate  
for risk management by forecasting the risks that the company 
could encounter and disclosing them with transparency.  
 
 
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal control  
systems.  
 
 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not  
contradict the provisions of this regulation, supervising and monitoring 
in general the effectiveness of the code and amending it whenever 
necessary.  
 
 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures,  
for the membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them after 
they have been approved by the General Assembly.  
 
 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with  
stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in  
particular, such policy must cover the following:  
1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case of  
contravening their rights under the law and their respective 
contracts.  
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might  
arise between the company and the stakeholders.  
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with  
customers and suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of 
information related to them.  
4. A code of conduct for the company's executives and employees  
compatible with the proper professional and ethical standards, and 
regulate their relationship with the stakeholders. The Board of 
Directors lays down procedures for supervising this code and 
ensuring compliance there with.  
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5. The Company's social contributions.  
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company's compliance  
with the laws and regulations and the company's obligation to 
disclose material information to shareholders, creditors and other 
stakeholders.  
 
 
 
 
Article 11 : Responsibilities of the Board  
 
 
a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b)  
 
 
 
c)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
d)  
 
Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the 
company's Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers 
for the company's management. The ultimate responsibility for the 
company rests with the Board even if it sets up committees or 
delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors 
shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney.  
 
 
The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated 
in the company's Articles of Association.  
 
 
The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible 
manner, in good faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be 
based on sufficient information from the executive management, or 
from any other reliable source.  
 
 
A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he 
undertakes to carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the 
company, but not the interests of the group he represents or that which 
voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors.  
 
 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to  
the executive management and the procedures for taking any action 
and the validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters 
reserved for decision by the Board of Directors. The executive 
management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic reports on 
the exercise of the delegated powers.  
 
 
f)  
 
The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for 
orienting the new board members of the company's business and, in 
particular, the financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, 
where necessary.  
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g)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h)  
The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about  
the company is made available to all members of the Board of 
Directors, generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, 
to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities in an 
effective manner.  
 
 
The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which 
spans more than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate 
of the company, or drop the company's debts, unless it is authorized to 
do so by the company's Articles of Association. In the case where the 
company's Articles of Association includes no provisions to this 
respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the General 
Assembly, unless such acts fall within the normal scope of the 
company's business.  
 
 
 
Article 12 4: Formation of the Board  
 
 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following:  
 
 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number  
of the Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall 
not be less than three and not more than eleven.  
 
 
b
)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c
)
  
 
 
 
d
)
  
 
 
The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of 
Directors for the duration provided for in the Articles of Association of the 
company, provided that such duration shall not exceed three years. Unless 
otherwise provided for in the Articles of Association of the company, 
members of the Board may be reappointed.  
 
 
The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non- 
executive members.  
 
 
It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as  
 
 
 
4The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H  
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance  
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009.  
- The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H  
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraph (g) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 
mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G.  
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e)  
 
 
 
f)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g)  
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the  
general manager.  
 
The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less 
than two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater.  
 
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner 
in which membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all 
times, the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members 
of the Board of Directors even though the Articles of Association 
provide otherwise.  
 
 
On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways 
of termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority and 
the Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination.  
 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of 
the  
Board of Directors of more than five joint stock companies at 
the same time.  
 
 
i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company's Articles of  
Association to appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, 
is not entitled to nomination vote of other members of the 
Board of Directors.  
 
Article 13: Committees of the 
Board  
 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance 
with  
the company's requirements and circumstances, in order to enable 
the Board of Directors to perform its duties in an effective 
manner.  
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b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors  
shall be according to general procedures laid down by the Board, 
indicating the duties, the duration and the powers of each committee, 
and the manner in which the Board monitors its activities. The 
committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or decisions 
with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the 
activities of such committees so as to ensure that the activities 
entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall 
approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter  
 
 
 
alia, the Audit  Committee,  Nomination  and  Remuneration  
Committee.  
 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of  
Directors shall be appointed in committees that are concerned with 
activities that might involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals 
concluded by related parties, nomination to membership of the Board, 
appointment of executive directors, and determination of 
remuneration. 
 
  
 
 
 
Article 14 5: Audit Committee  
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the  
"Audit Committee". Its members shall not be less than three, 
including a specialist in financial and accounting matters. Executive 
board members are not eligible for Audit Committee membership.  
 
 
b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation  
of the Board of Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of 
the Audit Committee and define the term of their office and the 
procedure to be followed by the Committee.  
 
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the  
following:  
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1. To supervise the company's internal audit department to ensure  
its effectiveness in executing the activities and duties specified 
by the Board of Directors.  
2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a written  
report on such audit and its recommendations with respect to it.  
 
 
3. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the  
implementation of the corrective measures in respect of the 
comments included in them.  
 
 
4. To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment,  
dismissal and the Remuneration of external auditors; upon any  
 
 
such recommendation, regard must be made to their  
independence.  
 
5. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve  
any activity beyond the scope of the audit work assigned to 
them during the performance of their duties.  
 
 
 
 
6. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and  
make any comments thereon.  
 
 
7. To review the external auditor's comments on the financial  
statements and follow up the actions taken about them.  
 
 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to  
presentation to the Board of Directors; and to give opinion and 
recommendations with respect thereto.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H  
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 14 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009.  
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9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board  
of Directors of any recommendation regarding them.  
 
 
Article 156: Nomination and Remuneration Committee  
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named  
"Nomination and Remuneration Committee".  
 
 
b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of  
Directors, issue rules for the appointment of the members of the 
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, terms of office and the 
procedure to be followed by such committee.  
 
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration  
Committee include the following:  
 
 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to  
membership of the Board in accordance with the approved policies 
and standards; the Committee shall ensure that no person who has 
been previously convicted of any offense affecting honor or 
honesty is nominated for such membership.  
2. Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for  
membership of the Board of Directors and the preparation of a 
description of the required capabilities and qualifications for such 
membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board member 
should reserve for the activities of the Board.  
 
 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend  
changes.  
4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of  
Directors and recommend remedies that are compatible with the 
company's interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
6The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-10-2010) Dated 30/3/1431H  
corresponding to 16/3/2010G making Article 15 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2011G.  
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5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent  
members and the absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board 
member also acts as a member of the Board of Directors of another 
company.  
 
 
6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and remunerations of  
the Board members and top executives; in laying down such  
policies, the standards related to performance shall be followed.  
 
 
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board  
 
1.The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their  
responsibilities, including the preparation for the meetings of the Board 
and the permanent and ad hoc committees, and shall endeavor to attend 
such meetings.  
 
 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request  
by the Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen 
meeting upon a written request by two of its members.  
 
 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the  
Chairman should consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. 
The agenda and other documentation should be sent to the members in 
a sufficient time prior to the meeting so that they may be able to 
consider such matters and prepare themselves for the meeting. Once 
convened, the Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of 
the Board raise any objection to this agenda, the details of such 
objection shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting.  
4. The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the  
deliberations and the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in 
chapters for ease of reference.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members  
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of 
remunerating the Board members; such remuneration may take the form of a 
lump sum amount, attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain 
percentage of the profits. Any two or more of these privileges may be 
conjoined.  
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Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board  
 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the  
General Assembly, to be renewed each year, have any interest 
(whether directly or indirectly) in the company's business and 
contracts. The activities to be performed through general bidding shall 
constitute an exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A 
Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal 
interest he/she may have in the business and contracts that are 
completed for the company's account. Such notification shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an 
interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be 
adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the 
Board of Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall 
notify the General Assembly, when convened, of the activities and 
contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a personal 
interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared 
by the company's auditor.  
 
b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the  
General Assembly, to be renewed annually, participate in any activity 
which may likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade 
in any branch of the activities carried out by the company.  
 
 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board  
members or render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a 
Board member with third parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary 
companies.  
PART 5  
CLOSING PROVISIONS  
 
 
 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force  
 
 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication.  
  
   
                                                                               302 
Appendix B 
 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
Corporate Governance Code 
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يدوعسلا يبرعلا دقنلا ةسسؤم 
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______________________ 
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 )القسم الأول(
 :التعريفات
 مؤسسة النقد العربي السعكدم.المؤسسة: 
 
البنػػػػػػػػػػػكؾ المرخصػػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػػف مؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػة النقػػػػػػػػػػػد المصػػػػػػػػػػػارؼ ك ن ـــــــــــ : الب
العربػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػعكدم لمةاكلػػػػػػػػػة الأعمػػػػػػػػػاؿ المصػػػػػػػػػرفية فػػػػػػػػػي المممكػػػػػػػػػة  
 .كفقان لأحكاـ نظاـ مراقبة البنكؾ  كفركعها الأجنبية
 
 
عضػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة الػػػػػػػػػ م يكػػػػػػػػػكف عضػػػػػػػػػكان  عضـــــــــو تنفي ـــــــــ  :
ة ػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػكمػيػؾ كيشػػػػػػػػػػػػارؾ فػػػػػػػػػػػػي الإدارة الػنػػػػػػػػػػػػػبػة لمػ يػػػػػػػػػػػػػيػفػنػتػفػػػػػػػػػػػػي الإدارة ال
 ابؿ  لؾ.ػقػريان مػبان شهػاضى راتػقػتػله كي
 
 
 الػػػػػػػػػػ م يقػػػػػػػػػػدـعضػػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة عضــــــــــو :ي ــــــــــر تنفي ــــــــــ  : 
بػػػػػػػػػام شػػػػػػػػػكؿ مػػػػػػػػػف الأشػػػػػػػػػكاؿ  لا يشػػػػػػػػػارؾالػػػػػػػػػرأم كالمشػػػػػػػػػكرة الفنيػػػػػػػػػة ك 
فػػػػػػػػػػػػي إدارة البنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ كمتابعػػػػػػػػػػػػة أعمالػػػػػػػػػػػػه اليكميػػػػػػػػػػػػة كلا يسػػػػػػػػػػػػتمـ راتبػػػػػػػػػػػػان 
 شهريان أك سنكيان.
 
عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة الػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ م يتمتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع عضــــــــــــــو مســــــــــــــتقل: 
بالكامػػػػػػػػػؿ  ضكػعػػػػػػػػػػة الػيػػػػػػػػػػكاممػػػػػػػػػة. كهػػػػػػػػػ ا يعنػػػػػػػػػي  استقلبلة ػيػػػػػػػػػػلبلػقػاستب
قدرة ػر الػػػػػػػػػػػلبلية تكافػػػػػػػػػػػقػػػػػػػػػػػني الاستػعػػػػػػػػػػػؾ. كتػنػػػػػػػػػػػبػعػػػػػػػػػػف الإدارة كعػػػػػػػػػػف ال
لمحكػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى الأمػػػػػػػػػػػػػكر بعػػػػػػػػػػػػػد الأخػػػػػػػػػػػػػ  فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي الاعتبػػػػػػػػػػػػػار جميػػػػػػػػػػػػػع 
المعمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػات  ات العلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػة دكف أم تػػػػػػػػػػػػػاثير مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف الإدارة أك مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف 
 جهات أخرل خارجية. 
ة لعضػػػػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة فػػػػػػػػػػػػي الحػػػػػػػػػػػػالات لا تتحقػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ الاسػػػػػػػػػػػػتقلبلي
 الآتية:
 
حاليػػػػػػػػػػػان أك خػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ  تنفي يػػػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػػػي البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ قيامػػػػػػػػػػػه بمهػػػػػػػػػػػاـ .أ 
 السنتيف الأخيرتيف.
 
فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ أك فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  % أك أكثػػػػػػػػػػػػػر5نسػػػػػػػػػػػػػبة امتلبكػػػػػػػػػػػػػه  .ب 
 إحدل الشركات التابعة لمبنؾ.
كجػػػكد علبقػػػة مػػػف الدرجػػػة الأكلػػػى بػػػام عضػػػك مػػػف أعضػػػاء  .ج 
ارة مجمػػػػػػػس الإدارة أك أم عضػػػػػػػك مػػػػػػػف أعضػػػػػػػاء مجػػػػػػػالس إد
 الشركات الأخرل التابعة لمبنؾ.
كجػػػػػػػكد صػػػػػػػمة قرابػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػف الدرجػػػػػػػة الأكلػػػػػػػى مػػػػػػػع المػػػػػػػديريف  .د 
أم مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػديريف مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع  التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ أك
 التنفي ييف في الشركات الأخرل التابعة لمبنؾ.
 
إ ا كػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكان فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس إدارة شػػػػػػػػػػػػػركة لػػػػػػػػػػػػػػديها  .ق 
مباشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرة أك  يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ ( ائتمانيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةعلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 ).مباشرة
اف العضػػػػػػػػػػك لديػػػػػػػػػػه علبقػػػػػػػػػػػة ائتمانيػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػع البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ إ ا كػػػػػػػػػػ .ك 
  (بطاقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات ائتمانيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  تسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػهيؿ ائتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاني
أقاربػػػػػػػػػػػػه مػػػػػػػػػػػػف  دضػػػػػػػػػػػػمانات..الب) باسػػػػػػػػػػػػمه أك باسػػػػػػػػػػػػـ أحػػػػػػػػػػػػ
 ألؼ ريال سعكدم. 333تةيد عف  الدرجة الأكلى
 )eno traP( 
 :snoitinifeD
 
 ."AMAS" ycnegA yratenoM naibarA iduaS :ycnegA
 
 yratenoM naibarA iduaS yb desnecil ,sknaB  :knaB
 eht ni ssenisub gniknab tuo yrrac ot ycnegA
 ecnadrocca ni ,sehcnarb ngierof rieht dna ,modgniK
 .waL lortnoC gniknaB eht fo snoisivorp eht htiw
 
 fo draoB eht fo rebmem A :rebmeM evitucexE
 evitucexe eht fo rebmem a osla si ohw srotceriD
 yliad eht ni setapicitrap dna knab eht fo tnemeganam
 nruter ni yralas ylhtnom a snrae dna knab eht fo sriaffa
 .foereht
 
 draoB eht fo rebmem A :rebmeM evitucexE -noN
 si dna ecivda lacinhcet dna snoinipo sedivorp ohw
 eht fo tnemeganam eht ni yaw yna ni devlovni ton
 .yralas launna ro ylhtnom a eviecer ton seod dna knab
 
 ohw draoB eht fo rebmem A :rebmeM tnednepednI
 eht taht snaem sihT .ecnednepedni etelpmoc syojne
 dna tnemeganam morf tnednepedni ylluf si rebmem
 sgniht egduj ot ytiliba eht si ecnednepednI .knab eht
 noitamrofni tnaveler lla tnuocca otni gnikat retfa
 morf ro tnemeganam morf ecneulfni eudnu tuohtiw
  .seititne lanretxe rehto
 rebmem draoB a yb deniatta eb tonnac ecnednepednI
 :snoitautis gniwollof eht ni
 saw ro ,gnitcudnoc yltnerruc si rebmem eht fI .a
 evitucexe ,sraey owt tsal eht ni gnitcudnoc
 .knab eht ni stnemngissa
 ro knab eht fo erom ro %5 snwo rebmem eht fI .b
  .seinapmoc detailiffa sti fo yna
 yna htiw eerged-tsrif fo pihsnoitaler a si ereht fI .c
 eht fo rebmem yna ro draoB eht fo rebmem
 .knaB eht fo seinapmoc detailiffa
 yna htiw eerged-tsrif fo pihsnoitaler a si ereht fI .d
 eht fo yna htiw ro knab eht fo evitucexe roines
 seinapmoc detailiffa rehto fo srotcerid evitucexe
 .knab eht fo
 a fo srotceriD fo draoB eht fo rebmem a si eh fI .e
 seitilicaf gnicnanif deliava sah hcihw ynapmoc
 .knab eht morf )dednufnu ro dednuf(
 knab eht htiw pihsnoitaler gniworrob a sah eh fI .f
 sih ni ).cte...seetnaraug ,ytilicaf tiderc ,drac tiderc(
 srebmem ylimaf sih htiw trecnoc ni ro eman nwo
 .RAS 000,003 naht erom fo )eerged-tsrif(
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إ ا كػػػػػػػػػػػػاف شػػػػػػػػػػػػػريكان أك مكظفػػػػػػػػػػػػػان لػػػػػػػػػػػػػدل أحػػػػػػػػػػػػػد المػػػػػػػػػػػػػراجعيف  .ة 
الخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارجييف أك إحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدل شػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػركاته التابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة خػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ 
 السنتيف الأخيرتيف.
ي حػػػػػػػػػػاؿ كػػػػػػػػػػاف العضػػػػػػػػػػك ممػػػػػػػػػػثلبن لشػػػػػػػػػػخ  م صػػػػػػػػػػفة فػػػػػػػػػػ .ح 
%) 5يممػػػػػػػػػؾ مػػػػػػػػػا نسػػػػػػػػػبته خمسػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػي المائػػػػػػػػػة ( اعتباريػػػػػػػػة
أك أكثػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػهـ البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ أك إحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدل الشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػركات 
 التابعة لمبنؾ.
 
) أيػػػػػػػػػػػاـ عمػػػػػػػػػػػؿ  5عمػػػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ إشػػػػػػػػػػػعار المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػة خػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ (
مػػػػػػػػػػف انتفػػػػػػػػػػت اسػػػػػػػػػػتقلبلية أم عضػػػػػػػػػػك لأم سػػػػػػػػػػبب  فػػػػػػػػػػي حػػػػػػػػػػاؿ
  الأسباب.
 
 .ـ  الةكج  الةكجة  الأبناءالأب  الأأقارب الدرجة الأولى: 
 
أم شػػػػػػػػخ لػػػػػػػػه مصػػػػػػػػمحة فػػػػػػػػي البنػػػػػػػػؾ مثػػػػػػػػؿ أصــــــــحاب الع ق ــــــــة: 
كالعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبء    فالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف كالمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكظفيف كالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتثمريف  كالػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدائني
 كالمكرديف  كالمشرفيف.
 
المسػػػػػػػػػاهمكف الػػػػػػػػػ يف يمثمػػػػػػػػػكف شػػػػػػػػػريحة مػػػػػػػػػف مســـــــــا:مو الأقميـــــــــة: 
المسػػػػػػػػػػػتثمريف  يػػػػػػػػػػػر المسػػػػػػػػػػػيطريف كبالتػػػػػػػػػػػالي  يػػػػػػػػػػػر قػػػػػػػػػػػادريف عمػػػػػػػػػػػى 
 .كاستراتيجيتهي سياسة البنؾ التاثير ف
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 eht fo eno fo eeyolpme na ro rentrap a saw eh fI .g
 sti fo eno ro knab eht fo smrif tidua lanretxe
 .sraey owt tsal eht gnirud seiraidisbus
 sdloh taht nosrep lagel a fo evitatneserper a gnieB .h
 eht fo serahs deussi eht fo erom ro tnecrep evif a
  .seinapmoc detailiffa sti fo yna ro knab
 
 
 ,syad ssenisub  )5( nihtiw AMAS yfiton dluohs knab ehT
 ecnednepedni sih deriapmi sah rotcerid tnednepedni eht fi
 .nosaer revetahw rof
 
 .gnirpsffo dna esuops ,stnerap :sevitaler eerged-tsriF
 
 ni ekats a ro tseretni na gnivah nosrep ynA :sredlohekatS
 ,srotsevni ,seeyolpme ,sredloherahs sa hcus ,knab eht
 .srosivrepus dna ,sreilppus ,sremotsuc ,srotiderc
 
 a tneserper ohw sredloherahS :sredloherahS ytironiM
 ,erofereht ,dna knab eht fo srotsevni gnillortnoc-non fo tnemges
 .ygetarts dna ycilop s’knab eht tceffa ot elba ton era yeht
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 :مقدمة
 
 مبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػادئمؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة النقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد العربػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعكدم  أصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدرت .1
 حككمػػػػػػػػػة البنػػػػػػػػػكؾ العاممػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػي المممكػػػػػػػػػة العربيػػػػػػػػػة السػػػػػػػػػعكدية
 المتعػػػػػػػػػػػارؼ عميهػػػػػػػػػػػاممارسػػػػػػػػػػػات الأفضػػػػػػػػػػػؿ  بمػػػػػػػػػػػا يتفػػػػػػػػػػػؽ مػػػػػػػػػػػع
 كجهػػػػػػػػػػػػػاة بنػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ العمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس إدارة ك دكليػػػػػػػػػػػػػان. 
  إضػػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػى فهػػػػػػػػػػػػـ بػػػػػػػػػػػػادئهػػػػػػػػػػػػ   الم تطبيػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ م
 ات العلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػة كالتاكػػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػػف كفايػػػػػػػػػػػػة معػػػػػػػػػػػػدلات المخػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر 
 مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع حجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ كتناسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبهاكالمخصصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات رأس المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ 
 كبمػػػػػػػػػػػػا يكفػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ كمعػػػػػػػػػػػػدلات السػػػػػػػػػػػػيكلة كالإقػػػػػػػػػػػػرا  المخػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر
حمايػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة حقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؽ المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكدعيف كالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف كأصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػحاب 
 .المصالح
 
 
ـ ػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد كالتعامػكاعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػقػح كالػائػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد المبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػادئ مكممػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة لمك  .2
سػػػػػػػػػػة النقػػػػػػػػػػد العربػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػعكدم كهيئػػػػػػػػػػة ف مؤسالصػػػػػػػػػػادرة مػػػػػػػػػػ
كمبادئهػػػػػػػػػػػػا مة ػككػػػػػػػػػػػػػحػال يماتػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػتالسػػػػػػػػػػػػكؽ الماليػػػػػػػػػػػػة بشػػػػػػػػػػػػاف 
كالإدارة  مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارةدكر الرئيسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  كتؤكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى 
يات ػجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيػػراتػػستالاع ػضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك ك العميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي إدارة المخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر 
   حديد المسؤكلية.ػػكت
العامة  لأطراة ػػةيػػى تعػػنكؾ عمػبػدة الػػى مساعػػبادئ إلػمػدؼ الػػهػت .3
ة أعضاء المجمس مساعدى ػلمحككمة كالإدارة الفاعمة  إضافة إل
 لإشراؼ عمى أنشطة البنؾ.في اكالإدارة العميا 
 
 أف أصػػػػػػػػػػػػدرتلمؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػة النقػػػػػػػػػػػػد العربػػػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػػػعكدم سػػػػػػػػػػػػبؽ  .4
"صـــــــــــــــ حيات ومســـــــــــــــئوليات  بشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػافمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ كرة إرشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػادية 
أعضـــــــاا مجم ـــــــك الإدارة لمبن ـــــــو  العامم ـــــــة   ـــــــي المممك ـــــــة 
أعضػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػس  بهػػػػػػػػػدؼ مسػػػػػػػػػاعدة  العربي ـــــــــة الســـــــــعودية"
نظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ مراقبػػػػػػػػػػػػػة البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؾ كنظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ بعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى الالتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ  الإدارة
تطبيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ الأنظمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المحاسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبية  كلا سػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيما  الشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػركات
إضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى تحديػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد   الداخميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةكنظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ 
ارة فػػػػػػػػػػي مراقبػػػػػػػػػػة الأصػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ مسػػػػػػػػػػئكلية أعضػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإد
 أصػػػػػػػػػػدرت كمػػػػػػػػػػا ماراته.ثالبنػػػػػػػػػػؾ كاسػػػػػػػػػػتكربحيػػػػػػػػػػة  كالمطمكبػػػػػػػػػػات
الػػػػػػػػػػػػدليؿ ك  قكاعػػػػػػػػػػػػد المكافػػػػػػػػػػػػ ت كالحػػػػػػػػػػػػكافة ثان حػػػػػػػػػػػػدي المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػة
تكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكيف الػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ م يكضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػح الإرشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػادم لمجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 .ها كمسئكلياتهـ كآلية عممهادكر أعضاءك  المجنة
 
 
تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػان مؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة النقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد العربػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعكدم  أصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدرت .5
 ـــــــــــي المناصـــــــــــب متطمبـــــــــــات التعيـــــــــــين " بشػػػػػػػػػػػافمبنػػػػػػػػػػػكؾ ل
القيادي ـــــــة   ـــــــي المؤسســـــــات المالي ـــــــة ال اضـــــــعة لإشـــــــرا  
التاكيػػػػػػد يهػػػػػػدؼ إلػػػػػػى  " نقــــــد العربــــــي الســــــعود مؤسســــــة ال
 الإدارة العميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاك  مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارةعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى تمتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء 
 .النةاهة كالأمانة كالسمعة الحسنةصفات ب
 
  الماضػػػػػػػػػػػية ةالثلبثػػػػػػػػػػػالعقػػػػػػػػػػػكد عػػػػػػػػػػػلبكة عمػػػػػػػػػػػى  لػػػػػػػػػػػؾ كخػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ  .6
مؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػة النقػػػػػػػػػػػػد العربػػػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػػػعكدم تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػات  أصػػػػػػػػػػػػدرت
 :noitcudortnI
 
 etaroproC fo selpicnirP deussi sah AMAS .1
 ni ,aibarA iduaS ni gnitarepo sknab rof ecnanrevoG
 dezingocer secitcarp tseb eht htiw ecnadrocca
 fo draoB eht fo srebmem ehT .yllanoitanretni
 tsum tnemeganam roines sti dna knab eht fo srotceriD
 gnidnatsrednu ot noitidda ni ,selpicnirP eseht ylppa
 latipac taht erusne dluohs yehT .sksir detaler eht
 etarusnemmoc era snoisivorp dna soitar ycauqeda
 dna ytidiuqil fo slevel dna sksir fo ezis eht htiw
 ,srotisoped fo sthgir eht gnitcetorp  ,ybereht ,gnidnel
 .sredlohekats rehto dna sredloherahs
 
 selur ,snoitaluger eht tnemelpmoc selpicnirP esehT .2
 tekraM latipaC eht dna AMAS yb deussi sralucric dna
 etaroproc fo selpicnirp eroc eht gnidrager ytirohtuA
 fo draoB eht fo selor eht thgilhgih esehT .ecnanrevog
 ksir ni tnemeganaM roineS dna srotceriD
 gninifed dna seigetarts gnittes ,tnemeganam
  .seitilibisnopser
 ni sknab tsissa ot dednetni era selpicnirP ehT .3
 ,skrowemarf ecnanrevog etaroproc rieht gnicnahne
 ot sreganam roines dna srebmem draoB pleh ot dna
 .seitivitca s’knab eht eesrevo
 no omem gniyfiralc a deussi sah AMAS ,reilraE .4
 fo draoB eht fo seitilibisnopseR dna srewoP"
 "aibarA iduaS ni sknaB laicremmoC fo srotceriD
 gniknaB eht htiw ylpmoc ot srebmem tsissa ot
 deriuqer ti ,oslA .waL ynapmoC eht dna waL lortnoC
 lanretni dna smetsys gnitnuocca fo noitacilppa eht
 eht gninimreted ot noitidda ni smetsys lortnoc
 eht gnirotinom ni srebmem draoB fo ytilibisnopser
 fo ytilibatiforp dna stnemtsevni ,seitilibail dna stessa
 noitasnepmoC deussi osla AMAS ,yltneceR .knab eht
 no launaM ecnadiuG a dna seluR evitnecnI dna
 na fo noitisopmoc eht gniyfiralc ,”seettimmoC tiduA“
 dna elor eht dna msinahcem krow sti ,eettimmoc tidua
  .srebmem sti fo seitilibisnopser
 :gnidrager sknab eht ot ralucric a deussi AMAS .5
 roineS ot stnemtnioppA rof stnemeriuqeR“
 yb desivrepuS snoitutitsnI laicnaniF ni snoitisoP
 ta demia "ycnegA yratenoM naibarA iduaS eht
 ssessop sreganam roines dna srotcerid taht gnirusne
 .noitatuper doog dna ,ytsenoh ,ytirgetni
 
 sah AMAS ,sedaced eerht tsal eht gnirud ,revoeroM .6
 ot detaler stnemucod ecnadiug lareves deussi
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 إرشػػػػػػػػػػػادات   مػػػػػػػػػػػف ضػػػػػػػػػػػمنهالحككمػػػػػػػػػػػةالهػػػػػػػػػػػا علبقػػػػػػػػػػػة ب عػػػػػػػػػػػدة
عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرؼ عميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ  كأنظمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة ا الداخميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كمبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدأالرقابػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
  كقكاعػػػػػػػػػػػػػد مكافحػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  سػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ الأمػػػػػػػػػػػػػكاؿ كتمكيػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ الإرهػػػػػػػػػػػػػاب
كميثػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؽ أخلبقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات المهنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كمكافحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الاحتيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ  
إضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى إصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدار تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات محػػػػػػػػػػػػػػددة  لممػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكظفيف 
 يفلعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ إدارة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الداخميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كدكر المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراجع
كحػػػػػػػػػػػػػدة  إنشػػػػػػػػػػػػػاءب ـ المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػة البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؾمػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كت  . يفالخػػػػػػػػػػػػػارجي
الدكليػػػػػػػػػػة  المعػػػػػػػػػاييرتطبيػػػػػػػػػؽ تؤكػػػػػػػػػد عمػػػػػػػػػى ك لتػػػػػػػػػةاـ لامراقبػػػػػػػػػة ال
الاسػػػػػػػػػػتعانة بخػػػػػػػػػػدمات ضػػػػػػػػػػركرة ك تابػػػػػػػػػػة التقػػػػػػػػػػارير الماليػػػػػػػػػػة  لك
 ة الخارجية.ػعػراجػمػلم اسبػةػػحػم مكتػبػي
 
العمػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  دراؾ أفالإعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  .7
قطاعػػػػػػػػػات ال يختمػػػػػػػػػؼ عػػػػػػػػػف العمػػػػػػػػػؿ فػػػػػػػػػي القطػػػػػػػػػاع المصػػػػػػػػػرفي
 :  ك لؾ عائد للؤسباب الآتيةالأخرل
 
المخػػػػػػػػػػػاطر فػػػػػػػػػػػي القطػػػػػػػػػػػاع المصػػػػػػػػػػػرفي أعمػػػػػػػػػػػى د ت عػػػػػػػػػػػ . أ
 منها في  ير  مف القطاعات.
قػػػػػد يطمبػػػػػكف مكدعيػػػػػه ك يتحمػػػػػؿ البنػػػػػؾ التةامػػػػػات تجػػػػػا   . ب
 مػػػػػػف لػػػػػػؾ  يتطمػػػػػػبك تسػػػػػػييؿ كدائعهػػػػػػـ فػػػػػػي أم كقػػػػػػت  
البنػػػػػػػػؾ تػػػػػػػػكفير السػػػػػػػػيكلة الكافيػػػػػػػػة لتمبيػػػػػػػػة الاحتياجػػػػػػػػات 
 .المحتممة لممكدعيف
 
قػػػػػدرة أم مػػػػػف البنػػػػػكؾ العاممػػػػػة عمػػػػػى تمبيػػػػػة هػػػػػ   عػػػػػدـ  . ج
بالتػػػػالي تياجػػػػات قػػػػد تػػػػؤثر عمػػػػى البنػػػػكؾ الأخػػػػرل ك الاح
 .القطاع المصرفيكافة عمى 
 
بالتػػػػػػػػػػػػػالي حجػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ التةامػػػػػػػػػػػػػات البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ ك قػػػػػػػػػػػػػد يػػػػػػػػػػػػػؤدم  . د
عنػػػػػػػػػػد اقترانهػػػػػػػػػػا بانظمػػػػػػػػػػة  يكاجههػػػػػػػػػػاالمخػػػػػػػػػػاطر التػػػػػػػػػػي 
 ضعيفة لمرقابة الداخمية إلى أةمات مالية.
 
 
 
مخػػػػاطر العمػػػػؿ المصػػػػرفي أكثػػػػر تعقيػػػػدان كأصػػػػعب فهمػػػػان هػػػػػ. 
أعضػػػػػاء  عنػػػػدبعػػػػ الأحيػػػػاف المسػػػػتثمريف كفػػػػي  عنػػػػد
 مجمس الإدارة.
 
الضػػػػػػػػػػػػركرية  مػػػػػػػػػػػػف القضػػػػػػػػػػػػاياأصػػػػػػػػػػػبحت حككمػػػػػػػػػػػػة الشػػػػػػػػػػػػركات  .8
جيػػػػػػػػػػػػػدة  مبػػػػػػػػػػػػػادئتػػػػػػػػػػػػػكافر ؽ حقػػػػػػػػػػػػػكي  فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي عػػػػػػػػػػػػػالـ الأعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ
 أهمها: الفكائد مفمف  العديد لمحككمة
 
صػػػػػػػػػػنع تطػػػػػػػػػػكير الكفػػػػػػػػػػاءة التشػػػػػػػػػػ يمية كالمسػػػػػػػػػػاعدة فػػػػػػػػػػي     . أ
 القرار.
 .ةالخارجي اتالاستثمار ج ب  . ب
كمفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة رأس  خفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ك  الائتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاني التقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيـ حسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيفت . ج
 الماؿ.
بػػػػػػػػػػيف أصػػػػػػػػػػحاب المصػػػػػػػػػػمحة الثقػػػػػػػػػػة  أك اسػػػػػػػػػػتعادةبنػػػػػػػػػػاء     . د
 .فالرئيسي
 slortnoC lanretnI gnidulcni ecnanrevog etaroproc
 yenoM-itnA ,selur sremotsuC ruoY wonK ;senilediug
 ,gnicnaniF msirorreT gnitabmoC dna gnirednuaL
 lanoisseforP fo edoC a dna duarF gnitabmoC rof selur
 cificeps gniussi ot noitidda ni ffatS  fo scihtE
 tiduA lanretnI fo noitcnuf eht no snoitaluger
 AMAS .srotiduA lanretxE fo elor eht dna tnemtrapeD
 dezilaiceps a hsilbatse ot sknab seriuqer osla
 eht  fo noitacilppa eht erusne ot ,tinU ecnailpmoC
 ot dna sdradnatS gnitropeR laicnaniF lanoitanretnI
 rof smrif gnitnuocca deifitrec owt fo secivres eht esu
 .tidua lanretxe
 ni gnikrow taht ezilaer dluohs srotceriD fo draoB ehT .7
 yna tuo gniyrrac morf tnereffid si rotces gniknab eht
 :snosaer gniwollof eht ot eud ,ssenisub rehto
 
 naht sksir erom sevlovni rotces gniknab ehT .a
 .srotces rehto
 ohw srotisoped ot snoitagilbo rucni sknaB .b
 ,dna ,emit yna ta stisoped wardhtiw yam
 ytidiuqil tneiciffus eb dluohs ereht ,erofereht
 fo sdeen laitnetop eht teem ot elbaliava
  .srotisoped
 yam sdeen eseht teem ot  knab a fo eruliaF .c
 yam yltneuqesnoc hcihw ,sknab rehto tceffa
  .rotces gniknab elohw eht tceffa
 
 eht yb nekatrednu snoitagilbo eht fo ezis ehT .d
 nehw ti ot desop ksir laitnetop eht dna knab
 nac lortnoc lanretni kaew yb deinapmocca
 .sesirc laicnanif ot dael
 
 tluciffid dna xelpmoc erom era sksir gniknaB .e
 yb neve dna srotsevni htob yb dnatsrednu ot
 .sesac emos ni srebmem draoB eht
 
 
 tsom eht fo eno emoceb sah ecnanrevoG etaroproC .8
 ehT .dlrow ssenisub eht ni snrecnoc tnatropmi
 etaroproc fo selpicnirp doog fo noitacilppa
 :gnidulcni ,stifeneb ynam ot dael nac ecnanrevog
 ni gnitsissa dna ycneiciffe lanoitarepo gnivorpmI .a
 .ssecorp gnikam-noisiced
 .stnemtsevni ngierof gnitcarttA .b
 fo tsoc eht gnirewol dna sgnitar tiderc gnivorpmI .c
 .latipac
 yek gnoma ecnedifnoc gnirotser ro gnidliuB .d
 .sredlohekats
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 مع المقترضيف. تعةية العلبقةهػ. 
 اسػػػػػػػػػػػػتقرار الأسػػػػػػػػػػػػكاؽ الماليػػػػػػػػػػػػة كالإسػػػػػػػػػػػػهاـ فػػػػػػػػػػػػيةيػػػػػػػػػػػػادة     . ك
 .النمك الاقتصادمك  التكظيؼ
 
 
فػػػػػػػػػػػي تحسػػػػػػػػػػػيف  رئيسػػػػػػػػػػػان  ان عنصػػػػػػػػػػػر حككمػػػػػػػػػػػة الشػػػػػػػػػػػركات عد ػتػػػػػػػػػػػ .9
ة ثقػػػػػػػػػػة ػف تعةيػػػػػػػػػػعػػػػػػػػػػ مك  فضػػػػػػػػػػلبن ػالكفػػػػػػػػػػاءة الاقتصػػػػػػػػػػادية كالنػػػػػػػػػػ
ركات عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى ػالشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ حككمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةكتنطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكم  ريف.ػالمستثمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
جمس ػيف إدارة الشػػػػػػػػػػػػركة كمػػػػػػػػػػػػػبػػػػػػػػػػػػ لبقاتػمجمكعػػػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػػػف العػػػػػػػػػػػػ
 المصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالح حابػكأصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميها  كبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف إدارتهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا
 م يػػػػػػػػػتـ ػح الإطػػػػػػػػػار العػػػػػػػػػاـ الػػػػػػػػػػكمػػػػػػػػػا أنهػػػػػػػػػا تكضػػػػػػػػػ الآخػػػػػػػػػريف.
قيقها ػديد الأهػػػػػػػػػداؼ كالإشػػػػػػػػػراؼ عمػػػػػػػػػى تحػػػػػػػػػػمػػػػػػػػػف خلبلػػػػػػػػػه تحػػػػػػػػػ
 ميمةػالسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ الإدارة فرتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك  أف ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيك  . عة الأداءػكمراجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
مجػػػػػػػػػػػػػالس الإدارات فة مناسػػػػػػػػػػػػػبة لأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء كعة حػػػػػػػػػػػػػكاػمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
 داؼػى تحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ أهػػػػػػػػػػػػػعمػػػػػػػػػػػػ تسػػػػػػػػػػػػاعدهـ كالمػػػػػػػػػػػػدراء التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف
يه. ػمساهمػػػػػػػػػػػػػمحته كمصػػػػػػػػػػػػػالح ػمصػػػػػػػػػػػػػ بمػػػػػػػػػػػػػا يحقػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽك  البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ
ع معػػػػػػػػدلات ػفػػػػػػػي رفػػػػػػػػ لمحككمػػػػػػػػةاؿ ػنظػػػػػػػاـ فعػػػػػػػػ كيسػػػػػػػاهـ تػػػػػػػػكافر
 فاءة.ؿ ككبعمؿ السكؽ تعةية ك قة ػالث
 
 
الأعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ  باسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمكب إدارة ككمة الشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػركاتػحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػت عنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى  .31
 الإدارةمجمػػػػػػػػػػػس ق بػػػػػػػػػػػؿ صارؼ مػػػػػػػػػػػف ػمػػػػػػػػػػػػكف الػجارية كشئػػػػػػػػػػػػالتػػػػػػػػػػػ
 :ة للآتيػسبػنػكلا سيما بال  مياػعػكالإدارة ال
 
 . كضع أهداؼ البنؾ    . أ
 إدارة عمؿ البنؾ. . ب
 حماية مصالح المكدعيف. . ج
كأصحاب الالتةاـ بالمسئكلية الكاجبة تجا  المساهميف د. 
 .المصالح الأخرل
 .الأنظمة كالمكائح مع البنؾ أنشطة تعار  عدـهػ.       
 
 ة الفعػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ اسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتقلبلية كفصػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبن ػككمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيتطمػػػػػػػػػػػػػب نظػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ الح .11
الػػػػػػػػػػػرئيس  عػػػػػػػػػػػف منصػػػػػػػػػػػبرئػػػػػػػػػػػيس مجمػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  منصػػػػػػػػػػػبل
ياكػػػػػػػػؿ ر هػػػػػػػػػػفاتك   لػػػػػػػػؾ يقتضػػػػػػػػيك  .(المػػػػػػػػدير العػػػػػػػػاـ)التنفيػػػػػػػػ م 
فػػػػػػػػػػػػي الصػػػػػػػػػػػػلبحيات ة كا  داريػػػػػػػػػػػػة جيػػػػػػػػػػػػدة ككضػػػػػػػػػػػػكحان ػميػػػػػػػػػػػػػظيػنػت
مػػػػػػػػػػػف فػػػػػػػػػػي البنػػػػػػػػػػؾ  يسػػػػػػػػػػةالرئكالمسػػػػػػػػػػؤكليات بػػػػػػػػػػيف الأطػػػػػػػػػػراؼ 
إضػػػػػػػػػػػػػافة   كتنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييفمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف كأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس إدارة 
إدارة رقابة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف خػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ ػإلػػػػػػػػػػػػػى كضػػػػػػػػػػػػػع إطػػػػػػػػػػػػػار عػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ لمػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
ة ػابػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكأنظمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة رقة ػميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػداخػة الػراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػممة لر كا  داممخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر ل
 خارجي.التةاـ كمراجع كا  دارة  ةػيػمػداخ
 
 
 
 
بعػػػػػػػػػػد  مبػػػػػػػػػػادئ حككمػػػػػػػػػػة الشػػػػػػػػػػركات أهميػػػػػػػػػػة دكليػػػػػػػػػػةاكتسػػػػػػػػػػبت  .21
المختصػػػػػػػػػػػػػة ت كالمنظمػػػػػػػػػػػػػات مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف الهيئػػػػػػػػػػػػػا إصػػػػػػػػػػػػػدار عػػػػػػػػػػػػػدد
 .sreworrob htiw spihsnoitaler gnicnahnE .e
 dna ytilibats stekram laicnanif eht gnisaercnI .f
 dna htworg cimonoce ot gnitubirtnoc
 .tnemyolpme
 
 gnivorpmi ni tnemele yek a si ecnanrevog etaroproC .9
 gnicnahne sa llew sa ,htworg dna ycneiciffe cimonoce
 a sevlovni ecnanrevog etaroproC .ecnedifnoc rotsevni
 tnemeganam ynapmoc neewteb spihsnoitaler fo tes
 rehto dna sredloherahs ,srotceriD fo draoB sti dna
 krowemarf lareneg eht seifiralc osla tI .sredlohekats
 stnemeveihca rieht dna tes era slaog hcihw hguorht
 .deweiver eb ecnamrofrep dna desivrepus eb nac
 reporp edivorp dluohs ecnanrevog etaroproC
 evitucexe dna srebmem draoB eht rof sevitnecni
 ezilaer ot dna sevitcejbo s’knab eht eusrup ot srotcerid
 ehT .sredloherahs sti dna ynapmoc eht fo stseretni eht
 metsys ecnanrevog etaroproc evitceffe na fo ecneserp
 eht secnahne dna tsurt fo setar rehgih ot setubirtnoc
  .ycneiciffe tekram
 ni yaw eht htiw denrecnoc si ecnanrevoG etaroproC .01
 yb deganam era sknab fo sriaffa dna ssenisub hcihw
 ,tnemeganam roines dna srotceriD fo draoB
  :gniwollof eht gnidrager ylralucitrap
 .sevitcejbo s’knab eht gnitteS .a
 .krow s'knaB eht fo tnemeganaM .b
  .srotisoped fo stseretni eht gnitcetorP .c
 eht sdrawot ytilibisnopser eud htiw gniylpmoC .d
 .sredlohekats rehto dna sredloherahs
 htiw tcidartnoc ton dluohs seitivitca s'knaB ehT .e
 .snoitaluger dna swal elbacilppa
  
 seriuqer metsys ecnanrevog etaroproc tneiciffe nA .11
 eht fo tsop eht fo noitarapes dna ecnednepedni
 feihC eht fo taht morf draoB eht fo namriahC
 seriuqer osla tI .)reganaM lareneG( reciffO evitucexE
 raelc htiw erutcurts lanoitazinagro na fo ecnetsixe eht
 eht neewteb seitilibisnopser dna srewop fo tnemngissa
 ,sredloherahs gnidulcni ,knab eht fo seitrap niam
 eht seriuqer osla tI .sreganam dna srebmem draoB
 htiw krowemarf lortnoc lareneg a fo tnemhsilbatse
 ,smetsys tnemeganam ksir dna lortnoc lanretni
 lanretxe na dna ,noitcnuf ecnailpmoc ,tidua lanretni
 .tidua
 
 deniag evah ecnanrevoG etaroproC fo selpicnirP .21
 fo ecnaussi eht retfa ecnatropmi lanoitanretni
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 عارؼ عميهػػػػػػػػػػػػاػمتػػػػػػػػػػػػحككمػػػػػػػػػػػػة الإرشػػػػػػػػػػػػادية لمبػػػػػػػػػػػػادئ  تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػات
 ات: ػئػيػ   الهػـ هػمف أهك   دكليان 
 
 
 .)SBCB( لجنة باةؿ لمرقابة المصرفية   . أ
 ).DCEO( كالتنمية منظمة التعاكف الاقتصادم . ب
 ).BSFIمجمس الخدمات المالية الإسلبمية ( . ج
 ).BWالبنؾ الدكلي (   . د
 
 
بػػػػػػػػػػػالم تيف العربيػػػػػػػػػػػة كالإنجميةيػػػػػػػػػػػة   دئالمبػػػػػػػػػػػاصػػػػػػػػػػػدرت هػػػػػػػػػػػ    .31
كعنػػػػػػػػػػػد اخػػػػػػػػػػػتلبؼ الػػػػػػػػػػػن بينهمػػػػػػػػػػػا فيعتمػػػػػػػػػػػد الػػػػػػػػػػػن بالم ػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 العربية. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a yb ecnanrevog etaroproc no snoitcurtsni ecnadiug
 ,snoitazinagro dna seititne tnetepmoc fo rebmun
 lanoitanretni na sa detpecca neeb evah hcihw
 :edulcni seititne esehT .kramhcneb
 noisivrepuS gniknaB no eettimmoC lesaB .a
 dna noitarepo-oC cimonocE rof noitazinagrO .b
 tnempoleveD
 )BSFI( draoB secivreS laicnaniF cimalsI .c
 knaB dlroW ehT .d
 
 dna cibarA htob ni deussi neeb evah selpicnirP esehT .31
 eht ni ycnapercsid fo tneve eht nI .hsilgnE
 llahs txet cibarA eht ,stxet owt eht fo noitaterpretni
  .liaverp
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 )القسم الثاني(
 
 لمحوكمة الرئيسةالمبادئ 
 :المبدأ الأول
 
 :مؤ: ت أعضاا مجمك الإدارة 
ال مـــؤ:مين لمقيـــام بالأعمـــ أعضـــاا مجمـــك الإدارة أن يكـــون ينبغـــي
أن يكــــون لــــديهم  هــــم واضــــ  لمــــدور المطمــــوب و ، الموكمــــة إلــــيهم
يم بموضـــوعية  ـــي مقـــدرة عمـــى ممارســـة الحكـــم الســـاللـــديهم و مـــنهم 
 وايممك ــــــ أن مجتمع ــــــين الأعضــــــاا عم ــــــىو  .جمي ــــــ  شــــــئون البن ــــــ 
مهـــارات مهنيـــة وعمميــــة واة داريـــة م تمفـــة و بــــرات ماليـــة وصــــفات 
 عـــال   التمت ـــ  بق ـــدرو الأمان ـــة والالت ـــ ام،  ولا ســـيما ،م ئمـــةش صـــية 
قـــدرة عمـــى الإشـــرا  ممـــن الســـمعة والكفـــااة والمســـئولية، ول ـــديهم ال
 الإستراتيجية. أ:دا هن البن  لتحقيق ئووالمتابعة وتوجيه ش
 
 
عػػػػػػػػػػػف السػػػػػػػػػػػيرة ال اتيػػػػػػػػػػػة لجميػػػػػػػػػػػع  الإفصػػػػػػػػػػػاحعمػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس  .41
ف المسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهمك  تمكفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػل الإدارةمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس  أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء
 عمػػػػػػػػػػىكقػػػػػػػػػدرتهـ  الحكػػػػػػػػػـ عمػػػػػػػػػػى كفػػػػػػػػػاءتهـ مػػػػػػػػػف فك كالمسػػػػػػػػػتثمر 
عمػػػػػػػػػى  ينب ػػػػػػػػػي كػػػػػػػػػ لؾ عمػػػػػػػػػى نحػػػػػػػػػك فعػػػػػػػػػاؿ. مهػػػػػػػػػامهـلقيػػػػػػػػػاـ با
 للئشػػػػػػػػػراؼ عمػػػػػػػػػىالإفصػػػػػػػػػاح عػػػػػػػػػف الآليػػػػػػػػػة المتبعػػػػػػػػػة  المجمػػػػػػػػػس
مراعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاة عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ ترشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيح أم ك الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء   أداءك  نةاهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة
مة ػخػػػػػػػػػػة مػمػػػػػػػػػػريػجأك ائي ػضػػػػػػػػػػكـ قػإدانتػػػػػػػػػه بحػػػػػػػػػ تػسبقػػػػػػػػػ عضػػػػػػػػػك
 رؼ كالأمانة.ػالشػػب
 
 
 
د فعاليػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى خبػػػػػػػػػػػػػرة الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء ػتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتع .51
مؿ  إضػػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػى ـ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى الحكػػػػػػػػػػػػـ بمنظػػػػػػػػػػػػكر شػػػػػػػػػػػػاكقػػػػػػػػػػػػدرته
مناقشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس كالإلمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ مشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاركتهـ بفعاليػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي 
 بالمكاضيع المطركحة قبؿ اتخا  قرار بشانها.
 
 
 
 مسػػػػػػػػػػتكل عػػػػػػػػػػاؿ  ب مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة أعضػػػػػػػػػػاء تمتعػيػػػػػػػػػػأف  يػب ػػػػػػػػػػػين .61
الر بػػػػػػػػػػػػة   إضػػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػى مػػػػػػػػػػػػف المعرفػػػػػػػػػػػػة كالخبػػػػػػػػػػػػرة كالمهػػػػػػػػػػػػارة
تتضػػػػػػػػػػػػػمف  أف ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػيك . كالتطػػػػػػػػػػػػػكر ـفػػػػػػػػػػػػػي الػػػػػػػػػػػػػتعمالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتمرة 
 :الصفات الآتية  مؤهلبت العضك
 
 قياديػػػػػػػة بمهػػػػػػػاراتأف يتمتػػػػػػػع العضػػػػػػػك  ينب ػػػػػػػي القيـــــــادة: . أ
كبمػػػػػا عمػػػػػى مػػػػػنح الصػػػػػلبحيات  كأف يكػػػػػكف لديػػػػػة القػػػػػدرة
تطبيػػػػػػؽ أفضػػػػػؿ الممارسػػػػػػات ل الأداءإلػػػػػػى تحفيػػػػػة  يػػػػػؤدم
 فػػػػػػي مجػػػػػػاؿ الإدارة الفاعمػػػػػػة كالتمسػػػػػػؾ بػػػػػػالقيـ كالأخػػػػػػلبؽ
 المهنية.
عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أف  العضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكقػػػػػػػػػػػػػدرة كتعنػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  الاســـــــــــــتق لية: . ب
دكف  فػػػػػػػػي اتخػػػػػػػػا  القػػػػػػػػػرار كمكضػػػػػػػػكعيان  يكػػػػػػػػكف محايػػػػػػػػدان 
أم تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاثير مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف الإدارة أك مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف جهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات أخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرل 
 .خارجية
 )owt traP(
 
 ecnanrevoG etaroproC fo selpicnirP
 :1 elpicnirP
  
  :draoB eht fo srebmem eht fo snoitacifilauq ehT
 eht mrofrep ot deifilauq eb dluohs srebmem draoB
 raelc a evah dluohs yehT .meht ot detsurtne sksat
 ot elba eb dna elor deriuqer rieht fo gnidnatsrednu
 sriaffa  lla no tnemegduj evitcejbo dna dnuos esicrexe
 fo xim a evah dluohs "ylevitcelloc" yehT .knab eht fo
 laicnanif ,slliks laireganam dna lacitcarp ,lanoisseforp
 ytirgetni ,ecnetepmoc dna noitatuper hgih ,ecneirepxe
 ot knab eht tcerid dna pu wollof ,eesrevo ot ytiliba dna
 .slaog cigetarts sti eveihca
  
 fo srebmem lla fo VC eht esolcsid dluohs draoB ehT .41
 dna sredloherahs taht os srotceriD fo draoB eht
 ytiliba rieht dna ecnetepmoc rieht egduj nac srotsevni
 eht ,oslA .ylevitceffe snoitcnuf rieht tuo yrrac ot
 eesrevo ot desu msinahcem eht esolcsid dluohs draoB
 erac gnikat ,srebmem fo ecnamrofrep dna ytirgetni eht
 a yb decnetnes ydaerla rebmem yna etanimon ot ton
 gnivlovni emirc a fo detcivnoc ro tnemgduj truoc
 .ytsenoh dna edutiprut larom
 
 ecneirepxe eht no sdneped draoB eht fo ssenevitceffe ehT .51
 a morf egduj ot ytiliba rieht dna srotceriD fo tnemgduj dna
 ni etapicitrap ylevitceffe ot dna ,evitcepsrep evisneherpmoc
 htiw railimaf eb dluohs yehT .snoitarebiled s’draoB eht
 .noereht noisiced a gnikat erofeb desiar seussi
 
 fo level hgih a ssessop dluohs srotceriD fo draoB .61
 ot noitidda ni ,slliks dna ecneirepxe ,egdelwonk
 snoitacifilauQ .poleved dna nrael ot erised suounitnoc
 gniwollof eht edulcni dluohs srebmem eht fo
 :stiart retcarahc
 pihsredael evah dluohs rebmeM A :pihsredaeL .a
 ot ,srewop etageled ot ytiliba eht dna slliks
 eht fo sriaffa eht revo thgisrevo evitceffe edivorp
 dna  seulav etaroproc ot erehda ot dna  knab
 .scihte lanoisseforp
 eb ot rebmem eht fo ytiliba ehT :ecnednepednI .b
 dna gnikam noisiced ni evitcejbo dna lartuen
 ro tnemeganam morf ecneulfni eudnu tuohtiw
  .seititne lanretxe rehto morf
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كيعكسػػػػػػػػػػػػها مسػػػػػػػػػػػػتكل التعمػػػػػػػػػػػػيـ كالتػػػػػػػػػػػػدريب  الكف ــــــــــــااة: . ج
إضػػػػػافة إلػػػػػى   فػػػػػي مكاصػػػػػمة الػػػػػتعمـكالر بػػػػػة  كالمهػػػػػارات
سػػػػػنكات فػػػػػػي  خبػػػػػرة متنكعػػػػػة لا تقػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػف عشػػػػػرتػػػػػكافر 
مػػػػػػػػؿ ا خبػػػػػػػػرة فػػػػػػػػي عيكػػػػػػػػكف ضػػػػػػػػمنه مجػػػػػػػػالات متعػػػػػػػػددة
 .كالمحاسبة الإدارة كالاقتصاد  كالتاميف ك البنكؾ
 
 
القػػػػػػػػػػػػػدرة عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى التكجيػػػػػػػػػػػػػه الاسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجي  التوجي ـــــــــــــه: . د
كالتخطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيط بعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدل كالرؤيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتقبمية 
 الكاضحة.
 
البيانػػػػػػػػػػات  القػػػػػػػػػػدرة عمػػػػػػػػػػى قػػػػػػػػػػراءة المعر ــــــــــة الماليــــــــــة: هػػػػػػػػػػػ.
لنسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػب ا كفهمهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا  ككػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ لؾكالتقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارير الماليػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 المستخدمة لقياس الأداء.
 
صػػػػػػحي  كعػػػػػػدـ كجػػػػػػكد مػػػػػػانعجيػػػػػػدة الصػػػػػػحة ال :الســــــن . ك
 .مسئكلياتهممارسة  عف العضك يعيؽ
    
 الصػػػػػػػػػػػػػدؽ مبػػػػػػػػػػػػػادئأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة بيعػػػػػػػػػػػػػد التػػػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ  .71
كالاهتمػػػػػػػػػػػاـ بمصػػػػػػػػػػػالح البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ مػػػػػػػػػػػف أهػػػػػػػػػػػـ  كالأمانػػػػػػػػػػػة كالػػػػػػػػػػػكلاء
 :الآتي كلا سيمامبادئ الحككمة السميمة   متطمبات
 
 
 
ضك بالبنػػػػػػػػػػؾ ػالعػػػػػػػػػػ علبقػػػػػػػػػػةككف ػأف تػػػػػػػػػػ  يػبػػػػػػػػػػػين الصــــــــــدق: . أ
 مثػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ أمـك ػقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػأف يك ة  ػية صادقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػقة مهلبػعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
ات  ات ػمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػح عػػػػػػػػػػػػف أم معػصريػػػػػػػػػػػػػتػكظؼ آخػػػػػػػػػػػػر بالػمػػػػػػػػػػػػ
 أك لبقة قبػػػػػػػػػؿ تنفيػػػػػػػػػ  أم صػػػػػػػػػفقة أك عقػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػع البنػػػػػػػػػؾػعػػػػػػػػػ
 .التابعة هشركات إحدلمع 
 
 
 كالمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدراءعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  ال ــــــــــــــولاا: . ب
قػػػػػػػػػػػد البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ تجنػػػػػػػػػػػب العمميػػػػػػػػػػػات التػػػػػػػػػػػي فػػػػػػػػػػػي  يفالتنفيػػػػػػػػػػػ ي
التاكػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػف أف ك   الحفيهػػػػػػػػا تضػػػػػػػػارب فػػػػػػػػي المصػػػػػػػػظهر ػيػػػػػػػػ
كتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ تنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ها دكف عادلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  أك (العمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات)العمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 .تفضيؿ
 
 
عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى العضػػػػػػػػػػػػػك  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  المنشػػػػػػػػػػػػػكد تحقيقػػػػػػػػػػػػػان لمػػػػػػػػػػػػػكلاءك 
 :الآتي مراعاة
تفضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيؿ مصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمحة ك كنةاهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  بامانػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة دكر ممارسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  
 البنؾ عمى مصالحه الشخصية.
اسػػػػػػػػػت لبؿ المنصػػػػػػػػػب عػػػػػػػػػدـ تجنػػػػػػػػػب تضػػػػػػػػػارب المصػػػػػػػػػالح ك  
 شخصية. مصالح لتحقيؽ
ية ػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمػعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أم ع ) دكف تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاخير( المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس إبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبغ 
صكيت ػمصػػػػػػػػػػػػالح كعػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ التػػػػػػػػػػػػتضػػػػػػػػػػػػارب محتمػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ فػػػػػػػػػػػػي ال
نؾ ػبػػػػػػػػػػػػح الػالػػػػػػػػػػػػصػمى ػمػػػػػػػػػػػػؤثر عيػػػػػػػػػػػقػػػػػػػػػػػد  ى أم قػػػػػػػػػػػرارػمػػػػػػػػػػػػع
 fo level eht yb detcelfer si tI :ecnetepmoC .c
 eunitnoc ot erised dna slliks ,gniniart ,noitacude
 on fo ecneirepxe deifisrevid sa llew sa ,gninrael
 snoitutitsni saera tnereffid ni sraey net naht ssel
 ,ecnarusni ,gniknab sa hcus ,snoitcidsiruj noitisop
 .gnitnuocca dna ,scimonoce ,ssenisub
 
 cigetarts edivorp ot ytiliba eht :ecnadiuG .d
 erutuf raelc a dna gninnalp mret-gnol ,ecnadiug
  .noisiv
 
 dna daer ot ytiliba eht :egdelwonK laicnaniF .e
 sa stroper dna stnemetats laicnanif dnatsrednu
 .ecnamrofrep erusaem ot desu soitar sa llew
 
 eb dna htlaeh doog ni eb dluohs rebmem eht :egA .f
 .seitud sih tuo yrrac ot elba
 
 eht ot draoB eht fo srebmem fo tnemtimmoC .71
 gniyap dna ,ytlayol ,ytsenoh dna hturt fo selpicnirp
 tnatropmi tsom eht era stseretni s’knab eht ot noitnetta
 dnuos fo selpicnirp eht eveihca ot stnemeriuqer
 :gniwollof eht ylralucitrap ,ecnanrevog
 
 eht htiw pihsnoitaler s'rebmem ehT :ytsenoH .a
 eht dna ,tsenoh yllanoisseforp eb tsum knab
 ,reciffo rehto yna ekil ,esolcsid dluohs rebmem
 yna gnitucexe erofeb noitamrofni tnaveler yna
 sti ro knab eht htiw tcartnoc ro noitcasnart
 .seiraidisbus
 
 roineS dna draoB eht fo srebmeM :ytlayoL .b
 diova dluohs knab eht fo tnemeganaM
 dna ,tseretni fo tcilfnoc gnivlovni snoitcasnart
 ro noitcasnart eht taht erus ekam dluohs yeht
 yna tuohtiw tuo deirrac dna riaf era snoitcasnart
  .ecnereferp
 
 eht ,ytlayol derised eht eveihca ot redro nI
 : llahs rebmem
 ,ytirgetni htiw dna yltsenoh elor sih esicrexE 
  .nwo sih revo tseretni s'knab eht gnicalp
 tiolpxe ot ton dna stseretni fo tcilfnoc diovA 
 .slaog lanosrep eveihca ot noitisop sih
 yna fo )yaled tuohtiw( draoB eht mrofnI 
 no etov ot ton dna tseretni fo tcilfnoc laitnetop
 fo stseretni eht tceffa thgim taht snoisiced yna
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 كمساهميه.كمكدعيه 
معمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ إفشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػائها الالحفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاظ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى سػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرية  
الاسػػػػػػػػػػتفادة منهػػػػػػػػػػا  تجنػػػػػػػػػػب إضػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػى  طػػػػػػػػػػرؼ آخػػػػػػػػػػرل
 شخصية. لتحقيؽ مكاسب
لبنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ لتحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ مكاسػػػػػػػػػػػػب ا اسػػػػػػػػػػػػت لبؿ مكجػػػػػػػػػػػػكداتعػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ  
 شخصية.
 
الكاجبػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػؤكليات تاديػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  يشػػػػػػػػػػػػػمؿ الا:تم ـــــــــــــام: . ج
كالأخػػػػػػػػػػػػػرل  مبنػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾل يالمحػػػػػػػػػػػػػددة فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي النظػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ الأساسػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
 السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمطات الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرافية كالرقابيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػددة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف 
لحصػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى كافػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المعمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كالسػػػػػػػػػػػػػعي إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػى ا
فػػػػػػػػي فرة لمتاكػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػف أف جميػػػػػػػػع القػػػػػػػػرارات المتخػػػػػػػػ ة االمتػػػػػػػػك 
عمػػػػػػػػػػػى  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػػػػػؾ إلػػػػػػػػػػػى  إضػػػػػػػػػػػافةن  .صػػػػػػػػػػػالح البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ
 :العضك القياـ بالآتي
 
مكدعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه مصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمحة البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ ك ل العمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ بكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ أمانػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 .مساهميهك 
 
المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدراء  ات العلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كمناقشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الأسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئمة  طػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرح 
 .بالبنؾ التنفي ييف
فػػػػػػػػػػػي  الرئيسػػػػػػػػػػػةالتاكػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػف إدراج المكاضػػػػػػػػػػػيع المهمػػػػػػػػػػػة ك  
 جدكؿ أعماؿ المجمس.
التاكػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػف التػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ تطبيػػػػػػػػػػػؽ جميػػػػػػػػػػػع الأنظمػػػػػػػػػػػة  
 مات  ات العلبقة.كالتعمي
دكف  كعػػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ الت يػػػػػػػػػػػػػب بانتظػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ حضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكر الاجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػػات 
  لؾ. يستدعيع ر 
عضػػػػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ م تقػػػػػػػػػػػػديـ مػػػػػػػػػػػػف التاكػػػػػػػػػػػػد  
 .لممجمس في حاؿ طمبها مات شاممةمعمك 
 لبنؾ.عمى إدارة االإشراؼ كالرقابة  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .sredloherahs sti dna srotisoped sti ,knab eht
 ton dna noitamrofni fo ytilaitnedifnoc niatniaM 
 diova dna ,ytrap rehto yna ot ti esolcsid ot
 .sniag lanosrep rof ti gnisu
 .niag lanosrep rof stessa s’knab eht tiolpxe toN 
 
 
 dna seitud lla tuo gniyrrac sedulcnI :eraC .c
 fo selcitrA eht ni denifed seitilibisnopser
 eht yb tes esoht dna knab eht fo noitaicossA
 ot kees dna ,seitirohtua yrotaluger dna yrosivrepus
 ekam ot elbaliava  noitamrofni  eht  lla  niatbo
 eht fo rovaf ni nekat era snoisiced lla taht erus
 eht ekatrednu tsum rebmem a ,noitidda nI .knab
  : gniwollof
 eht fo stseretni eht rof ytsenoh lluf htiw kroW 
 .sredloherahs sti dna srotisoped sti ,knab
 eht htiw ssucsid dna snoitseuq tnaveler esiaR 
  .knab eht fo tnemeganam roines
 yek dna tnatropmi fo noisulcni eht erusnE 
  .adnega s’draoB eht ni scipot
 noitacilppa eht htiw ecnailpmoc s'knab taht erusnE 
 .snoitcurtsni dna snoitaluger detaler lla fo
 eb ot ton dna ylraluger sgniteem dnettA 
 .esucxe dilav a tuohtiw tnesba
  rebmem draoB evitucexE eht taht erusnE 
 eht ot noitamrofni evisneherpmoc edivorp
 .detseuqer nehw draoB
 tnemeganam eht revo noisivrepus dna lortnoC 
 .knab eht fo
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 المبدأ الثاني:
 
 شئون المجمكو  التشكيل، التعيين
 
ية ـمسئولــــــــــــة لمـوضـــــــــــ  حـــــــــــدود واضحـــــــــــ جمكـمـــــــــــلعمـــــــــــى ا
 ــــــــي جمي ــــــــ  مســــــــتويات البنــــــــ ، ة والالتــــــــ ام به ــــــــا ـل ــــــــوالمساا
ى مســـــــتوة الإدارة ـم ــــــــام لممســـــــئوليات عـت ــــــــالل ـصــــــــفـال غيـب ــــــــنـيو 
 في  ـ:يــــــــر تنـــــــــ عمــــــــى الأعضــــــــاا ا تيـــــــــار رئــــــــيكو  .مياـالعــــــــ
دالة ـالتأكــــــــد مــــــــن عــــــــعميــــــــه الــــــــ    الإدارة مجمــــــــكرئاسة ـلــــــــ
ما ـب ــــــــــير المســــــــــتقمين ـين و:ـــــــــــم ـــــــــــقـاا المستـتمثي ــــــــــل الأعضــــــــــ
   .هنشاطم البن  و ق م  حجـفـتـي
 
 
 يػػػػػػػػػػر تنفيػػػػػػػػػػ م لرئاسػػػػػػػػػػة  عضػػػػػػػػػػكاختيػػػػػػػػػػار  ى المجمػػػػػػػػػػسػمػػػػػػػػػػػع .81
  ككػػػػػػػػػػ لؾ يجػػػػػػػػػػكة اختيػػػػػػػػػار عضػػػػػػػػػػك  يػػػػػػػػػػر تنفيػػػػػػػػػػ م المجمػػػػػػػػػس
ة ػعػػػػػػػػػػػػػانػعػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ مم الحصػػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى بعػػػػػػػػػػػػد( نائبػػػػػػػػػػػػان لمػػػػػػػػػػػػرئيس
لا أف  يػ ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبػنػي ك .)العربػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعكدم ؤسسة النقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
عضػػػػػػػك  هاـػمػػػػػػػأيػػػػػػػان مػػػػػػػف  الػػػػػػػرئيسأك نائػػػػػػػب  الػػػػػػػرئيس مارسػيػػػػػػػ
أف يكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف ك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ م (المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدير العػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ)  
 .لهاكتكةيع  لممسؤكلياتهناؾ فصؿ 
 
 
حددة كتعميمػػػػػػػػػػػات ػتماد إجػػػػػػػػػػػراءات مػػػػػػػػػػػػعمػػػػػػػػػػػى كػػػػػػػػػػػؿ بنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ اعػػػػػػػػػػػ .91
كأف  أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة كاختيػػػػػػػػػػػػار كاضػػػػػػػػػػػػحة لترشػػػػػػػػػػػػيح
لا كأف   لا يتجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاكة عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدد الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف أثنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف
كعمػػػػػػػػػى  .المسػػػػػػػػػتقميف عػػػػػػػػػف عضػػػػػػػػػكيفيقػػػػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػػػػػدد الأعضػػػػػػػػػاء 
قيـ ػك كيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػالمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس أف يحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدد اسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتقلبلية ال
 دػديػػػػػػػػػػػكتحكـ عمػػػػػػػػػى الأمػػػػػػػػػكر ػالحػػػػػػػػػ فػػػػػػػػػيه ػدرتػػػػػػػػػػه كقػتػػػػػػػػػػيػصػشخ
ف المحتمػػػػػػػػػػػؿ أف لبقة أك ظػػػػػػػػػػػركؼ قػػػػػػػػػػػد تػػػػػػػػػػؤدم أك مػػػػػػػػػػػػأم عػػػػػػػػػػ
  كينب ػػػػػػػػػػي العضػػػػػػػػػكة ػيػػػػػػػػػػلبلػقػاستتػػػػػػػػػؤدم إلػػػػػػػػػى التػػػػػػػػػاثير عمػػػػػػػػػى 
كالحصػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ كتابيػػػػػػػػػػػػػان  التشػػػػػػػػػػػػػاكر مػػػػػػػػػػػػػع المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كا  شػػػػػػػػػػػػػعارها
عضػػػػػػػػػك  تعيػػػػػػػػػيف أم أكترشػػػػػػػػػيح  قبػػػػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػػػػػدـ ممانعتهػػػػػػػػػاعمػػػػػػػػػى 
شػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا مي مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف  مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة أك أم
كمػػػػػػػػػػػا يجػػػػػػػػػػػب عمػػػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ إشػػػػػػػػػػػعار   القياديػػػػػػػػػػػة المناصػػػػػػػػػػػب
المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كتابيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػان عنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد قبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ اسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتقالة  أك تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرؾ 
العمػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ أك إنهػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء خػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدمات انتهاء عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكية أم عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك 
مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مكظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؼ مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة أك أم 
يػػػػػػػػػػػػػة لأم سػػػػػػػػػػػػػبب كػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف خػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ شػػػػػػػػػػػػػا مي المناصػػػػػػػػػػػػػب القياد
 ) أياـ عمؿ.5(
 
 
أف يحػػػػػػػػػدد النظػػػػػػػػػاـ الأساسػػػػػػػػػي لمبنػػػػػػػػػؾ عػػػػػػػػػدد أعضػػػػػػػػػاء  ينب ػػػػػػػػػي .32
أف إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة كمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكلياتهـ  مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارة 
المناسػػػػػػػػػػػب لأعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء  عػػػػػػػػػػػددمأفضػػػػػػػػػػػؿ الممارسػػػػػػػػػػػات المتبعػػػػػػػػػػػة ل
 حد عشر عضكان.يتراكح بيف تسعة كأ المجمس
 
 
  :2 elpicnirP
 
 sriaffA draoB eht dna tnemtnioppA ,noitisopmoC
 
 
 fo senil raelc erusne dna tuo tes dluohs draoB ehT
 .knab eht fo slevel lla ta ytilibatnuocca dna ytilibisnopser
 eht ta seitilibisnopser fo noitarapes tcirts a eb tsum erehT
 eht fo srebmeM .knab eht fo tnemeganam roines eht fo level
 eht sa rotceriD evitucexe-non a esoohc llahs draoB
 a erusne tsum ohw ,srotceriD fo draoB eht fo namriahC
 tnednepedni-non dna tnednepedni fo noitatneserper riaf
 .seitivitca sti dna ezis s’knab eht ot gnidrocca srotceriD
 
 
 sa rotceriD evitucexE-noN a esoohc tsum draoB ehT .81
 tceles yam draoB eht osla dna ,draoB eht fo namriahC
 retfa( namriahC-eciV sa rebmem evitucexe-non a
 naibarA iduaS eht fo ”noitcejbo-on“ a gniniatbo
-eciV dna namriahC ehT .)ycnegA yratenoM
 seitilibisnopser eht fo yna esicrexe ton llahs namriahC
 ,)reganaM lareneG( reciffO evitucexE feihC eht fo
 seitilibisnopser fo noitarapes a eb dluohs ereht dna
 .foereht noitubirtsid dna
 dna serudecorp cificeps tpoda llahs knab hcaE .91
 eht fo srebmem tceles dna etanimon ot snoitcurtsni
 eht ni srebmem evitucexe fo rebmun ehT .draoB
 draob owt tsael ta dna owt deecxe ton llahs draob
 dluohs draoB ehT .tnednepedni eb tsum srebmem
 dna tnednepedni si rotceriD a rehtehw enimreted
 enimreted dna ,sgniht egduj ot ytiliba sih ssessa
 secnatsmucric ro spihsnoitaler  yna era ereht rehtehw
 eht ,tceffa ot raeppa dluoc ro ,tceffa thgim hcihw
 tlusnoc dluohs knab ehT  .ecnednepedni s’rotceriD
-on nettirw sti niatbo dna AMAS mrofni dna htiw
 fo tnemtnioppa eht ,noitanimon eht erofeb noitcejbo
 roines eht morf eeyolpme yna ro rebmem draob yna
 ni AMAS yfiton osla dna ,snoitisop tnemeganam
 ot gnisaec/noitangiser detpecca eht fo gnitirw
 fo secivres eht fo noitanimret ro /gnikrow eunitnoc
 roines eht morf eeyolpme yna ro rebmem draob yna
 ssenisub )5( nihtiw ,nosaer revetahw rof tnemeganam
 .syad
 
 yficeps llahs knab eht fo noitaicossA fo selcitrA ehT .02
 rieht dna srotceriD fo draoB eht fo rebmun eht
 eht ot gnidrocca taht dnim ni gniraeb ,seitilibisnopser
 draoB fo rebmun etairporppa eht ,secitcarp tseb
  .nevele dna enin neewteb si srebmem
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 إدارةأف يكػػػػػػػػػػػػكف الشػػػػػػػػػػػخ عضػػػػػػػػػػػػكان فػػػػػػػػػػػي مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس  يحظػػػػػػػػػػػر .12
العربيػػػػػػػػة  داخػػػػػػػؿ المممكػػػػػػػػةكيعمػػػػػػػػؿ مػػػػػػػػرخ  بنػػػػػػػؾ مػػػػػػػػف أكثػػػػػػػر
المشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاركة  مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارةيحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ لعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك مجك   السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعكدية
أخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرل  يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر شػػػػػػػػػػػػػػركات إدارة لس افػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكية مجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
  شػػػػػػػػػريطة مدرجػػػػػػػػػة خمػػػػػػػػػس شػػػػػػػػػركات بحػػػػػػػػػد أقصػػػػػػػػػىك  البنػػػػػػػػػكؾ
 تعػػػػػػػػػار فػػػػػػػػػي المصػػػػػػػػػالح لعضػػػػػػػػػكيته فػػػػػػػػػي أم عػػػػػػػػػدـ كجػػػػػػػػػكد
عضػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػس  أممسػػػػػػػػػتقيلبن  يعػػػػػػػػػدك   مػػػػػػػػػف هػػػػػػػػػ   الشػػػػػػػػػركات
در حكػػػػػػػػػػـ بإشػػػػػػػػػػهار إفلبسػػػػػػػػػػه أك صػػػػػػػػػػ مكظػػػػػػػػػػؼإدارة بنػػػػػػػػػػؾ أك 
 .مخمة بالشرؼحكـ عميه في جريمة 
 
تكػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف فتػػػػػػػػػػػػػرة عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكية مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة ثػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبث سػػػػػػػػػػػػػنكات  .22
يحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ لجميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء المجمس"بمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيهـ رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس ك 
المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس كالمػػػػػػػػػػػدير العػػػػػػػػػػػاـ" إعػػػػػػػػػػػادة ترشػػػػػػػػػػػيح أنفسػػػػػػػػػػػهـ كػػػػػػػػػػػؿ 
الجمعيػػػػػػػػػة العامػػػػػػػػة التػػػػػػػػػي تمػػػػػػػػػي ثػػػػػػػػلبث سػػػػػػػػػنكات عػػػػػػػػف طريػػػػػػػػػؽ 
  تعيينهـ.
 
 
عمػػػػػػػػػى عػػػػػػػػػدـ ممانعػػػػػػػػػة  ينب ػػػػػػػػػي عمػػػػػػػػػى كػػػػػػػػػؿ بنػػػػػػػػػؾ الحصػػػػػػػػػكؿ .32
المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة قبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ تعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس كأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء 
 المجاف المنبثقة مف المجمس.
 
ي فّضػػػػػػػػػػؿ أف لا حسػػػػػػػػػػب أفضػػػػػػػػػػؿ الممارسػػػػػػػػػػات المتبعػػػػػػػػػػة  فإنػػػػػػػػػػه  .42
الإدارة كالمجػػػػػػػػػػاف مجمػػػػػػػػػػس دمػػػػػػػػػػة أم عضػػػػػػػػػػك فػػػػػػػػػػي تتجػػػػػػػػػػاكة خ
مػػػػػػػف عشػػػػػػػر سػػػػػػنة متكاصػػػػػػمة  تػػػػػػيالمنبثقػػػػػػة منػػػػػػه أكثػػػػػػػر مػػػػػػف اثن
 تاريب صدكر المبادئ.
 
سػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة إحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ مناسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبة عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس كضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع سيا .52
لأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػائه تضػػػػػػػػػػػػػمف الإسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتمرارية كالتػػػػػػػػػػػػػدرج فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
عمػػػػػػػػػى  إلػػػػػػػػػى المسػػػػػػػػػاعدةإعػػػػػػػػػادة الترشػػػػػػػػػيح  كتػػػػػػػػػؤدم الإحػػػػػػػػػلبؿ.
ة  كتقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيـ أداء متابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة أداء المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس كالمجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف التابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
أف إلػػػػػػػػػػػى الإشػػػػػػػػػػػارة  درػكتجػػػػػػػػػػػ ائه.ػضػػػػػػػػػػػكػػػػػػػػػػؿ عضػػػػػػػػػػػك مػػػػػػػػػػػف أع
 عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى  قافػبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػطػنػتخاب ػتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالان ف كا  عػػػػػػػػػػػػػادةػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيػعػتػال
المنتػػػػػػػػػػػدب بصػػػػػػػػػػػفته عضػػػػػػػػػػػكان فػػػػػػػػػػػي المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس  ةمجمػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدار 
  .لمبنؾ ان عام ان أك مدير  ان تنفي ي ان كليس بصفته رئيس
 
 
 
 رشيحػتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػملة ػنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػلج فػكيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكػتؾ ػنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى كػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ ب يجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػب .62
راجعة ػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمهامهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا  فػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػض مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف كفػكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي   تػكافػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمػكال
لعضػػػػػػػػػػػكية  السػػػػػػػػػػػيرة ال اتيػػػػػػػػػػػة كتقيػػػػػػػػػػػيـ الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء المرشػػػػػػػػػػػحيف
  كالحػػػػػػػػػػػػكافةف ت كاػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػد الػديػػػػػػػػػػػػػحػكاعتمػػػػػػػػػػػػاد آليػػػػػػػػػػػػة ت المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس
 ات  المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػة ماتػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمػعػتػ الاعتبػػػػػػػػػػػػػار مػػػػػػػػػػػػػع الأخػػػػػػػػػػػػػ  فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي
إجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراءات  ادػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتػاع دارةالإ كعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس .ةػلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػال
جمس كمراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػة أداء كػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ ػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػالػعػـ فػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػيػقػتػمحػػػػػػػػػػػػددة ل
 .كمساهمته عضك
 
 
 naht erom fo draoB eht no rotceriD a eb llahs nosrep oN .12
 fo modgniK eht ni detaroprocni dna desnecil knab eno
 eht ni etapicitrap yam rebmem draoB A .aibarA iduaS
 naht rehto seinapmoc rehto fo draoB eht fo pihsrebmem
 seinapmoc detsil evif fo mumixam a htiw ,sknab
 ni stseretni fo tcilfnoc on eb dluohs ereht taht dedivorp
 draoB ynA .seinapmoc eseht fo yna ni pihsrebmem sih
 neeb sah ohw knab a fo eeyolpme ro rebmem
 ecneffo larom a fo detcivnoc ro tpurknab detacidujda
 .tsop sih dengiser gnivah sa deredisnoc eb llahs
 eerht eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem eht fo mret ehT .22
 eht fo namriahC eht gnidulcni ,srotceriD llA( sraey
 etanimon-er llahs reganam lareneg dna draoB
 yranidrO eht hguorht sraey eerht yreve sevlesmeht
 rieht swollof hcihw )AGO( ylbmessA lareneG
 .)tnemtnioppa
 
 eht erofeb noitcejbo on AMAS teg tsum knab hcaE .32
 fo srebmem dna srebmem draob eht fo tnemtnioppa
 .seettimmoc draob eht
 
 a taht elbareferp si ti ,secitcarp tseb ot gnidroccA .42
 sti dna draoB eht no evres ton dluohs rebmem draob
 sraey evitucesnoc evlewt naht erom rof seettimmoc
  .selpicnirp eseht fo ecnaussi fo etad eht morf
 
 ycilop noisseccus etairporppa na tes dluohs draob ehT .52
 ytiunitnoc erusne ot srebmem sti fo tnemecalper rof
-er ehT .tnemecalper fo ssecorp eht ni noitaudarg dna
 eht fo ecnamrofrep eht ssessa ot pleh lliw noitanimon
 fo ecnamrofrep eht dna seettimmoc sti dna draoB
 taht gninoitnem htrow si tI .srebmem sti fo hcae
 gniganaM eht ot ylppa noitcele-er dna tnemtnioppa
 draoB eht fo rebmem a sa yticapac sih ni rotceriD
 fo reganam lareneg ro evitucexe feihc a sa naht rehtar
 .knab eht
 
 dna noitanimoN a mrof dluohs knab hcaE .62
 fo snoitcnuf ehT .)CCN( eettimmoC noitasnepmoC
 eativ mulucirruc eht gniweiver edulcni eettimmoC eht
 ,draoB eht fo srebmem detanimon fo noitaulave dna
 no seluR AMAS rednu denifed sa snoitcnuf rehto dna
 tpoda llahs draoB ehT .secitcarP noitasnepmoC
 fo ssenevitceffe eht gnissessa rof serudecorp cificeps
 dna ecnamrofrep eht gniweiver dna draoB eht
 srebmem sti fo hcae fo noitubirtnoc
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جميػػػػػػػػػع التعيينػػػػػػػػػات لشػػػػػػػػػا مي المناصػػػػػػػػػب القياديػػػػػػػػػة بمػػػػػػػػػا فيهػػػػػػػػػا  .72
كفػػػػػػػػؽ مػػػػػػػػا كرد فػػػػػػػػي يجػػػػػػػػب أف تػػػػػػػػتـ أعضػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػس الإدارة 
متطمبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات التعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي المناصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػب القياديػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي 
 ـ. 3132المؤسسات المالية الصادرة بتاريب يكليك 
 
 
 أداء تقيػػػػػػػػػػػيـكبصػػػػػػػػػػػفة  دكريػػػػػػػػػػػة عمػػػػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػي .82
كػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ عضػػػػػػػػػػػػك  أداء تقيػػػػػػػػػػػػيـمجتمعػػػػػػػػػػػػيف ك  أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػاء المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس
 تقيػػػػػػػػػيـ أداءتكميػػػػػػػػػؼ جهػػػػػػػػػة خارجيػػػػػػػػػة ل يسػػػػػػػػػاهـك عمػػػػػػػػػى حػػػػػػػػػدة  
عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى ك ية التقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػيـ. فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي مكضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكعالمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس كأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػائه 
المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس مراجعػػػػػػػػػػػة فعاليػػػػػػػػػػػة ضػػػػػػػػػػػكابطه المتبعػػػػػػػػػػػة كا  جػػػػػػػػػػػراءات 
لضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعؼ كعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ الت ييػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرات عممػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه كتحديػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد نقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاط ا
   .إلى  لؾما دعت الحاجة المطمكبة كم
 
 
معمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػات ك  للؤعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء بػػػػػػػػػػػػػرام  تعريفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػة تقػػػػػػػػػػػػػديـ ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػي .92
أنشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػطته ك  كا  سػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجيته رسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالة البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف  شػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاممة
 إضػػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػى  أفضػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ الممارسػػػػػػػػػػػػات المهنيػػػػػػػػػػػػةك  همنتجاتػػػػػػػػػػػػك 
اتيجية التػػػػػػػػػي يسػػػػػػػػػعى البنػػػػػػػػػؾ إلػػػػػػػػػى الأهػػػػػػػػػداؼ الإسػػػػػػػػػتر  تحديػػػػػػػػػد
تةكيػػػػػػػػػػػد أعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  عمػػػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾك  تحقيقهػػػػػػػػػػػا.
كضػػػػػػػػػػػػح الػػػػػػػػػػػػدكر تنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف) بمػػػػػػػػػػػػ كرة تالتنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف ك يػػػػػػػػػػػػر ال(
كالأحكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ المطمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكب مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػنهـ كمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكلياتهـ كالشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػركط 
لػػػػػػػدل البنػػػػػػػؾ آليػػػػػػػة تػػػػػػػكافر  ينب ػػػػػػػيك   التعاقديػػػػػػػة بػػػػػػػيف الطػػػػػػػرفيف
ات الأنظمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كالتعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرافية لمتابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتجد
عمػػػػػػػػػػى تاثيرهػػػػػػػػػا المتكقػػػػػػػػػع عمػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػؾ ك  كا  يضػػػػػػػػػاحكالرقابيػػػػػػػػػة 
 .حد الأعضاء كؿ عمى عمى المجمس ك 
 
لمناقشػػػػػػػػػػة  اتاجتماعػػػػػػػػػػ عقػػػػػػػػػػد عمػػػػػػػػػػى أعضػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة .33
البنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ  عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى أف لا يقػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػػػػػػػػدد  اتكدراسػػػػػػػػػػػػة إسػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجي
 عػػػػػػػػف فضػػػػػػػػلبن   اجتماعػػػػػػػػات سػػػػػػػػنكيان  ةجتماعػػػػػػػػات عػػػػػػػػف أربعػػػػػػػػالا
عمػػػػػػػػػػػى الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػيك جمعيػػػػػػػػػػػة العمكميػػػػػػػػػػػة. اجتمػػػػػػػػػػػاع ال
كفػػػػي  كر كالمشػػػػاركة فػػػػي اجتماعػػػػات المجمػػػػس.الحضػػػػجمػػػػيعهـ 
 السػػػػػنةفػػػػػي فػػػػي ثلبثػػػػػة اجتماعػػػػػات عضػػػػػك عػػػػػدـ مشػػػػػاركة  حػػػػاؿ
 بػػػػػػديؿ إحػػػػػػلبؿ عضػػػػػػك آخػػػػػػر يػػػػػػتـ  يسػػػػػػتدعي  لػػػػػػؾدكف عػػػػػػ ر 
ة لأعضػػػػاء عقػػػػد اجتمػػػػاع بصػػػػكرة دكريػػػػ مػػػػف المناسػػػػبك . محمػػػػه
 . المجمس  ير التنفي ييف
 
ى ػمػػػػػػػػػػػبنػػػػػػػػػػاءن عه ػاتػػػػػػػػػػػيػكلػمسئ الإدارةمس ػر مجػػػػػػػػػػػيػػػػػػػػػػػرتػسكيػػػػػػػػػػؤدم  .13
ر ػفػػػػػػػػػػػاد مػػػػػػػػػػف تك ػاكػػػػػػػػػػػتػال ؿػتشمػػػػػػػػػػػك   مسػه رئػػػػػػػػػػيس المجػػػػػػػػػػػيػػػػػػػػػػػكجػت
ات ػمكمػػػػػػػػػػػعػادؿ كتسػػػػػػػػػػجيؿ المػبػػػػػػػػػػػتػل ةػاسبػػػػػػػػػػػنػاؿ مػصػػػػػػػػػػػكسػػػػػػػػػػائؿ ات
 الإدارة ضاءػأعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف  هػانػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػجػكلمس ػجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمػبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف ال
 إلػػػػػػػػػػػى ةػإضافػػػػػػػػػػػف ػيػػػػػػػػػػػػ يػيػفػنػتػير الػ ػػػػػػػػػػػ اءػضػػػػػػػػػػػػكالأعة ػ يػػػػػػػػػػػػيػفػنػتػال
 دػعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكت جمس.ػالمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ اتػماعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتػاج رػاضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػظ محػفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػح
رسمي ػالػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػجمس السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػجؿ ػات المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمػتػر اجػاضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػحػم
  ة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػسػخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتػرارات المػكالقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدائـ للؤعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ 
 محاضػػػػػػػػر فػػػػػػػػيمراعػػػػػػػػاة الدقػػػػػػػػة  ينب ػػػػػػػػيك  .ةػقػػػػػػػػػثػبػنػالمجػػػػػػػػاف المك 
ح كافػػػػػػػػػػة البنػػػػػػػػػػكد كالمكاضػػػػػػػػػػيع أف تعكػػػػػػػػػػس بكضػػػػػػػػػػك ك  الاجتمػػػػػػػػػػاع
 sa gnidulcni snoitisop roines ot stnemtnioppa llA .72
 llahs knab eht fo srotceriD fo draoB eht fo srebmem
 s’AMAS eht htiw ecnadrocca ni edam eb
 ni snoitisoP roineS ot stnemtnioppA rof stnemeriuqeR
  .3102 yluJ ni deussi snoitutitsnI laicnaniF
 
 
  ,sisab lacidoirep a no ,tuo yrrac llahs draoB ehT .82
 elohw a sa srebmem draoB eht htob fo  tnemssessa raluger
 lanretxe na gnitsurtnE .srebmem draoB laudividni eht fo dna
 eht ot etubirtnoc nac tnemssessa draoB a tuo yrrac ot ytitne
 yllacidoirep dluohs draoB ehT .ssecorp eht fo ytivitcejbo
 krow dna slortnoc  nwo sti fo ssenevitceffe eht weiver
 yna ekam dna stniop kaew yfitnedi dna ,serudecorp
 .foereht sesira deen eht revenehw segnahc yrassecen
 
 semmargorp noitcudni htiw dedivorp eb llahs srebmeM .92
 sti ,noissim s’knab eht no noitamrofni evisneherpmoc dna
 eht ,noitidda nI .secitcarp lanoisseforp tseb dna seigetarts
 eb llahs eveihca ot skees knab eht taht sevitcejbo cigetarts
 draoB eht fo srebmem edivorp llahs knab ehT .denifed
 mudnaromem a htiw )evitucexe-non dna evitucexe(
 lautcartnoc dna ,seitilibisnopser dna selor rieht gniniltuo
 knab ehT .seitrap owt eht neewteb snoitidnoc dna smret
 wen rotinom ot msinahcem a ecalp ni evah llahs
 rieht dna ,snoitaluger lortnoc dna selur yrosivrepus
 .srebmem laudividni dna knab eht htob no tcapmi  laitnetop
 
 yduts dna ssucsid ot teem llahs draoB eht fo srebmeM .03
 fo rebmun eht taht dedivorp knab eht fo seigetarts eht
 morf trapa ,raey a ruof naht ssel eb ton llahs sgniteem
 srebmem llA .gniteem ylbmessA lareneG launnA eht
 dna ,sgniteem draoB ni etapicitrap dna dnetta dluohs
 raey a sgniteem eerht dnetta ot sliaf rebmem a fi
 yb detutitsbus eb dluohs ehs/eh ,esucxe na tuohtiw
 evitucexe-non taht elbasivda si tI .rebmem rehtona
 .yllacidoirep teem srotceriD
 
 tcudnoc llahs srotceriD fo draoB eht fo yraterceS ehT .13
 eht fo namriahC eht yb detcerid sa seitilibisnopser reh/sih
 eht gnirusne edulcni seitilibisnopser reH/siH .draoB
 eht rof noitacinummoc fo snaem etairporppa fo ytilibaliava
 draoB eht neewteb noitamrofni fo gnidrocer dna egnahcxe
 roines fo srebmem neewteb dna seettimmoc sti dna
 noitidda ni srebmem draob evitucexe-non dna tnemeganam
 setunim ehT .sgniteem draoB eht fo setunim gniniatniam ot
 snoisiced dna krow eht fo drocer laiciffo tnenamrep eht era
 setuniM ehT .seettimmocbus sti dna draoB eht yb nekat
 smeti eht lla tcelfer ylraelc dluohs dna etarucca eb dluohs
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لإدارة كالقػػػػػػػػػػرارات اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػات مجمػػػػػػػػػػس االتػػػػػػػػػػي طرحػػػػػػػػػػت فػػػػػػػػػػي 
 مناقشتها.مكاضيع أخرل تمت كأم  المتخ ة
 
 
 
أم عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة محضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر  كثػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽيأف  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي .23
فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ بمػػػػػػػػػػػػػا  خػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ الاجتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػاع  تصػػػػػػػػػػػػػكيت تمػػػػػػػػػػػػػت
 ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيك  المعارضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة أك الامتنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاع عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف التصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكيت.
إرفػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؽ أك الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػارة إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أم كثػػػػػػػػػػػػػائؽ أك مسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتندات تػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ 
بيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف  يعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدالرجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكع إليهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا خػػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ الاجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات  كأف 
ك يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر يشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتمؿ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػماء الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء الحاضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػريف 
امتنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاع  كأم المعتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدة  كقائمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة بالمجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف الحاضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػريف
 . هكأسباب لأم عضك عف التصكيت (إف كجد)
 
 
 المعنيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى الأطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ  محاضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر الجمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكةع .33
  ان ) يكمػػػػػػػػػ51ر (ػسة عشػػػػػػػػػػخمػػػػػػػػػ ىػمػػػػػػػػػػع دػةيػػػػػػػػػػرة لا تػتػػػػػػػػػػف خػػػػػػػػػلبؿ
نفيػػػػػػػػػػػ  الشػػػػػػػػػػخ أك الجهػػػػػػػػػػػة المسػػػػػػػػػػئكلة عػػػػػػػػػػف ت تحديػػػػػػػػػػدمػػػػػػػػػػع 
 ؛بدايػػػػػػػػػػػة كػػػػػػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػػػػػػػاـ لمجمػػػػػػػػػػػسعمػػػػػػػػػػػى اك . القػػػػػػػػػػػرارات المتخػػػػػػػػػػػ ة
التقػػػػػػػػارير مػػػػػػػػف المجػػػػػػػػاف  لتمقػػػػػػػػي كضػػػػػػػػع جػػػػػػػػدكؿ ةمنػػػػػػػػي محػػػػػػػػدد
المعنيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مراقبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي الحسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػابات الػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػداخمييف 
جمػػػػػػػػػػػػػع التقػػػػػػػػػػػػػارير  آليػػػػػػػػػػػػػةكالخػػػػػػػػػػػػػارجييف كأف يتاكػػػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أف 
 السياسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع  كمتفقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػميمة كا  عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدادها كتقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػديمها 
معمكمػػػػػػػػػػػات   بمػػػػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػػػػؾ إعػػػػػػػػػػداد الالمعتمػػػػػػػػػػدة الداخميػػػػػػػػػػة
 المهمة كعرضها عمى المجمس في أكقاتها المحددة.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 fo draoB eht fo sgniteem eht gnirud dessucsid scipot dna
 yna dna nekat snoisiced lla drocer dluohs dna srotceriD
 .sgniteem eht ta dessucsid srettam rehto
  
 
 
 edam setov yna tnemucod llahs setunim s’draoB ehT .23
 ro snoitcejbo gnidulcni ,sgniteem eht gnirud
 ot derrefer stnemucod ynA .gnitov morf noitnetsba
 .ot derrefer dna dehcatta eb llahs sgniteem eht gnirud
 deraperp eb dluohs tnemetats evisneherpmoc A
 tnesba dna tneserp eht fo seman eht gniniatnoc
 yna dna devorppa seettimmoc fo tsil a dna ,srebmem
 eht dna rebmem yna yb )yna fi( noitnetsba fo esac
  .foereht snosaer
  
   eht ot detubirtsid eb llahs sgniteem eht fo setuniM .33
 neetfif gnideecxe ton doirep a nihtiw denrecnoc seitrap
 rof elbisnopser ytitne ro nosrep ehT .syad )51(
 .denimreted eb llahs nekat snoituloser eht gnitnemelpmi
 a tes ,raey hcae fo gninnigeb eht ta ,dluohs draoB ehT
 eht morf stroper gniviecer rof elbatemit cificeps
 ,srotidua lanretxe dna lanretni dna denrecnoc seettimmoc
 ,noitcelloc eht rof msinahcem eht taht erusne llahs dna
 ecalp ni si atad dna stroper fo noissimbus dna noitaraperp
 osla llahs tI  .ycilop detpoda lanretni eht htiw enil ni dna
 sti dna noitamrofni tnatropmi fo noitaraperp eht erusne
  .sisab ylemit a no draoB eht ot noitatneserp
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 بدأ الثالث: مال
 
 :مجمك الإدارة مسئوليات
ا ـمــــــــ ، بـنــــــــبـلا لـى عمــــــــمــــــــالإشـــــــرا  ع عمـــــــى مجمـــــــك الإدارة
 ية لمبنـــــــ ـجــــــــيـراتـتالأ:ـــــــدا  الإسمى ـعـــــــة ـقــــــــوا ـمـ  ـــــــي  لـــــــ  ال
إســـــــــتراتيجية عمـــــــــى الموا قـــــــــة ، و والإشـــــــــرا  عمـــــــــى تنفيـــــــــ :ا 
، الســــــــمو  المهني ــــــــةوكم ــــــــة ومب ــــــــادئ الم ــــــــاطر وتعميم ــــــــات الح
 عمــــــــى ينبغـــــــيو الإشـــــــرا  عمـــــــى الإدارة العميـــــــا.  إضـــــــا ة إلـــــــى
القي ــــــــــــام بالمهــــــــــــام والمســــــــــــئوليات  الإدارةمجم ــــــــــــك  أعضــــــــــــاا
سياســـــــــات واة جـــــــــرااات  ت ـــــــــوا رمـــــــــن  ـــــــــ ل  مالموكم ـــــــــة إل ـــــــــيه
 مناسبة للإشرا  والرقابة عمى أداا البن . 
 
 
كػػػػػػػػػػؿ بنػػػػػػػػػػؾ مجمػػػػػػػػػػس إدارة فعػػػػػػػػػػاؿ يكػػػػػػػػػػكف كف ليكػػػػػػػػػػأف  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػي .43
ر المجمػػػػػػػػػػس فػػػػػػػػػػي يتمثػػػػػػػػػػؿ دك مسػػػػػػػػػػئكلان عػػػػػػػػػػف نجػػػػػػػػػػاح البنػػػػػػػػػػؾ  ك 
التاكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف كجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكد ك  الإسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجية تحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ الأهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػداؼ
ـ ػيػػػػػػػػػػيػقػا تػهػػػػػػػػػػلبلػإطػػػػػػػػػار عػػػػػػػػػاـ للؤنظمػػػػػػػػػة الرقابيػػػػػػػػػة يػػػػػػػػػتـ مػػػػػػػػػف خ
  لمحككمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة شػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاممةكا  دارة المخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر كا  يجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاد تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات 
 القػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيـؾ ؽ البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبػطػى تػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالمكافقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كالإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ عك 
المهنيػػػػػػػة  بمػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػؾ تطبيػػػػػػػؽ قكاعػػػػػػػد السػػػػػػػمكؾ  مبػػػػػػػادئكال
  المهني.
 
 
 
إدارة فػػػػػػػػػػي عمػػػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  المسػػػػػػػػػػئكلية النهائيػػػػػػػػػػة تقػػػػػػػػػػع .53
عمػػػػػػػػػػى أهػػػػػػػػػػداؼ    بمػػػػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػػػػؾ المكافقػػػػػػػػػػةالبنػػػػػػػػػػؾ شػػػػػػػػػػئكف
كالمكافقػػػػػػػػػػة   هاتنفيػػػػػػػػػػ  كالإشػػػػػػػػػػراؼ عمػػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػػؾ الإسػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجية
تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػات  تنفيػػػػػػػػػػػ  إسػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجية المخػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر  كمتابعػػػػػػػػػػػة عمػػػػػػػػػػػى
ة داخػػػػػػػػػؿ ػيػػػػػػػػػػنػهػمػكالسػػػػػػػػػمكؾ ال القػػػػػػػػػيـ أفضػػػػػػػػػؿ الحككمػػػػػػػػػة كنشػػػػػػػػػر
 مياػعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى الإدارة الػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ عػالإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ككػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ لؾ  ؾػنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبػال
 .أدائهاة ػعػابػتػكم
 
 
  الماليػػػػػػة ملبءتػػػػػػهك سػػػػػػلبمة البنػػػػػػؾ  التاكػػػػػػد مػػػػػػف المجمػػػػػػس عمػػػػػػى .63
 . الرقابيػةك  الإشػرافية السػمطاتمػع  عمى علبقات فعالػة المحافظةك 
عات  ات لأنظمػػػة كالتشػػػريا هػػػـدراسػػػة كفالمجمػػػس أعضػػػاء عمػػػى ك 
كمػا   أهمهػا نظػاـ مراقبػة البنػكؾ  مػفبالنظاـ المصػرفي ك العلبقة 
متطمبػات التعيػػيف فػي المناصػػب القياديػة فػػي  يجػب عمػيهـ معرفػػة
  كالمػػػػػػ كرة مؤسسػػػػػػةالالمؤسسػػػػػػات الماليػػػػػػة الخاضػػػػػػعة لإشػػػػػػراؼ 
مجمػػػػػػس الإدارة   الإيضػػػػػاحية لصػػػػػػلبحيات كمسػػػػػػئكليات أعضػػػػػػاء
 ات  أم جهة أخرلمف كالتعميمات الصادرة  إضافة إلى الأنظمة
 .علبقة
 
 
  
 
 :3 elpicnirP
 
 :seitilibisnopseR draoB 
 gnidulcni ,knab eht fo ssenisub eht eesrevo llahs draoB ehT
 s’knab eht fo noitatnemelpmi eht gnieesrevo dna gnivorppa
 etaroproc ,ygetarts ksir gnivorppa dna ,sevitcejbo cigetarts
 .tcudnoc lanoisseforp fo selpicnirp dna selur ecnanrevog
 roines fo noisivrepus rof elbisnopser osla si draoB ehT
 eht tuo yrrac llahs draoB eht fo srebmeM .tnemeganam
 gnirusne yb meht ot detsurtne seitilibisnopser dna sksat
 dna noisivrepus rof serudecorp dna seicilop etauqeda taht
 .ecalp ni era ecnamrofrep s'knab eht fo lortnoc
 
 elbisnopser eb ot draoB evitceffe na evah llahs knab yrevE .43
 eveihca ot si elor s'draoB ehT .knab eht fo sseccus eht rof
 eht erusne ot dna knab eht  fo sevitcejbo cigetarts eht
 lortnoc thgisrevo fo krowemarf lareneg a fo ecnetsixe
 .deganam dna dessessa eb nac sksir hcihw hguorht smetsys
 selur ecnanrevog  etaroproc tsubor a poleved osla dluohs tI
 fo knab eht yb noitacilppa eht esivrepus dna evorppa dna
 noitacilppa eht gnidulcni selpicnirp dna seulav lanoisseforp
 .tcudnoC lanoisseforP fo edoC eht fo
 
 eht rof elbisnopser yletamitlu si srotceriD fo draoB ehT .53
 gnivorppa gnidulcni ,sriaffa s'knab eht fo tnemeganam
 cigetarts s’knab eht fo noitatnemelpmi eht gnieesrevo dna
 eht gnirotinom dna ygetarts ksir gnivorppa ,slaog
 draoB ehT .selur ecnanrevog etaroproc fo noitatnemelpmi
 lanoisseforp tseb fo noitanimessid rof elbisnopser osla si
 roines revo thgisrevo gnidivorp dna tcudnoc dna seulav
 .ecnamrofrep sti gnirotinom dna tnemeganam
 ycnevlos dna ssendnuos eht erusne dluohs draoB ehT .63
 htiw spihsnoitaler evitceffe niatniam dna knab eht fo
 draoB ehT .seitirohtua yrotaluger dna yrosivrepus
 tnaveler dnatsrednu dna yduts osla dluohs srebmem
 gniknab eht ot detaler noitalsigel dna snoitaluger
 .waL lortnoC gniknaB eht si hcihw fo pot eht ta rotces
 rof stnemeriuqeR s’AMAS wonk osla dluohs yehT
 laicnaniF ni snoitisoP roineS ot stnemtnioppA
 eht dna ,AMAS yb desivrepuS snoitutitsnI
 dna srewoP eht fo mudnaromeM yrotanalpxE
 ot noitidda ni ,srebmem draoB fo seitilibisnopseR
 selur sa llew sa snoitaluger dna selur AMAS rehto
  .seititne detaler rehto yb deussi snoitcurtsni dna
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 اليةػمػػػػػػػػػػكفايػػػػػػػػػة المػػػػػػػػػكارد البشػػػػػػػػػرية كال ضػػػػػػػػػمافلمجمػػػػػػػػػس عمػػػػػػػػػى ا .73
تنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ   كضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػماف الإسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجية الأهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػداؼلتحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ 
كالتاكػػػػػػػػػػد   ات العلبقػػػػػػػػػػة لجميػػػػػػػػػػع الأطػػػػػػػػػػراؼالتةامػػػػػػػػػػات البنػػػػػػػػػػؾ 
مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف التػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكظفيف بالسياسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كالإجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراءات 
حمايػػػػػػػػػػة أمػػػػػػػػػػكاؿ  هـ عػػػػػػػػػػفالمعتمػػػػػػػػػػدة  إضػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػى مسػػػػػػػػػػئكليت
 المكدعيف كالمساهميف.
 
 
التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف  المػػػػػػػػػػػػكظفيف عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس اختيػػػػػػػػػػػػار كت ييػػػػػػػػػػػػر .83
البنػػػػػػػػؾ  أفكالتاكػػػػػػػػد  (عنػػػػػػػػد الحاجػػػػػػػػة)  ةفػػػػػػػػي المراكػػػػػػػػة الرئيسػػػػػػػػ
سياسػػػػػػػػػػػة مناسػػػػػػػػػػػبة لإحػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ بػػػػػػػػػػػديؿ مناسػػػػػػػػػػػب يكػػػػػػػػػػػػكف  لديػػػػػػػػػػػه
  .هارات المطمكبةلمعمؿ كيممؾ الم مؤهلبن 
 
 
ة كالسػػػػػػػػػػمكؾ ػةاهػػػػػػػػػػػنػال ادئػبػػػػػػػػػػػم ةػةيػػػػػػػػػػػتععمػػػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  .93
د مػػػػػػػػػػف ػاكػػػػػػػػػػػتػجمس الػى المػػػػػػػػػػػمػػػػػػػػػػػعك . ؾػنػػػػػػػػػػػبػداخػػػػػػػػػػؿ ال نيػهػػػػػػػػػػػالم
نع أك تحػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػف ػمػػػػػػػػػػػػة سياسػػػػػػػػػػػات تػ يػػػػػػػػػػػػيػفػنػتػالإدارة ال باعػاتػػػػػػػػػػػ
 مبػػػػػػػػػػػادئتطبيػػػػػػػػػػػؽ  تػػػػػػػػػػػؤثر عمػػػػػػػػػػػى أم نشػػػػػػػػػػػاط أك علبقػػػػػػػػػػػة قػػػػػػػػػػػد
كضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع سياسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مكتكبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة لتسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكية  عميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه  ك الحككمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة
الشػػػػػػػػػػػػكاكم كالاعتراضػػػػػػػػػػػػات التػػػػػػػػػػػػي قػػػػػػػػػػػػد تنشػػػػػػػػػػػػا بػػػػػػػػػػػػيف البنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ 
 .لحكأصحاب المصا
 
بػػػػػػػػػػػػػام عقكبػػػػػػػػػػػػػات أك مؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػة العمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس إحاطػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  .34
جػػػػػػػػػةاءات مفركضػػػػػػػػػة عمػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػؾ مػػػػػػػػػف أم جهػػػػػػػػػة إشػػػػػػػػػرافية 
أك تنظيميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة أك قضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػائية أخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرل كالمنصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك عميهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا 
متطمبػػػػػػػػػات التعيػػػػػػػػػيف فػػػػػػػػػي فػػػػػػػػػي نمػػػػػػػػػك ج الملبءمػػػػػػػػػة الخػػػػػػػػػا ب
المناصػػػػػػػػػػػب القياديػػػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػػػي المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػات الماليػػػػػػػػػػػة الخاضػػػػػػػػػػػعة 
مػػػػػػػػػػؿ ) أيػػػػػػػػػػاـ ع5ك لػػػػػػػػػػؾ خػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ فتػػػػػػػػػػرة (مؤسسػػػػػػػػػػة اللإشػػػػػػػػػػراؼ 
  . فر العقكبةمف تاريب 
 
 
مػػػػف المجمػػػػس   كا  شػػػػراؼالعميػػػػا فػػػػي البنػػػػؾ  بتكجيػػػػه  الإدارةعمػػػػى  .14
إسػػػػػتراتيجية العمػػػػػؿ البنػػػػػؾ تتكافػػػػػؽ مػػػػػع  أنشػػػػػطة أفالتاكػػػػػد مػػػػػف 
  مػػػػػػػػػف المجمػػػػػػػػػستكل المخػػػػػػػػػاطر كالسياسػػػػػػػػػات المعتمػػػػػػػػػدة كمسػػػػػػػػػ
ى التاكػػػػد مػػػػف كضػػػػع الإجػػػػراءات الملبئمػػػػة لمتكاصػػػػؿ إلػػػػ إضػػػػافة
 دؼػهػػػػػػػيف بػرضػػػػػػػتػقػمػف الػؾ مػػػػػػػنػػػػػػػبػالػػػػػػدكرم مػػػػػػع كبػػػػػػار عمػػػػػػلبء ال
أطػػػػػػر  الاعتبػػػػػػارمػػػػػػف الأهميػػػػػػة الأخػػػػػػ  فػػػػػػي ك  .مخػػػػػػاطرهـيـ ػيػػػػػػػقػت
الحككمػػػػػػػػػػة المتبعػػػػػػػػػػػة لػػػػػػػػػػػدل عمػػػػػػػػػػلبء البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ مػػػػػػػػػػػف الشػػػػػػػػػػػركات 
 .ائتمانيةفي علبقات  معهـ كالمؤسسات قبؿ الدخكؿ
 
 
 
 
 ة مػػػػػػػػػف الأفػػػػػػػػػرادؼ الإدارة العميػػػػػػػػػا مػػػػػػػػػف مجمكعػػػػػػػػػة رئيسػػػػػػػػػتتػػػػػػػػػال .24
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لة ضػػػػػػػػػػػة لممسػػػػػػػػػػػػاءكنػػػػػػػػػػػػكا عر أف يك ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػيك . اليػػػػػػػػػػػكمي لمبنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ
يكػػػػػػػػػػػكف لػػػػػػػػػػػديهـ الخبػػػػػػػػػػػرة المطمكبػػػػػػػػػػػة  أفك  فػػػػػػػػػػػي هػػػػػػػػػػػ ا الشػػػػػػػػػػػاف
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 s'knab eht taht erusne llahs tnemeganam roines
 ,ygetarts ssenisub eht htiw tnetsisnoc era seitivitca
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 إشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼتحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػت   العمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ لإدارةكالكفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاءة كالنةاهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
لػػػػػػػػػدل المجمػػػػػػػػػس أف يكػػػػػػػػػكف  أهميػػػػػػػػػة إلػػػػػػػػػى إضػػػػػػػػػافة  المجمػػػػػػػػػس
 عمى هؤلاء الأشخا . مناسبة رقابية ضكابط
 
 
ة ػر بصفػػػػػػػػػػػػريػػػػػػػػػػػػقػؾ رفػػػػػػػػػػػع تػنػػػػػػػػػػػػبػميا فػػػػػػػػػػػي الػعػػػػػػػػػػػػال عمػػػػػػػػػػػى الإدارة .34
ة ػيػػػػػػػػػػمػداخػة الػابػػػػػػػػػػرقػطاؽ نظػػػػػػػػػاـ الػجمس بشػػػػػػػػػاف نػػػػػػػػػػلممػػػػػػػػػ ةػكيػػػػػػػػػػسن
لممجمػػػػػػػػػس فرصػػػػػػػػػة مراجعػػػػػػػػػة النظػػػػػػػػػاـ  حتػػػػػػػػػى تتػػػػػػػػػاحه ػقػػػػػػػػػػيػبػكتط
 كالتاكد مف فاعميته.
 
 
 مسػػػػػػئكلان  تشػػػػػػمؿممخػػػػػػاطر ل إدارة يكػػػػػػكف لػػػػػػدل البنػػػػػػؾ أف ينب ػػػػػػي .44
 إلػػػػػى إضػػػػػافةللبلتػػػػػةاـ  كا  دارة "ORC") لممخػػػػػاطر ان (مػػػػػدير  ان رئيسػػػػػ
  السػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمطة ـمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػنحه ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيك  الداخميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة. لمراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةا رةإدا
لػػػػػػػػديهـ القػػػػػػػػدرة  أف يكػػػػػػػػكفك   المناسػػػػػػػػبة كالاسػػػػػػػػتقلبلية  كالمػػػػػػػػكارد
عمػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػس اعتمػػػػػػػاد السياسػػػػػػػة ك  .لمتكاصػػػػػػػؿ مػػػػػػػع المجمػػػػػػػس
مػػػػػػػػػف  العامػػػػػػػػػة لممخػػػػػػػػػاطر كا  جػػػػػػػػػراءات إدارة المخػػػػػػػػػاطر كالتاكػػػػػػػػػد
المخػػػػػػاطر ربػػػػػػط مسػػػػػػتكل تطبيقهػػػػػػا كمراجعتهػػػػػػا بشػػػػػػكؿ سػػػػػػنكم  ك 
 محػػػػػػػػػػددة ةمنيػػػػػػػػػػة فتػػػػػػػػػػرة فػػػػػػػػػػيتحممهػػػػػػػػػػا  التػػػػػػػػػػي ير ػػػػػػػػػػب البنػػػػػػػػػػؾ
  بالإستراتيجية العامة لعمؿ البنؾ كخطة رأس الماؿ. 
 
 
 
ف أمػػػػػػػػػػػدير المخػػػػػػػػػػػاطر ك مػػػػػػػػػػػنح السػػػػػػػػػػػمطات المناسػػػػػػػػػػػبة ل ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػي .54
 بػػػػػػػػالمجمس مػػػػػػػػف خػػػػػػػػلبؿ رفػػػػػػػػع التقػػػػػػػػارير يكػػػػػػػػكف لديػػػػػػػػه ارتبػػػػػػػػاط
  كارتبػػػػػػػػػػػػاط مباشػػػػػػػػػػػػػر بالمػػػػػػػػػػػػدير العػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ (العضػػػػػػػػػػػػك المنتػػػػػػػػػػػػػدب)
ارة جهػػػػػػػػػػػػة إد عػػػػػػػػػػػػف يكػػػػػػػػػػػػكف مػػػػػػػػػػػػدير المخػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر مسػػػػػػػػػػػػتقلبن  أفك 
مػػػػػػػػػػدير  أك اسػػػػػػػػػػتقالة الاسػػػػػػػػػػت ناء فػػػػػػػػػػي حػػػػػػػػػػاؿ تػػػػػػػػػػـك  الأعمػػػػػػػػػػاؿ 
الحصػػػػػػػػػكؿ أكلا  فػػػػػػػػػلب بػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػف  كػػػػػػػػػاف المخػػػػػػػػػاطر لأم سػػػػػػػػػبب
   ب لؾ.كا  شعار المؤسسة كتابيان   عمى مكافقة المجمس
 
 
عمػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػس التاكػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػف اسػػػػػػػػػتقلبلية المراجػػػػػػػػػع الػػػػػػػػػداخمي  .64
 تطمبػػػػػػػػػػػػاتكالمراجػػػػػػػػػػػػع الخػػػػػػػػػػػػارجي  كالتاكػػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػػف الالتػػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ بم
بشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف التقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارير كالمعمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات  الإفصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاح كالشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػفافية
 المالية كالكشؼ عنها دكف تاخير.
 
 
لمحفػػػػػػػػػػػاظ عمػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس كالإدارة العميػػػػػػػػػػػا كضػػػػػػػػػػػع ضػػػػػػػػػػػكابط  .74
بػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف  عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى سػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرية المعمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كالبيانػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كانتقالهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا
 .مختمؼ الإدارات كالكحدات في البنؾ
 
 
 
المعمكمػػػػػػػػػات عمػػػػػػػػػى عػػػػػػػػػاتؽ  يةػنػػػػػػػػػػقػتة ػمػػػػػػػػػػككػة حػيػػػػػػػػػػكلػع مسئػقػػػػػػػػػػت .84
 رة التنفي يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة.  كمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف المناسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة كالإدا
إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أف حػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالات الاحتيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ كالتلبعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػب هنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارة 
 ot ytirgetni dna ecnetepmoc ,ecneirepxe yrassecen
 ehT noisivrepus s’draoB eht rednu ssenisub eht eganam
 ot elbacilppa slortnoc etairporppa evah llahs draoB
 .slaudividni eseht
 
 ot timbus llahs knab eht fo tnemeganaM roineS ehT .34
 fo epocs eht gnidrager troper launna na draoB eht
 ni noitatnemelpmi sti dna metsys lortnoc lanretni
 eht erusne dna weiver ot draoB eht timrep ot redro
  .metsys eht fo ssenevitceffe
 
 noitcnuF tnemeganaM ksiR a evah llahs knaB ehT .44
 ecnailpmoC a ,)"ORC" reciffO ksiR feihC a gnidulcnI(
 fo sdaeh ehT .noitcnuf tiduA lanretnI na dna noitcnuF
 ,srewop tneiciffus evah dluohs snoitcnuf eseht
 ehT .draoB eht ot ssecca dna secruoser ,ecnednepedni
 ksir dna ycilop ksir llarevo eht evorppa llahs draoB
 deilppa era yeht erusne dna serudecorp tnemeganam
 etiteppa ksir ehT .sisab launna na no deweiver dna
 emit deificeps a revo tpecca ot gnilliw si knab eht taht
 llarevo sti ot detcennoc ylraelc eb dluohs noziroh
 .nalp latipac dna ygetarts ssenisub
 
 reganam lareneg eht ot yltcerid troper llahs ORC ehT  .54
 dluohs dna srewop etairporppa nevig eb dluohs dna )OEC(
 dna stroper fo noissimbus hguorht draoB eht ot ssecca evah
 ssenisub eht morf tnednepedni eb dluohs ORC eht
 rof noitisop sih morf devomer si ORC eht  fI .tnemeganam
 eb dluohs siht ,detpecca si noitangiser sih ro nosaer yna
 dluohs knab ehT .draoB eht fo lavorppa roirp eht htiw enod
  .gnitirw ni AMAS yfiton
 
 
 lanretni fo ecnednepedni eht erusne llahs draoB ehT .64
 eht htiw ecnailpmoc erusne dna ;srotidua lanretxe dna
 htiw ycnerapsnart dna erusolcsid fo stnemeriuqer
 llahs dna noitamrofni laicnanif dna stroper ot drager
 .yaled tuohtiw erusolcsid ylemit rieht erusne
 
 
 
 rof  selur tes llahs tnemeganam roines dna draoB ehT .74
 rof dna noitamrofni fo ytilaitnedifnoc gniniatniam
 stnemtraped tnereffid neewteb noitamrofni fo refsnart
 .knab eht ni stinu dna
 
 noitamrofnI fo ecnanrevog eht rof ytilibisnopser ehT .84
 roines dna srotceriD fo draoB eht htiw stser ygolonhceT
 fo sesac taht ereh gninoitnem htrow si tI .tnemeganam
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 تقنيػػػػػػػػػػػةبقصػػػػػػػػػػػكر فػػػػػػػػػػػي أداء إدارة المخػػػػػػػػػػػاطر ك عػػػػػػػػػػػادةن تػػػػػػػػػػػرتبط 
مػػػػػػػػػػػػة كمػػػػػػػػػػػػات كحمايػػػػػػػػػػػػة بيانػػػػػػػػػػػػات العمػػػػػػػػػػػػلبء كملبءأمػػػػػػػػػػػػف المعم
 مكافحة الاحتياؿ.أساليب 
 
 
بشػػػػػػػػػاف سياسػػػػػػػػػة مكتكبػػػػػػػػػة  يكػػػػػػػػػكف لػػػػػػػػػدل المجمػػػػػػػػػس أف ينب ػػػػػػػػػي .94
أف السياسػػػػػػػػػػػات مػػػػػػػػػػػف د   كعميػػػػػػػػػػػه التاكػػػػػػػػػػػالمصػػػػػػػػػػػالح تعػػػػػػػػػػػار 
كشػػػػػػػػػؼ العمميػػػػػػػػػات المحتممػػػػػػػػػة لتضػػػػػػػػػارب  تسػػػػػػػػػاعد فػػػػػػػػػيالتػػػػػػػػػي 
 المصالح مكجكدة كمطبقة.
 
ف المصػػػػػالح فػػػػػي حػػػػػاؿ كػػػػػك  تضػػػػػارب ا عمميػػػػػاتتنشػػػػػ أفيمكػػػػػف  .35
لمجمكعػػػػة عامػػػػة. مثػػػاؿ  لػػػػؾ  عنػػػػدما يكػػػػكف البنػػػػؾ  ان البنػػػؾ تابعػػػػ
ف مسػػػػػػػػتكيات الاتصػػػػػػػػاؿ ان مػػػػػػػػف مجمكعػػػػػػػػة مصػػػػػػػػرفية  فػػػػػػػػإجػػػػػػػػةء
الأـ أك الشػػػػػػػػركات شػػػػػػػػركة كتػػػػػػػػدفؽ المعمكمػػػػػػػػات بػػػػػػػػيف البنػػػػػػػػؾ كال
مكػػػػف أف يػػػػؤدم إلػػػػى تضػػػػارب فػػػػي المصػػػػالح يالأخػػػػرل التابعػػػػة 
المختمفػػػػػػػػػػة  الكيانػػػػػػػػػػات(مثػػػػػػػػػػؿ تبػػػػػػػػػػادؿ معمكمػػػػػػػػػػات سػػػػػػػػػػرية بػػػػػػػػػػيف 
 .لممجمكعة)
 
معػػػػػػػػػػاملبت  كتحػػػػػػػػػدد كضػػػػػػػػػع سياسػػػػػػػػػػة تػػػػػػػػػنظـعمػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػس  .15
معرفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كرصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد  تـبحيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػث تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ الأطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ  ات العلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة
 كالعمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات المكافػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ عميهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا التعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاملبتكحصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر 
 .عميها  ير المكافؽ العممياتك 
 
 
جكهريػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة أم عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  أف التاكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػفعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس  .25
مصػػػػػػػػػرفية أك  يػػػػػػػػػر مصػػػػػػػػػرفية مػػػػػػػػػع طػػػػػػػػػرؼ  م علبقػػػػػػػػػة تػػػػػػػػػتـ 
لممؤسسػػػػػػػػة بكػػػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػػػػدؿ كبػػػػػػػػدكف تفضػػػػػػػػيؿ  كالإفصػػػػػػػػاح عنهػػػػػػػػا 
 بشكؿ فكرم كسميـ خلبؿ مكعد أقصا  يكمي عمؿ.
 
 
الإلمػػػػػػػػػػاـ بالمخػػػػػػػػػػاطر مجمػػػػػػػػػػس إدارة الشػػػػػػػػػػركة الرئيسػػػػػػػػػػة  عمػػػػػػػػػػى .35
كعػػػػػػػة جميعهػػػػػػػا أف تػػػػػػػؤثر عمػػػػػػػى المجم ية التػػػػػػػي يمكػػػػػػػفالأساسػػػػػػػ
. كعمػػػػى المجمػػػػس ممارسػػػػة دكر رقػػػػابي كعمػػػػى الشػػػػركات التابعػػػػة
مناسػػػػب عمػػػػى هػػػػ   الشػػػػركات  مػػػػع أهميػػػػة الأخػػػػ  فػػػػي الإعتبػػػػار 
الاسػػػػػتقلبلية القانكنيػػػػػة كمتطمبػػػػػات مهػػػػػاـ الحككمػػػػػة التػػػػػي يمكػػػػػػف 
تطبيقهػػػػػػػػا مػػػػػػػػف الجهػػػػػػػػة المشػػػػػػػػرفة عمػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػس إدارة الشػػػػػػػػركة 
 التابعة.
 
 
المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس كالإدارة العميػػػػػػػػػػػػػا فهػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ  ضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاءععمػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أ ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػي .45
 لممجمكعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ الماليػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة ك يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر الماليػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كتكجيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه الهيا
آليػػػػػػػػػػػة مناسػػػػػػػػػػػبة لمحصػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ  كشػػػػػػػػػػػركاتها التابعػػػػػػػػػػػة كأف تتػػػػػػػػػػػكافر
 عمى المعمكمات المحدثة بشاف هيكمة المجمكعة.
 
 
إعػػػػػػػػػػػػػداد تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػات الشػػػػػػػػػػػػػركة التابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  إدارةمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى  .55
خاصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة بالحككمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كتقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيـ أم قػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرارات أك ممارسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات 
نهػػػػػػػػػػػا لا تضػػػػػػػػػػػع سػػػػػػػػػػػتكل المجمكعػػػػػػػػػػػة لمتاكػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػف أعمػػػػػػػػػػػى م
 ecnegilgen htiw detcennoc yllausu era noitalupinam dna duarf
 noitamrofni ,tnemeganam ksir fo ecnamrofrep eht ni
 dna atad remotsuc fo noitcetorp ,ygolonhceT ytiruceS
 .duarf tabmoc ot syaw ni seicneicifed
 
 nettirw lamrof a ecalp a ni evah llahs draoB ehT .94
 dluohs draoB ehT .stseretnI fo stcilfnoC rof yciloP
 fo stcilfnoc laitnetop yfitnedi ot seicilop taht erusne
 .detnemelpmi dna tnetsixe era stseretni
 
 fo trap si knab a nehw esira yam stseretni fo stcilfnoC .05
 trap si knab eht erehw ,elpmaxe roF  .puorg lareneg a
 dna noitacinummoc fo slevel eht ,puorg gniknab a fo
 tnerap sti ,knab eht neewteb swolf noitamrofni
 ot dael nac seiraidisbus rehto ro/dna ynapmoc
 laitnedifnoc fo gnirahs .g.e( stseretni fo stcilfnoc
 .)seititne tnereffid neewteb noitamrofni
 
 dna etaluger ot yciloP  a poleved llahs draoB ehT .15
 ,gniyfitnedi rof snoitcasnart ytraP detaleR yfitnedi
 dna devorppa gnitaremune dna gnirotinom
 .snoitcasnart devorppanu
 
 era snoitcasnart ytrap detaler taht erusne llahs draoB ehT .25
 s'mra" na dah ecnereferp tuohtiw dna ylriaf tuo deirrac
 dna yltpmorp AMAS ot desolcsid era dna "sisab htgnel
  .syad ssenisub owt nihtiw yletauqeda
 
 
 fo erawa eb dluohs ynapmoC tneraP eht fo draoB ehT .35
 a sa puorg eht htob tceffa thgim taht sksir lairetam eht
 ,erofereht ,dluohs tI  .seiraidisbus sti dna elohw
 gniraeb ,seiraidisbus revo thgisrevo etauqeda esicrexe
 ecnanrevog dna ecnednepedni lagel dnim ni
 no ytirohtua yrosivrepus eht yb decrofne stnemeriuqer
 .draoB s’yraidisbus a
 
 
 dnatsrednu dluohs tnemeganam roineS dna draoB ehT .45
 fo serutcurts laicnanif-non dna laicnanif eht ediug dna
 a evah dluohs dna seiraidisbus sti dna puorg eht
 no noitamrofni detadpu niatbo ot msinahcem elbatius
 .puorg eht fo erutcurts eht
 
 
 detaler tes llahs yraidisbus gniknab a fo draoB ehT .55
 yna etaulave dluohs dna selur ecnanrevog etaroproc
 yeht taht erusne ot secitcarp ro snoisiced level-puorg
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الأنظمػػػػػػػػػػة الفػػػػػػػػػػرع التػػػػػػػػػػابع فػػػػػػػػػػي حػػػػػػػػػػاؿ تػػػػػػػػػػؤدم إلػػػػػػػػػػى مخالفػػػػػػػػػػة 
 المحمية المطبقة.
 
فػػػػػػػي حػػػػػػػاؿ إسػػػػػػػناد عمميػػػػػػػات البنػػػػػػػؾ لطػػػػػػػرؼ آخػػػػػػػر فػػػػػػػاف  لػػػػػػػؾ  .65
مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة كالإدارة التنفي يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف  يعفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي لا
مسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكليتهـ قائمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كلا يمكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف  كتظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكلية  
إسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػناد بعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ  كلا يػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؤدممقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ الخدمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة. لتفكيضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػها 
كظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػائؼ عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات إدارة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الداخميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كا  دارة 
الالتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ كا  دارة المخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر  كالإدارات الأخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرل إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى 
مسػػػػػػػػػػئكلية مجمػػػػػػػػػػس  إلػػػػػػػػػػى إعفػػػػػػػػػػاءالشػػػػػػػػػػركة الأـ (المجمكعػػػػػػػػػػة) 
 كعميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػهكالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكلية  الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ كالمتابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  الإدارة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف
عمميػػػػػػػػػػة الإسػػػػػػػػػػناد لطػػػػػػػػػػرؼ المخػػػػػػػػػػاطر المترتبػػػػػػػػػػة عمػػػػػػػػػػى  إدراؾ
عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػات الإسػػػػػػػػػػػػناد إلػػػػػػػػػػػػى  ضػػػػػػػػػػػػكعخ كالتاكػػػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػػػف آخػػػػػػػػػػػػر 
 .به ا الشافتعميمات المؤسسة 
 
 
 
 
 المسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكليةبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرام  تتنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاكؿ إعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػداد ـ البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ ة يمتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ .75
 .العاديػػػػػػػػػػػػة الجمعيػػػػػػػػػػػػة العامػػػػػػػػػػػػةتكافػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ عميهػػػػػػػػػػػػا  الاجتماعيػػػػػػػػػػػػة
 الاجتماعيػػػػػػػػةالمشػػػػػػػػاريع  دعػػػػػػػػـ :مػػػػػػػػف أهػػػػػػػػداؼ هػػػػػػػػ   البػػػػػػػػرام ك 
  إضػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػى الػػػػػػػػػػػكعيةيػػػػػػػػػػػادة كالعمػػػػػػػػػػػؿ عمػػػػػػػػػػػى  المختمفػػػػػػػػػػػة
مػػػػػػػػػػػػف  للبقتصػػػػػػػػػػػػاد المحمػػػػػػػػػػػػي انيػػػػػػػػػػػػةالائتم الاحتياجػػػػػػػػػػػػاتتمبيػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
المنتجػػػػػػػػػػػة  للؤعمػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ مػػػػػػػػػػػنح القػػػػػػػػػػػرك كالتسػػػػػػػػػػػهيلبت خػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ
بمػػػػػػػػػػػلبءة إضػػػػػػػػػػػرار دكف التنميػػػػػػػػػػػة الاقتصػػػػػػػػػػػادية التػػػػػػػػػػػي تشػػػػػػػػػػػجع 
 .كمساهميهكمكدعيه  البنؾ المالية
 
 
 
التػػػػػػػػػػػي تمبػػػػػػػػػػػي  المصػػػػػػػػػػػرفيةقػػػػػػػػػػػديـ الخػػػػػػػػػػػدمات عمػػػػػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػػػػػؾ ت .85
  عادلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةبتكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاليؼ  المجتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع كمتطمبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات احتياجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات
شػػػػػػػػػػػػجيع المشػػػػػػػػػػػػاريع لػػػػػػػػػػػػدعـ كت المبػػػػػػػػػػػػادرة بتقػػػػػػػػػػػػديـ تسػػػػػػػػػػػػهيلبتك 
 هػػػػػػػػػػػتـالتػػػػػػػػػػػي تالمشػػػػػػػػػػػاريع  كلا سػػػػػػػػػػػيما  الصػػػػػػػػػػػ يرة كالمتكسػػػػػػػػػػػطة
تهـ  تػػػػػػػػػػػدريب المػػػػػػػػػػػكاطنيف كرفػػػػػػػػػػػع مسػػػػػػػػػػػتكل مهػػػػػػػػػػػار بتكظيػػػػػػػػػػػؼ ك 
فػػػػػػػػػػػي  مناسػػػػػػػػػػػبةإضػػػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػػػى إتبػػػػػػػػػػػاع سياسػػػػػػػػػػػات اجتماعيػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 .كالتعميـمجاؿ حماية البيئة كالصحة 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 lacol elbacilppa fo hcaerb ni yraidisbus eht tup ton od
  .snoitaluger
 
 ton llahs siht ,snoitcnuf yek secruostuo knab a erehW .65
 roines dna srotceriD fo draoB eht tpmexe
 ytilibisnopser riehT .ytilibisnopser morf tnemeganam
 eht ot detageled eb tonnac dna tnetsixe niamer llahs
 .secivres decruostuo eht gnidivorp seititne
 tiduA lanretnI eht fo snoitcnuf emos gnicruostuO
 ksiR ,tnemtrapeD ecnailpmoC ,tnemtrapeD
 ot stnemtraped rehto dna tnemtrapeD tnemeganaM
 eht eveiler ton llahs ,)puorg( ynapmoc tnerap eht
 wollof dna noisivrepus fo ytilibisnopser eht fo draoB
 gnisira sksir eht fo erawa eb dluohs draoB ehT .pu
 gnicruostuo taht erusne llahs tI .gnicruostuo morf
 ot gnidrocca detcudnoc gnieb era stnemegnarra
 .snoitcurtsni detaler s’AMAS
 
 laicos ot detaler smargorp eraperp dluohs knab ehT .75
 lareneG yranidrO eht yb devorppa eb ot ytilibisnopser
 gnitroppus edulcni smargorp eseht fo slaog ehT .ylbmessA
 fo level eht esaercni ot krow dna stcejorp laicos suoirav
 sdeen tiderc eht teem ot sa llew sa ,ecnadiug dna ssenerawa
 dna snaol fo gnitnarg hguorht ymonoce lacol eht fo
 cimonoce etomorp taht sessenisub evitcudorp ot seitilicaf
 tuohtiw si sihT .ytirepsorp gniogno dna htworg
 tseretni eht dna ,knab eht fo ycnevlos eht no gnisimorpmoc
 .sredloherahs dna srotisoped sti fo
 
 teem taht secivres gniknab edivorp dluohs knab ehT .85
 ,tsoc riaf ta yteicos eht fo stnemeriuqer dna sdeen eht
 llams etomorp dna troppus ot evitaitini eht ekat dna
 gnimia sessenisub yllaicepse ,sesirpretne muidem dna
 dna slanoitan fo gniniart dna tnemyolpme ta
 laicos gniwollof sa llew sa ,slliks rieht gnidargpu
 htlaeh ,noitcetorp latnemnorivne ot evicudnoc seicilop
 .noitacude dna
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 المبدأ الراب :
 
 :ن المجمكعالمجان المنبثقة  
 
أدية مهامـــــــه بشـــــــكل  عـــــــال ـجمك مـــــــن تــــــــمـــــــالن ـكــــــــمـي يتـكــــــــل
 ــــــي :ــــــ    ينلحصــــــول عمــــــى ال ــــــرأ  والمشــــــورة مــــــن الم تصــــــاو 
تشـــــــكيل عـــــــدد مناســـــــب مـــــــن المجــــــــان   ـــــــ ن عميـــــــه، المجـــــــان
  .حسب حجم البن  وتنوع أنشطته
 
إبػػػػػػػػػداء رأم إلػػػػػػػػػى تعةيػػػػػػػػػة المجمػػػػػػػػػس  لجػػػػػػػػػافاسػػػػػػػػػتخداـ يهػػػػػػػػػدؼ  .95
مػػػػػػػػػػػف الممكػػػػػػػػػػػف أف يكػػػػػػػػػػػكف مسػػػػػػػػػػػتقؿ بشػػػػػػػػػػػاف المسػػػػػػػػػػػائؿ التػػػػػػػػػػػي 
فػػػػػػػػػي تقػػػػػػػػػديـ الػػػػػػػػػرأم    كالمسػػػػػػػػػاعدةمصػػػػػػػػػالحلم تضػػػػػػػػػاربفيهػػػػػػػػػا 
كا  دارة  مراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الحسػػػػػػػػػػػػػابات فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي مجػػػػػػػػػػػػػالات عػػػػػػػػػػػػػدة  مثػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ
 الإدارة مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػسانتخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاب أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء المخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر ك 
 أفعمػػػػػػػػػػى  ديػػػػػػػػػػالتاك  مػػػػػػػػػػع التنفيػػػػػػػػػػ ييف مكافػػػػػػػػػػ تكتعكيضػػػػػػػػػػات ك 
مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الالمجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف لا يعفػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  الاسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتعانة بهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ  
 .مسئكلياته
 
إلػػػػػػػػػػى  ةػضافػػػػػػػػػػإؾ ػنػػػػػػػػػػػبػالـ ػجػػػػػػػػػػػكح مياتػمػػػػػػػػػػػالع ةػعػػػػػػػػػػػيػبػطدد ػحػػػػػػػػػػػت .36
عػػػػػػػػػػػػدد  جمسػمػػػػػػػػػػػػاء الػضػػػػػػػػػػػػػلبت أعػكمؤهػػػػػػػػػػػػ ةػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػالنسب رةػبػػػػػػػػػػػػػخال
كيػػػػػػػػؤدم تكػػػػػػػػكيف المجػػػػػػػػاف إلػػػػػػػػى ةيػػػػػػػػادة  ّكف.ػكػػػػػػػػػ  تتي ػالمجػػػػػػػػاف الػػػػػػػػ
 مهػػػػػػػػػػػاراتال عمػػػػػػػػػػػى تركيػػػػػػػػػػةالمػػػػػػػػػػف خػػػػػػػػػػػلبؿ  فعاليػػػػػػػػػػة المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس
 الأنشػػػػػػػػػػػطة بعػػػػػػػػػػػ  فػػػػػػػػػػػيلؤعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء  كم الخبػػػػػػػػػػػرة الخاصػػػػػػػػػػػة ل
 .المحددة كالعمميات
 
 عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػئكلان مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة يكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف  .16
طبيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات الحككمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ المجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف ت
 أعضػػػػػػػػػػاء المجػػػػػػػػػػاف كعميػػػػػػػػػػه التاكػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػف أف  المنبثقػػػػػػػػػػة منػػػػػػػػػػه
 .المطمكب عممهـداء عند أ يقكمكف بالعمؿ الجاد
 
 
مؿ المجػػػػػػػػاف ػكاعد عػػػػػػػػػقػػػػػػػػ إقػػػػػػػػرارمجمػػػػػػػػس الإدارة عمػػػػػػػػى  ب يػنػػػػػػػػػي .26
يكػػػػػكف لػػػػػدل كػػػػػؿ لجنػػػػػة  فكأها ػعػػػػػػيػمػجة مػػػػػف المجمػػػػػس ػقػػػػػػثػبػنػمػال
 مهػػػػػاـ المجنػػػػػة كمػػػػػدةحػػػػػدد ت عامػػػػػة تمػػػػػف هػػػػػ   المجػػػػػاف إجػػػػػراءا
ات ػيػػػػػػػػكالمسئكلها ػة لػػػػػػػػكحػػػػػػػنػالممات ػيػػػػػػػػكالصلبح مهاػمػػػػػػػػع كنطػػػػػػاؽ
 .هاػيػػػػػػػػػػمػجمس عػة المػػػػػػػػػػابػػػػػػػػػػة رقػيػػػػػػػػػػكآلها ػقػػػػػػػػػػاتػى عػمػػػػػػػػػػاة عػقػػػػػػػػػػمػمػال
عػػػػػف  ؾػنػػػػػػبػكم لمػرير السنػػػػػػقػػػػػتػفػػػػػي الصاح ػالإفػػػػػـ ػيتػػػػػأف  يػ ػػػػػبػنػيك 
إضػػػػػافة  قػػػػػهكنطا كآليػػػػػة عممهػػػػػا المجمػػػػػس كنهاػكػػػػػتي ػالػػػػػاف ػجػػػػػػالم
فػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػؾ الأعضػػػػػػاء  أعضػػػػػػاء كػػػػػػؿ لجنػػػػػػة  بمػػػػػػف أسػػػػػػماء إلػػػػػػى
مؤسسػػػػػػة بقائمػػػػػػة الكعمػػػػػػى رئػػػػػػيس المجمػػػػػػس تةكيػػػػػػد  .فمسػػػػػػتقمك ال
مهامهػػػػػػػػػا ك تشػػػػػػػػمؿ جميػػػػػػػػع المجػػػػػػػػػاف التابعػػػػػػػػة لعمػػػػػػػػػؿ المجمػػػػػػػػس  
 .أعضائهاكا  جراءات عممها كأسماء 
 
 
 
 
 :4 elpicnirP
  
 seettimmoC draoB
 etairporppa na pu tes llahs srotceriD fo draoB ehT
 sti dna ezis s’knab eht ot gnidrocca seettimmoc fo rebmun
 sti mrofrep ot draoB eht elbane ot redro ni ,seitivitca
 dna snoinipo niatbo dna rennam evitceffe na ni seitud
  .seettimmoc eseht ni stsilaiceps morf ecivda
 ecnahne ot smia draoB eht fo seettimmoc fo esu ehT .95
 laitnetop si ereht erehw seussi no noinipo tnednepedni
 ni ecivda gnidivorp ni tsissa dna ,tseretni fo tcilfnoc
 noitcele ,tnemeganam ksir ,tidua sa hcus saera suoirav
 dna snoitarenumer dna ,srebmem draoB fo
 eht taht dnim ni gniraeb ,sevitucexe fo snoitasnepmoc
 draoB eht evlosba ton seod seettimmoc eseht fo esu
  .seitilibisnopser sti morf
 
 sa llew sa knab eht fo ezis eht dna snoitarepo fo erutan ehT .06
 draoB sti fo snoitacifilauq dna esitrepxe evitaler eht
 fo rebmun eht gninimreted ni elor yek a yalp srebmem
 hcus fo tnemhsilbatse ehT .detaerc eb ot seettimmoc
 eht fo ssenevitceffe eht sevorpmi yllausu seettimmoc
 htiw srebmem fo slliks eht no gnitartnecnoc yb draoB
   .snoitarepo dna seitivitca cificeps emos ni esitrepxe
 
 rof elbisnopser eb llahs srotceriD fo draoB ehT .16
 ecnanrevoG etaroproC  fo noitacilppa eht gnieesrevo
 erusne dluohs dna krow seettimmoc eht dna ecnadiug
 tuo gniyrrac  era seettimmoc eht fo srebmem eht taht
 .seitud rieht
 
 lla fo etadnam eht evorppa llahs draoB ehT .26
 dluohs eettimmoc hcaE .draoB eht fo seettimmoc
 sti ,snoitcnuf sti gniyficeps serudecorp lareneg evah
 ,seitud dna srewop sti ,krow sti fo epocs ,noitarud
 draoB eht hcihw hguorht msinahcem eht dna
 ni esolcsid dluohs knab ehT .seitivitca sti srotinom
 draoB eht fo gnikrow eht no troper launna sti
 dna ,krow rieht fo epocs eht ,demrof seettimmoc
 tnednepedni gnidulcni( srebmem rieht fo seman
 llahs draoB eht fo namriahC ehT .)srebmem
 eht fo seettimmoC lla fo tsil a htiw AMAS edivorp
 sa llew sa serudecorp krow dna seitud rieht ,draoB
  .seman ’srebmem rieht
 
 
 
  للرقابة على البنوكالإدارة العامة    
 
 lortnoC gniknaB fo etarotceriD lareneG
 
 423
 
 
 
عمػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػس  ينب ػػػػػػػػػػيالتػػػػػػػػػػي  المتخصصػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػف المجػػػػػػػػػػاف .36
 :المجاف الآتية  تككينها
 
  :راجعةلجنة الم
 
ف ة عػػػػػػػػقػػػػػػػػثػبػنػمػالأهػػػػػػػـ المجػػػػػػػاف  أحػػػػػػػد ةػعػػػػػػػػراجػمػة الػنػػػػػػػػجػل دػعػػػػػػػػت  .46
الالتػػػػػػػػػػػةاـ ضػػػػػػػػػػػماف  ة عػػػػػػػػػػػفػمسئكلػػػػػػػػػػػال هػػػػػػػػػػػيك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة. 
 اكد مػػػػػػػػفػتػػػػػػػػػكال ؾػنػػػػػػػػػبػميات الػى عمػػػػػػػػػمػػػػػػػػػالإشػػػػػػػػراؼ عك  ةػمػػػػػػػػػلأنظبا
ة ػيػػػػػػػػالػانات المػيػػػػػػػػبػة الػدالػػػػػػػػكعمػػػػػػػف دقػػػػػػػة ك ي ػظاـ رقابػػػػػػػػر نػػػػػػػػفػػػػػػػاتك 
 يػػػػػر  ة أعضػػػػاءن ػنػػػػػضاء المجػكف أعػػػػػكػػػػػف يأ يػ ػػػػػبػنػيك  ة. ػنػػػػػمػالمع
تعميمػػػػات المؤسسػػػػة كفػػػػؽ  تنفيػػػػ ييف مػػػػف داخػػػػؿ كخػػػػارج المجمػػػػس
قكاعػػػػػد تنظػػػػػيـ لجػػػػػاف المراجعػػػػػة فػػػػػي البنػػػػػكؾ العاممػػػػػة المتعمقػػػػػة ب
 بالمممكة.
 
 
رصػػػػػػػػػػػد   مجنػػػػػػػػػػػة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػةسػػػػػػػػػػػة ليالرئمسػػػػػػػػػػػئكليات الضػػػػػػػػػػػمف تت .56
كتقػػػػػػػػػػديـ   المراجعػػػػػػػػػػة الداخميػػػػػػػػػػة أنشػػػػػػػػػػطةفعاليػػػػػػػػػػة  كاسػػػػػػػػػػتعرا 
 تعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيفالتعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف كا  عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػادة الاف جمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس بشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمملتكصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػية ال
اسػػػػػػػػػػتقلبليته كدراسػػػػػػػػػػة  كضػػػػػػػػػماف ت ييػػػػػػػػػر المراجػػػػػػػػػػع الخػػػػػػػػػػارجيك 
السياسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات المحاسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبية كمراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة خطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المحاسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػب 
 مكجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكداتكحمايػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  القػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكائـ الماليػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة بشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػافالقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػانكني 
البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ  كمراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات الأطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ  ات العلبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
 .بشكؿ سميـ عنهالإفصاح تسجيمها كا كضماف
 
 
 
 مػػػػػػػػػػدةل رئػػػػػػػػػػيس كأعضػػػػػػػػػػاء لجنػػػػػػػػػػة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػةجمػػػػػػػػػػس المعػػػػػػػػػػيف ي   .66
لفتػػػػػػػػػرتيف إضػػػػػػػػػافيتيف كحػػػػػػػػػد  لمتجديػػػػػػػػػد  قابمػػػػػػػػػة ثػػػػػػػػػلبث سػػػػػػػػػنكات
عمػػػػػػػى الأقػػػػػػػؿ أعضػػػػػػػاء  ثلبثػػػػػػػة تتػػػػػػػالؼ المجنػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػفك أقصػػػػػػػى. 
ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػي أف ك . جمػػػػػػػػػػػيعهـ مػػػػػػػػػػػف الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء  يػػػػػػػػػػػر التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف
يكػػػػػػػػػكف أعضػػػػػػػػػاء المجنػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػف خػػػػػػػػػارج المجمػػػػػػػػػس أكثػػػػػػػػػر مػػػػػػػػػف 
الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف داخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس  كأف لا يكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف 
عملبئػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه أك  مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكظفي البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ أكالأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء 
ككلبئػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه أك مستشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاريه. كػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ لؾ ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي أف لا يكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف 
ائتمانيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع  لأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء لجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة أم علبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة
تسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػهيؿ ائتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاني    بطاقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات ائتمانيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة( البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ
أقاربػػػػػػػػػػػػه مػػػػػػػػػػػػف باسػػػػػػػػػػػػمه أك باسػػػػػػػػػػػػـ أحػػػػػػػػػػػػد  ....إلب)ضػػػػػػػػػػػػمانات
 امبػػػػػػػػػك  ألػػػػػػػػػؼ ريال  333 مبمػػػػػػػػػ  تةيػػػػػػػػػد عػػػػػػػػػف الدرجػػػػػػػػػة الأكلػػػػػػػػػى
مكظفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه  أك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس إدارتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه أكصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػفة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ 
 .التنفي ييف
 
 
 
 عمميػػػػػػػػػةمػػػػػػػػػؤهلبت  أعضػػػػػػػػػاء المجنػػػػػػػػة يكػػػػػػػػػكف لػػػػػػػػدل أف ينب ػػػػػػػػي .76
كا  دارة  الحسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػابات مراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػةمهنيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  كخبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرات
المحاسػػػػػػػػػػبية  المعػػػػػػػػػػايير معرفػػػػػػػػػػة بمػػػػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػػػػؾالمخػػػػػػػػػػاطر  
الأنظمػػػػػػػػػػػة كفهػػػػػػػػػػػـ   الماليػػػػػػػػػػػةتقػػػػػػػػػػارير القػػػػػػػػػػػراءة كالقػػػػػػػػػػدرة عمػػػػػػػػػػػى 
 tsum draoB eht taht seettimmoc laiceps eht gnomA .36
 :era hsilbatse
 
 :)CA( eettimmoC tiduA
 
 tnatropmi tsom eht fo eno si eettimmoC tiduA nA .46
 rof elbisnopser si tI .srotceriD fo draoB eht fo seettimmoc
 s’knab eht gnieesrevo dna selur htiw ecnailpmoc gnirusne
 ni si metsys lortnoc a taht erusne dluohs ti dna ,snoitcasnart
 .riaf dna etarucca era detroper atad laicnanif eht dna ecalp
 evitucexe – non eb dluohs srebmem eettimmoc tiduA ehT
 ot gnidrocca draoB eht edistuo dna edisni morf srebmem
 sknab fo seettimmoC tiduA gninrevog seluR s’AMAS
 .modgniK eht ni gnitarepo
 
 :edulcni seitilibisnopser niam s'eettimmoC tiduA ehT .56
 lanretni eht fo ssenevitceffe eht gniweiver dna gnirotinom
 no draoB eht ot snoitadnemmocer gnikam ,seitivitca tidua
 eht fo gnignahc dna tnemtnioppaer ,tnemtnioppa eht
 gniyduts ,ecnednepedni rieht gnirusne dna srotidua lanretxe
 ’srotidua lanretxe eht gniweiver dna seicilop gnitnuocca
 s'knab eht gnidraugefas ,stnemetats laicnanif ot detaler nalp
 gnirusne dna snoitcasnart 'seitrap detaler gniweiver ,stessa
 desolcsid dna dedrocer era snoitcasnart hcus taht
 .yletairporppa
 
 eettimmoC tiduA eht fo srebmeM dna namriahC ehT .66
 eerht fo doirep a rof draoB eht yb detnioppa eb llahs
 lanoitidda owt fo mumixam a rof elbawener ,sraey
  eerht tsael ta esirpmoc llahs eettimmoC ehT .smret
 srebmem eettimmoc ehT .srotceriD evitucexe - non
 morf esoht naht erom eb llahs draoB eht edistuo morf
 eht morf eb ton llahs rebmem ehT .draoB eht edisni
 .srosivda ro ,stnega ,sremotsuc ,ffats s’knab
 dluohs eettimmoc tidua eht fo rebmem a ,eromrehtruF
 ,drac tiderc( seitilicaf gnicnanif yna deliava evah ton
 sih ni knab eht morf )cte...seetnaraug ,ytilicaf tiderc
 srebmem ylimaf sih htiw trecnoc ni ro eman nwo
 nI .RAS 000,003 naht erom fo )eerged-tsrif(
 ssenisub a evah ton dluohs srebmem eht ,noitidda
 draoB eht fo srebmem rehto yna htiw pihsnoitaler
  .tnemeganam roines ro
  .
  evah dluohs eettimmoc eht fo srebmem ehT  .76
 ni ecneirepxe lanoisseforp ,snoitacifilauq cimedaca
 fo egdelwonk tnaveler ,tnemeganam ksir dna gnitidua
 daer ot yticapac eht dna ,sdradnats gnitnuocca
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 . العلبقة الجهات  ات القكاعد كالمكائح الصادرة مفك 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
كالتاكػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػف عمػػػػػػػػػػؿ المجنػػػػػػػػػػة  تحديػػػػػػػػػػد مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارةعمػػػػػػػػػى  .86
كالمكاضػػػػػػػػػػػيع  جػػػػػػػػػػػدكؿ أعمالهػػػػػػػػػػػا ككضػػػػػػػػػػػعاسػػػػػػػػػػػتقلبلية عممهػػػػػػػػػػػا 
 المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػة رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػيسأف يكػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف عميهػػػػػػػػػػػػػا. كيجػػػػػػػػػػػػػب  المطركحػػػػػػػػػػػػػة
كبػػػػػػػػػػػار المسػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف عػػػػػػػػػػػف ك  التنفي يػػػػػػػػػػػة عػػػػػػػػػػػف الإدارة تقلبن مسػػػػػػػػػػػ
 :فر الآتيامف خلبؿ تك  لؾ يتحقؽ ك   في البنؾ
 
مجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػة ل ان رئيسػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة عػػػػػػػػػػػػػدـ تعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػ . أ
 المراجعة.
تجاريػػػػػػػػة بػػػػػػػػيف أك قرابػػػػػػػػة أك علبقػػػػػػػػة ماليػػػػػػػػة  عػػػػػػػػدـ كجػػػػػػػػكد . ب
رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كبػػػػػػػػػػػػػيف أم عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػك مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء 
 مجمس الإدارة. 
 
 بالمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػديريفلػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرئيس المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة علبقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة يكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف  لاأف  . ج
التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف أك المسػػػػػػػػػػػػئكليف القيػػػػػػػػػػػػادييف بالبنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ تػػػػػػػػػػػػؤثر 
 . عمى استقلبليته
 
البنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ لمجنػػػػػػػػػػػػة عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى حجػػػػػػػػػػػػـ عػػػػػػػػػػػػدد اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػات ايعتمػػػػػػػػػػػػد  .96
كتشػػػػػػػػػػػترط هػػػػػػػػػػػا المجنػػػػػػػػػػػة  ب اؽ الأنشػػػػػػػػػػػطة التػػػػػػػػػػػي تكمػػػػػػػػػػػؼكنطػػػػػػػػػػػ
الحاجػػػػػػػػػػػػة  عنػػػػػػػػػػػػدمؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػة أف تكػػػػػػػػػػػػكف اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػات المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػة ال
فػػػػػػػػي  اجتماعػػػػػػػػات ةأف لا تقػػػػػػػػؿ عػػػػػػػػف أربعػػػػػػػػعمػػػػػػػػى إلػػػػػػػػى  لػػػػػػػػؾ  
تعقػػػػػػػػػدها قػػػػػػػػػد اجتماعػػػػػػػػػات أخػػػػػػػػػرل  مالسػػػػػػػػػنة (إضػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػى أ
 المجنة مع مراقبي الحسابات الخارجييف). 
 
 لاستمرار ان ركريػضها ػاتػماعػتػاجنة ػجػلماء اػضػأعكر ػضػد حػعػي .37
كف ػكػي يػكضاء ػف الأعػ% م35كر ػضػـة حػمػة كيػنػجػة المػكيػضػع
ى ػمػاءن عػنػبرة ػؤثػمػرارات الػقػيع الػمػج  ػخػتػكتاع صحيحان. ػمػتػالاج
ادؿ ػعػي حاؿ تػفة  ك ػيػبػمػالأ بدأ ػمػ  بػاء كالأخػضػكيت الأعػصػت
كت رئيس ػالة صػحػ   الػي هػح فػرجػمػكت الػصػلكف اػكػالأصكات ي
رؼ الآخر في محضر الاجتماع  مع ػطػيسجؿ رأم الك ة ػنػجػمػال
 ه. أف التصكيت بالككالة  ير مسمكح ب عمى التاكيد
 
 
أم مكظػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؼ لإجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  دعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكة  يمكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف .17
كمناقشػػػػػػػػػػػته فػػػػػػػػػػػي المكاضػػػػػػػػػػػيع المطركحػػػػػػػػػػػة  بمػػػػػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػػػػػي  لػػػػػػػػػػػؾ 
(الػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرئيس  بعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػك مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة المنتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػددعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكة 
مراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي الحسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػابات ك  التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ م  المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدير العػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ)
تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكةع محاضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػر اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات لػػػػػػػػػػػػػػداخمييف كالخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارجييف  ك ا
أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى جميػػػػػػػػػػػػعلجنػػػػػػػػػػػػة المراجعػػػػػػػػػػػػة 
مػػػػػػػػػػػػف مكاضػػػػػػػػػػػػيع  مإيضػػػػػػػػػػػػاح أطمػػػػػػػػػػػػب الػػػػػػػػػػػػ يف يحػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ لهػػػػػػػػػػػػـ 
    .المجنة
 dna selur detaler dnatsrednu dna stroper laicnanif
  .seititne tnetepmoc yb deussi snoitaluger
 
  ,krow s’eettimmoc eht enimreted llahs draob ehT .86
 .adnega sti htrof tes dna ecnednepedni sti erusne
 tnednepedni eb dluohs eettimmoC eht fo namriahC
 rojam dna tnemeganam evitucexe eht morf
 yb deveihca eb nac sihT .knab eht fo sredloherahs
 :gniwollof eht gniteem
 sa draoB eht fo namriahC eht fo tnemtnioppa-noN )a
 .eettimmoC tiduA eht fo namriahC
 ton dluohs eettimmoC tiduA eht fo namriahC ehT )b
 evah ro draoB eht fo srebmem rehto ot detaler eb
 yna htiw pihsnoitaler ssenisub ro laicnanif yna
  .draoB eht fo srebmem
 ton dluohs eettimmoc tidua eht fo namriahC ehT )c
 yek ro srotcerid evitucexe htiw pihsnoitaler a evah
 sih tceffa dluoc taht knab eht fo sevitucexe
  .ecnednepedni
 dneped llahs sgniteem s’eettimmoc eht fo rebmun ehT .96
 eht fo epocs eht dna knab eht fo erutan dna ezis eht no
 eht seriuqer AMAS ,revewoH .seitivitca s'eettimmoc
 ,seriuqer ssenisub eht sa netfo sa teem ot eettimmoc
 ot noitidda ni( raey a semit )4( ruof naht ssel ton dna
  .)srotidua lanretxe eht htiw sgniteem rehto
 
 s’eettimmoC eht fo srebmem eht fo ecnadnetta ehT .07
 tA .eunitnoc ot pihsrebmem rieht rof tnatropmi si sgniteem
 eht rof tneserp eb dluohs srebmem eht fo %05 ,tsael
 edam eb lliw snoisiced tnacifingis llA .dilav eb ot gniteem
 ,gnitov lauqe fo esac eht nI .etov ytirojam a fo sisab eht no
 eht fo noinipo eht ;etov gnitsac a evah llahs namriahC eht
 .gniteem eht fo setunim eht ni dedrocer eb tsum ytrap rehto
 .dettimrep eb llahs yxorp yb gnitov oN
 
 
 eht dnetta ot detivni eb yam eeyolpme s’knab eht fo ynA .17
 seussi eht reh/mih htiw ssucsid ot sgniteem s’eettimmoC
 ,reciffO evitucexE feihC( OEC eht sedulcni sihT .desiar
 ehT .srotidua lanretxe dna lanretni dna )reganaM lareneG
 lliw eettimmoC tiduA eht fo sgnideecorp eht fo setunim
 eht evah ohw draoB eht fo srebmem lla ot detalucric eb
 eht morf eussi  yna rof noitacifiralc a tseuqer ot thgir
 .eettimmoc
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 :والمكا آت لجنة الترشي 
حث ػبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة بالػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػنػعػكاف ت مػرشيح كالمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة التػػػػػػػػػػػػػػنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكف لجػكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػت .27
اء تنفيػػػػػػػػػػ ييف ك يػػػػػػػػػػر ػضػػػػػػػػػػػـ أعػيارهػػػػػػػػػػػتػخيف لاػرشحػػػػػػػػػػػتراح مػكاقػػػػػػػػػػ
مكافػػػػػػػػػ ت كفػػػػػػػػػؽ الكتحديػػػػػػػػػد نظػػػػػػػػػاـ حػػػػػػػػػكافة كاعتمػػػػػػػػػاد  تنفيػػػػػػػػػ ييف
عمػػػػػػػػػػى مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة   ك بهػػػػػػػػػػ ا الشػػػػػػػػػػاف تعميمػػػػػػػػػػات المؤسسػػػػػػػػػػة
عمػػػػػػػػى   أدنػػػػػػػػى حػػػػػػػػدان  ثلبثػػػػػػػػة أعضػػػػػػػػاء لمعمػػػػػػػػؿ بالمجنػػػػػػػػة تعيػػػػػػػػيف
عضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكاف  المعينػػػػػػػػػػػػيف أف يكػػػػػػػػػػػػكف مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف ضػػػػػػػػػػػػمف الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء
أس هػػػػػػػػػػػػػ   المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػة رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس ف يػػػػػػػػػػػػػر يمكػػػػػػػػػػػػػف أ لاك . مسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتقلبف
اجتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاعيف عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف  هػػػػػػػػػػػػػػااجتماعاتمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  كلا تقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ 
دراسػػػػػػػػػػة أداء الأعضػػػػػػػػػػاء  هػػػػػػػػػػاخلبليػػػػػػػػػػتـ فػػػػػػػػػػي العػػػػػػػػػػاـ الكاحػػػػػػػػػػد 
سياسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كترشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيح أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء جػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدد كمناقشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كتقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيمهـ 
 .المكاف ت كالحكافة
 
 
 
 التنسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيؽ مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػع إدارة المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكارد البشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرية عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة .37
مػػػػػػػػف  بهػػػػػػػػاتػػػػػػػػةاـ الاللإحػػػػػػػػلبؿ كالتاكػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػف اتطػػػػػػػػكير سياسػػػػػػػػة ل
 . الإدارة التنفي ية
 
معمكمػػػػػػػػات عػػػػػػػػف  يحتػػػػػػػػكم عمػػػػػػػىسػػػػػػػػجؿ  كضػػػػػػػعمجنػػػػػػػػة العمػػػػػػػى  .47
التعػػػػػػػػػػػرؼ  بهػػػػػػػػػػػدؼمػػػػػػػػػػػؤهلبت كمهػػػػػػػػػػػارات أعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء المجمػػػػػػػػػػػس 
ؿ دكر ػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػفػتػعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارات الإضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػافية المطمكبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة ل
 ه كمسئكلياته. ػهامػمػب امهػيػكقالمجمس 
 
 
 ؽػفػػػػػػػػػػػتػيـ المكافػػػػػػػػػػ ت ػجػػػػػػػػػػػة التاكػػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػػف أف حػنػػػػػػػػػػػجػى المػمػػػػػػػػػػػع .57
رقابية  ػة الػػػػػػػػػػػػػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػظػة كالأنػميػػػػػػػػػػػػػحػسػػػػػػػػػػػػائدة المالأعػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ المػػػػػػػػػػػػع 
المسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف المػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكدعيف ك كمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػرتبط بتحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ مصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالح 
البنػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ الإسػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجية طكيمػػػػػػػػػػػػة المػػػػػػػػػػػػدل. كتحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ أهػػػػػػػػػػػػداؼ 
لا ك  مراجعتػػػػػػػػػه دكريػػػػػػػػػػان يػػػػػػػػػتـ  نظػػػػػػػػػاـ الحػػػػػػػػػكافة كالتاكػػػػػػػػػد مػػػػػػػػػف أف
فػػػػػػػػػػػػي عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػات  ات مخػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر عاليػػػػػػػػػػػػة  المشػػػػػػػػػػػػاركةيشػػػػػػػػػػػػجع 
مػػػػػػػػػػػػع سياسػػػػػػػػػػػػػة  كيتفػػػػػػػػػػػػؽتحقيػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ أربػػػػػػػػػػػػاح قصػػػػػػػػػػػػيرة المػػػػػػػػػػػػدل ل
 مخاطر البنؾ المعتمدة مف المجمس. 
 
 
عػػػػػػػػف آليػػػػػػػػة  التقريػػػػػػػػر السػػػػػػػػنكم لمبنػػػػػػػػؾفػػػػػػػػي  الإفصػػػػػػػػاح نب يػيػػػػػػػػ .67
حسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػب مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا جػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  تحديػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد مكافػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ت الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء
  مػػػػػػػػػػػع إيضػػػػػػػػػػػاح آليػػػػػػػػػػػة بهػػػػػػػػػػػ ا الشػػػػػػػػػػػافالمؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػة  تعميمػػػػػػػػػػػات
مكافػػػػػػػػػػػ ت  ككػػػػػػػػػػػ لؾتحديػػػػػػػػػػػد مكافػػػػػػػػػػػ ت الأعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء التنفيػػػػػػػػػػػ ييف 
كػػػػػػػػػػػؿ بنػػػػػػػػػػػد  (مفصػػػػػػػػػػػمة حسػػػػػػػػػػب الأعضػػػػػػػػػػاء  يػػػػػػػػػػػر التنفيػػػػػػػػػػ ييف
  العػػػػػػػػػػػػلبكات  كخيػػػػػػػػػػػػارات ت ؿ مبمػػػػػػػػػػػػ  الراتػػػػػػػػػػػػب  المكافػػػػػػػػػػػػمثػػػػػػػػػػػػ
 ).تممؾ الأسهـ
 
 
 
  :CCN eettimmoC noitasnepmoC dna noitanimoN
 llahs eettimmoc noitasnepmoC dna noitanimoN ehT .27
 fo gnidnemmocer dna gniyfitnedi htiw denrecnoc eb
-non dna evitucexe sa noitceles rof seenimon
 metsys sevitnecni na gninimreted ,srotceriD evitucexe
 s’AMAS ot gnidrocca noitasnepmoc fo gnivorppa dna
 a tnioppa llahs draoB ehT .snoitcurtsni detaler
 ,eettimmoc eht ni krow ot srebmem eerht fo muminim
 ehT .srebmem tnednepedni eb tsum eseht fo owt
 .eettimmoc siht riahc ton nac draoB eht fo namriahC
 a eciwt teem dluohs eettimmoC eht ,muminim a sA
 ,ecnamrofrep srebmem etaulave dna ssessa ot raey
 eht ssucsid dna ,setadidnac wen etanimon
 .ycilop sevitnecni dna noitasnepmoc
 
 namuH eht htiw etanidrooc llahs eettimmoc ehT .37
 tnemecalper a poleved ot tnemtrapeD secruoseR
 roines eht fo ecnailpmoc eht erusne dna ycilop
 .ycilop hcus htiw tnemeganam
 
 gnidulcni drocer a poleved llahs eettimmoc ehT .47
 dna snoitacifilauq ’srebmem draoB eht no noitamrofni
 etavitca ot slliks deriuqer lanoitidda yfitnedi ot slliks
 dna snoitcnuf sti tcudnoc ot selor s’draoB eht
  .seitilibisnopser
 
 fo tnuoma eht taht erusne llahs eettimmoC ehT .57
 citsemod gniliaverp eht htiw tnetsisnoc si snoitasnepmoc
 eht dengila dna ,snoitaluger yrosivrepus dna secitcarp
 mret-gnol s’knab eht dna sredloherahs ,srotisoped fo stseretni
 eht taht erusne llahs eettimmoC ehT .sevitcejbo cigetarts
 ton seod dna deweiver yllacidoirep si metsys sevitnecni
 eveihca ot snoitcasnart ksir hgih ni noitapicitrap egaruocne
 ycilop ksir s’knab eht htiw seilpmoc ti dna stiforp mret-trohs
 .draoB eht yb devorppa
 
  snoitasnepmoc ’srotceriD gnittes rof msinahcem ehT .67
 ni knab eht fo troper launna eht ni desolcsid eb dluohs
 ehT .snoitcurtsni detaler s’AMAS htiw ecnadrocca
 roF .desolcsid eb dluohs srotceriD rof noitarenumer
 eb dluohs noitarenumer eht ,srotceriD evitucexE
 cisab :sa hcus smeti yb nwod nekorb dna deifissalc
 dna ,noitarenumer ,sesunob ,drawer ,ecnawolla ,yralas
 .snoitpo pihsrenwo-erahs
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 المجنة التنفي ية:
 مػػػػػػػػػػػف خمسػػػػػػػػػػػة أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػاء عػػػػػػػػػػػػادةن التنفي يػػػػػػػػػػػة تتػػػػػػػػػػػالؼ المجنػػػػػػػػػػػة  .77
الػػػػػػػػػػرئيس يرأسػػػػػػػػػػها  أف  كيمكػػػػػػػػػػف (تنفيػػػػػػػػػػ ييف ك يػػػػػػػػػػر تنفيػػػػػػػػػػ ييف)
يحػػػػػػػػػػدد مجمػػػػػػػػػػس ك . التنفيػػػػػػػػػػ م (المػػػػػػػػػػدير العػػػػػػػػػػاـ) فػػػػػػػػػػي البنػػػػػػػػػػؾ
 ئكلان مسػػػػػػػػػػػػكيكػػػػػػػػػػػػكف صػػػػػػػػػػػػلبحيات كمسػػػػػػػػػػػػئكليات المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػة الإدارة 
يحػػػػػػػػػدد المجمػػػػػػػػػس بقػػػػػػػػػرار ك  عػػػػػػػػػف متابعػػػػػػػػػة تنفيػػػػػػػػػ  الصػػػػػػػػػلبحيات
منػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػه اختصاصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات هػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ   المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة كأحكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاـ عممهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا 
فيهػػػػػػػػا  إشػػػػػػػػراؾ المجنػػػػػػػػة  ينب ػػػػػػػػيكالمكاضػػػػػػػػيع التػػػػػػػػي كشػػػػػػػػركطه 
 سػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتةعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف  اعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدد اجتماعاتهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ ؿعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى أف لا يقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ
  مػػػػػػػػػػع الإشػػػػػػػػػػارة إلػػػػػػػػػػى أنػػػػػػػػػػه يمكػػػػػػػػػػف اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػات فػػػػػػػػػػي السػػػػػػػػػػنة
 أم كقػػػػػػػػػػػت إ ا اقتضػػػػػػػػػػػت الحاجػػػػػػػػػػػةكتهػػػػػػػػػػػا للبجتمػػػػػػػػػػػاع فػػػػػػػػػػػي دع
حضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكر لمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدير المخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر دعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكة كيجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكة  . لػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ
اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات المجنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة دكف الحصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى حػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ 
تقػػػػػػػػػديـ  رئػػػػػػػػػيس المجنػػػػػػػػػة كعمػػػػػػػػػى قػػػػػػػػػرارات.العمػػػػػػػػػى  تالتصػػػػػػػػػكي
عػػػػػػػػػػد قضػػػػػػػػػػية هامػػػػػػػػػػة  كيحػػػػػػػػػػدد ب لممجمػػػػػػػػػػس بشػػػػػػػػػػاف أم تقريػػػػػػػػػػر
 ينب ػػػػػػػػػػػػػيالتشػػػػػػػػػػػػػاكر مػػػػػػػػػػػػػع رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػكد التػػػػػػػػػػػػػي 
إلػػػػػػػػػػى  إضػػػػػػػػػػافةن إدراجهػػػػػػػػػػا عمػػػػػػػػػػى جػػػػػػػػػػدكؿ أعمػػػػػػػػػػاؿ المجمػػػػػػػػػػس  
 أخرل.مف اختصا لجاف ف مكاضيع لا تكك أم 
 
 
 
مخػػػػػػػػػػاطر لإدارة ال  لجنػػػػػػػػػة يشػػػػػػػػػكؿ أف المجمػػػػػػػػػس عمػػػػػػػػػى يجػػػػػػػػػب .87
 تنفيػػػػػػػػػػػػػ م  يػػػػػػػػػػػػػر رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس برئاسػػػػػػػػػػػػػة تابعػػػػػػػػػػػػػة لمجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة
الإشػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػة إدارة فػػػػػػػػػػػػي المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس لمسػػػػػػػػػػػػاعدة 
مخػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر الائتمػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف كالكفػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء بالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػؤكليات الأخػػػػػػػػػػػػػرل  ات 
العلبقػػػػػػػػة التػػػػػػػػي قػػػػػػػػد يككػػػػػػػػؿ بهػػػػػػػػا مػػػػػػػػف قبػػػػػػػػؿ المجمػػػػػػػػس  كفقػػػػػػػػان 
كتػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاريب  244633333143مؤسسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة رقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػـ لتعمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيـ ال
المخػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاطر ـ  كيمكػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف دعػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكة رئػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيس إدارة 3132 2 2
 أف يككف عضكان بها. لحضكر الاجتماعات دكف 
 
 
كػػػػػػػػػؿ بنػػػػػػػػػؾ كحجػػػػػػػػػـ  حسػػػػػػػػػب أنشػػػػػػػػػطةلمجمػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة  ينب ػػػػػػػػػي .97
لجػػػػػػػػػػػػاف  إنشػػػػػػػػػػػاء بحػػػػػػػػػػػػث الأصػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ التػػػػػػػػػػػػي يممكهػػػػػػػػػػػاكنكعيػػػػػػػػػػػة 
عمميػػػػػػػػػات البنػػػػػػػػػؾ. لمتابعػػػػػػػػػة كمراقبػػػػػػػػػة مختمػػػػػػػػػؼ  تابعػػػػػػػػػة أخػػػػػػػػػرل
لمجػػػػػػػػػػػػاف المكصػػػػػػػػػػػػى بتككينهػػػػػػػػػػػػا لجنػػػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػػػف ضػػػػػػػػػػػػمف هػػػػػػػػػػػػ   ا
 .كلجنة الحككمة كلجنة المكارد البشرية الائتماف
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 :eettimmoC evitucexE
 evif sesirpmoc yllausu eettimmoC evitucexE ehT .77
 eb yam tI .)sevitucexe-non dna sevitucexe( srotceriD
 lareneG( reciffO evitucexE feihC eht yb deriahc
 eht fo seitilibisnopser dna srewop ehT .)reganaM
 dna deificeps eb llahs eettimmoC evitucexE
 rof elbisnopser si hcihw draoB eht yb denimreted
 yficeps llahs draoB ehT .ecnamrofrep sti pu gniwollof
 eht enifed dna ecnerefer fo smret sti noituloser a yb
 scipot eht sa llew sa krow sti fo snoitidnoc dna smret
 ehT .trap ekat llahs eettimmoc eht hcihw ni
 tI .raey a semit xis naht ssel on teem llahs eettimmoC
 ehT .sesira deen eht fi emit yna ta denommus eb nac
 eht dnetta ot detivni eb yam reciffO ksiR feihC
 .etov ot thgir on htiw sgniteem eettimmoC evitucexE
 eht ot troper llahs eettimmoc eht fo namriahC ehT
 ,enimreted llahs ehs/eH .eussi rojam yna no draoB
 eht ,draoB eht fo namriahC eht htiw noitatlusnoc retfa
 eht fo adnegA eht ni dedulcni eb llahs taht smeti
 .sgniteem draoB
 
 ksiR draoB a etutitsnoc ot deriuqer osla si draoB ehT .87
 evitucexe-non a yb dedaeh eettimmoC tnemeganaM
 ksir tiderc eht gnieesrevo ni draoB eht tsissa ot rotcerid
 detaler rehto hcus egrahcsid ot dna ssecorp tnemeganam
 sa draoB eht yb ti ot dengissa eb yam sa seitilibisnopser
 .3102/20/20 detad 244630000143# ralucric AMAS rep
 ksiR draoB eht fo rebmem a eb ton lliw ORC ehT
 sti dnetta ot detivni ebyam tub eettimmoC tnemeganaM
 .sgniteem
 
 eht dna seitivitca s'knab hcae fo erutan eht no gnidnepeD .97
 yam draoB eht ,snoitarepo sti fo ytixelpmoc dna ezis
 rotinom ot seettimmoc rehto hcus gnihsilbatse redisnoc
 eb yam sa snoitarepo s`knab eht esivrepus dna
 edulcni ,aila retni ,yam seettimmoc esehT .yrassecen
 namuh ,eettimmoc ecnanrevog ,eettimmoc tiderc
 .cte ,eettimmoc ecruoser
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 :حقوق المسا:مين
الحوكم ــــــــة المتبع ــــــــة تحم ــــــــي  مب ــــــــادئالتأك ــــــــد م ــــــــن أن  ينبغ ــــــــي
وتســــــــا:م  ممارســــــــة حقــــــــوقهم،ا:مين وتســــــــهل حقــــــــوق المســــــــ
لمتواصــــــل قنــــــوات اتصــــــال  عالــــــة ووســــــائل متنوعــــــة   ـــــي تــــــو ير
بالعـــــدل،  تهممعـــــاممجميـــــ  مســـــا:مي البنـــــ ، والتأكـــــد مـــــن   مـــــ
عمـــــى  المســـــاعدةوكـــــ ل  الأقميـــــة. ن  ـــــي  لـــــ  المســـــا:مو بمـــــن
اجتماعـــــــات الجمعي ـــــــة حـــــــثهم باســـــــتمرار عم ـــــــى المشـــــــاركة  ـــــــي 
أداا البنـــــــ  المتعمقـــــــة ب ـــــــوتقـــــــديم المقترحـــــــات العام ـــــــة العادي ـــــــة 
 وتطوير عممياته.
 
 
 
مارسػػػػػػػػة تضػػػػػػػػمف ملػػػػػػػػدل البنػػػػػػػػؾ آليػػػػػػػػة محػػػػػػػػددة  تػػػػػػػػكافر ينب ػػػػػػػػي .38
حصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكلهـ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المعمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات ك  حقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكقهـالمسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف 
كف تػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاخير  كتشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػمؿ هػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػ   الحقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؽ: المناسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبة د
حضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكر جمعيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات الحصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكؿ عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى الأربػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاح ك 
المسػػػػػػػػػػاهميف كالاشػػػػػػػػػػتراؾ فػػػػػػػػػػي مػػػػػػػػػػداكلاتها كالتصػػػػػػػػػػكيت عمػػػػػػػػػػى 
البريػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد أك قراراتهػػػػػػػػػػػػػا بالحضػػػػػػػػػػػػػكر الشخصػػػػػػػػػػػػػي أك اسػػػػػػػػػػػػػتخداـ 
الأنظمػػػػػػػػػػة كالتعميمػػػػػػػػػػات    كفػػػػػػػػػػؽ مػػػػػػػػػػا تحػػػػػػػػػػدد كسػػػػػػػػػػائؿ التقنيػػػػػػػػػػة
 العلبقة.  ات
 
 : الآتي  الرئيسةتشمؿ حقكؽ المساهميف  .18
التػػػػػي  ات العلبقػػػػة المعمكمػػػػات  جميػػػػع الحصػػػػكؿ عمػػػػى . أ
ف مػػػػػف ممارسػػػػػة حقػػػػػكقهـ عمػػػػػى أكمػػػػػؿ تمكػػػػػف المسػػػػػاهمي
 بصفة دكرية كدكف تاخير.  كجه
 
المشػػػػػػػػػػػاركة كالتصػػػػػػػػػػػكيت فػػػػػػػػػػػي اجتماعػػػػػػػػػػػات الجمعيػػػػػػػػػػػة  . ب
تػػػػي يؤخػػػػ  فػػػػي الاعتبػػػػار المكاضػػػػيع ال أفعمػػػػى العامػػػػة 
طرحهػػػػػػػػػػػػػا فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي مثػػػػػػػػػػػػػؿ هػػػػػػػػػػػػػ    فك المسػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهم ير ػػػػػػػػػػػػػب
 الاجتماعات.
 
 أعمػػػػػػاؿجػػػػػػدكؿ  عمػػػػػػىالمكضػػػػػػكعات المدرجػػػػػػة  مناقشػػػػػػة . ج
كتكجيػػػػػػه الاستفسػػػػػارات إلػػػػػى أعضػػػػػػاء  الجمعيػػػػػة العامػػػػػة
المجمػػػػس كالمحاسػػػػب القػػػػانكني  كالحصػػػػكؿ عمػػػػى إفػػػػادة 
 .بشانها
 
أسػػػػػػػػػػمكب إمػػػػػػػػػػا بإتبػػػػػػػػػػاع لمجمػػػػػػػػػػس اختيػػػػػػػػػػار اعضػػػػػػػػػػاء ا . د
اكمػػػػػػػػػػػي (كػػػػػػػػػػػؿ مسػػػػػػػػػػػاهـ لديػػػػػػػػػػػه قػػػػػػػػػػػدرة التصػػػػػػػػػػػكيت التر 
الأسػػػػػػػػػػػهـ التػػػػػػػػػػػي يممكهػػػػػػػػػػػا  بحيػػػػػػػػػػػث  بعػػػػػػػػػػػدد تصػػػػػػػػػػػكيتية
يسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتطيع التصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػكيت فيهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا لمرشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػح كاحػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد أك 
دكف تقسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػيمها عمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػى عػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػدد مػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػف المرشػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػحيف  
أك أم أسػػػػػػػمكب آخػػػػػػػر يػػػػػػػتـ إقػػػػػػػرار  مػػػػػػػف قبػػػػػػػؿ  تكػػػػػػػرار)
المسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف بمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا يحقػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ كافػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالح 
 المساهميف عمى اختلبؼ فئاتهـ.
 
 :5 elpicnirP
 
 :sredloherahS fo sthgiR ehT 
 dluohs dewollof selpicnirp ecnanrevog etaroproc ehT
 ’sredloherahs fo esicrexe eht etatilicaf dna tcetorp
 rof slennahc evitceffe gnidivorp ot etubirtnoc ,sthgir
 eht erusne dna sredloherahs htiw noitacinummoc
 gnidulcni ,sredloherahs lla fo tnemtaert elbatiuqe
 redloherahs retaerg egaruocne ,sgnidloh ytironim
 lareneG yranidrO eht fo sgniteem eht ta noitapicitrap
 s’knab eht ot gnitaler slasoporp tneserp dna ,ylbmessA
 sti fo tnempoleved eht ecnahne dna ecnamrofrep
 .snoitarepo
 
 timrep ot ecalp ni eb llahs msinahcem cificeps A .08
 niatbo ot dna sthgir rieht esicrexe ot sredloherahs
 sthgir ’sredloherahS .sisab ylemit a no noitamrofni
 ot thgir eht dna sdnedivid fo thgir eht :edulcni
 fo sgniteem eht ta etov dna snoitarebiled ni etapicitrap
 ro nosrep ni etov dna ylbmessA lareneG yranidrO eht
 dna selur detaler ot gnidrocca )cte…xaf ,liam( liam yb
 .snoitaluger
 
  :gniwollof eht edulcni llahs sthgir redloherahs cisaB .18
 selbane hcihw noitamrofni detaler lla niatbO .a
 tseb eht ni sthgir rieht esicrexe ot sredloherahs
 .sisab raluger dna ylemit a no rennam
 
 ylbmessA lareneG eht ta etov dna etapicitraP .b
 ot erised sredloherahs taht seussi ehT .sgniteem
 otni nekat eb llahs sgniteem eht ta esiar
  .noitaredisnoc
 
 s’ylbmessA lareneG eht ni detsil srettam ssucsiD .c
 srebmem draoB eht ot seireuq esiar dna adnega
 kcabdeef teg ot dna rotidua lanretxe eht ot dna
 .noereht
 
 hguorht srebmem draoB eht tcele ot thgir ehT .d
 sah redloherahs hcae( gnitov evitalumucca  rehtie
 serahs fo rebmun eht ot tnelaviuqe thgir gnitov a
 eno rof lla meht esu ot thgir eht sah eH .snwo eh
 detceles neewteb meht edivid ot ro eenimon
 rehto yna ro )snoitacilpud tuohtiw ,seenimon
 hcihw sredloherahs yb devorppa dohtem gnitov
 fo sessalc tnereffid fo stseretni eht sevres
 .redloherahs
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عمػػػػػػػى البنػػػػػػػؾ تةكيػػػػػػػد المؤسسػػػػػػػة بنسػػػػػػػخة مػػػػػػػف محاضػػػػػػػر هػػػػػػػػ. 
 العامػػػػػة خػػػػػلبؿ فتػػػػػرة لا تةيػػػػػد عمػػػػػىمعيػػػػػة اجتماعػػػػػات الج
 ) يكمان مف تاريب انعقادها.51(
 
ات عػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مكػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف ػمكمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػمػيف بػمػػػػػػػػػػػػػػد المساهػةكيػػػػػػػػػػػػػػت يػ ػػػػػػػػػػػػػػبػنػي .28
ا ػهػػػػػػػػػػػػػلاػمػدكؿ أعػة كجػػػػػػػػػػػػػامػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػة الػيػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػمػجػاد الػقػػػػػػػػػػػػػعػكتػػػػػػػػػػػػاريب ان
ت كػػػػػػػػػاؼ كبمػػػػػػػػػا يتفػػػػػػػػػؽ مػػػػػػػػػع الأنظمػػػػػػػػػة ػكقػػػػػػػػػػب اجتماعهػػػػػػػػػاقبػػػػػػػػػؿ 
 مف الجهات  ات العلبقة. كالتعميمات الصادرة
 
 
 
ترشػػػػػػػػػػػػػيح كانتخػػػػػػػػػػػػػاب أعضػػػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس حػػػػػػػػػػػػػؽ لممسػػػػػػػػػػػػػاهميف  .38
تهـ كقػػػػػػػػػػػػػدرتهـ االإدارة كالاستفسػػػػػػػػػػػػػار عػػػػػػػػػػػػػف مػػػػػػػػػػػػػؤهلبتهـ كخبػػػػػػػػػػػػػر 
كمناقشػػػػػػػػػػة حجػػػػػػػػػػـ المكافػػػػػػػػػػ ت كالحػػػػػػػػػػكافة   عممهػػػػػػػػػػـعمػػػػػػػػػػى أداء 
يتقاضػػػػػػػػػػاها أعضػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة ككبػػػػػػػػػػار الماليػػػػػػػػػػة التػػػػػػػػػػي 
أم قػػػػػػػػديـ فة إلػػػػػػػػى حقهػػػػػػػػـ فػػػػػػػػي ت  إضػػػػػػػػاالأعضػػػػػػػػاء التنفيػػػػػػػػ ييف
ممارسػػػػػػػػػػػػػات  يػػػػػػػػػػػػػر  استفسػػػػػػػػػػػػػار إلػػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػػس بشػػػػػػػػػػػػػاف أم
 .فادة بشانهاكالحصكؿ عمى إ مهنية
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 eht fo ypoc a htiw AMAS edivorp llahs knab ehT .e
 nihtiw sgniteem ylbmessA lareneG eht fo setunim
 eht fo etad eht fo syad )51(  naht erom on
 .gniteem
 tneiciffus htiw dehsinruf eb dluohs sredloherahS .28
 eht fo adnega dna noitacol ,etad eht no noitamrofni
 emit tneiciffus nihtiw ,sgniteem s’ylbmessA lareneG
 eht htiw ecnadrocca ni dna gniteem eht erofeb
 yrotaluger yna yb deussi snoitcurtsni dna snoitaluger
  .ydob yrosivrepus dna
 
 draoB tcele dna etanimon ot thgir eht evah sredloherahS .38
 slliks ,snoitacifilauq rieht tuoba eriuqne ot dna srebmem
 eht evah ,osla yehT .sboj rieht mrofrep ot yticapac dna
 deviecer sevitnecni dna snoitarenumer eht ssucsid ot thgir
 rieht sa llew sa sevitucexe yek pot dna srebmem draoB yb
 yna tuoba seiriuqne rieht etacinummoc ot thgir
 reporp teg dna draoB eht ot secitcarp lanoisseforpnu
 .kcabdeef
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 المبدأ السادك: 
 
 :الإ صاح والشفا ية
إتب ـــــــــاع مب ـــــــــدأ الإ صـــــــــاح والشـــــــــفا ية  ـــــــــي عممي ـــــــــات  ينبغـــــــــي
، وعمــــــى المجمــــــك نشــــــر المعمومــــــات جميعهــــــا وأنشــــــطة البنــــــ 
مالي ـــــــة الت ـــــــي ته ـــــــم الم ـــــــودعين والمســـــــا:مين الالمالي ـــــــة و:ي ـــــــر 
ثمرين والمتعــــــــــــاممين بالســــــــــــوق وت وي ــــــــــــد الجهــــــــــــات والمســــــــــــت
 والأطــــــــرا  الأ ــــــــرة أصــــــــحاب المصــــــــمحةالإشــــــــرا ية والرقابيــــــــة 
 .بها
 
عمػػػػػػػػػػػػى المجمػػػػػػػػػػػػس تةكيػػػػػػػػػػػػد الأطػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ أصػػػػػػػػػػػػحاب المصػػػػػػػػػػػػمحة  .48
بمعمكمػػػػػػػػػات شػػػػػػػػػاممة تسػػػػػػػػػاعد عمػػػػػػػػػى تحديػػػػػػػػػد تكجهػػػػػػػػػات البنػػػػػػػػػؾ 
 المستقبمية كخططه الإستراتيجية.
 
 
المػػػػػػػػػكدعيف  عػػػػػػػػػف المعمكمػػػػػػػػػات التػػػػػػػػػي تهػػػػػػػػػـ الإفصػػػػػػػػػاح ينب ػػػػػػػػػي .58
 مػػػػػف خػػػػػلبؿ التقريػػػػػر السػػػػػنكم   سػػػػػكاءلمسػػػػػاهميف كالمسػػػػػتثمريفاك 
المكقػػػػػػػػع الالكتركنػػػػػػػػي لمبنػػػػػػػػؾ  أك أم طريقػػػػػػػػة أخػػػػػػػػرل لمبنػػػػػػػػؾ أك 
نػػػػػػػكع كطبيعػػػػػػػة المعمكمػػػػػػػات التػػػػػػػي أف يكػػػػػػػكف  ينب ػػػػػػػيك مناسػػػػػػػبة. 
 .مناسبان لحجـ البنؾ كأنشطته تنشر
 
 
جميػػػػػػػػػع الأحػػػػػػػػػكاؿ فػػػػػػػػػي  أف تشػػػػػػػػػمؿ عمميػػػػػػػػػة الإفصػػػػػػػػػاح ينب ػػػػػػػػػي .68
 :الآتي
حصػػػػػػػػػػػػػة فػػػػػػػػػػػػػي  تممػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾتػػػػػػػػػػػػػي الجهػػػػػػػػػػػػػات كالأطػػػػػػػػػػػػػراؼ ال . أ
 البنؾ.
 مجمس إدارة البنؾ كالمجاف التابعة له. . ب
 معمكمػػػػػػػػػػات مفصػػػػػػػػػػمة عػػػػػػػػػػف حجػػػػػػػػػػـ المكافػػػػػػػػػػ ت الماليػػػػػػػػػػة . ج
رئيس كأعضػػػػػػػػػػػاء مجمػػػػػػػػػػػس الإدارة الػػػػػػػػػػػالمدفكعػػػػػػػػػػػة إلػػػػػػػػػػػى 
المػػػػػػػػػكظفيف التنفيػػػػػػػػػ ييف الػػػػػػػػػ يف يتطمػػػػػػػػػب إضػػػػػػػػػافة إلػػػػػػػػػى 
دكف  تعييػػػػػػنهـ الحصػػػػػػكؿ عمػػػػػػى عػػػػػػدـ ممانعػػػػػػة المؤسسػػػػػػة
 .أسمائهـ كر 
ت الماليػػػػػػػػػة كسياسػػػػػػػػػة  معمكمػػػػػػػػػات عػػػػػػػػػف نظػػػػػػػػػاـ المكافػػػػػػػػػ . د
 الحكافة.
 الإطار العاـ لأنظمة الرقابة الداخمية.هػ. 
 البنؾ. يالأخلبقية كالأسس المهنية لمكظف مبادئال . ك
علبقػػػػػػػػػة  أم عمميػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػع طػػػػػػػػرؼ  ممعمكمػػػػػػػػات عػػػػػػػػػف  . ة
إف ( ممصػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػالحلضػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػارب تكأم عمميػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػة فيهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا 
 كالسياسات المنظمة لها. )كجدت
  الخطػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػط كالتكجهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػات الإسػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػتراتيجية لمبنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ . ح
ؾ كانػػػػػػػػػػػػدماج بػػػػػػػػػػػػرة التطػػػػػػػػػػػػكرات مػػػػػػػػػػػػف تمم ػػػػػػػػػػػػا أكلاسػػػػػػػػػػػػيم
 كا  نشاء شركات تابعة.
التػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي يطبقهػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػا البنػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػؾ فػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػي مجػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػاؿ  مبػػػػػػػػػػػػػػػادئال . ط
 الحككمة.
التصػػػػػػػػػػػػػنيفات الائتمانيػػػػػػػػػػػػػة الممنكحػػػػػػػػػػػػػة مػػػػػػػػػػػػػف ككػػػػػػػػػػػػػالات  . م
 التصنيؼ الدكلية. 
  :6 elpicnirP
 
 :ycnerapsnarT dna erusolcsiD
 deilppa eb llahs elpicnirp ycnerapsnart dna erusolcsid ehT
 llahs draoB ehT .knab eht fo seitivitca dna snoitarepo lla no
 hcihw noitamrofni laicnanif-non dna laicnanif lla hsilbup
 tekram ,srotsevni ,sredloherahs ,srotisoped snrecnoc
 yrotaluger ot dedivorp eb llahs noitamrofni hcus ;srelaed
  .seitrap denrecnoc rehto dna seititne yrosivrepus dna
 
 htiw sredlohekats edivorp llahs draoB ehT .48
 meht tsissa dluoc hcihw noitamrofni evisneherpmoc
 fo snalp cigetarts dna sdnert erutuf eht gniyfitnedi ni
 .knab eht
 
 taht noitamrofni eht esolcsid dluohs knab ehT .58
 ,sredloherahs dna srotsevni ,srotisoped snrecnoc
 aiv ro etisbew ,knab eht fo troper launna eht hguorht
 fo erutan dna epyT .lennahc etairporppa na
 ezis eht htiw enil ni eb llahs dehsilbup noitamrofni
  .knab eht fo seitivitca dna
 
 gniwollof eht ,sesac lla ni ,edulcni dluohs erusolcsiD .68
  :srettam
 eht ni pihsrenwo erahs htiw seitrap dna seititne ehT .a
  .knab
 .seettimmoc sti dna srotceriD fo draoB ehT .b
 eht ot diap snoitasnepmoc fo noitamrofni deliateD .c
 srotceriD fo draoB eht fo srebmem dna namriahC
 tnemtnioppa esohw sevitucexe ot noitidda ni
 gnivig tuohtiw , AMAS yb noitcejbo-on seriuqer
 .seman rieht
 laicnanif fo metsys eht no noitamrofnI .d
 .ycilop evitnecni dna noitasnepmoc
 .krowemarf lortnoc lanretnI .e
 'sknab eht fo selpicnirp lanoisseforp dna lacihtE .f
 .ffats
 seitrap detaler htiw noitcasnart yna no noitamrofnI .g
 fi ,tseretni fo tcilfnoc gnivlovni noitcasnart yna dna
 .meht gninrevog seicilop eht dna ,yna
 yllaicepse ,knab eht fo sdnert cigetarts dna snalP .h
 ,revo-ekat gninrecnoc stnempoleved tnenimorp
 .seiraidisbus fo tnemhsilbatse ro ,regrem
 fo aera eht ni knab eht yb deilppa selpicnirP .i
 .ecnanrevoG etaroproC
 gnitar tiderc lanoitanretni yb sgnitar tiderc s’knaB .j
 .seicnega
    ةماعلا ةرادلإاكونبلا ىلع ةباقرلل  
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لا مسقلا()ثلاث 
 
:ةسسؤملا اهتردصأ يتلا تاميمعتلاو تاداشرلإا 
 
ىػلإ ناداػنػتػسا  ـكسرملاب رداصلا مدكعسلا يبرعلا دقنلا ةسسؤم ـاظن
( ـقر يكمملا23 بيراتك )23 35 1377 ؾكنبلا ةبقارم ـاظنك ػه
 ـ( ـقر يكمملا ـكسرملاب رداصلا5 بيراتك )1386ػه ةسسؤملا ردصت  
تاداشر  اك تاميمعتك دعاكق  .اهب ـاةتللااك ديقتلا ؾكنبلا ىمع ي بني
 فم ةعكمجم ةيضاملا ةميمقلا تاكنسلا ؿلبخ ةسسؤملا تردصأك
 ئدابمب ةرشابملا ري  كأ ةرشابملا ةقلبعلا تا  تاميمعتلاك تاداشرلإا
 علبطلإا ةي يفنتلا ةرادلإاك ةرادلإا سمجم ءاضعأ ىمع ي بنيك .ةمككحلا
ا عيمجب ؾنبلا ـاةتلا فم دكاتلاك فم ردصت يتلا تاداشرلإاك تاميمعتل
ا تا  لرخلأا تاهجلاك ةسسؤملا ةيمحم تناكأ نءاكس  ةقلبعل.ةيلكد ـأ 
 
 
(Part Three) 
 
Guidelines and Instructions Issued by SAMA: 
 
According to charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
issued by Royal Decree No.23 dated 23-05-1377h and 
Banking Control law issued by Royal Decree No. m/5 dated 
22-02-1386h, SAMA issues regulations, rules, and guidelines 
which banks are required to comply with. In this respect, 
SAMA has recently issued a selection of guidelines and rules 
directly or indirectly related to corporate governance 
principles, which the members of the Board, and senior 
management should be aware of and ensure the bank's 
compliance with all instructions and guidelines issued by 
SAMA and other related local or international organizations. 
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Appendix C 
 
Board of Directors in Saudi Arabia 
Semi-structure interview 
(English version) 
 
Section A- corporate governance and board composition 
 What is your understanding of corporate governance 
 Do you have a corporate governance code? Why? 
 What is the composition of the board? 
 How are your board members selected? Has this changed since 2006?  
 How are independent NEDs selected and why are they selected this way?  
 How many board members do you have in total? Has that changed recently? Is this 
appropriate for your company? 
 How long do directors serve on the board? What experience does each director have? Do you 
think other companies do the same thing? 
 How is the board chairman selected? And why is it done in this way? 
 Is the role of Chairmen and CEO separated in your company? Why? Is the separation good or 
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bad for companies? 
 Which board committees do you have? Do other company boards have these committees?   
 How are board committee members selected?  
 Has your company adopted accumulative voting system? Why? 
 Does your audit committee have any members with accounting or finance knowledge? Is this 
the same in other companies? 
 What influences the practices of the audit committee?  
 What influences the practices of the remuneration and nomination committee?  
Section B- Board Meeting 
 How much time do directors spend on board matters? Is this the same or do some board 
members spend lot more or less time than others on board matters?  
 When and how do board meetings take place? Is this adequate? 
 Who influences board debates and decisions? Does this also happen in other companies? 
 What influences people to become board members? 
 
Section C- institutional influences 
 What are the cultural influences on adopting CG practices? 
 What are the political influences on adopting CG practices? 
 What are the economic influences on adopting CG practices? 
 What are the organizational influences on adopting CG practices? 
 What are the regulatory influences on adopting CG practices? 
Section D- Other 
 Do you have any other comments? 
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Appendix D 
 
Board of Directors in Saudi Arabia 
Questionnaire 
(English version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Business, University of Dundee, Dundee, DD1 4HN, UK  
Tel: +44 (0) 1382 384193 Fax: 01382388421_______________________________________________ 
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1. Please identify the roles that are most applicable to you by  ticking the appropriate 
box :  
 Chairman Executive  NED Independent NED Board 
secretary 
Financial sector      
Cement - Petrochemicals      
Telecom-Media & publishing      
Agricultural & food      
Energy & utilities & Industrial      
Real estate development      
Transport- Retail      
Services -Hotel and tourism      
 
        2. Which board committees does your company have and which ones do you serve on: 
 Have                  Serve on 
Audit   
Remuneration and nomination   
Sharia   
Executive   
 
         3. Who has majority control in your company? 
- Not applicable -Government -Family Ownership - Foreign ownership - Other 
4. How long have you served on company boards? 
- 0- 5 years- 6- 10 years-11 – 15 years- Over 15 years 
5. Please state your current full time position:  
 
                      …................................................................................... 
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements where: 
                          1 = strongly agree/  2= Agree/  3= Neutral/  4= Disagree / 5= strongly disagree 
6.  Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the following factors influence the selection of 
Chairman, NED and Independent NED on your board? (1 = strongly agree. 5= strongly disagree) 
 Chairmen  NED INED 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
CG code                
Government  and Regulatory 
bodies  
               
Members of royal family                
Islamic principles                 
Personal relationships                
Courtesy to others                 
Position in society                
Family ownership                
Government ownership                
Top Management                 
Company size                
Company sector                
Experience and Qualification of 
nominee 
               
Nominee being on other 
company boards 
               
Other                
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7- Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the following factors influence the selection of the 
members of the following board committees:        
 (1 = strongly agree. 5= strongly disagree) 
 
 Audit  Remuneration and 
nomination 
Executive 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
CG code                
Government and Regulatory 
bodies  
               
Islamic values                 
Favoritism                 
Personal relationships                
Courtesy to others                 
Position in society                
Family ownership                
Government ownership                
Top Management                 
Company size                
Company sector                
Experience and Qualification 
of BM  
               
BM being on similar 
committees  
               
Other                
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8. To What extent do you agree that the following factors influence; (i) the size of the board; (ii) the 
adoption of accumulative voting 
                                                                            (1 = strongly agree. 5= strongly disagree) 
 
 Board size Accumulative voting 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate governance code           
Government and Regulatory bodies           
Members of the royal family           
Islamic values           
Personal relationships           
Courtesy to others           
Position in society           
Family ownership           
Government ownership           
Top Management           
Company size           
Company sector           
Experience and Qualification of BM           
BM being on other company boards           
Other           
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9. To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence an individual becoming a board 
member and also the number of directorships that an individual holds?  
                                                                             (1 = strongly agree. 5= strongly disagree) 
 Becoming a board member Number of directorships 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate governance code           
Government and Regulatory bodies           
Economic factors           
Favouritism           
Personal relationships           
Courtesy to others           
Position in society           
Family ownership           
Government ownership           
Top Management           
Company size           
Company sector           
Experience of BM           
Qualification of BM           
Insider dealing by board members           
Other           
 
 
 
10. To what extent do you agree that your board ensures that there are no conflicts of interest that might 
lead to the misuse of company assets especially in the cases of related transaction with board 
members? Please tick the relevant box: 
 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
     
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11. To what extent do the following factors prevent or contributes to your board role when  ensuring 
that there are no conflicts of interest   
 Strongly  
contributes  
contributes Neutral  Prevents Strongly  
prevents 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate governance code      
Government and Regulatory bodies      
Members of the royal family      
Economic Factors      
Favouritism      
Personal relationships      
Courtesy to others      
Position in society      
Family ownership      
Government ownership      
Top Management      
Company size      
Company sector      
Experience of BM      
Qualification of BM      
Board Member  being on other company boards      
Other      
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12. To what extent do the following factors prevent or contributes in the following committee’s 
practices:   
 
 1= Strongly assists/ 2= Assists/ 3 =Neutral/ 4= Prevents /5= Strongly prevents 
 Audit committee Remuneration and nomination 
committee 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate governance code           
Government and Regulatory bodies            
Economic factors           
Favouritism           
Personal relationships           
Courtesy to others            
Position in society           
Family ownership           
Government ownership           
Top Management            
Company size           
Company sector           
Experience of BM           
Qualification of BM           
BM being on similar committees on 
other boards 
          
Other           
 
13. Do the same factors affect the Audit committee in ensuring the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal control                   yes         no 
If no pleas state the difference……………………………………………….. 
14. Do the same factors affect the Remuneration and nomination committee in evaluating individual 
board members?                  Yes         no 
 
If no pleas state the difference……………………………………………….. 
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15. To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence when board meetings take place, 
board decisions and time spent by directors preparing for agenda items    
     (1 = strongly agree. 5= strongly disagree) 
 Board decisions When board meetings 
take place 
Time spent by directors 
preparing for agenda 
items 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Government and Regulatory 
bodies 
               
Economic Factors                
Members of the royal family                
Islamic values                
Favouritism                
Personal relationships                
Courtesy to others                
Position in society                
Family ownership                
Government ownership                
Top Management                
Company size                
Company sector                
Insider dealing by  board 
member 
               
Experience of the chairmen                      
Other    
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16. Please feel free to add any other comments about corporate governance and the board of directors in your 
company or in Saudi Arabia in general: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Thank you for your participation in this questionnaire 
Please send the questionnaire to this address or in the manner agreed upon 
Maree Alamri 
Po box 140330 Jeddah 213333 
Saudi Arabia 
 
If you would like the results of this study to be sent to you please write your email here: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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ةيدوعسلا تاكرشلا يف تارادلإا سلاجم نع نايبتسإ ةرامتسإ 
Board of Directors in Saudi Arabia 
Questionnaire 
(Arabic version) 
 
يرمعلا يلع يعرم 
ةاروتكد باط 
يدند ةعماج 
ةدحتملا ةكلمملا 
 
 
 
School of Business, University of Dundee, Dundee, DD1 4HN, UK  
Tel: +44 (0) 1382 384193 Fax: 01382388421_______________________________________________ 
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  الرحمن الرحيمبسم الله
 
 سعادة المكرم
 السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاتة 
في المملكة المتحدة وذلك عن  حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربية السعودية , أقوم حاليا بتحضير رسالة الدكتوراة في جامعة دندي 
وكمتطلب أساسي للدراسة أقوم بمسح إستبياني بغرض التعرف على آراء الأطراف . دور مجالس الإداره في الشركات المساهمةو 
ذات الصلة بمجالس الإدارات حول المواضيع المتعلقه بممارسات مجالس الإدارة في ظل صدور لوائح الحوكمة في المملكة العربية 
 . السعودية
بأهمية دعم وتشجيع البحث العلمي ودوره في تطوير المجتمع فإنني أرجو منكم التكرم بالإجابة على أسئلة  ولعلمي التام بإيمانكم
كما لا يفوتني التنويه على أهمية إظهار وجهة . الاستبيان وإعادة إرسالة  الى العنوان المرفق أو بالطريقة المتفق عليها مع الباحث
أن هدف البحث الفعلى هو معرفة الواقع الفعلى لممارسات مجالس الادارة و مدى تأثير حيث , نظرك في مختلف القضايا المطروحة
أود الإشارة الى أن جميع المعلومات ستعامل بسرية كاملة ولن تستخدم إلا لأغراض . عوامل مختلفة على الممارسات المذكورة
ي حال رغبتكم الحصول على نتائج البحث فإنه يسرني وف. البحث العلمي ولن يتم ذكر أسماء أو مراكز المشتركين في الإستبيان
 .إرساله إليكم بالطريقة التي تفضلونها
 
 ,,,,,أتقدم اليك بالشكر مقدما لتعبئة هذا الاستبيان
 الباحث         
 مرعي علي العمري         
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 أرجو ان تحدد المناصب التي شغلتها على مجالس الادارات في القطاعات التاليه .1
 عضو مجلس سكرتير المجلس
 غير تنفيذي مستقل
 عضو مجلس غير
 تنفيذي 
 عضو مجلس 
 تنفيذي
  رئيس مجلس ادارة
 القطاع المالي و التأمين     
الاسمنت والصناعات      
 البتروكيماويه
 الاتصالات والاعلام والنشر     
 الزراعة والصناعات الغذائية     
 الاستثمار  المتعدد و الصناعي      
 التشييد والبناء والتطوير العقاري     
 النقل و الفنادق والسياحة     
 قطاعات أخرى     
 أرجو تحديد لجان المجلس التى في شركتكم و اللجان التى أنت عضو بها.2
  لديكم                     انت عضو بها
 لجنة المراجعة  
 لجنة الترشيحات والمكافاءات  
 اللجنه التنفيذيه  
 اللجنة الشرعية  
 
 :اي الفئات التاليه لديها أغلبية التحكم في مجلس إدارتكم.3
 اخرى -ملكية الشريك الاجنبي         -الملكية العائلية      -الملكية الحكومية     -لا ينطبق     -
 
 :كم عدد السنوات التي مارستها كعضو مجلس ادارة.4
 سنة 50اكثر من  سنه       50 - 00 سنوات           10 - سنوات      5اقل من  
 
 ارجو ذكر وظيفتك الحالية.5
 ....................................................................................................................
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 القيام بتحديدالى اي مدى توافق من خلا ل اختيار المربع الأنسب من الخيارات التالية حيثأرجو 
 5=  غير موافق بشدة       4=غيرموافق           3=محايد          2=موافق          1=موافق بشده 
والعضو الغير التنفيذي والعضو غير الى اي مدى توافق على أن العوامل التاليه تؤثر على إختيار كلا من  رئيس المجلس .6
 التنفيذي المستقل لمجلس إدارتكم
  رئيس مجلس الادارة العضو الغير تنفيذي العضو الغير تنفيذي المستقل
 العوامل المؤثرة 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 لائحة حوكمة الشركات               
الجهات الحكومية  و الهيئات                
 التنظيمية
 افراد العائلة الملكية               
 المباديء الاسلامية               
 العلاقات الشخصية               
 المجاملة               
 مكانة الشخص الإجتماعية               
 حجم الملكية               
 الادارة التنفيذية العليا               
 حجم الشركة               
 قطاع الذي تنتمي إليه الشركة               
عضو مجلس مؤهلات خبرة و                
 الادارة المرشح
 كون المرشح عضو في مجالس أخرى               
 )ارجو ذكرها(عوامل اخرى                
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 الى اي مدي توافق على أن العوامل التالية تؤثر على إختيار عضو المجلس كعضو في احد اللجان المذكورة.7
 5=  غير موافق بشدة /      1=موافق بشده 
لجنة الترشيحات  الجنة التنفيذية
 والمكافاءات
  لجنة المراجعة
 العوامل المؤثرة 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 لائحة حوكمة الشركات               
 الجهات الحكومية و الهيئات التنظيمية               
 المباديء الاسلامية               
 المحاباه               
 العلاقات الشخصية               
 المجاملة               
 مكانة الشخص الإجتماعية                 
 الملكية العائلية               
 الملكية الحكومية               
 الإدارة التنفيذية العليا               
 حجم الشركة               
 قطاع الذي تنتمي اليه الشركة               
خبرة و مؤهلات عضو مجلس                
 الادارة
                
كون العضو في نفس اللجان في                 
 مجالس إدارات أخرى
 )ارجو ذكرها(عوامل اخرى                
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 اعتماد طريقة التصويت التراكمي, حجم المجلس  : امل التالية تؤثر على كلا منالى اي مدى توافق على ان العو.8
 5=  غير موافق بشدة/  1=موافق بشده :         فصل وظيفة الرئيس التنفيذي عن وظيفة رئيس مجلس الادارة,  
  حجم المجلس  تطبيق التصويت التراكمي
 العوامل المؤثرة 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 لائحة حوكمة الشركات          
 الجهات الحكومية والهيئات التنظيمية          
 العائلة الملكية          
 عوامل اقتصادية          
 الملكية العائلية          
 الملكية الحكومية          
 الادارة التنفيذية العليا          
 حجم الشركة          
 القطاع الذي تنتمي إليه الشركة          
 خبرة عضو مجلس الادارة          
 خبرة رئيس مجلس الادارة          
كون عضو المجلس  ايضا عضو           
 في مجالس أخرى
 عوامل أخرى          
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 الى اي مدى توافق على ان العوامل التاليه  لها اثر غلى كون الشخص يرغب في  ترشيح نفسة كعضو مجلس ادارة .9
 5=  غير موافق بشدة/     1=موافق بشده : وايضا على عدد عضويات المجلس التي لدى الشخص الواحد
  ضو مجلس ادارةرغبة الشخص ان يصبح ع عدد عضويات المجلس التى لدى الشخص
 العوامل المؤثرة 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 لائحة حوكمة الشركات          
 الجهات الحكومية          
 عوامل اقتصادية          
 المحاباه          
 العلاقات الشخصية          
 المجاملة          
 مكانة الشخص الإجتماعية            
 الملكية العائلية          
 الملكية الحكومية          
 الادارة التنفيذية العليا          
 حجم الشركة          
 قطاع الذي تنتمي اليه الشركة          
 خبرة عضو مجلس الادارة          
 مؤهلات عضو مجلس الادارة          
 التعاملات الداخلية           
 )ارجو ذكرها(أخرى          
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يجب على مجالس الادارات التأكد من عدم وجود تضارب مصالح بين اعضاء مجلس الإدارة اللذي قد يؤدي الى اساءة استخدام . 11
 اصول الشركة
 الى اي مدى توافق على ان مجلس ادارتكم يقوم بهذا الدور 
 موافق بشدة  موافق محايد غير موافق غير موافق بشدة
 1 2 3 4 5
الى اي مدى تساهم أو تعيق العوامل التالية مجلس ادارتكم  في التأكد من عدم وجود تضارب مصالح بين اعضاء مجلس . 11
 الإدارة اللذي قد يؤدي الى اساءة استخدام اصول الشركة
 العوامل المؤثرة تساهم بشدة تساهم محايد تعيق تعيق بشدة
 لائحة حوكمة الشركات     
 الجهات الحكومية والتنظيمية     
 افراد العائلة الملكية     
 عوامل اقتصادية     
 المحاباه     
 العلاقات الشخصية     
 المجاملة     
 مكانة الشخص الإجتماعية       
 الملكية العائلية     
 الملكية الحكومية     
 الادارة التنفيذية العليا     
 حجم الشركة     
 قطاع الذي تنتمي اليه الشركة     
 خبرة عضو مجلس الادارة     
 مؤهلات عضو مجلس الادارة     
كون عضو المجلس  ايضا      
 عضو في مجالس أخرى
 )ارجو ذكرها(أخرى     
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 :الى اي مدي تعتقد ان العوامل التالية تساهم او تعيق لجان مجلس الادارة في اداء دورهم. 21
  لجنة المراجعة لجنة الترشيحات والمكافاءات
 العوامل المؤثرة
 
تعيق 
 بشدة
تساهم  تساهم محايد تعيق
 بشدة
تعيق 
 بشدة
تساهم  تساهم محايد تعيق
 بشدة
 ألعوامل ألمؤثرة
 لائحة حوكمة الشركات          
الجهات الحكومية و الجهات           
 التنظيمية
 عوامل اقتصادية          
 المحاباه          
 العلاقات الشخصية          
 المجاملة          
 مكانة الشخص الإجتماعية            
 الملكية العائلية          
 الملكية الحكومية          
 الادارة التنفيذية العليا          
 حجم الشركة          
قطاع الذي تنتمي اليه           
 الشركة
 خبرة عضو اللجنه           
 مؤهلات عضو اللجنة           
كون عضو اللجنه في لجان           
 اخرى مشايهه
 اخرى الرجاء ذكرها          
 
 هل الخيارات التى اخترتها ايضا توثر على لجنة المراجعة في القيام بتقييم مدى فاعلية وكفاءة نظام الرقابة الداخلي   
 نعم              لا      
 .............................اذا كان الجواب لا ارجو ذكر المؤثرات الاخرى
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 هل المؤثرات التى اخترتها للجنة الترشيحات ايضا تؤثر على دور اللجنة في تقييم أداء أعضاء مجلس الادارة
 لا  نعم       
 ........................................اذا كانت اجابتك لا ارجوا ذكر المؤثرات الاخرى
 ر هذة اللجنة في التأكد من استقلالية الاعضاء المستقلينهل المؤثرات التى اخترتها للجنة الترشيحات ايضا تؤثر على دو
 لا  نعم       
 ........................................اذا كانت اجابتك لا ارجوا ذكر المؤثرات الاخرى
ت الذي يقضيه الى اي مدى توافق على ان العوامل التالية  تؤثر على تحديد وقت الاجتماع وايضا على قرارات المجلس والوق. 41
 العضو إستعدادا للإجتماع
 5=  غير موافق بشدة/       1=موافق بشده 
الوقت الذي يقضية العضو 
 استعدادا للاجتماع
  قرارات المجلس وجت اجتماع المجلس
 العوامل المؤثرة 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 الجهات الحكومية               
 عوامل اقتصادية               
 افراد العائلة الملكية               
 المباديء الاسلامية               
 المحاباه               
 العلاقات الشخصية               
 المجاملة               
مكانة الشخص                
 الإجتماعية  
 الملكية العائلية               
 الملكية الحكومية               
 الادارة التنفيذية العليا               
 حجم الشركة               
قطاع الذي تنتمي اليه                
 الشركة
اهتمام الاعضاء                
بالمعلومات الداخلية 
للتضارب في سوق 
 الاسهم 
خبرة رئيس مجلس                
 الادارة
 )ارجو ذكرها(أخرى               
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 كل الشكر والتقدير على حسن تعاونك
 ادة ارسال الاستمارة الى العنوان التاليالرجاء التكرم بإع
 مرعي علي العمري
  133141ص ب 
 333312جدة 
 أو بالطريقة المتفق عليها مع الباحث
 إذا رغبت في الحصول على ملخص نتائج البحث فضلا ضع بريدك الألكتروني هنا
 
